PRODUCTION OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R001000080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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14 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Production Options
1. The memorandum you saw in draft on Sunday is attached.
You should read Paragraphs 7 and 8 which were added in response
to some of the questions you raised. We (Murphy, Knoche, Duckett,
Proctor, Carver, and I) are scheduled to meet with you on this
matter Friday afternoon.
2. Some additional points not in the basic memorandum:
- Options IIIA and IV match the Senate Select
Committee recommendations.
- Option IV comes pretty close to Bill Bundy's
proposal.
- Option III requires greater substantive
competence in your Agency Deputy than do the
others.
- Any Deputy or DDI who was made Executive
Agent could legitimately ask that the NIO's report
through him, as in Option IV.
3. All my soundings reinforce my belief that, however minor
a change appears involved in transferring the Vice-Chairmanship of
NFIB to it will be viewed in the Agency as highly sym-
bolic. will have a most unfortunate effect on CIA, unless you
balance it with a symbolic reaffirmation of the Agency's central
role. Options III or IIIA will provide that symbol and I urge
you to adopt one of them. (But IV would again be seen as de-
structive of the Agency.)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
28 Mar 77
Dear Professor Bowie:
Admiral Turner asked me to send
you a copy of the ched article
by
Very respectfully,
TSGT, USAF
Writer to DCI
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14 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Options for a National Production System
1. We have been discussing the future handling of national
production since the Executive Order was issued in'February. From
these discussions have emerged consensus on some issues and defi-
nition of others on which no consensus exists. In addition, from
the Executive Order itself come new requirements that must be
accommodated. This memorandum provides a basis for you to reach
a decision on these matters. I believe you should do so now,
while your freedom of action is at its maximum.
2. Statutes and Directives
-- The National Security Act of 1947
states that: "...it shall be the duty of
the Agency, under the direction of the
National Security Council...to correlate
and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security... Departments and other
Agencies of the Government shall evaluate
[and] correlate-departmental intelligence."
-- E.O. 11905 provides that: "The DCI
will... supervise production and dissemination
of national intelligence... Promote the develop-
ment and maintenance by the Central Intelligence
Agency of sources of common concern-including ...
national level intelligence products."
"CIA will.. .produce and disseminate
foreign intelligence relating to the national
security... to meet the needs of the President,
the National Security Council, and other
elements of the United States Government."
"Senior Officials of the Intelligence
Community shall...contribute in areas of
[their] responsibility to the national intel-
ligence products produced under auspices of
the Director of Central Intelligence."
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3. It is generally agreed that:
-- National production should be admini-
stratively placed as close to you as possible.
-- You should receive substantive advice
directly, without a requirement that it be
channeled through either Deputy.
-- The NIO's are extremely useful as
staff officers and should continue in this
role. (Their staff functions include: con-
sumer liaison; advice to the DCI on sub-
stantive matters, including intelligence
production; action to develop teamwork among
producers and collectors and among agencies
of the Community; and energizing the Com-
munity to address new problems, fill gaps,
and exploit new sources and methodologies.)
-- The quality of estimative intel-
ligence would be improved by some sort of
collegial review process.
-- The system should provide for a
formal Community role, and should in practice
encourage maximum Community participation
where the product would not suffer thereby.
4. There is disagreement over the present management of
national production. In the present system, the NIO's act not only
as staff officers but, with respect to estimative production, as
managers.
-- Line managers of production organi-
zations argue that this system divides and
weakens responsibility for review of product
and undercuts their authority over their
analysts. They believe confusion over re-
sponsibility for product means that papers
are issued without sufficient review. They
see the NIO's as having first call on their
resources but no responsibility for justifying
these resources or managing them. They be-
lieve the focus of NIO's on short-range policy
support draws resources away from essential
longer range research. Moreover, the indi-
vidualistic nature of the NIO system creates
uncertainties within the system and makes for
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an uneven product.* The DCI does not have
one manager for national production; he has
a dozen. This leaves him the only generalist
officer in the review process and places on
him too great a burden for ensuring that all
regional and functional interests have been
considered. Finally, the flow of current
intelligence support to the policymaker is
managed separately from the flow of estimative
support.
-- The NIO's do not accept most of these
criticisms. They contend that the ability of
the NIO's to cut across organizational barriers
makes for maximum flexibility in focusing Com-
munity resources on a particular problem. They
agree that this creates some tension within the
system but believe that this is a relatively
small price to pay for producing truly national
intelligence. To them, if intelligence does
not meet policy support requirements, its per-
formance in research will be irrelevant. They
do not accept the argument that the quality of
product has suffered. Rather, they argue that
improved communications with the consumer have
made the product much more useful. Moreover,
they believe that line managers are too focused
on management concerns to give full attention
to the product. The system is individualistic,
but by design: the requirements facing each NIO
are unique, and he must deal directly with the
DCI in his own way. The NIO's would agree that
the system separates current and estimative
intelligence, but do not consider this a matter
of concern.
5. The Executive Order, in addition to confirming your
authority over the national production system, generates two new
problems you must take into account in considering changes to that
system.
-- The creation of the CFI provides for
the first time centralized resource authority
over the Community. If that authority is to be
used effectively, the IC Staff must be able to
*The Director of Current Intelligence, CIA, must meet the require-
ments of seven NIO's, for three of whom his are virtually the
only supporting analysts available, and has at least peripheral
concerns involving all eleven.
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provide the CFI with requirements and evaluations
that have been developed by the production organi-
zations and their analysts. A systematic allo-
cation of resources must reflect a systematic
marshalling of analytic judgment. No effective
central management for such a purpose now exists.
-- The trend over recent years toward a
greater separation of the DCI in his Community
role from the Central Intelligence Agency has
caused morale problems in CIA, which sees it-
self as being ousted from its "central" role.
Separation of the DCI is institutionalized in
the Executive Order, and in your consequent de-
cision to transfer the Vice-Chairmanship of NFIB
to your Community Deputy. But CIA, after the
travails of the last three years, needs a re-
confirmation from you that it is central and
essential to the nation if it is to recover its
elan. Moreover, it would be desirable for you
to structure relations between your deputies
do that their roles are 1) mutually supporting;
and 2) more or less balanced in responsibilities.
6. We have developed four options for you to consider. Each
assumes that your Community Deputy will be Vice-Chairman of NFIB.
Each links you closely to national production and provides for
substantive advice directly to you. Each retains the NIO's in their
staff role and incorporates the improvements that all agree they
have brought to national intelligence. Each can accommodate a
collegial review function. (There are several forms such a review
might take, and several variants on how the NIO's themselves might
be constituted; this memorandum does not address these questions.)
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-- Option I retains the present system,
perhaps with minor modifications. The NIO's
continue to manage national estimative pro-
duction; CIA continues to handle current.
This Option as it stands does not provide
for a strong analyst-based evaluation system.
PRO: Provides maximum Community role
Provides flexible system
System works reasonably well
Least disruption
CON: No single officer responsible for
production
Product suffers from divided respon-
sibility
Violates chain-of-command
CIA downgraded, no longer central
DD/COMM greatly overweighs DD/CIA
NIO's must be integrated into larger
structure and given additional
staff if evaluative input to ICS
is to be provided
Current and estimative separated
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Estimative Intelligence
Option I
Present system
DCI
DIA
NFIB
CIA
INR
N I O's
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
Board?
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-- Option II transfers the management of
national estimative production to a Steering
Group composed of the production managers of
CIA, DIA, and INR, and chaired by DD/CIA or DDI.
Through them it places the responsibility for
production and review within the line organi-
zations. The Steering Group is charged with
providing evaluations to the ICS. (See Para-
graph 7 for a discussion of the production
process and the role of the NIO's under Op-
tions II-IV.)
PRO: Maintains strong Community role
Places estimative production in the
hands of line managers
Gives some "centrality" to CIA through
chairmanship of Steering Group
Provides mechanism for evaluative input
CON: No single officer responsible for production
Cumbersome: an additional layer in the process
NIO's will have difficulty relating to the
management system
DD/COMM still out of balance with DD/CIA
Current and estimative still divided
Some disruption necessary
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Estimative Intelligence
Option II
Present system with community production
management separated from NIO's
DCI
DIA
NFIB
CIA
N I O's
and Board ? )
National
Intelligence
Steering Group
CIA, DIA, INR
INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
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-- Option III eliminates the Steering
Group and makes the Deputy for CIA the DCI's
Executive Agent* for national production,
both estimative and current. He in turn is
responsible for organizing and coordinating
Community participation. The NIO's report
separately to the DCI, as in Option II.
DD/CIA also becomes Executive Agent for Com-
munity evaluation.
PRO: All production management, current and
estimative, in hands of line managers
One officer (DD/CIA) responsible for all
Community production
DD/COMM and DD/CIA have balanced, com-
plementary responsibilities
CIA role as central organization reaffirmed
Provides mechanism for evaluative input
Improved efficiency
System worked well on military estimates
1970-73
CON: Some loss in the appearance of Community
participation; the actuality will de-
pend on what mandate DCI gives to DD/CIA
DIA and INR may view as a step backward
With these additional duties, DD/CIA may
not be able to give sufficient attention
to management of the Agency
The NIO's will have some difficulty re-
lating to the management system, although
less than under Option II
Some disruption necessary
*DD/CIA might want to retain the Steering Group
to advise him.
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Estimative Intelligence
Option III
Adaptation of system used for military estimates 1970-73
DCI
DIA
NFIB
CIA
N I O's
(and Board ?)
INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
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-- Option IIIA is similar to Option III
in all but one respect. In matters relating
to production, the DDI reports directly to the
DCI and thus becomes his Executive Agent* for
national production.
PRO: One officer (DDI) responsible for all
Community production
All production management in the hands
of line managers
CIA role as central organization re-
affirmed
Provides mechanism for evaluation in-
put, in which CIA complementary to
ICS
Improved efficiency
DD/CIA would carry less load than under
Option III
One less layer between DCI and producers
CON: Some loss in the appearance of Community
participation; the actuality will de-
pend on the DCI's instructions to DDI
DIA and INR may view as a step backward
The NIO's will have some difficulty in
relating to the management system,
although less than under Option II
Some disruption necessary
*DDI might want to retain the Steering Group
to advise him.
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Estimative Intelligence
Option Ilia
DDI as Executive agent
DCI
NFIB
DIA
CIA
N I O's
(and Board?)
INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
Production
I Matters Only
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Estimative Intelligence
Option IV
National production organization directly subordinate to DCI
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
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-- Option IV goes a further step. The
DDI/CIA is Executive Agent and becomes in effect
the chief NIO as well. His Directorate remains
administratively a part of CIA, but he reports
directly to the DCI, not through the Deputy for
CIA, on other matters. This amounts to the
creation of a national production organization
under the DCI. It would be responsible for
managing Community evaluation.
PRO: Integration of NIO's and CIA producers
makes for maximum efficiency
Brings production most directly under
DCI control
All production management in hands of line
managers
One officer (DDI) responsible for all Com-
munity production
CIA role as central organization reaffirmed
Compared with III, reduced load on DD/CIA
Provides mechanism for evaluative input in
which CIA complementary to ICS
CON: Would considerably exacerbate problem of
Community participation noted under
Option III
Would create serious concerns in other
Community agencies
While NIO's would be available to DCI, their
ability to operate throughout the Community
would be reduced
Could be seen as first step toward fragmentation
of CIA
DD/CIA would carry less weight vis-a-vis DD/COMM
Considerable organizational disruption
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THE PROCESS
1. Estimative
Option I
DCI
2. Estimative
Option II
ICS
DIA
CIA
N I O's
INR
-~' REQUESTS
DRAFTS
--- CONTRIBUTIONS
DCI
ICS
STEERING
GROUP
N I O's
DESIGNATED
----~
AGENCY jE------
L------ CIA, DIA, INR 1--------------J
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7. Options II-IV require a change in the production
process, in which responsibility for the finished product rests
more on the line production managers than it does under the
present system. At the same time, each of these options places
on the NIO responsibilities comparable to those he now carries.
-- In Option II, the NIO (or for
evaluations, the DD/COMM) states his re-
quirement for a paper to the Steering
Group and recommends which organizations
and analysts should be involved. The
Steering Group decides how the paper is
to be produced (normally accepting the
NIO's definition of the paper and giving
full weight to his recommendation). It
designates which production Agency will
manage the product. That Agency is then
responsible for assembly of contributions,
drafting, coordination, etc., and deliver-
ing a draft to the DCI. The NIO is re-
sponsible to the DCI for reviewing the
draft and advising him as to its suit-
ability before the DCI finally issues it.
He may serve in this regard as the member
of a collegial board who has primary in-
terest. He is also free to participate in
the process at every stage, but not to di-
rect it. Rather, his influence comes from
the fact that the drafters will have to
defend the piece before the DCI, or the
DCI's board of review, and the NIO has an
independent opportunity to advise the DCI.
It is therefore in the production officer's
interest to take account of the NIO's view,
but he remains personally responsible for
his product from the time he is asked to
prepare it until the time the draft leaves
his organization. His analysts are working
for him.
-- In Option III, one layer is re-
moved from this process. The NIO addresses
his request to the DD/CIA, who is then
responsible for arranging with DIA and INR
for drafts and contributions, and for ar-
ranging coordination. Under this Option,
CIA would usually take the lead, but the
participation of the other agencies would
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THE PROCESS
3. Estimative
Option I I IM V
ICs
DCI
EXEC.
AGENT
*DDICIA under Option III
DDI under Option Ilia & IV
4. Current
All Options
CIA
N I O's
INR
REQUESTS
DRAFTS
--~ CONTRIBUTIONS
ICS
DIA
N I O's
INR
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otherwise be no less. (The DD/CIA will have
to accept that in these matters the easy
way--turn to CIA--is not necessarily the best
way.) The NIO then works with the drafters
as fully as under Option II, and his re-
sponsibilities to the DCI are unchanged.
-- Option IIIA differs from Option III
only in substituting the DDI for the DD/CIA,
thus removing another layer. The role of the
NIO remains the same.
-- In Option IV, the NIO's are inte-
grated into the DDI structure, but still
serve the DCI individually. This is an
efficient arrangement, but under it they
obviously cannot, while they can do the other
things called for under Options II, III and
IIIA, give the DCI independent advice. That
function must fall to a board of review, al-
though an individual NIO might well serve as
an ex officio member of such a board for papers
in his field.
8. The changes under Options II-IV are directed toward
combining the best elements of the various systems used in the
past. The worst faults of the system prior to creation of the
NIO system were communications failures between consumer and
producer and among elements of the Community. These Options
retain the improvements in communication derived from the NIO
system while moving toward more clearly defined responsibility,
and therefore--one hopes--toward quality. Should any of them
be adopted, there would be no reason to anticipate any loss in
responsiveness if production management responsibility reverts
to line officers. The intelligence production business, like
any bureaucracy, has a number of echelons, but over the last
two decades it has developed a discipline that enables it to
deliver a product to the consumer when he wants it and how he
wants it, wherever the request enters the system. We have
learned not to let our own bureaucratic structure get in the
way of doing the job.
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 Approv
Mil. MIUM6
A reed Requirements
(Para 3)
Area of New Requirements
nicanra Under E
O.
.
(Para 4) (Para 5)
O
National
NIO Staff
P
TI
Production
Direct
Functions
Formal
Practical
Management
O
Administratively
Substantive
In Support
Collegial
Community
Community
of
Evaluation
IC-CIA
N
Close to DCI
Advice to DCI
of DCI
Review
Role
Participation
Production
Management
Balance
S
Through NIO's
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB with DD/COMM
Estimative
Partly by
CIA further
directly
present
incorporated
as Vice-Chairman
Through NIO's
by NIO's
NIO's but
downgraded
fragmented
I
NIO's represent
Current by
DCI
CIA
Through Chair-
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB, NIO's,
Through
Estimative
By Steering
DD/CIA or DDI
man, Steering
present
incorporated
and Steering
Steering Group
by line
Group
as Chairman of
Group
Group
managers
Steering Group
II
I
--
downgrades CIA
Current by
less than
CIA
Option I
Through DD/CIA
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB and NIO's
DD/CIA
Estimative
By DD/CIA
DD/COMM as
and
present
incorporated
responsible
and current
V-Chair NFIB
DD/CIA
to DCI for
by DD/CIA
is balanced
III
maintaining
by DD/CIA
responsibility
for production
Through DDI
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB and NIO's
DDI
Estimative
By DDI
As in
and
present
incorporated
responsible
and current
Option III
IIIA
DDI
to DCI for
by DDI
but DDI
maintaining
responsible
Through DDI
By DDI
As at
Can be
NFIB
As in
As in
By DDI
As in
supported
present
incorporated
Option IIIA
Option IIIA
Option III
IV
by NIO's
but
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but DDI
responsible
man