CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A010200090001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 21, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 10, 1967
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A010200090001-8.pdf307.72 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO102TOP 25X1 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE oret Central Intelligence Bulletin Top Secret c 160 10 August 1967 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 25X1 Approved For Rp' 25 10 August 1967 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) 25X1 Nigeria: Biafran forces have captured the capital of the neighboring state. (Page 4) Cuba: LASO censures Soviet and East European credit and aid policy toward Latin America. (Page 5) Congo (Kinshasa): Mercenaries' terms (Page 6) 25X1 Peru: Constitutional crisis (Page 6) Approved For Re 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00974AO10200090001-8 25X1 *Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) North Vietnam: A recent article by a high-ranking general suggests that the debate among North Viet- namese leaders over war policy has started up again. An article in the North Vietnamese Army daily newspaper last month by General Le Quang Dao harshly attacked unnamed persons who seem to have voiced doubts over the wisdom of continuing to wage a military struggle without some more serious effort, to get negotiations going. It was implied that these people have even suggested some Communist concessions would not be too high a price to pay. Dao, deputy chief of the army's political department, condemned these arguments and reiterated the new Hanoi view that "only by waging a protracted and ex- tremely violent revolutionary struggle against imperial- ism" can "oppressed peoples" completely liberate themselves. If "one deviates from the path of revolu- tion through violence, " Dao stated, "he will enter the path of reforms and compromises. " Dao's warning suggests that some political and military officials have once again been leaning in the direction of a negotiated settlement. It is not clear from Dao's article, however, whether any high-level officials are involved. South Vietnam: Discussions are under way in the Armed Forces Council in an effort to improve military support of the Revolutionary Development program by reorganizing and augmenting the armed forces, 25X1 The addition of 00 inductees was reportedly discussed. The mobilization effort will probably not be implemented before the corWp - 25X1 ing elections. 10 Aug 67 Approved For Rele I ase9003 - 104 199 - C1 - A - -RnR79TOO97 T 010200090001-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 State boundary Former region boundary Road Bridge 00 15O We s ra 25X1 A proved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01020009 001-8 10 Aug 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map/Chart Approved For Rel ase 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975410200090001-8 25X1 Nigeria: Secessionist Biafran forces invaded the neighboring Mid-Western state yesterday, swiftly capturing key towns including Benin City, the capital. By this bold move, Biafran leader Ojukwu has the initiative. He was probably hoping to relieve some of the pressure from federal incursions into Biafra from the north and the southern coast. The operation apparently had support from Mid-Western Ika Ibos, especially army officers. Ika Ibos are a branch of Biafra's dominant Ibo tribe. The invasion, which clearly took federal leader Gowon by surprise, appears to have been well planned, with troops striking across the Niger River bridge at Onitsha and also farther upstream. Besides occupying Benin City, Ojukwu's troops are in key towns in both the northern and southern parts of the state. The strength of the invading force is unknown. It seems doubtful, however, that Ojukwu could spare even two battalions without seriously weakening his forces op- posing the federal army within Biafra. To counter the Biafran thrust, the federal govern- ment has available immediately several hundred well- trained men of the Federal Guard in Lagos and a newly formed battalion at Ibadan. Within the Mid-West, federal troops may number around 1, 200, but a large proportion are Mid-Western Ibos who cannot be relied on. It is not clear at this time whether Biafran forces intend to try and hold the Mid-West or to move on to Lagos or Ibadan. (Map) 10 Aug 67 25X1 Approved For Rel 010200090001-8 25X1 Approved For Rele 010200090001-8 25X1 *Cuba: The Cuban- sponsored Latin American Sol- idarity Organization (LASO) yesterday condemned by implication the Soviet Union's credit and aid policy to- ward Latin American Armando Hart, organizational secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and chair- man of the Cuban LASO delegation, initiated a resolu- tion censuring the policy of certain "Socialist" countries which give credits and technical aid to "dictatorships" and "oligarchies" in Latin America. The Soviet Union and several East European countries accelerated their economic activity in Latin America in 1966 and have continued their effort this year. From the Cuban viewpoint, the resolution firmly restates the views Fidel Castro expounded on 13 March during a speech in which he condemned the aid and tirade policies of the "Socialist" countries toward Latin Amer- ica. Moreover, in directly challenging the Soviet Union and its orthodox Communist adherents in the Western Hemisphere, Castro, through LASO, is asserting his advocacy of "armed struggle" as the only valid course to achieve "national liberation." The alleged Cuban re- tort to orthodox Communists who threatened to walk out of the conference if the resolution passed was, "the doors are wide open.... the time for true revolutionary defini- tions has come." The Soviets are probably not surprised by this de- velopments Great effort had been made earlier to per- suade Castro not to formalize Soviet-Cuban differences by any such overt displayl Publicly the Soviets are likely to continue to downplay the situation, while privately en- couraging their friends in the Communist world to under- cut Castro's radical policies, Moscow will not be diverted from trying to build diplomatic, commercial, and other contacts with Latin America. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that Moscow will rebuke Castro by decreasing its economic and military assistance to Cuba at this time. 10 Aug 67 Approved For Rele 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Approved For Rele NOTES 010200090001-8 25X1 Congo (Kinshasa): Mercenary leader Schramme has laid down his terms for a settlement with the Mobutu regime. They include Tshombe's liberation and inclusion in the government in Kinshasa. Schramme probably will also demand a guarantee of substantial freedom of action in his own fief in eastern Congo, where he evidently plans to remain for the time being. Mobutu will find it hard to stomach such demands or even talk to Schramme, but Mobutu has practically no chance of defeating Schramme militarily. Peru: A reported plan by the opposition coalition to try to reconvene Congress on 11 August could pro- voke President Belaunde to take extralegal measures. The impasse is complicated by differences over the interpretation of what constitutes a constitutional quorum, Opposition leaders now seem confident they can muster enough senators despite the boycott by ad- ministration supporters to install their candidate as senate president and resume legislative activity. Thus far the military have avoided taking sides in the dis- put e. 10 Aug 67 25X1 Approved For Rel - A010200090001-5X1 Top import For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8 Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO10200090001-8