CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A010200090001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 21, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 10, 1967
Content Type:
REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
oret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
c 160
10 August 1967
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10 August 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
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Nigeria: Biafran forces have captured the capital of
the neighboring state. (Page 4)
Cuba: LASO censures Soviet and East European credit
and aid policy toward Latin America. (Page 5)
Congo (Kinshasa): Mercenaries' terms (Page 6)
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Peru: Constitutional crisis (Page 6)
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
North Vietnam: A recent article by a high-ranking
general suggests that the debate among North Viet-
namese leaders over war policy has started up again.
An article in the North Vietnamese Army daily
newspaper last month by General Le Quang Dao harshly
attacked unnamed persons who seem to have voiced
doubts over the wisdom of continuing to wage a military
struggle without some more serious effort, to get
negotiations going. It was implied that these people
have even suggested some Communist concessions
would not be too high a price to pay.
Dao, deputy chief of the army's political department,
condemned these arguments and reiterated the new
Hanoi view that "only by waging a protracted and ex-
tremely violent revolutionary struggle against imperial-
ism" can "oppressed peoples" completely liberate
themselves. If "one deviates from the path of revolu-
tion through violence, " Dao stated, "he will enter the
path of reforms and compromises. "
Dao's warning suggests that some political and
military officials have once again been leaning in the
direction of a negotiated settlement. It is not clear
from Dao's article, however, whether any high-level
officials are involved.
South Vietnam: Discussions are under way in the
Armed Forces Council in an effort to improve military
support of the Revolutionary Development program by
reorganizing and augmenting the armed forces, 25X1
The addition of 00
inductees was reportedly discussed. The mobilization
effort will probably not be implemented before the corWp - 25X1
ing elections.
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State boundary
Former region
boundary
Road
Bridge
00 15O We s
ra
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10 Aug 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map/Chart
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Nigeria: Secessionist Biafran forces invaded the
neighboring Mid-Western state yesterday, swiftly
capturing key towns including Benin City, the capital.
By this bold move, Biafran leader Ojukwu has
the initiative. He was probably hoping to relieve some
of the pressure from federal incursions into Biafra
from the north and the southern coast. The operation
apparently had support from Mid-Western Ika Ibos,
especially army officers. Ika Ibos are a branch of
Biafra's dominant Ibo tribe.
The invasion, which clearly took federal leader
Gowon by surprise, appears to have been well planned,
with troops striking across the Niger River bridge at
Onitsha and also farther upstream. Besides occupying
Benin City, Ojukwu's troops are in key towns in both
the northern and southern parts of the state. The
strength of the invading force is unknown. It seems
doubtful, however, that Ojukwu could spare even two
battalions without seriously weakening his forces op-
posing the federal army within Biafra.
To counter the Biafran thrust, the federal govern-
ment has available immediately several hundred well-
trained men of the Federal Guard in Lagos and a newly
formed battalion at Ibadan. Within the Mid-West,
federal troops may number around 1, 200, but a large
proportion are Mid-Western Ibos who cannot be relied
on.
It is not clear at this time whether Biafran forces
intend to try and hold the Mid-West or to move on to
Lagos or Ibadan.
(Map)
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*Cuba: The Cuban- sponsored Latin American Sol-
idarity Organization (LASO) yesterday condemned by
implication the Soviet Union's credit and aid policy to-
ward Latin American
Armando Hart, organizational secretary of the
Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and chair-
man of the Cuban LASO delegation, initiated a resolu-
tion censuring the policy of certain "Socialist" countries
which give credits and technical aid to "dictatorships"
and "oligarchies" in Latin America. The Soviet Union
and several East European countries accelerated their
economic activity in Latin America in 1966 and have
continued their effort this year.
From the Cuban viewpoint, the resolution firmly
restates the views Fidel Castro expounded on 13 March
during a speech in which he condemned the aid and tirade
policies of the "Socialist" countries toward Latin Amer-
ica. Moreover, in directly challenging the Soviet Union
and its orthodox Communist adherents in the Western
Hemisphere, Castro, through LASO, is asserting his
advocacy of "armed struggle" as the only valid course
to achieve "national liberation." The alleged Cuban re-
tort to orthodox Communists who threatened to walk out
of the conference if the resolution passed was, "the doors
are wide open.... the time for true revolutionary defini-
tions has come."
The Soviets are probably not surprised by this de-
velopments Great effort had been made earlier to per-
suade Castro not to formalize Soviet-Cuban differences
by any such overt displayl Publicly the Soviets are likely
to continue to downplay the situation, while privately en-
couraging their friends in the Communist world to under-
cut Castro's radical policies, Moscow will not be diverted
from trying to build diplomatic, commercial, and other
contacts with Latin America. Furthermore, it does not
seem likely that Moscow will rebuke Castro by decreasing
its economic and military assistance to Cuba at this time.
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Congo (Kinshasa): Mercenary leader Schramme
has laid down his terms for a settlement with the
Mobutu regime. They include Tshombe's liberation
and inclusion in the government in Kinshasa.
Schramme probably will also demand a guarantee of
substantial freedom of action in his own fief in eastern
Congo, where he evidently plans to remain for the time
being. Mobutu will find it hard to stomach such demands
or even talk to Schramme, but Mobutu has practically
no chance of defeating Schramme militarily.
Peru: A reported plan by the opposition coalition
to try to reconvene Congress on 11 August could pro-
voke President Belaunde to take extralegal measures.
The impasse is complicated by differences over the
interpretation of what constitutes a constitutional
quorum, Opposition leaders now seem confident they
can muster enough senators despite the boycott by ad-
ministration supporters to install their candidate as
senate president and resume legislative activity. Thus
far the military have avoided taking sides in the dis-
put e.
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