INTERNAL MISSION APPROVAL FOR (Sanitized) MISSION C136C, 15 MAY 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00724R000100060019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 14, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

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SUBJECT: Internal Mission Approval for
15 May 1966
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2524-66
14 May 1966
Copy
Mission C136C,
1. At 1100 hours, 14 May, I picked up the Black Book for Mission
C136C in the OSA Control Center, together with the mission folder on
Mission C126C, flown last night, and proceeded to the Director's
Office where I met with Director of Reconnaissance,
CIA, to obtain his signature for C136C.
2. I went over in some detail with I the events of Mission
C126C, and especially the information then in hand regarding the SA-2
activity in the Kunming area, where the aircraft was reportedly attacked
by several missiles from an area where the NPIC SAM search had been
25X1A performed with negative results. I showed him 07287 and
7295 which contained details on performance, pilot's 25X1
observations and evasive maneuvers.
We both informally concluded
that in all probability the SA-Zs came from Chicom mobile SAM instal-
25X1 A lation(s). I explained to that C 136C was designed to comple-
ment the coverage of C126C, and that if it was successfully flown, that
should wrap up Southwest China highest priority targetd for at least
another month or so. He then signed for the mission.
25X1A 3. In company with we then called on Mr. Richard Helms,
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DDCI, in his office, to obtain his sign off for the Director. I 25X1A
and I once again went over the details of C126C, stressing the SAM
mobility idea. I said that if the Chicoms did fire two or three missiles
at Kunming and missed, unless they were different than we in the same
circumstance, there might well be a post-mortem examination of what
went wrong, which might make it unlikely that they would immediately roll
that capability down the road to Meng Tzu to be ready to try it again to-
night. We did admit, however, that there was no way of telling if they
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had a different SAM battery at Meng Tzu than the one at Kunming. As
for a coordinated attack at Meng Tzu between, SA-2s and MIG-21 s, I
said that I discounted this possibility, since the Chicoms might nail one
of their own birds. Yet it would be attractive to be able to distract the
U-2 pilot with one or the other capability, and then when he was turning
and losing altitude, hit him with the other.
4. Mr. Helms said that in view of the recent dust-up over the MIG
shootdown in China by U. S. aircraft and the political noise level arising
therefrom, he felt that he should not contribute a possible added static
element (arising from a shootdown) to the pot without first running it by
Secretary McNamara. (It appears that the Chicom MIG was in fact shot
down over China, despite the preliminary view to the contrary held by
the Air Force, and C136C flies right over the spot where the reported
shootdown took place).
5. Mr. Helms then (1150 hours) placed a call to the Secretary of
Defense to discuss the matter. Mr. McNamara was not available, so
Mr. Helms spoke with Secretary Vance, repeating the substance of
paragraph four above, mentioning the success of Mission C126C (but
not discussing the SA-2 input) and the fact that C136C had a mathematical
chance of adding to the noise level if anything went sour. Mr. Vance
said that he was lunching with Secretary McNamara in a few minutes, and
together they would discuss the matter and report back. Mr. Helms ex-
plained that he was leaving the office, and asked Mr. Vance to call
in the DCI's office when they had a position to report.
6. I then joined of COMOR in
whole transaction, which this document represents.
office to await word from Secretary Vance. Promptly
at 1230 hours, Mr. Vance called and said that he and
Secretary McNamara had gone over the problem, and it was their joint
view that the mission should proceed. I then signed the
Black Book for both the DDCI and the DCI as he had been given approval
to do by Mr. Helms on receipt of favorable word from the. Pentagon. I
told that I would make a memorandum for the record of the
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DD/SA /JA Cunningham/mcm(14 May 66)
Distribution:
1 - DD/SA
2 - D/R/CIA
3 - DDCI
4 - DD/S&T
5 - D/FA/OSA
6 - SS/OSA
7 - PS / OSA
8 - Chrono
9 - RB / OSA
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