CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

27
no Approved For RelectOginegrigiNglAMMB004
Second, to outline a progressive and rea-
sonable method of financing the programs of
SBA and other Government agencies.
There is an important relationship between
these two. They are part of this Adminis-
tration' 3 effort to make sure that our Govern-
ment atsistatnce programs are wisely planned
and organized, that they are supported by
private efforts wherever possible, and that
they are managed by the most competent
men available for the public service.
The 'All I will sign today allows SBA to
set up two separate revolving funds?one for
business loans, and one for disaster loans.
In this way the disruptions in the business
loan program, which have sometimes oc-
curred, when disasters have struck various
communities, can be avoided.
The hill also increases by $125 million the
amount of loans SBA may have on its books
at any one time. And we expect SBA to use
this authority to serve more firms than ever
before.
Theso are necessary changes, if the Agency
Is to carry out the small business program
I have proposed for the coming fiscal year.
Our budget for fiscal year 1967 proposes
that SBA make available about $725 million
in loam, guarantees, and other commitments
to small business. That is the largest
amount of financing SBA has undertaken in
its entire history. It is more than four times
what the Agency 'accomplished in 1960.
This is an impressive program?as it must
be, if ibis to keep pace with the growth of
small business during the past 4 years.
There are about 300,000 more small busi-
ness firms operating in America today than
there were 4 years ago.
Ther; were 20 percent fewer failures among
all businesses last year, than there were in
1961. 'rou know only too well that the great
part or those failures were among small
busineises.
Profits after taxes in small manufacturing
corporations were nearly three times greater
in 1965 than they were in 1961.
Small business has taken a much greater
share c f military prime contract awards. In
1961 small firms obtained $3.6 billion of
those awards. In 1965 the figure was $4.9
billion?an increase of 36 percent in 4 years.
So we are planning and working for a
growth industry?for almost 5 million busi-
nesses, from the corner store to the small
manufacturer?for those millions of men
and wcmen who by their initiative and deter-
rainati Dn and hope keep the wheels moving
in our economy.
This bill is essential for their growth and
development. But it is only half the answer
to small business needs.
It gives SBA the authority to carry out
our program for the coming year. But it
does not give it any money.
We proposed to the Congress last year a
new way of providing the funds necessary
for our small business programs.
Today SBA has only a limited amount of
money for its lending operations. That does
not mean the Agency is without assets. Far
from I;. It has in its revolving fund?in its
loan portfolio?loan paper worth almost $11/2
Theie tremendous assests, owed to the
SBA by those who have borrowed from it in
past years, represent the taxpayer's money.
Their representatives in Congress have ap-
propriated it to the SBA over the years, to be
Invested in small business concerns.
But there is no reason for SBA to hold so
large an inventory. It can and should be
able to sell its loans to private investors. In
that way, it should be able to generate new
funds for it expanded lending programs.
- SBA has long had the authority to sell its
seasoned loans, as well as to make them. It
has wed that authority over the years?to
provide new capital for assisting more small
businesses.
What we are asking for is a more efficient
and practical way of achieving that goal.
We want to authorize the SBA to sell par-
ticipations in its loan portfolio?to sell
shares in this great $1.5 million pool of out-
standing loans. Those shares would be guar-
anteed by the SBA, and sold to private in-
vestors large and small. The Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association, "Fannie Mae,"
will act as trustee.
Once the certificates are sold, the proceeds
will come back to SBA. They will be avail-
able for lending to other dynamic small firms
that are hungry for capital to produce and
expand.
The legislation we have asked for to
achieve this has passed the Senate. It is
under active consideration in the House. It
is as necessary for small business as it is
sound for the Government.
SBA is not the only Federal agency in
need of more effective financing authority.
If selling certificates of participation makes
sense for SBA, it makes sense as well in our
other programs. That is why I have rec-
ommended that the Congress authorize the
same sound fiscal procedures for agencies
throughout the Government.
This policy is not original with this ad-
ministration. In 1954, in 1955, in 1956, and
again in 1958, President Eisenhower affirmed
his belief that private capital should be
gradually substitute for the Government's
investment in housing mortgages.
In 1954, for example, President Eisenhower
said: "The policy of this administration is to
sell the mortgages now held (by the Federal
National Mortgage Association) as rapidly as
the mortgage market permits."
In 1955, again President Eisenhower made
clear his position: "Private capital will be
gradually substituted for the Government
investment until the Government funds are
fully repaid and the private owners take
over responsibility for the program."
President Eisenhower appointed a Com-
mission on Money and Credit, and in 1961
the Commission's report called once again
for the maximum substitution of private for
Federal credit.
In 1962 President Kennedy's Committee on
Federal Credit Programs reported that "un-
less the urgency of other goals makes pri-
vate participation infeasible, the methods
used should facilitate private financing, and
thus encourage longrun achievement of
program objectives with a minimum of Gov-
ernment aid."
And as recently as 1963 the Republican
members of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, led by Congressmen BYRNES, Cuarrs,
UTT, BETTS, SCHNEEBELI, and COLLIER, argued
that "the administration also can redupe its
borrowing requirements by additional sales
of marketable Government assets."
That Is what we are trying to do through
the general legislation we have offered to
Congress. We are trying to further the sub-
stitution of private for public credit?wher-
ever and whenever we can in our free enter-
prise system. We want to extend the prin-
ciple of private participation to SBA, and to
its sister agencies throughout the Govern-
ment.
Now it is my great pleasure to sign my
name to the Small Business Act Amendments
of 1966.
NEW YORK TIMES RESPONSIBLY
REPORTS ON THE CIA
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, last
week the New York Times published a
series of five very illuminating articles
concerning the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The Times attached such significance
to this series that it assigned several of
its top writers, including Tom Wicker,
Max Frankel, Bud Kenworthy, and John
Finney to work as a team to research and
write them.
0020001-8 May 3, 1966
As one would expect from this team,
the Times series on the CIA was top-
notch. It was illuminating, incisive, and
responsible. The Times writers, avoiding
the superficially sensational, raised a
number of provocative questions about
the CIA and provided substantial factual
background to illuminate the search for
the answers.
Because I deem these articles of con-
siderable value to the current congres-
sional discussion of the proper degree of
congressional review of CIA activities, I
ask unanimous consent that they be
printed.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times,
Apr. 25, 1966]
CIA: MAKER OF POLICY, OR TOGO?SURVEY
FINDS WIDELY FEARED AGENCY IS TIGHTLY
CONTROLLED
(NOTE?The Central Intelligence Agency,
which does not often appear in the news,
made headlines on two counts in recent
days. The Agency was found to have inter-
ceded in the slander trial of one of its agents
in an effort to obtain his exoneration with-
out explanation except that he had done its
bidding in the interest of national security.
And it was reported to have planted at, least
five agents among Michigan State University
scholars engaged in a foreign aid project
some years ago in Vietnam. Although the
specific work of these agents and the cir-
cumstances of their employment are in dis-
pute, reports of their activities have raised
many questions about the purposes and
methods of the CIA, and about its relation-
ship to other parts of the Government and
nongovernmental institutions. Even larger
questions about control of the CIA within
the framework of a free government and
about its role in foreign affairs are period-
ically brought up in Congress and among
other governments. To provide background
for these questions, and to determine what
issues of public policy are posed by the
Agency's work. The New York Times has
spent several months looking into its af-
fairs. This series is the result.
(Following is the first of five articles on
the Central Intelligence Agency. The arti-
cles are by a team of New York Times cor-
respondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John
W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy,
and other Times staff members.)
WASHINGTON.?One day in 1960 an agent
of the Central Intelligence Agency caught a
plane in Tokyo, flew to Singapore and
checked into a hotel room in time to receive
a visitor. The agent plugged a lie detector
Into an overloaded electrical circuit and
blew out the lights in the building.
In the investigation that followed, the
agent and a CIA colleague were arrested and
jailed as American spies.
The result was an international incident
that infuriated London, not once but twice.
It embarrassed an American Ambassador.
It led an American Secretary of State to
write a rare letter of apology to a foreign
chief of state.
Five years later that foreign leader was
handed an opportunity to denounce the
perfidy of all Americans and of the CIA
in particular, thus increasing the apprehen-
sion of his oriental neighbors about the
Agency and enhancing his own political
position.
Ultimately, the incident led the U.S. Gov-
ernment to tell a lie in public and then to
admit the lie even more publicly.
PERSISTENT QUESTIONS
The lie was no sooner disclosed than a
world predisposed to suspicion of the CIA
and unaware of what really had happened
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May 3, 1966 Approvectioactifirgmtga3LONE004-13PANW111432R000500020001-8 9109 e
become contented and ensconced within the
framework of civil service with a false sense
of immunity from accounting to the public
and Government for their failures or indiffer-
ence as representatives of the Government.
This false insulation may well be shattered
with the realization that there is no im-
munity; instead there is liability not only to
the public, but to Government itself. It
should be our duty to make it difficult for
people to do wrong and to make it easy for
them to do right.
I approach the close of my remarks. And
I take license to make some personal observa-
tions. I have visited many offices of our
Service not only as a necessity but as a privi-
lege. Amidst our employees I find sincere
and deep dedication to high professional
standards; I find devotion, recognition, and
acceptance of public responsibility which re-
flects their pride and esteem to be representa-
tives of our Government.
In my many travels and encounters with
the public, I find a profound respect and
admiration for our service and its employees.
Throughout the length and breadth of our
Nation there is found public acknowledge-
ment and confident acceptance of our sense
and purpose of direction. I am filled with a
personal feeling of vanity to be included
among the ranks of our employees. Each
passing day adds to the tall of my time as a
servant of the people and the years add to
my pride. My convictions are reinforced that
We are serving and shall continue to serve
the people loyally and to the full measure of
our abilities. The passage of time adds new
and challenging dimensions to dedication
and devotion to duty. Together we shall
meet them and fulfill them.
As this Holy Name Society meets here, we
need pray to God that He will continue to
grant us the serenity to accept the things
which we cannot change; the courage to
change the things which lie within our pow-
er; and finally to continue our wisdom to
know the difference.
As for myself, if I may borrow from the 23d
Psalm of David in the Old Testament, I can
truly say to my fellow employees that "my
cup runneth over."
WHAT IS AMERICA TO ME?
Mr. MTJNDT. Mr. President, there
are those who say patriotism is dead, and
no doubt they are those among them who
join also in the cry that "God Is dead."
While I happen to be one of those who
believes that neither one's patriotism nor
his faith in a Supreme Being requires a
defense, I feel it is worthwhile to call
attention to some positive statements,
particularly in behalf of patriotism and
what this great country means to two
young individuals in my home State of
South Dakota.
Mr. President, the American Legion
Auxiliary of Howard, S. Dak., recently
sponsored an essay contest entitled
"What Is America to Me?" The first-
place winner is James Feldhaus and the
second-place winner is Kathi Bradbury.
The essays by these youngsters were
printed in the April 29 issue of the Miner
County Pioneer newspaper of Howard.
I believe they are worthy of being brought
to the attention of the Senate and I ask
unanimous consent that the article con-
taining the essays be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the essays
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WHAT IS AMERICA TO ME?
(Enrroa's Nom?The following essays on
the subject "What Is America to Me?" were
selected as first and second place winners in
an essay contest sponsored by the American
Legion Auxiliary in Howard. The essay by
James Felbhaus was first place winner and
the essay by Kathi Bradbury was second
place winner.)
(By James Feldhaus)
America to me is land of freedoni, a land
with a future.
I think it is good to stop and think just
how good our beautiful land is. She is like
a mother who's tending her children. Her
horizons are like the mother's arms who draw
her children close together. When the bright
sun comes up in the morning it is as if
she were awakening her children. Then she
watches us through the day, working and
playing and at nightfall she draws her arms
together and wraps us in a blanket of dark-
ness. Then as we fall asleep we have the
feeling shell watch over us during the night,
and then awake us again at dawn.
Just when our mother was starting out in
the 1500's she showed signs of love and
consideration for her children. When the
first settlers came over looking for freedom
and a future she showed them it. On her
lap (the soils) she gave them food and water.
From her soils America has flourished, and
molded her children to help themselves. On
her soils the freedom she promised was
fought for and given the reward, democracy.
She has been so good that she is now bless-
ing other lands with her love. She is al-
ways ready to dress the wounds of smaller
neighbors.
In America we are given freedom of re-
ligion and speech. It's like being gathered
around the family table, discussing the prob-
lems of the day, giving each other suggestions
and ideas.
We the Americans show our gratitude by
patrotism, which means love of one's coun-
try. This is proven every day. Take for
instance, the Vietnam war, where so many
Americans are fighting for their mother,
upholding freedom.
Patriotism is love of the customs and tra-
ditions of this land. It's a feeling of oneness
and membership in this Nation. It's also the
attachment to the land and the people, as
well as devotion to the welfare of the land.
These men who are fighting are showing all
of these. They are not the only patriots.
The men who are venturing out to outer-
space show also a patriotism. They show
a great love, risking their lives to conquer
the outer space. When outer space is con-
quered our motherland will be able to offer
her children other planets.
This is why I cannot see why there are
men who would stoop so low as to protest
and burn their draft cards. To me serving
one's country would be one of the greatest
privileges on earth.
(By Kathi Bradbury)
"Oh, beautiful, for spacious skies, for
amber waves of grain, for purple mountain
Majesties above the fruited plain."
This is one American's description of his
homeland. America is a land of variety.
Lakes, rivers, plains, mountains, forests, and
badlands add to her physical beauty. Amer-
ica is a land of great mineral wealth and
it promises much potential for future gen-
erations.
America is an adventure story about cow-
boys and Indians, explorers, wars, rockets,
and progress.
America is the mother of many great men.
She has watched statesmen such as George
Washington and Abraham Lincoln; inventors
like Edison and Fulton; military heroes, like
Pershing; and athletes, humanitarians, au-
thors, musicians, and educators grow up
under her wing.
America is freedom. We can say, do, think,
and write whatever we please, as long as we
don't infringe upon the rights of others.
We can travel where we please, buy what we
please, and work when we please. America
is what we make it. It is our duty to vote
for responsible representatives and to be edu-
cated on current issues if we want to pre-
serve democracy.
America is hotdogs, hamburgers, popcorn,
and peanuts; it is baseball, football, and
basketball games and cheering crowds.
America is competition in sports, in contests
of every kind, in business and in sobiety.
Each individual has a chance to win and to
better himself.
America is a mixture of people from almost
every other nation on earth. People of dif-
ferent colors, creeds and religions live and
work together peacefully and happily. Amer-
ica invites the tired, the poor, and the hud-
dled masses of the world to come to her
and find a new happiness that is to be
found nowhere else on earth.
From my desk in study hall I can see
America. It is a flag waving outside a
school, where everyone has equal educational
opportunities. It is a church that is neither
state-run nor state-controlled. It is a police-
man driving down the road insuring us of
our protections and reminding us of our du-
ties as citizens. It is the rooftops of busi-
nesses which practice free enterprise.
Happiness is living in America.
SMALL BUSINESS ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1966
Mr. SCOT!'. Mr. President, it was my
great privilege as a member of the Select
Committee on Small Business, to witness
yesterday at the White House the sign-
ing of S. 2729, a bill to increase the ceiling
on the Small Business Administration's
revolving loan fund?a bill which, in
President Johnson's words, "will make
the Small Business Administration a
more effective friend of small business in
America."
I invite attention to the fact that the
policy of the Government to sell mort-
gages now held by the Federal National
Mortgage Association as rapidly as the
mortgage market permits, was set by
President Eisenhower in 1954, and re-
iterated in 1955, in 1956, and in 1958, In
1963, Republicans took the lead in the
House Ways and Means Committee in
urging such sales by Government to pri-
vate enterprise outlets.
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the President's remarks occasioned by
the enactment of this worthwhile bill be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TEXT OF THE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT UP-
ON SIGNING THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1966
I welcome you here?Members of Congress,
small business leaders, those in and out of
Government who have worked long and hard
to increase small business' share in the na-
tional prosperity.
I have invited you here for two reasons:
First, to ask you to witness the signing of
a bill that will make the Small Business Ad-
ministration a more effective friend of small
business in America.
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Many earnest Americans, too, are bitter
critics of the-CIA
Senator EUGENE J. IVIcCAR;rxy, Democrat, of
Minnesota, has charged that the agency "is
snaking foreign policy and in so doing is as-
suming the roles of President and Congress."
He has introduced a proposal to create a spe-
cial Fcreign Relations Subcommittee to make
a "full and complete" study of the effects of
CIA operations on U.S. foreign relations.
Se11g6tOY STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Democrat, of
Ohio, has proposed that a joint Senate-House
committee oversee the CIA because, "wrapped
In a c.oak of secrecy, the CIA has, in effect,
been making foreign policy."
May pr Lindsay of New York, while a Repub-
lican Member of Congress, indicated the CIA
on tho House floor for a long series of fi-
ascos, including the most famous blunder in
recent American history?the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba.
Former President Truman, whose admin-
istrati NI established the CIA in 1947, said
in 1968 that by then he saw "something about
the way the CIA has been functioning that
is cawing a shadow over our historic posi-
tions, and I feel that we need to correct it."
KENNEDY'S BrrahrtuEss
And President Kennedy, as the enormity
of the Bay of Pigs disaster came home to him,
said to one of the highest officials of his ad-
ministration that he wanted "to splinter the
CIA ir. a thousand pieces and scatter it to the
winds"
Even some who defend the CIA as the in-
dispensable eyes and ears of the Govern-
ment--for example Allen Dulles, the Agency's
most famous Director?now fear that the
cumu. ative criticism and suspicion, at home
and abroad, have impaired the CIA's effec-
tiveness and therefore the Nation's safety.
They are anxious to see the criticisms an-
swered and the suspicions allayed, even if?
in some cases?the Agency should thus be-
come more exposed to domestic politics and
to compromises of security.
"If the establishment of a congressional
committee with responsibility for intelligence
would quiet public fears and restore public
confic.ence in the CIA," Mr. Dulles said in an
interNiew, "then I now think it would be
worth doing despite some of the problems it
woulc[ cause the Agency."
Because this view is shared in varying de-
gree by numerous friends of the CIA and be-
cause its critics are virtually unanimous in
calling for more "control," most students of
the problem have looked to Congress for a
remee ly.
In the 19 years -that the CIA has been in
existence, 150 resolutions for tighter con-
gressional control have been introduced?
and put aside. The statistic in itself is evid-
ence if widespread uneasiness about the CIA
and of how little is known about the Agency.
For the truth is that despite the CIA's in-
ternational reputation, few persons in or out
of tile American Government know much
-abotr; its work, its organization, its super-
vision or its relationship to the other arms
of the executive branch.
A lormer chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, for instance, had no idea how big the
CIA ?Dudget was. A Senator, experienced in
foreign affairs, proved in an interview, to
know very little about, but to fear very much,
its operations.
Many critics do not know that virtually
all CIA expenditures must be authorized in
adva ice--first by an administration commit-
tee that includes some of the highest-rank-
ing political officials and White House staff
assiw.ants, then by officials in the Bureau of
the Budget, who have the power to rule out
or reduce an expenditure.
TI,ey do not know that, instead of a blank
check, the CIA has an annual budget of a
little more than $500 million?only one-sixth
the (33 billion the Government spents on its
overall intelligence effort. The National Se-
curity Agency, a cryptographic and code-
breaking operation run by the Defense De-
partment, and almost never questioned by
outsiders, spends twice as much as the CIA.
The critics shrug aside the fact that Presi-
dent Kennedy, after the most rigorous in-
quiry into the Agency's affairs, methods and
problems after the Bay of Pigs, did not
splinter it after all and did not recommend
congressional supervision.
They may be unaware that since then
supervision of intelligence activities has been
tightened. When President Eisenhower
wrote a leter to all ambassadors placing
them in charge of all American activities in
their countries, he followed it with a secret
letter specifically exempting the CIA; but
When President Kennedy put the ambassa-
dors in command of all activities, he sent
a secret letter specifically including the CIA.
It is still in effect but, like all directives,
variously interpreted.
OUT OF A SPY NOVEL
The critics, quick to point to the Agency's
publicized blunders and setbacks, are not
mollified by its genuine achievements?its
precise prediction of the date on which the
Chinese Communists would explode a nuclear
device; its fantastic world of electronic de-
vices; its use of a spy, Oleg Penkovskiy, to
reach into the Kremlin itself; its work in
keeping the Congo out of Communist con-
trol; or the feat?straight from a spy novel?
of arranging things so that when Gamal
Abdel Nasser came to pawer in Egypt the
management consultant who had an office
next to the Arab leader's and who was one
of his principal advisers was a CIA operative.
When the U-2 incident is mentioned by
critics, as it always is, the emphasis is usually
on the CIA's?and the Eisenhower adminis-
tration's?blunder in permitting Francis
Gary Powers' flight over the Soviet Union
in 1960 just before a scheduled summit con-
ference. Not much is usually said of the in-
calculable intelligence value of the undis-
turbed U-2 flights between 1956 and 1960
over the heartland of Russia.
And when critics frequently charge that
CIA operations contradict and sabotage of-
ficial American policy, they may not know
that the CIA is often overruled in its policy
judgments.
As an example, the CIA strongly urged
the Kennedy administration not to recog-
nize the Egyptian-backed Yemeni regime
and warned that President Nasser would not
quickly pull his troops out of Yemen. Am-
bassador John Badeau thought otherwise.
His advice was accepted, the republic was
recognized, President Nasser's troops re-
mained?and much military and political
trouble followed that the CIA had foreseen
and the State Department had not.
Nor do critics always give the CIA credit
where it is due for its vital and daily service
as an accurate and encyclopedic source of
quick news, information, analysis and deduc-
tion about everything from a new police
chief in Mozambique to an aid agreement
between Communist China and Albania, from
the state of President Sukarno's health to
the meaning of Nikita S. Khrushchev's fall
from power.
Yet the critics favorite indictments are
spectacular enough to explain the world's
suspicions, and fears of the CIA and its oper-
ations.
A sorry episode in Asia in the early 1950's
is a frequently cited example. CIA agents
gathered remnants of the defeated Chinese
Nationalist armies in the jungles of north-
west Burma, supplied them with gold and
arms and encouraged them to raid Commu-
nist China.
One aim was to harrass Peking to a point
where it might retaliate against Burma, forc-
ing the Burmese to turn to the United States
for protection.
Actually, few raids occurred, and the army
became a troublesome and costly burden.
The CIA had enlisted the help of Gen. Phao
Sriyanod, the police chief of Thailand?and
a leading narcotics dealer. The Nationalists,
with the planes and gold furnished them by
the agents, went into the opium business.
By the time the "anti-Communist" force
could be disbanded, and the CIA could wash
its hands of it, Burma had renounced Amer-
ican aid, threatened to quit the United Na-
tions and moved closer to Peking.
Moreover, some of the Nationalist Chinese
are still in northern Burma, years later, and
still fomenting trouble and infuriating gov-
ernments in that area, although they have
not been supported by the CIA or any Amer-
ican agency for a decade.
In 1958, a CIA-aided operation involving
South Vietnamese agents and Cambodian
rebels was interpreted by Prince Sihanouk
as an attempt to overthrow him. It failed
but drove him farther down the road that
ultimately led to his break in diplomatic rela-
tions with Washington.
INDONESIAN VENTURE
In Indonesia in the same year, against the
advice of American diplomats, the CIA was
authorized to fly in supplies from Taiwan
and the Philippines to aid army officers rebel-
ling against President Sukarno in Sumatra
and Java. An American pilot was shot down
on a bombing mission and was released only
at the insistent urging of the Kennedy ad-
ministration in 1962, Mr. Sukarno, naturally
enough, drew the obvious conclusions; how
much of his fear and dislike of the United
States can be traced to those days is hard
to say.
In 1960, CIA agents in Laos, disguised as
"military advisers," stuffed ballot boxes and
engineered local uprisings to help a hand-
picked strongman, Gen. Phourni Nosavan,
set up a "pro-American" government that
was desired by President Eisenhower and
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
This operation succeeded?so much so
that it stimulated Soviet intervention on the
side of leftists Laotians, who counterattacked
the Phoumi government. When the Ken-
nedy administration set out to reverse the
policy of the Eisenhower administration, it
found the CIA deeply committed to Phourrd
Nosovan and needed 2 years of negotiations
and threats to restore the neutralist regime
of Prince Souvanna Phouma.
Pro-Communist Laotians, however, were
never again driven from the border of North
Vietnam, and it is through that region that
-the Vietcong in South Vietnam have been
supplied and replenished in their war to de-
stroy still another CIA-aided project, the
non-Communist government in Saigon.
CATALOG OF CHARGES
It was the CIA that built up Ngo Dinh
Diem as the pro-American head of South
Vietnam after the French, through Emperor
Bao Dai, had found him in a monastery cell
in Belgium and brought him back to Saigon
as Premier. And it was the CIA that helped
persuade the Eisenhower and Kennedy ad-
ministrations to ride out the Vietnamese
storm with Diem?probably too long.
These recorded incidents not only have
prompted much soul searching about the
Influence of an instrument such as the CIA
on American policies but also have given the
CIA a reputation for deeds and misdeeds far
beyond its real intentions and capacities.
Through spurious reports, gossip, misun-
derstandings, deep-seated fears and forgeries
and falsifications, the Agency has been ac-
cused of almost anything anyone wanted to
accuse it of.
It was been accused of
Plotting the assassination of Jawaharlal
Nehru, of India.
Provoking the 1965 war between India and
Pakistan.
Engineering the "plot" that became the
pretext for the murder of the leading Indo-
nesia generals last year.
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in Singapore 5 years earlier began to repeat
questions that have dogged the Agency and
the U.S. Government for years.
Was this secret body, which was known
to have overthrown governments and in-
stalled others, raised armies, staged an in-
vasion of Cuba, spied and counterspied, es-
tablished airlines, radio stations and schools
and supported books, magazines and busi-
nesses, running out of the control of its sup-
posed political master?
Was it in fact damaging, while it sought
to advance, the national interest? Could it
spend huge sums for ransoms, bribes and
subversion without check or regard for the
consequences?
Did it lie to or influence the political lead-
ers of the United States to such an extent
that it really was an "invisible government"
more powerful than even the President?
These are questions constantly asked
around the world. Some of them were raised
again recently when it was disclosed that
Michigan State University was the cover for
some CIA agents in South Vietnam during
a multimillion-dollar technical assistance
program the university conducted for the
regime of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem.
Last week, it also became known that an
Estonian refugee who was being sued for
slander in a Federal district court in Balti-
more was resting his defense on the fact
that the alleged slander had been committed
in the course of his duties as a CIA agent.
In a public memorandum addressed to
the court, the CIA stated that it had ordered
the agent, Jun i Raus, to disclose no further
details of the case, in order to protect the
Nation's foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr.
Raus is claiming complete legal immunity
from the suit on the ground that he had
acted as an official agent of the Federal
Government.
Such incidents, bringing the activities of
the CIA into dim and often dismaying public
view, have caused Members of Congress and
many publications to question ever more
persistently the role and propriety of one of
Washington's most discussed and least un-
derstood in_stitutions. Some of the misgiv-
ings have been shared by at least two Amer-
ican Presidents, Harry S. Truman and John
F. Kennedy.
A WIDE EXAMINATION
To seek reliable answers to these ques-
tions; to sift, where possible, fact from fancy
and theory from condition; to determine
what real questions of public policy and
international relations are posed by the ex-
istence and operations of the CIA. The New
York Times has compiled information and
opinions from informed Americans through-
out the world.
It has obtained reports from 20 foreign
correspondents and editors with recent serv-
ice in more than 35 countries and from re-
porters in Washington who interviewed more
than 50 present and former Government effi-
dials, Members of Congress and military
officers.
This study, carried out over several months,
disclosed, for instance, that the Singapore af-
fair resulted not from a lack of political con-
trol or from recklessness by the CIA, but
from bad fortune and diplomatic blundering.
It found that the CIA, for all its fearsome
reputation, is under far more stringent politi-
cal and budgetary control than nicest of its
critics know or concede, and that since the
Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961 these
controls have been tightly exercised.
The consensus of these interviewed was
that the critics' favorite recommendation
for a stronger rein on the Agency?a con-
gressional committee to oversee the CIA?
would probably provide little more real con-
trol than now exists and might both restrict
the Agency's effectiveness and actually shield
It from those who desire more knowledge
about its operations.
No.
A MATTER OF WILL
Other important conclusions of the study
include the following:
While the institutional forms of political
control appear effective and sufficient, it is
really the will of the political officials who
must exert control that is important and that
has most often been lacking.
Even when the control is tight and effec-
tive, a more important question may concern
the extent to which CIA information and
policy judgments affect political decisions in
foreign affairs.
Whether or not political control is being
exercised, the more serious question is
whether the very existence of an efficient
CIA causes the U.S. Government to rely too
much on clandestine and illicit activities,
back-alley tactics, subversion and what is
known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."
Finally, regardless of the facts, the CIA's
reputation in the world is so horrendous and
Its role in events so exaggerated that it is
becoming a burden on American foreign
policy, rather than the secret weapon it was
Intended to be.
The Singapore incident, with its bizarre
repercussions 5 years later, is an excellent
lesson in how that has happened, although
none of the fears of the critics are justified
by the facts of the particular case.
PROBLEM IN SINGAPORE
The ill-fated agent who blew out the lights
flew from Tokyo to Singapore only after a pro-
longed argument inside the CIA. Singapore,
a strategic Asian port with a large Chinese
population, was soon to get its independence
from Britain and enter the Malaysian Feder-
ation. Should CIA recruit some well-placed
spies, or should it, as before, rely on MI-6,
the British secret service, and on Britain's
ability to maintain good relations and good
sources in Singapore?
Allen W. Dulles, then director of the CIA,
decided to infiltrate the city with its own
agents, to make sure that the British were
sharing everything they knew. Although the
decision was disputed, it is not uncommon in
any intelligence service to bypass or double-
check on an ally.
(On Vice President HUMPHREY'S visit late
last year to the capitals of Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Secret
Service agents found at least three "bugs,"
or listening devices, hidden in his private
quarters by one of his hosts.)
The agent who flew from Tokyo to Singa-
pore was on a recruiting mission, and the lie
detector, an instrument used by the CIA on
its own employees, was intended to test the
reliability of a local candidate for a spy's job.
When the machine shorted out the lights
in the hotel, the visiting agent, the would-be
spy and another CIA man were discovered.
They wound up in a Singapore jail. There
they were reported to have been "tortured"?
either for real, or to extract a ransom.
THE PRICE WAS HIGH
Secret discussions?apparently through
CIA channels?were held about the possi-
bility of buying the agents' freedom with
increased American foreign aid, but Wash-
ington eventually decided Singapore's price
was too high The men were subsequently
released.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk?the Ken-
nedy administration had succeeded to office
in January 1961?wrote a formal apology to
Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and
promised to discipline the culprits.
That appeared to have ended the matter
until last fall, when Premier Lee broke away
from the Malaysian Federation and sought to
establish himself for political reasons as
more nearly a friend of Britain than of the
United States, although his anti-American-
ism was short of procommunism.
To help achieve this purpose, Mr. Lee dis-
closed the 1960 "affront" without giving any
details, except to say that he had been offered
a paltry $3.3 million bribe when he had de-
manded $33 million.
The State Department, which had been
routinely fed a denial of wrongdoing by CIA
officials who did not know of the Rusk apol-
ogy, described the charge as false. Mr. Lee
then published Mr. Rusk's letter of 1961 and
threatened also to play some interesting tape
recordings for the press.
Hastily, Washington confessed?not to the
bribe offer, which is hotly denied by all offi-
cials connected with the incident, or to the
incident itself, but to having done some-
thing that had merited an apology.
London, infuriated in the first instance by
what it considered the CIA's mistrust of
MI-6, now fumed a second time about
clumsy tactics in Washington.
ACTING ON ORDERS
Errors of bureaucracy and mishaps of
chance can easily be found in the Singapore
incident, but critics of the CIA cannot easily
find in it proof of the charges so often raised
about the agency?"control," "making
policy," and "undermining policy."
The agent in Singapore was acting on di-
rect orders from Washington. His superiors
in the CIA were acting within the directives
of the President and the National Security
Council. The mission was not contrary to
American foreign policy, was not undertaken
to change or subvert that policy, and was not
dangerously foolhardy. It was not much
more than routine--and would not have
been unusual in any intelligence service in
the world.
Nevertheless, the Singapore incident?the
details of which have been shrouded in the
CIA's enforced secrecy?added greatly to the
rising tide of dark suspicion that many peo-
ple throughout the world, including many
in this country, harbor about the agency and
its activities.
Carl Rowan, the former director of the
U.S. Information Agency and former Ambas-
sador to Finland, wrote last year in his syndi-
cated column that "during a recent tour of
east Africa and southeast Asia, it was made
clear to me that suspicion and fear of the
CIA has become a sort of Achilles heel of
American foreign policy."
President Sukarno of Indonesia, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's Chief of
State, President Jonio Kenyatta of Kenya,
former President Kwame Nkrurnah of Ghana
and many other leaders have repeatedly in-
sisted that behind the regular American
government there is an "invisible govern-
ment," the CIA, threatening them all with
infiltration, subversion and even war. Com-
munist China and the Soviet Union sound
this theme endlessly.
"The Invisible Government" was the phrase
applied to American intelligence agencies,
and particularly the CIA, in a book of that
title by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. It
was a bestseller in the United States and
among many government officials abroad.
SUBJECT or HUMOR
So prevalent is the CIA reputation of men-
ace in so much of the world that even hu-
morists have taken note of it. The New
Yorker magazine last December printed a
cartoon showing two natives of an unspe-
cified country watching a volcano erupt.
One native is saying the other; "The CIA did
it. Pass it along."
In southeast Asia, even the most rational
leaders are said to be ready to believe any-
thing about the CIA.
"Like Dorothy Parker and the things she
said, " one observer notes, "the CIA gets
credit or blame both for what it does and
for many things it has not even thought of
doing."
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Supporting the rightist army plots in Al-
geria.
Murdering; Patrice Ltunurnba in the Congo.
Kidnaping Moroccan agents in Paris.
Plotting the overthrow of President
Kwarne Nkrumah, of Ghana.
All of these charges and many similar to
them are fabrications, authoritative officials
outside the CIA insist.
The CIA'3 notoriety even enables some
enemies to recover from their own mistakes.
A former American official unconnected with
the Agency recalls that pro-Chinese ele-
ments in east Africa once circulated a docu-
ment urging revolts against several govern-
ments. When this inflammatory message
backfired on its authors, they promptly
spread the word that it was a CIA forgery de-
signed to discredit them?and some believed
the falsehocd.
OBVIOUS DEDUCTION
"Many otherwise rational African leaders
are ready to take forgeries at face value,"
one observer says, "because deep down they
honestly fear the CIA. Its image in this part
of the world couldn't be worse."
The imaga feeds on the rankest of fabrica-
tions as weLl as on the wildest of stories?
for the simple reason that the wildest of sto-
ries are not always false, and the CIA is often
involved and all too often obvious.
When an embassy subordinate in Lagos,
Nigeria, known to be the CIA station chief
had a fancier house than the U.S. Ambassa-
dor, Nigertins made the, obvious deduction
about who was in charge.
When Preisdent Jotio Goulart of Brazil
fell from power in 1964 and CIA men were
accused of being among his Most energetic
opponents, ntaggerated conclusions as to who
had ousted him were natural.
It is not only abroad that Such CIA in-
volvements--real or imaginary?have armised
dire fears and suspicions. Theodore C. Sor-
ensen has written, for instance, that the
Peace Corpf in its early days strove manfully,
and aPparently successfully, to keep its ranks
free of CIA infiltration.
Other Covernment agencies, American
newspapers and business concerns, charitable
foundation, research institutions and uni-
versities have, in some cases, been as diligent
as Soviet agents in trying to protect them-
selves 'from CIA penetration. They have not
always been so successful as the Peace Corps.
Some of their fear has been misplaced;
the CIA is no longer so dependent on clan-
destine agonts and other institutions' re-
sources. But as in the case of its overseas
reputation, its actual activities in the United
States?for instance, its aid in financing a
center for International studies at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology?have
made the fear of infiltration real to many
scholars ar d businesses.
' The revalation that CIA agents served
among Michigan State University scholars in
South Vietnam from 1955 to 1950 has con-
tributed to the fear. The nature of the
agents' work and the circumstances of their
employment are in dispute, but their very
involvement, even relatively long ago, has
aroused concern that hundreds of scholarly
and charitable American efforts abroad will
be tainted and hampered by the suspicions
of other governments.
Thus, it is easy for sincere men to believe
deeply thet the CIA must be brought "to
heel" in the Nation's own interest. Yet
every well-informed official and former official
with recent knowledge of the CIA and its ac-
tivities who was interviewed confirmed what
Secretary of State Rusk has said publicly?
that the CIA "does not initiate actions un-
known to ,he high policy leaders of the Gov-
ernment."
The New York Times survey left no doubt
that, whatever its miscalculations, blunders
and misfortunes, whatever may have been the
situation during its bumptious early days and
during its overhastY expansion in and after
the Korean war, the Agency acts today not on
its own but with the approval and under the
control of the political leaders of the U.S.
Government.
But that virtually undisputed fact raises
in itself the central questions that emerge
from the survey: What is control? And who
guards the guards?
For it is upon information provided by the
CIA itself that those who must approve its
activities are usually required to decide.
It is the CIA that has the money (not un-
limited but ample) and the talent (as much
as any agency) not only to conceive but also
to carry out projects of great importance?
and commensurate risk.
ACTION, IF NOT SUCCESS
It is the CIA, unlike the Defense Depart-
ment with its service rivalries, budget con-
cerns and political involvements, and unlike
the State Department with its international
diplomatic responsibilities and its vulnera-
bility to criticism, that is freest of all agen-
cies to advocate its projects and press home
its views; the CIA can promise action, if not
success.
And both the Agency and those who must
pass upon its plans are shielded by security
from the outside oversight and review under
which virtually all other officials operate, at
home and abroad.
Thus, while the survey left no doubt that
the CIA operates under strict forms of con-
trol, it raised the more serious question
whether there was always the substance of
control.
In many ways, moreover, public discussion
has become too centered on the question of
control. A more disturbing matter may be
whether the Nation has allowed itself to
go too far in the grim and sometimes deadly
business of espionage and secret operations.
One of the best-informed men on this sub-
ject in Washington described that business
as "ugly, mean, and cruel." The Agency
loses men and no one ever hears of them
again, he said, and when "we catch one of
them" (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes
necessary "to get everything out of them and
we do it with no holds barred."
Secretary Rusk has said publicly that there
is a "tough struggle going on in the back
alleys all over the world." "It's a tough one,
it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that
Is not a field which can be left entirely to the
other side," he said.
The back-alley struggle, he concluded, is
"a never-ending war, and there's no quarter
asked and none given."
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM
But that struggle, Mr. Rusk insisted, is
"part of the struggle for freedom."
No one seriously disputes that the effort
to gain intelligence about real or potential
enemies, even about one's friends, is a vital
part of any government's activities, particu-
larly a government so burdened with respon-
sibility as the U.S. Government in the 20th
century.
But beyond their need for information,
how far should the political leaders of the
United States go in approving the clandestine
violation of treaties and borders, financing
of coups, influencing of parties and govern-
ments, without tarnishing and retarding
those ideas of freedom and self-government
they proclaim to the world?
And how much of the secrecy and auton-
omy necessary to carry out such acts can or
should be tolerated by a free society?
There are no certain or easy answers. But
these questions cannot even be discussed
knowledgeably on the basis of the few
glimpses?accidental or intentional?that
the public has so far been given into the
private world of the CIA.
That world is both dull and lurid, often at
the same time.
A year ago, for instance, it was reported
that some of the anti-Castro Cuban survivors
of the Bay of Pigs were flying in combat in
deepest, darkest Africa. Any Madison
Avenue publisher would recognize that as
right out of Ian Fleming and James Bond.
But to the bookish and tweedy men who
labor in the pastoral setting of the CIA's
huge building on the banks of the Potomac
River near Langley, Va., the story was only a
satisfying episode in the back-alley version
of "Struggle for Freedom."
How CIA PUT "INSTANT Ars FORCE" INTO
CONGO?INTERVENTION OR SPYING ALL IN A
DAY'S WORK
(NoTE.?Following is the second of five
articles on the Central Intelligence Agency.
The articles are by a team of New York
Times correspondents consisting of Tom
Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W.
Kenworthy, and other Times staff members.)
WASHINGTON, April 25.?At the Ituri River,
8 miles south of Nia Nia in the northeast
Congo, a Government column of 600 Congo-
lese troops and 100 white mercenaries had
been ambushed by a rebel force and was
under heavy fire. Suddenly, three B-26's
skimmed in over the rain forest and bombed
and strafed a path through the rebel ranks
for the forces supported by the United
States.
At the controls of the American-made
planes were anti-Castro Cubans, veterans of
the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961,
3 years before. They had been recruited by a
purportedly private company in Florida.
Servicing their planes were European me-
chanics solicited through advertisements in
London newspapers. Guiding them into ac-
tion were American "diplomats" and other
officials in apparently civilian positions.
The sponsor, paymaster, and director of all
of them, however, was the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, with headquarters in Langley,
Va. Its rapid and effective provision of an
"instant air force" in the Congo was the
climax of the Agency's deep involvement
there.
The CIA's operation in the Congo was at
all times responsible to and welcomed by
the policymakers of the United States.
It was these policymakers who chose to
make the Agency the instrument of political
and military intervention in another nation's
affairs, for in 5 years of strenuous diplomatic
effort it was only in Langley that the White
House, the State Department, and the Penta-
gon found the peculiar combination of tal-
ents necessary to block the creation of a pro-
Communist regime, recruit the leaders for a
pro-American government, and supply the
advice and support to enable that govern-
ment to survive.
IN DARK AND LIGHT
From wiretapping to influencing elections,
from bridge blowing to armed invasions, in
the dark and in the light, the Central In-
telligence Agency has become a vital instru-
ment of American policy and a major com-
ponent of American Government.
It not only gathers information but also
rebuts an adversary's information. It not
only organizes its own farflung operations
but also resists an adversary's operation.
Against the Soviet Union alone, it per-
forms not only certain of the services per-
formed in Moscow by the KGB, the Com-
mittee for State Security, but also many
of the political, intelligence and military
services performed by pro-Soviet Communist
parties around the world.
When the Communist and Western worlds
began to wrestle for control of the vast,
undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had
gained independence from Belgium, a modest
little CIA office in Leopoldville mush-
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roomed overnight into a virtual embassy and
miniature war department.
This was not to compete with the real
U.S. Embassy and military attaches but to
apply the secret, or at least discreet, capaci-
ties of the CIA to a seething contest among
many conflicting forces.
Starting almost from scratch, because the
Belgians had forbidden Americans even to
meet with Congolese officials, the CIA dis-
persed its agents to learn Congolese politics
from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders
and to finance their bids for power.
Capable of quickly gathering information
from all sources, of buying informants, and
disbursing funds without the bureaucratic
restraints imposed on other Government
agencies, the CIA soon found Joseph Mo-
butu, Victor Nendaka, and Albert Ndele.
Their eventual emergence as President of the
country, Minister of Transportation and head
of the national bank, respectively, proved a
tribute to the Americans' judgment and
tactics.
So pervasive was the CIA influence that
the agency was widely accused of the assas-
sination of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice
Lumumba. Correspondents who were in the
Congo are convinced the CIA had nothing
to do with the murder, though it did play
a major role in establishing Cyrille Adoula
as Mr. Lurnumba's successor for a time.
Money and shiny American automobiles,
furnished through the logistic wizardry of
Langley, are said to have been the deciding
factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula
to power. Russian, Czechslovak, Egyptian,
and Ghanaian agents were simply outbid
where they could not be outmaneuvered.
In one test after Mr. Adoula had been
elected, rival agents of East and West almost
stumbled over each other rushing In and out
of parliamentary delegates' homes. On the
day of the rollcall, American and Czech rep-
resentatives sat one seat apart In the gallery
with lists of members, winking at each other
in triumph whenever a man pledged to the
one turned out to have been picked oil by the
other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula won by four
votes.
MORE THAN MONEY
By the Congo period, however, the men
at Langley say they had learned that their
earlier instincts to try to solve nasty political
problems with money alone had been over-
taken by the recognition of the need for far
more sophisticated and enduring forms of
Influence.
"Purchased?" one American commented.
"You can't even rent these guys for the
afternoon."
And so the CIA, kept growing in size and
scope.
By the time Moise Tshombe had returned
to power in the Congo?through American
acquiescence, if not design?it became ap-
parent that hastily supplied arms and planes,
as well as dollars and cars, would be needed
to protect the American-sponsored Govern-
ment in Leopoldville.
This, apparently, was a job for the Defense
Department, but to avoid a too obvious
American involvement, and in the interests
of speed and efficiency, the Government again
turned to the CIA.
The Agency had the tools. It knew the
Cubans in Miami and their abilities as pilots.
It had the front organizations through which
they could be recruited, paid, and serviced.
It could engage 20 British mechanics with-
out legal complications and furnish the tac-
tical expertise from its own ranks or from
Americans under contract.
Moreover, some CIA agents eventually felt
compelled to fly some combat missions them-
selves in support of South African and
Rhodesian mercenaries. The State Depart-
ment denied this at first?then insisted the
Americans be kept out of combat.
But it was pleased by the overall success
of the operation in which no planes were
lost and all civilian targets were avoided.
MEANWHILE, IN OTHER AREAS
In the years of the Congo effort, the CIA
was also smuggling Tibetans in and out of
Communist China, drawing secrets from Col.
Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelli-
gence, spying on Soviet missile buildups and
withdrawals in Cuba, masterminding scores
of lesser operations, analyzing the world's
press and radio broadcasts, predicting the
longevity of the world's major political lead-
ers, keeping track of the world's arms traffic
and of many arms manufacturing enterprises
and supplying a staggering flow of informa-
tion, rumor, gossip, and analysis to the Pres-
ident and all major departments of Govern-
ment.
For all this, the CIA employs about 15,000
persons and spends about a half billion dol-
lars a year.
Its headquarters, the brain and nerve cen-
ter, the information repository of this
sprawling intelligence and operations system,
Is a modern, eight-story building of precast
concrete and inset windows?a somewhat
superior example of the faceless Federal
style?set in 140 acres of lawn and woodland
overlooking the south bank of the Potomac
8 miles from downtown Washington.
In this sylvan setting, somewhat resem-
bling an English deer park, about 8,000 CIA
employees?the top managers, the planners,
and the analysts?live, if not a cloistered life,
at least a kind of academic one with the ma-
terials they are studying or the plans they
may be hatching.
Formerly, the CIA was scattered through
many buildings in downtown Washington,
which increased the problems and expense of
security.
In the early 1950's, a $30 million appropri-
ation for a new, unitary headquarters was
inserted without identification in the budget
of another agency?and promptly knocked
out by a congressional committee so befud-
dled by CIA secrecy that it did not know
what the item was for.
When Allen W. Dulles, then Director of the
CIA, came back in 1956 with more candor,
he asked for $50 million, and Congress gave
him $46 million. He justified the bite that
he proposed to take out of a 750-acre Gov-
ernment reservation on the Potomac by say-
ing the site with "its isolation, topography,
and heavy forestation" would provide the
agency with the required security.
While the whitish-gray building is un-
doubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safes,
and elaborate electronic devices can make it,
the location is hardly a secret. A large sign
on the George Washington Parkway pointing
to "Central Intelligence Agency" has been
removed, but thousands of people know you
can still get to the same building by turning
off on the same road, now marked by the
sign "BPR"?"Bureau of Public Roads."
There, beyond the affable guard at the
gate, is the large, rectangular structure with
four wings, the ground-level windows barred,
which stands as the visible symbol of what is
supposed to be an invisible operation.
For organizational purposes, CIA head-
quarters is divided into four divisions, each
under a Deputy Director?plans, intelligence,
science and technology, and support.
WHAT THE DIVIS/ONS DO
The Division of Science and Technology is
responsible for keeping current on develop-
ing techniques in science and weapons, in-
cluding nuclear weapons, and for analyzing
photos taken by U-2 reconnaissance planes
and by space satellites.
The Division of Support is responsible for
procuring equipment and for logistics, com-
munications and security, including the CIA
codes.
The Division of Plans and the Division of
Intelligence perform the basic functions of
the Agency. They represent the alpha and
omega, the hand and brain, the dagger and
the lamp, the melodrama and the monograph
of the intelligence profession. Their pres-
ence under one roof has caused much of the
controversy that has swirled about the CIA
since the Bay of Pigs.
It is the responsibility of the Intelligence
Division to assemble, analyze, and evaluate
information from all sources, and to produce
daily and periodical intelligence reports on
any country, person, or situation for the
President and the National Security Council,
the President's top advisory group on defense
and foreign policy.
All information?military, political, eco-
nomic, scientific, industrial?is grist for this
division's mill. Perhaps no more than one-
fifth?by volume and not necessarily impor-
tance?comes from agents overseas under
varying depths of cover.
Most information is culled from foreign
newspapers, scientific journals, industry
publications, the reports of other Govern-
ment departments and intelligence services
and foreign broadcasts monitored by CIA
stations around the world.
ALL SORTS OF EXPERTS
The Intelligence Division is organized by
geographical sections that are served by
resident specialists from almost every pro-
fession and discipline?linguists, chemists,
physicists, biologists, geographers, engineers,
psychiatrists and even agronomists, geol-
ogists, and foresters.
Some of the achievements of these experts
are prodigious, if reports filtering through
the secrecy screen are even half accurate.
For instance:
From ordinarily available information, re-
liable actuarial and life-expectancy studies
have been prepared on major foreign leaders.
In the case of one leader, from not-so-
ordinarily available information, physicians
gleaned important health data: They made
a urinalysis from a specimen stolen from a
hospital in Vienna where the great man was
being treated.
CIA shipping experts, through sheer ex-
pertise, spotted the first shipment of Soviet
arms to Cuba before ;the vessels had cleared
the Black Sea.
Some anthropologists at CIA headquarters
devote their time to helpful studies of such
minor?but strategically crucial?societies as
those of the hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam.
One woinan has spent her professional
lifetime in the Agency doing nothing but
collecting, studying, collating, analyzing, and
reporting on everything that can be learned
about President Sukarno of Indonesia?"and
I mean everything," one official reported.
HEAVY WITH PH. D.'S
It is the Agency's boast that it could staff
any college from its analysts, 50 percent of
whom have advanced degrees and 30 percent
of whom have doctorates.
Sixty percent of the Intelligence Division
personnel have served 10 years. Twenty-five
percent have been with the CIA since 1947,
when the Agency was established. The
heaviest recruiting occurred during the Ko-
rean war?primarily, but by no means exclu-
sively, among Ivy League graduates.
The Division of Plans is a cover title for
What is actually the division of secret opera-
tions, or "dirty tricks." It is charged with
all those, stratagems and wiles--some as old
as those of Rahab and some as new as satel-
lites?associated with the black and despised
arts of espionage and subversion.
The operations of the CIA go far beyond
the hiring and training of spies who seek out
informers and defectors.
It was the Plans Division that set up clan-
destine "black" radio stations in the Middle
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East to counter the propaganda and the
open incitements to revolution and murder
by Presider ,t Genial Abdel Nasser's Radio
Cairo. ,
? It was the Plans Division that master-
minded the ouster of the Arbenz govern-
ment in Guatemala in 1954, the overthrow of
Premier Mehammed Mossadegh in Iran in
1953 (two notable succes-ses) and the Bay of
Pigs invasion in 1961 (a resounding fan-
fare).
Among tb e triumphs of the Plans Division
are the del, elopment of the U-2 high-alti-
tude plane, which between 1956 and May
1960, whe;r Francis Gary Powers was
shot down by a Soviet rocket, photographed
much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a
tunnel into East Berlin from which CIA
agents tapped telephone cables leading to
Soviet military headquarters in the East-
ern Zone and the acquisition of a copy of
Premier Kl,rushchev's secret speech to the
20th party congress in 1956 denouncing Stal-
in's excesse; and brutalities.
LIBERALS IN THE CIA
The CIA analysts of the Intelligence Di-
vision, in the opinion of many experts, are
aware of the embedded antagonisms and
frustrationa of peoples just emerging into
nationhood. Thus they are likely to be
more tolerant than the activists in the Plans
Division of the liamboyantfnationalism and
Socialist orientation of the leaders in former
colonies and more flexible than many of the
State Department's cautious and legalistic
diplomats.
In discussing the Portuguese territories
of Angola or Mozambique, for example, the
analysts are said to take the attitude that
change is inevitable, that the United States
has to deal with a pluralistic world. The
State Department, on the other hand, tends
to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base
in the Azores, also a Portuguese territory.
Regarding the CIA analysts, one State De-
partment officer said that "there are more
liberal intellectuals per square inch at CIA
than anywhere else in the Government."
The operators and agents of the Plans Di-
vision, on the other hand, are described as
more conservative in their economic outlook
and more single minded in their anticom-
munism. This is particularly true of those
engaged ir. deep-cover operations, many of
whom are ax-military people or men former-
ly in the ()trice of Strategic Services of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It has keen said, however, that many of
the agents who are essentially information
gatherers and who work under transparent
cover are as sophisticated as the analysts
back home, and like them are sympathetic to
the "anti-Communist left" in underde-
veloped countries.
The CIA. agents abroad fall into two
groups?both under the Plans Division.
First, there are those engaged in the really
dirty business?the-spies and counterspies,
the Babotours, the leaders of paramilitary
operations the suborners of revolution. Such
agents operate under deepest cover, and their
activities become known only when they are
unfortunate enough to be caught and "sur-
faced" for political or propaganda purposes.
While s ich operatives may be known to
"the chief of station"?the top CIA officer
in any country--they are rarely known to the
American Ambassador, although he may
sometimes be aware of their mission. In
fact, these deep agents are not known to the
CIA's Intelligence Division in Washington,
and their reports are not identified to it by
name.
Correspondents of the New York Times say
they have never, with certainty, been able to
Identify one of these agents, although they
have on occasion run across some unaccount-
able American of whom they have had their
suspicionf. Often unknown to each other,
the deep' agents Masquerade as businessmen,
tourists, scholars, students, missionaries, or
charity workers.
Second, there are those agents, by far the
larger number, who operate under the looser
cover of the official diplomatic mission. In
the mission register they are listed as politi-
cal or economic officers, Treasury representa-
tives, consular officers, or employees of the
Agency for International Development (the
U.S. foreign aid agency) or U.S. Information
Agency. The CIA chief of station may be
listed as a special assistant to the Ambassa-
dor or as the top political officer.
A THIN COVER
This official cover is so thin as to be mean-
ingless except to avoid embarrassment for
the host government. These agents usually
are readily identifiable.
The chief of station is recognized as the
man with a car as big as the Ambassador's
and a house that is sometimes?as in Lagos,
Nigeria?better.
In practically all the allied countries the
CIA agents identify themselves to host gov-
ernments, and actually work in close co-
operation with Cabinet officials, local intelli-
gence, and the police.
In some embassies the CIA agents outnum-
ber the regular political and economic offi-
cers. In a few they have made up as much
as 75 percent of the diplomatic mission.
The chief of station often has more money
than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has
been in the country longer and is better in-
formed than the Ambassador.
For all these reasons the host government,
especially in underdeveloped areas of the
world, may prefer to deal with the chief of
station rather than the Ambassador, believ-
ing him to have readier access to top policy-
making officials in Washington.
WELL KEPT SECRET
Obviously the number of agents abroad
is a closely held secret, kept from even such
close Presidential advisers in the past as
the historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. In
his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger
states that those "under official cover over-
seas" number almost as many as State De-
partment employees. This would be roughly
8,800. The actual number, however, is be-
lieved to be considerably less, probably
around 2,200.
The secrecy of identification can lead to
some amusing situations. Once when Allen
Dulles, then CIA Director, visited New Delhi,
every known spook (CIA men) was lined
up in an anteroom of the Embassy to greet
him. At that moment a newspaper corre-
spondent who had been interviewing Mr.
Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look
of bewilderment crossed the faces of the CIA
men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't
know about?"
Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some
areas the CIA had outstripped the State De-
partment in the quality of its personnel."
Almost without exception, correspondents
of the New York Times reported that the
men at the top overseas were men of "high
competence and discipline," "extremely
knowing," "Imaginative," "sharp and schol-
arly" and "generally somewhat better than
those in State in work and dedication."
But they also found that below the top
many CIA people were "a little thin" and
did not compare so favorably with Foreign
Service officers on the same level.
The CIA screens and rescreens applicants,
because it is quite aware of the attraction
that secrecy holds for the psychopath, the
misfit, and the immature person.
The greatest danger obviously lies in the
area of special- operations. Although it is
generally agreed that the agents?overt and
covert?have been for the most part men of
competence and character, the CIA has also
permitted some of limited intelligence and
of emotional instability to get through its
acteeri- and has even assigned them to sensi-
tive tasks, with disastrous results.
One example was the assignment of a man
known as "Frank Bender" as contact with
Cuban exile leaders during the preliminaries
of the Bay of Pigs operation. A German
refugee with only a smattering of Spanish
and no understanding of Latin America or
Latin character, Bender antagonized the more
liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his
obvious partiality for the Cuban right.
OFFICES IN THIS COUNTRY
The CIA maintains field offices in 30 Amer-
ican cities. These offices are overt but dis-
creet. Their telephone numbers are listed
under "Central Intelligence Agency" or
"U.S. Government," but no address is
given. Anyone wanting the address must
know the name of the office director, whose
telephone number and address are listed.
At one time these field offices sought out
scholars, businessmen, students, and even
ordinary tourists whom they knew to be plan-
ning a trip behind the Iron Curtain and asked
them to. record their observations and report
to the CIA on their return.
Very little of this assertedly is done any
more, probably because of some embarrassing
arrests and imprisonment of tourists and
students. While the CIA deals frankly with
businessmen, it reputedly does not compro-
mise their traveling representatives.
Most of the work of domestic field agents
involves contacts with industry and univer-
sities. For example, an agent, on instruc-
tions from headquarters, will seek evaluation
of captured equipment, analysis of the color
of factory smoke as a clue to production, an
estimate of production capacity from the size
of a factory, or critiques of articles in techni-
cal and scientific journals.
THE HUMAN INADEQUACY
In greater secrecy, the CIA susidizes, in
whole or in part, a wide range of interprises?
"private" foundations, book and magazine
publishers, schools of international studies in
universities, law offices, "businesses" of vari-
ous kinds, and foreign broadcasting stations,
Some of these perform real and valuable
work for the CIA. Others are not much more
than "mail drops."
Yet all these human activities, all the value
received and the dangers surmounted, all
the organization and secrecy, all the trouble
averted, and all the setbacks encountered,
still do not describe the work of the CIA.
For the most gifted of analysts, the most
crafty of agents?like all human beings?
have their limitations.
At the time when the Americans were suc-
ces.sfully keeping the Congo out of the Com-
munist orbit, it still took the same men sev-
eral months to slip an African agent into
Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives
and fate of some arrested Americans.
Men are fallible and limited, and the de-
mands on the CIA are almost infinite; that
is why, today, some of the most valuable spies
are not human and some of the most omni-
potent agents hum through the heavens, and
above.
CIA SPIES FROM 100 MILES UP; SATELLITES
PROBE SECRETS OF SOVIET?ELECTRONICS PRY-
ING GROWS
(Norz.?Following is the third of five arti-
cles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The
article are by a team of New York Times cor-
respondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John
W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy,
and other Times staff members.)
WASHINGTON, April 26.?To the men most
privy to the secrets of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, it sometimes seems that the
human spies, the James Bonds, and Mata
Hans, are obsolete. Like humans everywhere,
they are no match for the computers, cam-
eras, radars, and other gadgets by which na-
tions can now gather the darkest secrets of
both friends and foes.
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With complex machines circling the earth
at 17,000 miles an hour, CIA agents are able
to relax in their carpeted offices beside the
Potomac and count the intercontinental mis-
siles poised in Soviet Kazakhstan, monitor
the conversations between Moscow and a
Soviet submarine near Tahiti, follow the
countdown of a sputnik launching as easily
as that of a Gemini capsule in Florida, track
the electronic imprint of an adversary's
bombers and watch for the heat traces of his
missiles. -
Only a half dozen years ago, at least one
human pilot was still required to guide a
black U-2 jet across the Soviet Union from
Pakistan to Norway, or over Cuba or Commu-
nist China from bases in Florida and Taiwan.
His cameras and listening devices, capable
of picking out a chalk line or a radar sta-
tion from 15 miles up, were incredible in their
day, the product of imaginative CIA re-
search and developments. But spies in the
sky now orbiting the earth do almost as well
from 100 miles up.
COSMIC ESPIONAGE
Already, the United States and the Soviet
Union are vying with each other in cosmic
spying. American Samos and Soviet Cosmos
satellites gather more data in one 90-minute
orbit than an army of earthbound spies.
Other gadgets of the missile age have taken
over the counterspy function. Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara gave a congres-
sional committee a strong hint about that
last year when he mentioned "inspection of
orbiting objects in the satellite interceptor
Thor program as well as in the two large
ground-based optical programs at Cloudcroft,
N. Mex."
His testimony suggested that the United
States could orbit a satellite capable of pho-
tographing and otherwise "inspecting" Soviet
space spies, while other equipment could
photograph them from the ground with re-
markable detail.
Such electronic eyes, ears, noses and nerve
ends?and similar ones aboard ships and
submarines?are among the Nation's most
vital secrets. They are not exclusively the
property or inspiration of the CIA.
CIA cameras and other snooping equip-
ment are riding in spacecraft that are other-
wise the responsibility of the Defense De-
partment.
No clear breakdown of responsibilities and
cost is available, but, altogether, the annual
cost of the U.S. intelligence effort exceeds
$3 billion a year?more than six times the
amount specifically allocated to the CIA and
more than 2 percent of the total Federal
budget.
BUGGING FROM AFAR
Not all the gadgetry is cosmic. The Agency
is now developing a highly sensitive device
that will pick up from afar indoor conversa-
tions, by recording the window vibrations
caused by the speakers' voices.
This is only one of many nefarious gadgets
that have made the word "privacy" an
anachronism. It is possible, for instance,
with equipment so tiny as to be all but in-
visible, to turn the whole electric wiring sys-
tem of a building into a quivering transmit-
ter of conversation taking place anywhere
Picking up information is one thing; get-
ting it "home" and doing something with it
is another. Some satellites, for instance, are
rigged to emit capsules bearing photos and
other readings; as they float to earth by para-
chute, old C-130 aircraft dash across the
Pacific from Hawaii and snare the parachutes
with long, dangling, trapezelike cables. The
planes have a 70-percent catching average.
Sometimes the intelligence wizards get
carried away by their imaginations. Several
years ago they spent tens of millions of dol-
lars on the construction of a 600-foot radio..
telescope designed to eavesdrop on the Krem-
lin. It was to pickup radio signals, such aS
those emitted when a Soviet Premier called
his chauffeur by radiotelephone, as they
bounced off the moon.
The project turned into an engineering
fiasco, but technology came to the rescue by
providing "ferret" satellites that can tune in
on the same short-range radio signals as they
move straight up to the ionosphere.
Overlooking the rights of territorial sov-
ereignty and national and human privacy,
officials throughout the U.S. Government
praise the CIA'sgadgetry as nothing short of
"phenomenal." The atmosphere everywhere,
they say, is full of information, and the ob-
jective of a technological intelligence service
is to gather and translate it into knowledge.
At CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., other
Intricate machines, some unknown a decade
or even a few years ago, read, translate, in-
terpret, collate, file, and store the informa-
tion. Sometimes months or years later, the
data can be retrieved from tens of millions
of microfilmed categories.
This effort has paid off monumentally, ac-
cording to those who know most about it.
It was aerial reconnaissance by the 1.1-2
spy lane?succeeded in many ways by satel-
lites in 1961?that enabled Washington to
anticipate and measure the Soviet Union's
capacity to produce missiles in the 1950's.
These estimates, in turn, led to the so-called
"missile gap," which became a prime polit-
ical issue in the 1960 presidential campaign.
But it was also the tT-2 that later produced
proof that the Russians were not turning out
missiles as fast as they could, thus dispelling
the "missile gap" from Washington's think-
ing and jargon.
Still later, CIA devices discovered missiles
being emplaced underground in the Soviet
Union. 15-2's spotted the preparation of
missile sites in Cuba in 1962. They also sam-
pled the radioactive fallout of Soviet nuclear
tests in 1961. Highly secret techniques, in-
cluding aerial reconnaissance, allowed the
CIA to predict the Chinese nuclear explosion
in 1964 with remarkable accuracy.
PURLOINED MESSAGES
Countless conversations and messages the
World over have been purloined; even subtler
signals and indications, once detected by the
marvels of science, can be read and combined
into information of a kind once impossible to
obtain.
The first duty of the CIA is to collect,
interpret and disseminate what it learns
from its worldwide nerve system?weaving
together, into the intelligence the Govern-
ment needs, every electronic blip, squeak, and
image and the millions of other items that
reach its headquarters from more conven-
tional, often public, sources: random diplo-
matic contacts, press clippings, radio moni-
tor reports, books and research projects and
eyewitness evidence. (Even some of these
open sources, such as a regional newspaper
from Communist China, must be smuggled or
bought at a stiff price.)
Every hour of every day, about 100 to 150
fresh items of news, gossip and research
reach the CIA's busy headquarters in Vir-
ginia and are poured into the gigantic
human and technological computer that its
analysis section resembles.
Four of every five of these items, it is said,
now come either from open sources or in-
animate devices. But in many important
instances it is still the human agent, alerted
to make a particular arrangement or to chase
a specific piece of information, who provides
the link that makes all else meaningful and
significant; sometimes, now as in the 18th
century, it is men alone who do the job in
danger and difficulty.
When it was discovered, for instance, that
Premier Khrushchev had shaken the Com-
munist world with a secret speech de-
nouncing Stalin in 1956, it was a CIA agent
who finally came up with the text, some-
where in Poland, and other analysts who
determined that it was genuine.
A REBELLION HASTENED
This feat of human spying in an elec-
tronic age yielded vital information and,
leaked to the press in Europe and elsewhere
hastened the anti-Stalin rebellions in many
Communist countries and probably contrib-
uted to unheavals in Poland and Hungary
that are still among the heaviest liabilities
of Communist history.
It takes a subagent in Tibet, personally
recruited by a CIA man there and paid either
a retainer or by the piece, to deliver a sheaf
of secret army documents circulating among
regimental commanders of Communist
China's People's Liberation Army.
Only his counterpart in Algeria can pro-
vide some drawings of the design of the
interior of Peking's embassy (although such
designs can often be obtained with no more
effort than asking for them at the offices of
the American who constructed the building).
And beyond this large remaining value of
the human being in the humming world
of espionage, it is also the human brain in
the CIA that gives iformation its real im-
portance by supplying interpretations for the
President and his men.
The end product is a series of papers, hand-
somely printed and often illustrated with
fancy maps to gain a bureaucratic advantage
over a rival pieces of paper from other
agencies.
The Agency produces intelligence reports
almost hourly, and sweeping summaries
every day. It provides a special news report
for President Johnson's nightly bedtime
reading, sometimes containing such juicy
tidbits as the most recent playboy activities
of the indefatigable President Sukarno of In-
donesia.
More elaborate reports and projections are
prepared on such matters as the rate of So-
viet economic growth.
The State Department has sometimes pub-
lished these, without credit to their origin.
Piqued by these announcements. the CIA
called its first news conference in 1964 to put
out the latest readings on Soviet prosperity.
The idea of the "spooks," as CIA men are
called, summoning reporters caused so much
amusement in Washington?and perhaps
displeasure in other agencies?that the CIA
has never held another news conference.
Still more important subjects, such as So-
viet nuclear capabilities or Communist Chi-
nese intentions in southeast Asia, are dealt
with in formal national intelligence esti-
mates. These encompass all information
available on a given subject and reflect the
final judgment of the Board of National Esti-
mates, a group of 14 analysts in the CIA.
National estimate intelligence is intended
to reach a definite conclusion to guide the
President. But as other departments are
consulted and the various experts express
their views, their disagreements, caveats and
dissents are noted and recorded by footnotes
in the final document. These signs of dis-
pute are likely to herald important uncer-
tainties, and some officials believe the foot-
notes to be the best read lines of all the
millions committed to paper in the Govern-
ment every month.
The CIA also produces rapid analyses and
predictions on request?say, about the like-
lihood of the Soviet Union's going to war over
the Cuban missile crisis, or about the conse-
quences of different courses of action con-
templated at a particular moment by the
United States in Vietnam.
HOW GOOD ARE THE REPORTS?
How effective these reports have been, and
how well they are heeded by the policymak-
ers, are questions of lively debate in the in-
telligence community.
In recent years, the CIA is generally be-
lieved to have been extremely good in fur-
nishing information about Soviet military
capabilities and orders of battle, about the
Chinese nuclear weapons program and, after
constant goading from the White House,
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about the progress of India, the United Arab
Republic,Jsrael, and other nations toward a
capacity tc build nuclear weapons.
Reports from inside Indonesia, Algeria, and
the Congo during recent fast-moving situ-
ations are also said to have been extremely
good.
On the other hand, the CIA has been criti-
cized for not having known more in advance
about the construction of the Berlin Wall
in 1961, a aout the divorce of the United
Arab Repu'alic and Syria in 1961, about the
political leanings of various leaders in the
Dominican Republic, and about such rela-
tively pub :ie matters as party politics in
Italy.
Some?including Dwight D. Eisenhower?
have criticized the Agency for not having
recognized in time Fidel Castro's Communist
leanings or the possibility that the Soviet
Union would ship missiles to Cuba.
Almost everyone, however, generally con-
cedes the necessity for gathering intelligence
to guide t ae Government in its worldwide
involvemer ts. Criticism goes beyond the
value or acouracy of CIA reports. For infor-
mation-gathering often spills over at the
scene of action into something else?subver-
sion, counteractivity, sabotage, political, and
economic intervention and other kinds of
"dirty tricl:s.? Often the intelligence gath-
erer, by deidgn or force of circumstance, be-
comes an activist in the affairs he was set to
watch.
ON-THE-SCENE ACT/ON
CIA analysts reading the punchcards of
their computers in Virginia can determine
that a new youth group in Bogota appears
to have fal: en under the control of suspected
.Communiss, but it takes an agent on the
Spot to trade information with the local
police, col:ect photographs and telephone
taps of those involved, organize and finance a
countermatement of, say, young Christians
or democriLtic labor youth, and help them
erect billboards and turn mimeograph ma-
chines at the next election.
Dozens?at times hundreds?of CIA men
have been employed on Taiwan to train men
who will lac smuggled into Communist China
and to intorview defectors and refugees who
come out; "D train Chinese Nationalists to fly
the U-2; to identify and befriend those who
will move .,nto power after the departure of
the Nationalists' President Chiang Kai-shek;
to beam Propaganda broadcasts at the main-
land; to organize harassing operations on
the islands just off the shore of the mainland,
and to pro,ride logistic support for other CIA
operations in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, the
PhilippineE, and Indonesia.
In these and dozens of other instances, an
agent who is merely ostensibly gathering in-
telligence is in reality an activist attempting
to create or resolve a situation.
Because a great many such activists are
also in the :ield for a variety of purposes other
than open or clandestine information gath-
ering, the involvement of fallible human be-
ings in the most dangerous and murky areas
of CIA operations causes most of the Agency's
failures and difficulties and gives it its fear-
some reputation.
Men, by and large, can control machines
but not ea ents, and not always themselves.
It was not, after all, the shooting down of a
17-2 inside the Soviet Union in 1960 that
caused worldwide political repercussions and
a Soviet-tmerican crisis; each side could
have absorbed that in some sort of "cover."
It was rather the Soviet capture of a living
American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, that
could not be explained away and that Rus-
sians did not want explained away.
But the CIA 'invariably develops an inter-
est in Its :projects and can be a formidable
advocate in the Government.
When it presented the tf-2 program in
1956, fear of detection and diplomatic reper-
cussions led the Eisenhower administration
to run some "practice" missions over Eastern
Europe. The first mission to the Soviet
Union, in mid-1956, over Moscow and Lenin-
grad, was detected but not molested. It did,
however, draw the first of a number of secret
diplomatic protests.
After six missions the administration
halted the flights, but the CIA pressed for
their resumption. Doubts were finally over-
come, and 20 to 25 more flights were con-
ducted, with Soviet fighter planes in vain
pursuit of at least some of them.
The Powers plane is thought to have been
crippled by the nearby explosion of an anti-
aircraft missile developed with the II-2's in
mind.
RISKY AND OFTEN PROFITABLE
The simplest and most modest of such
risky, often profitable, sometimes disastrous
human efforts are reported to be carried out
in the friendly nations of Western Europe.
In Britain, for instance, CIA agents are
said to be little more than contact men with
British intelligence, with British Kremlinol-
ogists and other scholars and experts.
With MI-6, its London counterpart, the
CIA compares notes and divides responsibili-
ties on targets of mutual interest. The
Agency, having come a painful cropper in
Singapore a few years ago, now leaves spying
in Malaysia, for instance, to the old Com-
monwealth sleuths while probably offering
In return the CIA's copious material from
Indonesia.
Generally cooperative arrangements also
prevail in countries such as Canada and Italy
and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in France,
In West Germany, a major cold war battle-
ground, the CIA is much more active.
The CIA runs an office in Bonn for general
coordination. Another in Berlin conducts
special activities such as the famous wiretap
tunnel under East Berlin, a brilliant tech-
nical hookup that eavesdropped on Soviet
Army headquarters. It was exposed in 1956
when East German workmen, digging on an-
other project, struck a weak spot in the
tunnel and caused it to collapse.
A CIA office in Frankfurt supervises some
of the United States own espionage opera-
tions against the Soviet Union, interviews
defectors and recruits agents for service in
Communist countries.
In Munich, the CIA supports a variety of
research groups and such major propaganda
outlets as Radio Free Europe, which broad-
casts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty,
aimed at the Soviet Union.
JOBS FOR REFUGEES
Besides entertaining and informing mil-
lions of listeners in Communist nations,
these nominally "private" outlets provide
employment for many gifted and knowledge-
able refugees from Russia, Poland, Hungary,
and other countries.
They also solicit the services of informers
inside the Communist world, monitor Com-
munist broadcasts, underwrite anti-Com-
munist lectures and writings by Western
Intellectuals and distribute their research
materials to scholars and journalists in all
continents.
But there is said to be relatively little
direct CIA spying upon the U.S. allies.
Even in such undemocratic countries as
Spain and Portugal, where more independ-
ent CIA activity might be expected, the op-
eration is reliably described as modest.
The American Agency has a special inter-
est, for instance, in keeping track in Spain
of such refugees from Latin America as Juan
Peron of Argentina. Nevertheless, it relies
so heavily on the information of the Span-
ish police that American newspapermen are
often a better source for American Embassy
officials than the CIA office.
In much of Africa, too, despite the formi-
dable reputation it has among governments,
the CIA takes a back seat to the intelligence
agencies of the former colonial nations, Brit-
ain and France, and concentrates on gather-
ing information about Soviet, Chinese, and
other Communist efforts there. (The Congo
has been the major exception.) The Agency
compiles lists of travelers to Moscow, Prague,
or Peking, attempts to infiltrate their embas-
sies and checks on arms and aid shipments
through African airfields.
AN EYE ON POTENTIAL REBELS
The Agency is thought to have attempted
to infiltrate the security services of some
African countries but only with mixed suc-
cess. It gathers special dossiers on the ac-
tivities of various nationalist and liberation
movements and befriends opposition lead-
ers in such countries as Algeria and the
United Arab Republic, in the hope that it
can predict upheavals or at least be familiar
with new rulers if their bids for power are
successful.
The CIA, long in advance, had information
on the plan by which Algerian Army officers
overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella last June?but it
did not know the month in which the officers
would make their move, and it had nothing
to do with plotting or carrying out the coup.
Thanks to contacts with Carnal Abdel
Nasser before he seized power in Egypt, the
CIA had almost intimate dealings with the
Nasser government before the United States
drew his ire by reneging on Its promised aid
to build the Aswan Dam.
Some of these Egyptian ties lingered even
through the recent years of strained rela-
tions. Through reputed informants like
Mustafa Amin, a prominent Cairo editor,
the CIA is said in the United Arab Republic
to have obtained the details of a Soviet-
Egyptian arms deal in 1964 and other similar
information. Thus, Mr. Amin's arrest last
fall may have closed some important chan-
nels and it gave the United Arab Republic
the opportunity to demand greater American
aid in return for playing down its "evidence"
of CIA activity in Cairo.
A TALENT FOR SECRET WAR
The CIA's talent for secret warfare is
known to have been tested twice in Latin
America. It successfully directed a battle
of "liberation" against the leftist govern-
ment of Col. Jacob? Arbenz Guzman in
Guatemala in 1954. Seven years later, a
CIA-sponsored army jumped off from secret
bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the
disastrous engagement at Cuba's Bay of
Pigs.
Not so melodramaticaly, the Agency runs
dozens of other operations throughout the
hemisphere.
It provides "technical assistance" to most
Latin nations by helping them establish anti-
Communist police forces. It promotes anti-
Communist front organizations for students,
workers, professional and businessmen,
farmers, and political parties. It arranges
for contact between these groups and Ameri-
can labor organizations, institutes, and foun-
dations.
It has poured money into Latin American
election campaigns in support of moderate
candidates and against leftist leaders such
as Cheddi Jagan, of British Guiana.
It spies upon Soviet, Chinese, and other
Communist infiltrators and diplomats and
attempts to subvert their programs. When
the CIA learned last year that a Brazilian
youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in
an auto accident, while studying on a
scholarship at the Lumumba University in
Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity cam-
paign to discourage other South American
families from sending their youngsters to the
Soviet Union.
In southeast Asia over the last decade, the
CIA has been so active that the Agency in
some countries has been the principal arm of
American policy.
It is said, for instance, to have been so
successful at infiltrating the top of the Indo-
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nesian Government and Army that the
United States was reluctant to disrupt C/A
covering operations by withdrawing aid and
information programs in 1964 and 1985.
What was presented officially in Washington
as toleration of President Sukarno's insults
and provocations was in much larger measure
a desire to keep the CIA fronts in business as
long as possible.
Though It is not thought to have been in-
volved in any of the maneuvering that has
curbed President Sukarno's power in recent
months, the Agency was well poised to follow
events and to predict the emergence of anti-
Communist forces.
LINKS TO POWER
After helping to elect Ramon Magsaysay
as President of the Philippines in 1953, but-
tressing the family government of Ngo Dinh
Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu in South Vietnam
in 1954, and assisting in implanting the re-
gime of the strong man Phoumi Nosavan in
Laos in 1960, the CIA agents responsible ob-
viously became for long periods much more
intimate advisers and effective links to
Washington than the formally designated
American Ambassadors in those countries.
And when the Kennedy administration
came into office in 1961, the President con-
cluded that the CIA had so mortgaged Amer-
ican interests to Phoumi Nosavan that there
was at first no alternative to dealing with
Moreover, the CIA's skill at moving quickly
and in reasonable secrecy drew for it many
assignments in southeast Asia that would
normally be given to the Defense Depart-
ment. It was able, for instance, to fly sup-
plies to the Meo tribesmen in Laos to help
them fight against the pro-Communist
Pathet Lao at a time when treaty obligations
forbade the assignment of American military
advisers to the task.
In South Vietnam, the CIA's possession of
energetic young men with political and
lingulsitic talents proved much more success-
ful in wresting mountain and jungle villages
from Communist control than the Pentagon's
special forces.
But the CIA was also deeply committed to
the Ngo brothers and was tricked by them
Into supporting their private police forces.
These were eventually employed against the
Buddhist political opposition, thus provoking
the coup d'etat by military leaders in 1983
that brought down the Ngos.
In Thailand, the CIA has now begun a
program of rural defense against Communist
subversion. Acting through foreign aid of-
fices and certain airlines, agents are working
with hill tribes along the Burmese and Laos
borders and helping to build a provincial
police network along the borders of Laos and
Cambodia.
FURTIVE OPERATIONS
Few Americans realize how such operations
as these may affect innocent domestic situa-
tions--the extent to which the dispatch of a
planeload of rice by a subsidized carrier, Air
America, in Laos causes the Agency to set
furtive operations in motion within the
United States.
When Air America or any other false-
front organizations has run into financial
difficulties, the Agency has used its influence
in Washington and throughout the United
States to drum up some legitimate sources
of income.
Unknown to most of the directors and
stockholders of an airline, for instance, the
CIA may approach the leading officials of the
company, explain its problem and come away
with some profitable air cargo contracts.
In other domestic offshoots of the CIA's
foreign dealings, American newspaper and
magazine publishers, authors and univer-
sities are often the beneficiaries of direct or
indirect CIA subsidies.
A secret transfer of CIA funds to the State
Department or U.S. Information Agency, for
example, may help finance a scholarly inquiry
and publication. Or the Agency may channel
research and propaganda money through
foundations?legitimate ones or dummy
fronts.
The CIA is said to be behind the efforts
of several foundations that sponsor the
travel of social scientists in the Communist
world. The vast majority of independent
foundations have warned that this practice
casts suspicion on all traveling scholars, and
in the last year the CIA is said to have cur-
tailed these activities somewhat.
Congressional investigation of tax-exempt
foundations in 1964 showed that the J. M.
Kaplan Fund, Inc., among others, had dis-
bursed at least $400,000 for the CIA in a
single year to a research institute. This in-
stitute, in turn, financed research centers in
Latin America that drew other support from
the Agency for International Development
(the U.S. Foreign Aid Agency), the Ford
Foundation and such universities as Harvard
and Brandeis.
Among the Kaplan Fund's other previous
contributors there had been eight funds or
foundations unknown to experts on tax-
exempt charitable organizations. Five of
them were not even listed on the Internal
Revenue Service's list of foundations entitled
to tax exemption.
MAGAZINE GOT FUNDS
Through similar channels, the CIA has
supported groups of exiles from Cuba and
refugees from Communism in Europe, or
anti-Communist but liberal organizations of
intellectuals such as the Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom, and some of their newspapers
and magazines.
Encounter magazine, a well-known anti-
Communist intellectual monthly with edi-
tions in Spanish and German as well as Eng-
lish, was for a long time?though it is not
now?one of the indirect beneficiaries of CIA
funds. Through arrangements that have
never been publicly explained, several Ameri-
can book publishers have also received CIA
subsidies.
An even greater amount of CIA money ap-
parently was spent on direct, though often
secret, support of American scholars. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
opened a Center of International Studies
with a grant of $300,000 from the CIA in
1951 and continued to take agency funds
until the link was exposed, causing great
embarrassment to MIT's scholars working
in India and other countries.
The Agency's support for MIT projects
gradually dwindled, but the fear of compro-
mising publicity led the university to decide
a year ago to accept no new CIA contracts.
Similar embarrassment was felt at Mich-
igan State University after the recent dis-
closure that CIA agents had served on its
payroll in a foreign-aid project in South
Vietnam from 1955 tO 1959. The university
contended that no secret intelligence work
was done by the agents, but it feared that a
dozen other overseas projects now under way
would be hampered by the suspicions of
other governments.
The CIA was among the first Government
agencies to seek the valuable services of
American scholars?an idea now widely
emulated. Many scholars continue to serve
the Agency as consultants, while others work
on research projects frankly presented to
their superiors as CIA assignments.
At a meeting of the American Political
Science Foundation here last fall, however,
at least two speakers said too many scholars
were still taking on full-time intelligence
services. They also warned that the part-
time activities of others could influence their
judgments or reputations.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty pro-
vide cover for CIA-financed organizations
that draw upon the research talents of
American scholars and also service scholars
with invaluable raw material. The Free
Europe Committee even advertises for public
contributions without revealing its ties to
the U.S. Government.
Radio Swan, a CIA station in the Carib-
bean that was particularly active during the
Bay of Pigs invasion, maintains unpublicized
contacts with private American broadcasters.
The C/A at times has addressed the Amer-
ican people directly through public relations
men and nominally independent citizens
committees. Many other CIA-run fronts and
offices, however, exist primarily to gather
mail from and to provide credentials for its
overseas agents.
Thus, the ramifications of CIA activities,
at home and abroad, seem almost endless.
Though satellites, electronics, and gadgets
have taken over much of the sheer drudgery
of espionage, there remains a deep involve-
ment of human beings, who project the
Agency into awkward diplomatic situations,
raising many issues of policy and ethics.
That is why many persons are convinced
that in the CIA a sort of Franken.stein's
monster has been created that no one can
fully control.
By its clandestine nature, the CIA has few
opportunities to explain, justify, or defend
Itself. It can don the cloak of secrecy and
label all its works as necessary to further
some "national interest." And it can quietly
lobby for support inside the Government and
among infiuencial Members of Congress and
with the President.
But a "national interest" that is not a
persuasive defense to men who have their
own ideas of the "national interest"?along
with secrecy itself?has the inevitable effect
of convincing critics that the Agency has
plenty to hide besides its code-books.
The imaginations and consciences of such
critics are certainly not set at rest when they
learn, for instance, that in 1962 an outraged
President Kennedy?obviously differing with
the Agency about the "national interest"?
forced the CIA to undo a particularly clumsy
piece of sabotage that might have blackened
the Nation's name all around the world.
CIA OPERATION: A PLOT SCUTTLED?PLAN TO
DOCTOR CUBAN SUGAR DEPICTS CONTROL
PROBLEM
(Norm?Following is the fourth of five ar-
ticles on the Central Intelligence Agency.
The articles are by a team of New York
Times correspondents consisting of Tom
Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W.
Kenworthy and other Times staff members.)
WASHINGTON, April 27.?On August 22,
1962, the S.S. Streatham Hill, a British
freighter under Soviet lease, crept into the
harbor of San Juan, P.R., for repairs.
Bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of
Cuban sugar, she had damaged her propeller
on a reef.
The ship was put in drydock, and 14,135
sacks were offloaded to facilitate repairs.
Because of the U.S. embargo on Cuban im-
ports, the sugar was put under bond in a
customs warehouse.
Sometime during the layup, agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency entered the cus-
toms shed and contaminated the offloaded
sugar with a harmless but unpalatable sub-
stance.
Later, a White House official, running
through some intelligence reports, came
upon a paper indicating the sabotage. He
Investigated, had his suspicions confirmed,
and informed President Kennedy, much to
the annoyance of the CIA command.
The President was not merely annoyed;
he was furious, because the operation had
taken place on American territory, because it
would, if discovered, provide the Soviet
Union with a propaganda field day, and be-
cause it could set a terrible precedent for
chemical sabotage in the undeclared "back-
alley" struggle that rages constantly between
the West and the Communist countries.
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Mr. Kennedy directed that the doctored
sugar not lave Puerto Rico. This was more
easily ordeied than done, and it finally re-
quired the combined efforts of the CIA, the
Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the State Department, cus-
toms agents and harbor authorities to dis-
intrigue the intrigue.
The Sovict Union never got its 14,135 sacks
of sugar; whether it was compensated for
them has not been disclosed.
It would be unfair to conclude that this
was a typical CIA operation. On the other
hand, it cannot be dismissed as merely the
unwise invontion of some agent who let his
anti-Communist fervor get out of control.
There is good reason to believe that a
high-level ?olitical decision had been taken
to sabotage, where feasible, the Cuban econ-
omy. The sugar project, harum-scarum as
It was, developed from a general policy de-
termination in the Plans Division of the CIA,
and the general policy, if not the specific
plot, presumably had the approval of the
interagency, sub-Cabinet group responsible
for reviewing all operations that could have
political consequences.
This was not, then, a well-laid plan that
went sour in the operation; it was a badly
laid plan that was bound to cause trouble.
It is instructive because it illustrates many
of the control problems in CIA operations
and makes plain why, from the outset, so
many questions have been so persistently
raised by so many critics about the ade-
quacy of these controls.
A MAJOR CONCERN
First, there is the preeminent concern
whether tie CIA, despite its disclaimers to
the contra! y, does on occasion make policy?
not willfu ly, perhaps, but simply because
of its capt,city to mount an operation and
pursue it wherever it may lead without day-
by-day guidance or restriction from the pol-
itical departments of the Government.
Operations like that of sabotaging the
Cuban economy can lead to such dangerous
episodes as the sugar doctoring; they can ac-
quire a momentum and life of their own, the
consequences of which cannot be anticipated
by politica. officers who may have given them
original ar proval.
Thus, it should be noted that, in the sugar
tampering, the CIA and its agents unques-
tionably bnlieved they were operating within
approved instructions, and consequently re-
sented whit they regarded as "interference"
by the White House officer who reported it
to the President.
Another example of operations assuming a
life of their own occurred in 1954 during the
CIA-engineered revolution against the Com-
munist-oriented President of Guatemala,
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.
A P-38 fighter, piloted by an American,
bombed a British ship, the Spring-Fjord,
which waf lying off-shore and was believed
to be carrying aircraft to the Arbenz govern-
ment. Only one of the three bombs exploded,
and no c ?ew Members were injured. The
ship, which was actually carrying coffee and
cotton, was beached.
Richard M. Bissell, a former CIA deputy
director f Jr plans, has admitted that the
bombing as a "sub-incident" that "went
beyohd the established limits of policy."
An outE -Landing example of an operation
with polit cal consequences was the dispatch
of Francia Gary Powers on the U-2 flight
from Pakistan to Norway across the Soviet
Union on May 1, 1960, just before the Paris
summit nLeeting and the scheduled visit of
President Eisenhower to Moscow.
UNRESOLVED QUESTION
The U-2 photoreconnaissance flights had
been goin; on for nearly 5 years, with fabu-
lously prcfitable results. It was established
practice f)r the President to approve in ad-
No. 73-9
vance a set of flights within a given time
span, and there was also established machin-
ery for the approval of each flight by the
Secretary of Defense. Yet, to this day, no
one then in the top councils of the Govern-
ment is able to say with certainty whether
the Powers flight, the last in a series of six,
was specifically approved by Thomas S. Gates,
Jr., then the Secretary of Defense.
One Senator has said that the U-2 flight
was a perfectly legitimate operation of great
value, and that the embarrassment to the
President was not inherent in the project but
was the result of a lack of coordination and
controls.
"The operation," he said, "just went along
regardless of the political circumstances."
A second serious control question derives
from the special position of the CIA as the
Government's fountain of necessary infor-
mation. This appears to be at once the ma-
jor advantage and a principal hazard of the
CIA operation today.
"Policy," Allen W. Dulles, the former CIA
Chief, once said, "must be based on the best
estimates of the facts which can be put to-
gether. That estimate in turn should be
given by some agency which has no axes to
grind and which itself is not wedded to any
particular policy."
This point is often made by the CIA and
its defenders. They cite, for instance, the
Agency's accurate estimate on Soviet missile
strength, as a contrast to the inflated esti-
mates that came from the Pentagon in the
late fifties. The latter, they say, were surely
influenced by service rivalries and budgetary
battles?such as the Air Force's desire for
more missiles of its own. The, CIA has no
such vested interest and little to gain by dis-
torting or coloring its reports and estimates.
Mr. Dulles?like Secretary of State Dean
Rusk?insists that no CIA operation "of a
political nature" has ever been undertaken
"without appropriate approval at a high po-
litical level in our Government" outside the
CIA.
The problem is that the facts presented
to the Government by the CIA are some-
times dramatic and inevitably tend to in-
spire dramatic proposals for clandestine op-
erations that the Agency's men are eager to
carry out, and that they believe can?or
might?succeed.
LONG ODDS CAN HELP
Even long odds sometimes work to the
Agency's advantage. General Eisenhower,
for instance, has written that he undertook
to aid pro-Western rebels in Guatemala in
1954 because Mr. Dulles told him the opera-
tion had only a 20-percent chance to succeed.
If the CIA Director had estimated a better
chance than that, General Eisenhower wrote
In his memoirs, he would have been un-
realistic, unconvincing and overruled.
Command of the facts?at least the best
facts available?plus zeal to do something
about them, many critics fear, can make the
CIA an unanswerable advocate, not for a
vested budgetary or policy interest, but for
its own sincere notions of how to proceed.
And its advantage of providing the facts on
which decision must be made, these critics
feel, can enable it to prevail over the advice
or fears of political officers.
Thus, in 1958, Ambassador John Allison
strongly opposed the plan of Allen Dulles
to aid the rebel movement in Sumatra
against President Sukarno of Indonesia. But
Mr. Dulles had won the powerful support of
his brother, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles.
Ultimately, the plan went forward?with
the result that an American pilot was shot
down and captured by the Sukarno forces,
causing a conspicuous deterioration of rela-
tions between Indonesia and the United
States. The plan was not unapproved; it
was just unwise.
A third problem of control arises from the
necessary secrecy that surrounds the Agency.
To protect its sources of information, to per-
mit it to proceed with any form of clandes-
tine operations, to guard the Nation's politi-
cal relations with most other countries, it is
necessary for the CIA to be shielded?and
Congress has so shielded it, by law?from
the ordinary scrutiny, investigation and pub-
lic disclosure of activities that other Govern-
ment agencies must undergo.
Within the Agency, until the Bay of Pigs
disaster of 1961 in Cuba, even the Intelli-
gence Division was not allowed to know about
the "dirty tricks" being planned and carried
out by the Plans Division.
STEVENSON IN TIIE DARK
Many of the highest Government officials
are told nothing of some of the Agency's ac-
tivities because, in the course of their own
duties, they do not "need to know."
It is now well established, for instance,
that until the disaster unfolded, Adlai E.
Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the
United Nations, knew nothing of the Bay of
Pigs plan. As a result, he and his Govern-
ment, suffered grievous humiliation after he
publicly misstated the facts.
In years past, CIA secrecy reached some ab-
surd proportions?with high-level employees
identifying themselves solemnly at cocktail
parties as "librarians" and "clerks." In its
early days, for instance, CIA employees who,
in their private lives, needed to apply for
credit were instructed by the Agency to say,
when asked for an employer's reference:
"Call Miss Bertha Potts" at a certain number.
It was not long, of course, before the lend-
ers who were told to call Miss Potts would say
gleefully: "Oh, you work for the CIA."
For many years prior to 1961, a good many
critics had been aware of the control dan-
gers inherent in the CIA's peculiar position.
In 1954, Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat,
of Montana, obtained 34 cosponsors for a
bill to create a 12-member joint committee on
intelligence to keep watch over the CIA,
much as the Congressional Joint Committtee
on Atomic Energy does over the Atomic
Energy Commission.
Allen Dulles, who was completely satisfied
with the scrutiny provided by four carefully
selected subcommittees of the Senate and
House Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees, went to work. He succeeded in
cutting away 14 of Mr. MANSFIELD'S cospon-
sors, and the bill was defeated, 59 to 27.
BOARD HEADED BY KILLIAN
A year later the second Hoover Commission
also recommended a congressional joint
committee, as well as a presidentially ap-
pointed board of consultants on intelligence
activities.
To forestall the first, Mr. Dulles acquiesced
in the second, and in January 1965, President
Eisenhower named a board of consultants on
foreign intelligence activities, with James R.
Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, as chairman.
Those familiar with the board's work in
the Eiesnhower years say it performed a
useful function on the technical side, where
Dr. Killian, for instance, was a powerful
advocate in the development of the U-2.
However, it is generally agreed that the
board did not give very critical attention to
"black" operations, and then only after the
fact.
In 1954 there was also established by the ?
National Security Council?which advises
the President on defense and foreign policy
matters?what came to be known as "the
special group," or the "54-12 group," after
the date (December 1954) of the secret di-
rective ordering its formation.
This directive also provided the basic
charter for the agency's countersubversive
and counter-Communist activity. until
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a 1966
that time, these activities had been under-
taken under authority of a secret memoran-
dum from President Truman issued in 1947
and inspired principally by the Italian,
Czechoslovak and Berlin situations, then
acute cold-war issues.
The 54-12 group was?and Still is?00111-
posed of the President's special assistants for
national security affairs, the Director of the
CIA, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
the Under Secretary (or Deputy Under Sec-
retary) of State for Political Affairs, plus
other officers consulted occasionally on par-
ticular proposals.
The group seems to have been created,
partly at least, in response to public con-
cern over the problem of control, and it was
given responsibility for passing on intelli-
gence operations beforehand. However, be-
cause of the fraternal relationship of Allen
Dulles and John Foster Dulles, because of
their close relations with President Eisen-
hower and because Allen Dulles had the
power to give it the facts on which it had to
base its decisions, the 54-12 group during
the Eisenhower administration is believed by
knowledgeable sources to have exercised
little control.
THE CLASSIC DISASTER
At the Bay of Pigs, just after President
Kennedy took office in 1961, the worst finally
happened; all the fears expressed through
the years came true.
The Bay of Pigs must take its place In
history as a classic example of the disaster
that can occur when a major international
operation is undertaken in deepest secrecy,
is politically approved on the basis of facts
provided by those who most fervently advo-
cated it, is carried out by the same advca,
cates, and ultimately acquires a momentum
of its own beyond anything contemplated
either by the advocates or those who sup-
posedly controlled them.
Responsible officials of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration report, for instance, that the
invasion plan was not even in existence, as
such, when they went out of office on Janu-
ary 19, 1961; there was nothing but a Cuban
refugee force, available for whatever the in-
coming administration might ultimately de-
cide to do with it.
Yet the testimony of Kennedy administra-
tion officials?Theodore C. Sorenson and
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., for instance?is
that the matter was presented to Mr. Ken-
nedy by the CIA advocates as if it were al-
ready committed to it and would have to
cancel it rather than approve it. Mr. Soren-
sen even wrote in his book, "Kennedy," that
Mr. Kennedy had been subtly pushed to be
no less "hard" in his anti-Castroism than
President Eisenhower supposedly had been.
The ultimate disaster and its various
causes need no retelling. Their effect was
graphically described by an official who saw
the shaken Mr. Kennedy immediately after-
ward. The President, he said, "wanted to
splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and
scatter it to the winds."
At the same time, to Clark M. Clifford, a
Washington lawyer and close friend, who had
written the legislation setting up the CIA
during the Truman administration, Mr. Ken-
neCiy said flatly and poignantly:
"I could not survive another one of
these."
AN INQUIRY ORDERED
But because he could not simply abolish
the Agency, much less its function, the Presi-
dent decided he would "get it under control."
First, he ordered a thorough investigation
by a group headed by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
and composed also of Allen Dulles, Adm.
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations,
and Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY.
Second, on Mr. Clifford's advice, the Presi-
dent recreated the old board of consultants
under the title of the Foreign Intelligence
Committee and asked Dr. Killian to resume
the chairmanship. (Mr. Clifford became a
member and later succeeded Dr. Killian as
chairman.) The President directed the
committee to investigate the whole intelli-
gence community from "stem to stern," rec-
ommend changes and see that they were
carried out.
Third, after a decent interval, the Presi-
dent replaced Allen Dulles with John A. Mc-
Cone, a former Chairman of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission. He told the new Director
that he was not to be simply the Director of
the CIA but should regard his primary task
as "the coordination and effective guidance
of the total U.S. intelligence effort." Mr.
Dulles' key assistants were also removed.
Fourth, the President sent a letter to every
Ambassador telling him he was "in charge of
the entire diplomatic mission" at his post,
including not only foreign service personnel
but "also the representatives of all other
U.S. agencies." These representatives of
other agencies were to keep the Ambassador
"fully informed of their views and activities"
and would abide by the Ambassador's deci-
sions "unless in some particular instance you
and they are notified to the contrary."
The President followed this letter, which
was made public, with a secret communica-
tion, saying he meant it and specifically in-
cluding CIA men among those responsible
to the Ambassador.
A BLOW TO BUNDY
Perhaps the most important change in
control procedures, however, involved the
54-12 group within the political ranks of
the Administration, and it came without any
Presidential initiative.
The Bay of Pigs had dealt a severe psy-
chological blow to McGeorge Bundy, who as
the President's Assistant for National Secu-
rity Affairs was a member of the group, and
perhaps also to his self-esteem. Thereafter
he set out tightening up the surveillance of
CIA operations, subjecting them to search-
ing analysis before and not after the event.
The hard-eyed Mr. Bundy was notably re-
lentless at that kind of administration.
The President accepted the advice of the
Taylor and Killian investigations on two im-
portant questions.
First, he decided not to limit the CIA to
intelligence gathering and not to shift clan-
destine operations to the Pentagon, or to a
special agency created for the purpose.
These ideas had found favor among some
sections of the State Department, among
many public critics and even among some
members of the staff of the advisory commit-
tee. But it was stoutly opposed by Allen
Dulles, who argued that this would result
in duplication and rivalry, and that the two
functions were interdependent, though he
admitted that they had not been working
in harness on the Bay of Pigs operation.
The two committees of inquiry agreed with
Mr. Dulles, and so, finally, did the Presi-
dent.
Second the committees recommended, and
the president enthusiastically agreed, that
the CIA should leave sizable military opera-
tions to the Pentagon and henceforth limit
itself to operations of a kind in which U.S.
involvement would be "plausibly deniable."
This, however, has proved to be a rule of
thumb in which it is often difficult to hide
the thumb.
SOMETHING LIKE SECRECY
For instance, the later creation of an air
force of anti-Castro Cubans to fly for the
Congolese Government was carried out and
managed by the CIA, not by the Pentagon,
despite the recommendation.
The obvious reason was that the Agency
could do the job in something like secrecy,
while Defense Department involvement
would have been necessarily more open, ad-
vertising the backing of the United States
for the "instant air force."
It is beyond dispute, however, that the
Bay of Pigs was a watershed in the life of
the CIA and its influence on policymaking.
Before that, no matter how much adminis-
trative control and political approval there
may have been, Mr. Dulles ran the Agency
largely as he saw fit.
We was able to do so because he could
almost always get "approval"?and thus ad-
here to the forms of control?from his broth-
er in the State Department or from Presi-
dent Eisenhower, with both of whom he had
the closest relations of trust and liking.
The effect of the Kennedy shakeup was
immediately apparent?on policy in Laos, for
instance. W. Averell Harriman, then the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, was given a free hand in getting rid
of the American puppet, Premier Phoumi
No.savana-whose backing by the CIA Presi-
dent Eisenhower had specifically approved?
and reinstating Souvanna Phourna, at the
head of a neutralist government.
By general agreement of virtually every
official interviewed, the CIA does not now
directly make policy, and its operations are
under much more rigorous surveillance and
control than before. Nevertheless, there con-
tinue to be?and probably always will be?
instances where the controls simply do not
work.
UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES
Richard Bissell, who as deputy director for
plans was largely responsible for the U-2 re-
connaissance triumph and for the Bay of
Pigs disaster, has explained why this must
be.
"You can't take on operations of this
scope," he has said, "draw narrow bound-
aries of policy around them and be absolutely
sure that those boundaries will never be
overstepped."
Recently, for instance, the CIA was ac-
cused of supporting Cambodian rebels who
oppose Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head
of state. Even some senior U.S. Foreign
Service officers said they were not sure that
the agency's firm denials meant no agent in
the field, no obscure planner in the huge
CIA building in Virginia, had strayed from
the strict boundaries of policy.
A high degree of control of CIA activities
exists, however, and inquiry produced this
picture of the controlling agencies and how
well the control works:
THE 54-12 GROUP
The 54-12 group is the heart of the control
system. Its members now are Adm. William
F. Raborn, the CIA director; U. Alexis John-
son, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs; Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and two presidential
assistants, Bill D. Moyers and Walt W. Ros-
tow, who have replaced McGeorge Bundy in
representing the White House.
This group meets once a week with a de-
tailed agenda. It concentrates almost ex-
clusively on operations. It approves all pro-
posed operations and it passes in great detail
on expenditures as small as $10,000 that have
political implications or could prove em-
barrassing if discovered. Any differences are
referred first to the Cabinet level and then, if
necessary, to the President.
While the group approves every "black"
operation, it does not necessarily clear all the
routine intelligence-gathering activities of
the agency. Nor, once approval has been
given for a "black" operation, does it main-
tain a running supervision over every detail
of its execution.
Under a given policy decision approving a
guerrilla operation- in a certain country, for
instance, the 54-12 group might also have to
approve something as specific an.d import: nt
as a bridge blowing. But the overall pro-
gram would go on by itself under the direc-
tion of agents in the field.
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BUREA17 OF THE BUDGET
Another form of control is that of the
pursestrinE;.
The CIA's annual request for funds, which
is hidden largely in the Defense Department
budget, is the responsibility of the head of
the Budget Bureau's International Division.
The request has usually fared well, but in the
fiscal year 1965, for the fust time in several
years, it was cut back sharply by the Bureau.
Another form of budgetary control centers
on the Agency's "slush fund," which used to
be about $100-million a year and is now in
"the tens cf millions." One official has said
that "the CIA can't spend a dollar without
Bureau of Budget approval." But another
official put a somewhat different light on
how the "slush fund" is handled.
Suppose, he said, that country X is having
an election. and the candidates backed by
the U.S. Government seem headed for defeat.
The Ambas5ador and the CIA station chief?
the Agency's chief in that country?may for-
ward a reqtest for some fast money to spread
around..
The request, when reviewed and cleared
by the middle levels of the State Department
and the ClA, goes to the 54-12 group for
review. -
This group will first decide whether the
money should be spent, how the CIA should
spend it a:ad how much should be made
available. Then the request goes to the
Budget Bueau to be justified in. budget
terms against other needs.
A CALL BRINGS THE MONEY
For example, this official said, one such
project was recently trimmed by the Budget
Bureau from $3 to $1.7 million. But in the
last week oi the election, the CIA ran out of
funds just es it needed some more billboards
plastered, wad it was able to get the money
simply by a phone call to the Budget Bureau.
This official explained that there had to be
some way of providing "quick-turn money"
under tight controls and audit.
It should also be noted that this form of
control is purely budgetary and not substan-
tive. The 13ureau of the Budget does not
interpose any policy judgment but simply
weighs a p:oposed operation against total
money available and ale outlays for other
projects.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Another cantrol Agency is the Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board. This group has
nine membe::s. Four have had extensive gov-
ernment exIerience.
The chairman, Clark Clifford, was special
counsel to President Truman from 1946 to
1950. Among the other members, Robert D.
Murphy, forrier career Ambassador and for-
mer Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, has had personal experience in clan-
destine operations, for he prepared the way
for the American landing in North Africa in
1942. He is now a director of Corning Glass.
Gordon Gray, a director of the It. J. Reyn-
olds Co. and a newspaper owner, was Secre-
tary of the Army under President Truman
and later was President Eisenhower's special
assistant for national security affairs. Frank
Pace, Jr., chairman of the Special Advisory
Board, Air Force Systems Command, was di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget in 1949-50
and Secretary of the Army from 1950 to 1953.
Two members are scientists connected with
industry?William 0. Baker, vice president in
charge of research for the Bell. Telephone
Laboratories, a member for many years of
the Science Advisory Board of the Air Force,
and Edwin 13. Land, chairman and president
of the Polaroid Corp., a former adviser to
the Navy on guided missiles and an expert
on photogra?hy.
There are two military representatives?
General Taylor, former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and former Ambassador to
South Vietnam, and Admiral John H. Sides,
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from
1960 to 1963. Dr. William L. Langer, the ninth
member, is professor of history at Harvard
and a frequent Government consultant.
The board meets an average of 1 or 11h
days a month. It is subdivided into two-
man panels specializing in various fields,
which meet more frequently. Individual
members also take field inspection trips. Mr.
Clifford went recently to outh Vietnam; Mr.
Gray has been on extensive trips to the Mid-
dle East and southeast Asia.
There is divergent opinion on the control
value of this board. Some of its members
are highly pleased with their own work. They
point out that over the last 41/2 years they
have made some 200 recommendations, of
which the President accepted 95 percent.
They take credit for persuading President
Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara to create the Defense Intelligence
Agency, combining the separate service in-
telligence divisions. This had been recom-
mended by Secretary of Defense Gates and
by Lyman Kirkpatrick, inspector general of
the CIA, as a result of the widely differing
estimates of the so-called "missile gap" in
the late 1950's made by the intelligence arms
of the services.
Another official in a position of authority,
however, believes that the board does little
more than provide a 'nice audit" of CIA op-
erations and that any "control" it exercises is
largely ex post facto. He asked what could
be expected from a board that met only a few
days a month.
"By 5 in the afternoon," he said, "the guys
can't remember what they were told in the
morning."
Even the members concede that their work
has been aimed primarily at improving the
efficiency and methods of the CIA, rather
than at control of individual operations.
Thus, if the board does investigate some
"black" operations, its emphasis is placed on
whether it was done well or could have been
more successful, rather than on the political
question of whether it should have been done
at all.
One member reported, however, that the
CIA now brought some of its proposals to the
committee for prior discussion, if not spe-
cific approval. This is not an unmixed bless-
ing.
While the board might advise against some
risky scheme, it also might not; in the latter
case its weight added to that of the CIA,
would present the responsible political of-
ficials in the 54-12 group with an even more
powerful advocacy than usual.
An advantage of the board is its direct link
to the President. Since this is augmented,
at present, by Mr. Clifford's close personal and
political ties to President Johnson, any rec-
ommendations the committee makes carry
great weight with the bureaucrats of the CIA,
even before they appear in a Presidential or-
der.
STATE DEPARTMENT AND AMBASSADORS
Also exercising some control over the CIA
are the State Department and Ambassadors,
Secretary of State Rusk has confided to his
associates that he is now quite certain the
CIA is doing nothing affecting official policy
he does not know about. But he added that
he was also sure he was the only one in the
State Department informed about some of
the things being done.
Despite this information gap as high as
the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary
levels, State Department officers with a need
to know are far better informed about opera-
tions than before the Bay of Pigs.
Moreover, in the 54-12 group and in inter-
agency intelligence meetings, State Depart-
ment officers are now more ready to speak
out and more likely to be heeded on proposed
intelligence operations that they believe
would compromise larger policy interests.
9121
President Kennedy's secret letter to the
Ambassadors also had some effect in chang-
ing a dangerous situation.
In 1951, William J. Sebald resigned as Am-
bassador to Burma because of continued
CIA support to Chinese Nationalists in north-
ern Burma despite all his protests. In 1956,
James B. Conant, Ambassador to West Ger-
many, was not told about the tunnel under
East Berlin. In 1960, in Laos, Ambassador
Winthrop G. Brown was often bypassed as
the CIA helped prop up the American-backed
Premier Phoumi Nosavan, against his advice.
The same year, the Ambassador in Malaysia
knew nothing of the Singapore operation that
ultimately was to embarrass the State De-
partment in 1965.
It is doubtful whether such things could
happen today if an Ambassador is forceful
enough in establishing his authority.
In the last 4 years the Ambassadors have
been kept much better informed, and their
relations with CIA chiefs of station have
been consequently more cordial. Ambassa-
dors Clare Timberlake and Edward Gullion
were completely posted on CIA operations
during the Congo crisis and worked closely
with the Agency. So, apparently, was Henry
Cabot Lodge after he took over the Embassy
in Saigon in 1963.
While the Ambassador may not always be
completely master in his own house, neither
does it seem to be true?as a staff report of
Senator HENRY M. JACKSON'S Subcommittee
on National Security Staffing and Operations
said in 1962?that the primacy of the Am-
bassador, supposedly established by the Ken-
nedy letter, was largely "a polite fiction."
For example, Robert F. Woodward, Ambas-
sador to Spain, vetoed a man chosen to be
the CIA's Spanish station chief. And the
State Department, while still complaining
about the size of some CIA stations, is now
supposed to approve the number of agents
in each diplomatic mission.
In secret testimony before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee in the summer of
1965, Under Secretary of State Thomas C.
Mann made plain that the creation of the
Imbert military junta in the Dominican
Republic in May was a State Department,
and not a CIA, idea.
Asked whether the CIA would have set
up the junta without orders from state, Mr.
Mann replied:
"I will say that in the past this may
have been; I do not know. But since I
arrived in January 1964, I have had an
understanding first with Mr. McCone and
now with Admiral Reborn, and I am sure
the Department has, even more importantly,
that the policy is made here [at State] and
that nothing is done without our consent."
This "nothing" probably goes too far, since
there remain areas of ambassadorial igno-
rance. An Ambassador is not always in-
formed of "third party" spying in his coun-
try?for example, spying in France on the
Chinese Communists there. Nor is he given
specific details on counterespionage and in-
formation gathering about which he may be
generally informed.
, If the CIA has "bought the madam," as
one official put it, of a house of ill fame
patronized by influential citizens or officials
of a host country, the Ambassador does not
know it and probably doesn't want to. Ho
would, however, have the dubious benefit of
any information the madam might disclose.
These are the four institutional forms of
"control" of the CIA that now exists?save
for congressional oversight and the all-im-
portant role of the Agency's Director. And
the New York Times' survey for these
articles left little doubt that the newly
vigorous functioning of these four groups
has greatly improved coordination, more
nearly assured political approval, and sub-
stantially reduced the hazards implicit in
CIA operations. s
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9122 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 3, 1966
Nevertheless, the Agency still remains the
fount of information on which many policy
decisions rest, and the source of facts,
selected or otherwise, on which to justify
Its own projects.
Nevertheless, the CIA enjoys an inherent
advantage in any conflict with the State
or Defense Departments because of its un-
deniable expertise?especially_ in economics
and science?and because it is free from
such political entanglements as trying to
build up a missile budget (as in the case of
the Air Force) or of having to justify the
recognition of a. foreign leader (as in the
case of State).
And, nevertheless, in its legitimate need for
secrecy, the CIA simply cannot be subjected
to as much public or even official scrutiny as
all other agencies undergo.
A CALL FOR MORE CONTROL
For all these reasons and because of occa-
sional blunders, there has been no abatement
in the demand of critics for more and
stronger control. Inevitably, their calL is for
some form of increased supervision by the
people's Representatives in Congress, usually
by a joint committee of the two Houses.
The Times survey indicated a widespread
feeling that such a committee would do the
Agency's vital functions more harm than
good, and that it would provide little if any
solution to the central problem of control.
The history of the Central Intelligence
Agency since 1947 makes one thing painfully
clear--that the control question, while real
and of the utmost importance, is one of "not
measures but men." The forms of control
mean nothing if there is no will to control,
and if there is a will to control, then the
form of it is more or less irrelevant.
Such a will can only come from the high
political officials of the administration, and
it can best be inspired in them by the direst
example of the President.
But even the President probably could not
impose his will on the Agency in every case
without the understanding, the concurrence
and the vigorous and efficient cooperation
of the second most important man in the
matter of control?the Director of the CIA.
THE CIA: QUALITIES OF DIRECTOR VIEWED AS
CHIEF REIN ON AGENCY
(Noes?Following is the last of five articles
on the Central Intelligence Agency. The ar-
ticles are by a team of New York Times
correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker,
John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Ken-
worthy, and others.)
Wp,sniercicag, April 28.?As copious evi-
dence of a Soviet military buildup in Cuba,
including the installation of antiaircraft mis-
siles, poured into Washington in the summer
of 1962, the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, John A. McCone, had a strong
hunch about its meaning.
He believed such an arsenal half-way
around the world from Moscow had to be
designed ultimately to protect even more
important installations?lmagrange offensive
missiles and nuclear weapons yet to be pro-
vided.
Mr. McCone told President Kennedy about
his hunch but specified that it was a per-
sonal guess entirely lacking in concrete sup-
porting evidence. He scrupulously refused to
impose his hunch on the contradictory docu-
mentary and photoa,nalysis evidence being
provided by the intelligence community over
which he presided. He continued to pass to
the President and his advisers reports and
estimates?based on all available evidence?
that the Soviet Union was not likely to do
what he believed in his heart it was doing.
When the evidence that the Russians had
implanted offensive missiles in Cuba did come
in, Mr. McCone was among those around the
President who argued for quick, decisive air
action before the missiles could become oper-
ative. But when the President decided on his
blockade-and-ultimatum policy, Mr. McCone
loyally supported it and helped carry it out.
In 1969, Mr, McCone was personally in fa-
vor of the proposed limited nuclear test-ban
treaty. He had backed such proposals since
his years as chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission in the Eisenhower administra-
tion.
Nevertheless, because of his desire that the
facts should be known as fully as possible, he
furnished a CIA staff expert to assist Senator
JOHN STENNIS, Democrat, of Mississippi,
chairman of an armed services subcommittee
and an opponent of the treaty. This angered
the White House and the State Department,
but it was consistent with Mr. McCone's view
of the CIA's role in informing the Govern-
ment as fully as possible.
It is in this kind of intellectual effort to
separate fact from fancy, evidence from sus-
picion, decision from preference, opinion
from policy, and consequence from guess
that effective control of the CIA must begin,
in the opinion of most -of those who have
been surveyed by the New York Times.
And it is when these qualities have been
lacking, the same officials and experts believe,
that the CIA most often has become involved
In those activities that have led to widespread
charges that it is not controlled, makes its
own policy and undermines that of its politi-
cal masters.
Inevitably, the contrast is drawn between
John McCone and Allen W. Dulles, one of
the most charming and imaginative men irt
Washington, under whose direction the CIA
grew to its present proportions and impor-
tance.
A GAMBLING MAN
Digging a wiretap tunnel from West to
East Berlin, flying spy planes beyond the
reach of antiaircraft weapons over the Soviet
Union, and finding a Laotian ruler in the
cafes of Paris were romantic projects that
kindled Mr. Dulles' enthusiasm. Sometimes
the profits were great; sometimes the losses
were greater.
To Allen Dulles, a gambling man, the possi-
bility of the losses were real but the chance
of success was more important.
A 20-percent chance to overthrow a leftist
regime in Guatemala through a CIA-spon-
sored invasion was all he wanted to give it
a try. He charmed President Eisenhower
with tales of extraordinary snooping on such
rulers as President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the
United Arab Republic and with accounts of
the romantic derring-do of Kermit Roosevelt
in arousing Iranian mobs against Mohammed
Mossadegh to restore the Shah to his throne.
As long as his brother, John Foster Dulles,
was Secretary of State, Allen Dulles had no
need to chafe under political "control." The
Secretary had an almost equal fascination for
devious, back-alley adventure in what he saw
as a worldwide crusade.
PERSONAL JUDGMENTS
Neither brother earned his high reputation
by taut and businesslike administration.
Both placed supreme confidence in their per-
sonal judgments.
Colleagues recall many occasions on which
Allen Dulles would cut off debate about, say,
the intentions of a foreign head of state
with the remark: "Oh, I know him person-
ally. He would never do that sort of thing."
Allen Dulles was also an accomplished poli-
tician. Throughout his regime he main-
tained the best of relations with the late
Clarence Cannon of Missouri, who as chair-
man of the House Appropriations Committee,
was the key figure in providing CIA funds.
Mr. Dulles kept personal control of the
selection of other Members of Congress with
responsibility for overseeing the CIA, with
the result that he invariably had on his side
those Members of the Congressional estab-
lishment who could carry the rest of Con-
gress with them.
Thus, in the Dulles period at the CIA, there
was a peculiar set of circumstances. An ad-
venturous Director, inclined to rely on his
own often extremely good and informed in-
tuition, widely traveled, read, and experi-
enced, with great prestige and the best con-
nections in Congress, whose brother held the
second highest office in the administration,
and whose President completely trusted and
relied upon both, was able to act almost at
will and was shielded from any unpleasant
consequences.
KENNEDY KEPT HIM /N OFFICE
When the Eisenhower administration came
to an end in 1961, Allen Dulles' reappoint-
ment was one of President Kennedy's first
acts. Mr. Dulles, like J. Edgar Hoover, who
was reappointed head of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation at the same time, had great
prestige and was thought to lend continuity
and stability to the new administration.
In fact, Mr. Dulles' continuance in office
set the stage for the Bay of Pigs and the
great crisis of the CIA.
In that incredible drama of 1961, it was
Mr. Dulles' weaknesses as CIA Director?
rather than, as so often before, his
strengths?that came to the fore. He was
committed to the Cuba invasion plan, at all
costs, against whatever objections. The ad-
vocate overcame the planner.
As President Kennedy and others inter-
posed reservations and qualifications, Mr.
Dulles and his chief lieutenant, Richard M.
Bissell, made whatever changes were required
In order to keep the plan alive. For in-
stance, they switched the landing site from
the Trinidad area to the Bay of Pigs, to
achieve more secrecy, thereby accepting an
inferior beachhead site and separating the
refugee force of invaders from the Escarn-
bray Mountains, where they were supposed to
Operate as guerrillas, by 80 miles of swamp.
Above all, lacking his old rapport with
President Eisenhower and his brother, lack-
ing a coldly objective approach to his plan,
Mr. Dulles never realized that President
Kennedy suffered from more than tactical
reservations.
These misgivings?in reality a reluctance
to approve the invasion?forced the frequent
changes in plans, each weakening the whole,
until whatever chance of success there might
have been was gone.
AT A CRITICAL HOUR
It was John McCone who replaced Allen
Dulles at the CIA's most critical hour. After
the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it had barely escaped
dismemberment or at least the divorce
of its Intelligence and Operations Divisions.
There were also new cries for greater control,
and the men around President Kennedy were
suspicious of, if not hostile to, the Agency.
Like Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone devoted much
energy to resisting a formal congressional
watchdog committee, to courting the senior
members of the Armed Services and Appro-
priations Committees on Capitol Hill and to
converting the members of a resuscitated
Presidential advisory board to his view of
intelligence policies.
But those who observed him work believe
he also brought a keen intelligence and
energy to a tough-minded administration of
the Agency itself and to careful, challenging
study of its intelligence estimates and
recommendations.
He broke down the rigid division between
operations and analysis that had kept the
CIA's analysts?incredible as it seems?ig-
norant of the Operations Division's specific
plan to invade Cuba. And he began to sub-
ject the CIA's own action programs to vigor-
ous review and criticism by the Agency's
own experts.
INCISIVE QUESTIONS
The intellectual level of meetings among
intelligence officials at the CIA and other
agencies improved greatly under Mr. McCone,
primarily because he put difficult and in-
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cisive questions to those preparing formal
analyses and plans, forcing them to chal-
lenge and defend their own judgments.
Above al, he set the hard example himself
of putting aside personal preference, in-
formed gussses and long gambles in favor of
realistic weighing of available evidence and
close adherence to administration policy.
He brought specialists and experts into
conferences and decisionmaking at a much
higher level of policy than before. Often
he took such men with him to meetings at
the Cabin et level. This exposed them to
policy cor.siderations as never before, and
put policy nakers more closely in touch with
the experts on whose "facts" they were
acting.
As Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
Board?a group that brings together rep-
resentatives from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the State Department's intelligence
unit and others?Mr. McCone won a reputa-
tion for objectivity by frequently overruling
the proporals of his own Agency, the CIA.
SOIVIE CRITIC/SM, TOO
His regnie was not without its critics.
Many officials believe he narrowed the CIA's
range of interests, which was as wide as the
horizons t nder the imaginative Allen Dulles.
For instance, they say, he was slow to mo-
bilize the CIA to obtain information about
nuclear pi ograms in India, Israel, and other
nations. ?
Mr. McCone also tried, but failed, to end
interagency rivalries. He spent much time
In bitter dispute with Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara about divisions of labor
and costs in technological programs and
about chans of command in Vietnam. He is
reported 10 have feared the growth of the
Defense Intelligence Agency as an invasion
of CIA territory.
With the State Department, too, rivalry
continued?and still does. Much of this can
be attributed, on the diplomats' side, to the
CIA's readier access to the upper levels of
Government and to its financial ability to
underwrit; the kind of research and field
operations that State would like to do for
itself.
On the Agency's side, there is undoubtedly
some rese atment at the State Department's
recently increased political control of CIA
operations. For instance, until April 28,
1965, the (lay President Johnson ordered the
Marines into Santo Domingo, the CIA had
reported the possibility of a rebellion and it
knew of taree Communist-controlled groups
functioning in the Dominican Republic, but
the Agency had not suggested an imminent
threat of E. Communist takeover.
When tae President and his advisers be-
came pers _laded that there was such a threat,
however, CIA agents supplied confirming in-
telligence?some of it open to challenge by
an alert reader. CIA officials seem a little
red faced about this compliance, and the in-
timation is that the CIA may have gone over-
board in trying not to undermine but to
substanticte a political policy decision.
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF POLICY
Mr. McCone's pride and the fierce loyalty
to the Agsncy that he developed made him
resentful of congressional and public criti-
cism, not always to his own advantage.
Nevertheless, as a result of his single-minded
efforts to control himself and his Agency,
other former members of the Kennedy ad-
ministration?many of whom opposed his
appointment?now find it hard to recall any
time when Mr. McCone or the CIA in his time
overstepped the bounds of policy deliber-
ately.
Thus, they are inclined to cite him as proof
of the theory that in the process of Govern-
ment men are more important than mechan-
ics?and in support of the widespread
opinion among present and former officials
that the problem of controlling the CIA must
begin with men inside the Agency itself.
The far more general belief is that Con-
grecs ought to have a much larger voice in
the control of the Agency. This belief is
reinforced by the fact that the congressional
control that now exists is ill-informed, in the
hands of a chosen few, subject to what the
Agency wishes to tell even these few, and
occasionally apathetic.
There are four subcommittees of the Sen-
ate and House Armed Services and Appro-
priations Committees to which the Director
reports.
Mr. McCone met about once a month with
the subcommittees. The present Director,
Adm. William F. Raborn, meets with them
somewhat more often.
CONFLICTING VIEWS
There are conflicting opinions on the val-
ue of these sessions. Some who participate
say that they are "comprehensive," that the
Director holds back nothing in response to
questions, that he goes into "great detail on
budget and operations" and is "brutally
frank." Others say that "we are pretty well
filled in" but that the subcommittees get
no precise information on the budget or the
number of employees and that the Director
reveals only as much as he wants to.
_These conflicting views probably reflect
the composition and interests of the sub-
committees. Those on the Senate side
are said to be "lackadaisical" and "apathet-
ic," with some Senators not wanting to know
too much. The House subcommittees are
said to be "alert, interested and efficient,"
with members insisting on answers to ques-
tions.
Representative GEORGE H. MAHON, Demo-
crat, of Texas, chairman of the House Ap-
propriations Comimttee, has warned the ad-
ministration it must itself police the CIA
budget more stringently than that of any
other agency because he and other Congress-
men believe they should protect the sensi-
tive CIA budget, as it comes to them, from
the congressional economy bloc and the
Agency's more determined critics.
As a result of this and other congressional
representations, the CIA "slush fund" for
emergencies has been reduced below $100
million. Ana?much to Mr. McCone's an-
noyance?President Johnson's economy
drives resulted in an administration reduc-
tion in the Agency's budget.
Three things, however, are clear about this
congressional oversight.
NO REAL CONTROL
One is that the subcommittee members
exercise no real control because they are
not informed of all covert operations, either
before or after they take place.
The second point regarding congressional
oversight is that a handful of men like Sen-
ators CANNON and RUSSELL with their great
prestige, do not so much control the CIA
as shield it from its critics.
Finally, even these establishment watch-
dogs can be told just as much as the CIA
Director thinks they should know. In fact,
one or two of the subcommittee members are
known to shy away from too much secret in-
formation, on the ground that they do not
want either to know about "black" opera-
tions or take the chance of unwittingly dis-
closing them.
For all these reasons, there is a large body
of substantial opinion?in and out of Con-
gress?that favors more specific monitoring
of intelligence activity.
The critics insist that Congress has a duty
periodically to investigate the activities of
the CIA and other intelligence arms; to check
on the CIA's relations with other executive
departments, study its budget and exercise
greater and more intelligent oversight than
the present diffused subcommittees, which
operate without staff and with little or no
representation from members most con-
cerned with foreign affairs.
9123
A FOUNTAIN OF LEAKS
But the overwhelming consensus of those
most knowledgeable about the CIA, now and
in the past, does not support the idea that
Congress should "control" the CIA. A num-
ber of reasons are adduced:
Security. Congrecs is the well-known
fountain of more leaks than any other body
In Washington. The political aspirations of
and pressures on Members make them eager
to appear in print; they do not have the
executive responsibility weighing on them,
and many CIA operations could provide
dramatic passages in campaign speeches.
Politics. Any standing committee would
have to be bipartisan. This would give
minority party members?as well as dis-
sidents in the majority?unparalleled oppor-
tunities to learn the secrets of the executive
branch and of foreign policy, and to make
political capital of mistakes or controversial
policies. Republicans, for instance, armed
with all the facts and testimony that investi-
gation could have disclosed, might well have
wrecked the Kennedy administration after
the Bay of Pigs.
The Constitution. The CIA acts at the di-
rection of the President and the National
Security Council. If a congressional com-
mittee had to be informed in advance of
CIA activities, covert and overt, there might
well be a direct congressional breach of the
constitutional freedom of the executive
branch and of the President's right to con-
duct foreign policy.
Control. If a carefully chosen committee
conscientiously tried to avoid all these
dangers, it could probably exercise little real
"control" of the kind critics desire. At best,
for instance, it could probably do little more
than investigate some questionable opera-
tions in secrecy and after they had taken
place, and then report privately to the Presi-
dent, who might or might not respond.
Ideology. Congress is full of "professional
anti-Communists" and has not a few "pro-
fessional liberals." In its worldwide activi-
ties, the CIA regularly takes covert actions
that would profoundly offend either or
both?for instance, supporting some non-
Communist leftist against a military regime,
or vice versa. To report this kind of activity
to Congress would be certain to set off public
debate and recriminations and lay a whole
new set of domestic political pressures on the
agency.
Policy. Knowledgeable men in Washing-
ton do not accept the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy as a desirable model for over-
sight of the CIA. They point out that the
Atomic Energy Committee has developed its
own staff of experts in its field, in some
cases abler men than those in the Atomic
Energy Commission, and these congressional
experts now have a vested interest in their
own ideas of atomic policy and projects.
AN EMP/RE FORESEEN
This, these sources fear, would be the out-
come of a joint committee on intelligence?
a new intelligence empire on Capitol Hill
that could in time exert a direct policy in-
fluence on the CIA, separate from and chal-
lenging the President's policy decisions.
This would diffuse rather than focus power
over the Agency and confuse rather than
clarify the problem of control.
Other recommendations for a congres-
sional intervention have been advanced.
The most drastic?and in some ways the
most interesting?would be to legislate the
separation of the CIA's intelligence and
analysis function from the operations or
"dirty tricks" function.
President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs,
rejected a proposal to create a new and au-
tonomous intelligence and analysis agency.
This plan would have covert political opera-
tions under a small and largely anonymous
section of the State Department,
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9124 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 3, 1936
EFFICIENCY DROP FEARED
If accepted, this plan would have had the
great advantage, in terms of control, of di-
vorcing "black" operators and their schemes
from the source of information on which
the decision to act must be made. Thus,
the covert operators would have no more in-
formation than anyone else in government,
no power to shape, color, withhold, or man-
ufacture information, and could, in effect,
do only what they were told to do by politi-
cal authorities.
It would also reduce the sheer size and
power of the CIA within the Government,
much of which is based on its combination
of functions?providing information, pro-
posing action, and having the ability to
carry it out.
On the other hand, as Mr. Kennedy con-
cluded, such a divorce might well lower the
total overt and covert efficiency of the intel-
ligence effort. Those who favor the present
combined agency insist that intelligence and
action officers must be close enough to ad-
vise one another?with analysts checking
operators, but also profiting from the opera-
tors' experiences in the field.
Moreover, they point out that so-called
paramilitary operations are more easily
transferred on paper than in fact to the De-
fense Department. They note that the De-
partment, for instance, can by law, ship arms
only to recognized governments that under-
take certain obligations in return, and can-
not legally arm or assist, say, rebel groups
or mercenaries, even for laudable purposes.
Nor could the Defense Department easily
acquire the skill, the convenient "covers,"
the political talents, and bureaucratic flexi-
bility required for quick, improvised action
in time of crisis.
As evidence of that, there is the case of
the successful political and military organi-
zation of hill tribesmen in Vietnam carried
out by the CIA some years ago. When the
Army won control of the operation in a
bureaucratic infight, the good beginning was
lost in a classic bit of military mismanage-
ment and the tribal project collapsed.
As for the State Department's taking over
covert operations, the opponents ask how
could the Department survive the inevitable
exposure of some bit of political skulduggery
in some other country, when it is supposed
to be the simon-pure vessel of the United
States proper diplomatic relations?
A LESS DRASTIC PLAN
A far less drastic but perhaps more feasi-
ble approach would be to add knowledge-
able congressional expl in foreign affairs
to the military and app opriations subcom-
mittees that now check on the CIA.
Along this line is the idea backed by Sen-
ato:r MCCARTHY?that a subcommittee of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
should be added to the existing watchdogs.
Such men as J. W. Ftmarticm,,Democrat, of
Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, MIKE MANSFIELD Of
Montana, the Senate Democratic leader, and
GEORGE D. AIKEN of Vermont, a Republican
member of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, might bring greater balance and sensi-
tivity to the present group of watchdog sub-
committees.
Most of those interviewed in the New York
Times survey for these articles also believed
that the CIA should have no influence on the
selection of members of the subcommittees.
While the excuse for giving the Agency a
voice is to make sure that only "secure" and
"responsible" Members of Congress are
chosen, the net effect is that the Agency usu-
ally manages to have itself checked by? its
best friends in Congress and by those who
can best shield it from more critical Mem-
bers like Senator MCCARTHY and Senator
MANSFIELD.
FUND SLASH PROPOSED
Finally, many observers consider that it
might be useful for some select nonperma-
nent committee of independent-minded
Members of Congress to make a thorough,
responsible study of the whole intelligence
community. Such a group might set out to
determine how much of the community's
activity is actually needed or useful, and
how much of the whole apparatus might be
reduced in size and expense?and thus in the
kind of visibility that brings the CIA into
disrepute overseas and at home.
One former official said quite seriously that
he was not sure how much the Nation would
lose in vital services if all the activities of
the CIA apart from those dealing with tech-
nological espionage?satellites and the like--
bad their budgets arbitrarily reduced by half.
A number of others suggested that it was
possible for a great many of the CIA's infor-
mation-gathering functions and study proj-
ects to be handled openly by the State De-
partment, if only Congress would appropri-
ate the money for it.
But the State Department is traditionally
starved for funds by Members of Congress
who scoff at the "cookie pushers" and the
"striped-pants boys." The same Members
are often quite willing to appropriate big
sums, almost blindly, for the secret, "tough"
and occasionally glamorous activities of the
spies, saboteurs, and mysterious experts of
the CIA.
As another example of what a specially
organized, responsible congressional investi-
gation might discover, some officials ex-
pressed their doubts about the National
Security Agency. This Defense Department
arm specializes in making and breaking
codes, spends about $1 billion a year?twice
as much as the CIA?and, in the opinion of
many who know its work, hardly earns its
keep.
But to most of those interviewed, the
question of control ultimately came down
to the caliber and attitude of the men who
run the CIA, and particularly its director.
The present director, Admiral Reborn, is
a man who earned a high reputation as the
developer of the Navy's Polaris missile but
who had no previous experience in intelli-
gence work. Nor is he particularly close to
President Johnson or to other high admin-
istration officials. .
so.
INAUSPICIOUS START
The admiral took office on a bad day?the
one on which Mr. Johnson dispatched the
Marines to Santo Domingo last April.
Admiral Reborn and his predecessor, Mr.
McCone, lunched together in downtown
Washington that afternoon, unaware of the
Imminent intervention. As they parted,
Admiral Raborn offered Mr. Malone a ride to
the Langley, Va., headquarters of the CIA.
But Mr. McCone said he was going home to
pack his clothes.
Those who know of this exchange have a
hunch that if Mr. McCone had accepted the
invitation and returned to the turmoil that
quickly developed in his old office, the his-
tory of the intervention might have been
different. Many are inclined to blame Ad-
miral Reborn, in any event, for the mish-
mash of hasty evidence the CIA contrived
to justify the State Department's claim that
there was a threat of a Communist uprising.
One reason the admiral was chosen, after
President Johnson had searched for 6
months for a successor to Mr. McCone, was
that as head of the Polaris project he had
shown great ability to work with and mollify
inquisitive Congressmen.
Another was that his military background
made him an unlikely target for charges of
being too "soft" or to liberal for his post.
The same consideration influenced President
Kennedy in choosing the conservative Re-
publican John McCone, and it is notable
that no leading figure of the Democratic
Party, much less one of its liberals, has ever
been the Agency's Director.
Because of his lack of experience in intelli-
gence and international affairs, it is widely
believed among present and former officials
that Admiral Reborn was chosen primarily
as a "front man." Ironically, the Congress
that he was supposed to impress is actually
concerned?interviews disclosed?because he
has not seemed to have the sure grasp of the
Agency's needs and activities that would
most inspire confidence in it.
RABORN DEFENDED
Knowledgeable sources say the CIA itself,
In its day-to-day business, is a bureaucracy
like any other, functioning routinely what-
ever the quality of its leadership. These
sources argue that the experience and pro-
fessionalism of its staff are so great that any
lack of these qualities in Admiral Reborn is
scarcely felt.
But they do not agree that "Red" Reborn
is just a front man. He is different?as would
be expected?from any Director who pre-
ceded him, but there is evidence available to
suggest that he may not be such an un-
fortunate choice as has been suggested in a
number of critical articles in the press.
The admiral is said to have President
Johnson's confidence, although in a different
way from the confidence President Kennedy
placed in Mr. McCone. The latter was a
valued member of the group that argued out
high policy and influenced the President's
decisions, not with facts but also with opin-
ions and recommendations.
Admiral Reborn is said to to make little
effort to exert such an influence on policy.
Partly, this is because Mr. Johnson appar-
ently does not want the CIA Director in such
a role?and among those interviewed by the
New York Times there was a belief that one
reason John McCone left the post was that he
could not play as influential a role as he had
In the Kennedy administration.
The main reason for the admiral's ap-
proach, however, is his Navy background. He
regards himself as having more of a service
and staff mission than a policymaking job.
He believes it is his duty to lay the best
available facts before the President and
those other high officials who make or in-
fluence policy, so that their judgments may
be as informed as possible. To enter into
policy discussions as an advocate, in his view,
would inevitably compromise his role as an
impartial and objective source of infor-
mation.
Among knowledgeable officials, moreover,
Admiral Reborn is credited with at least two
administrative developments within the
Agency?both stemming, again, from his
Navy background.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
He has installed an operations center, not
unlike a military command post or a Navy
ship's "combat information center." In it,
round-the-clock duty officers constantly
monitor communications of every sort. They
can instantly communicate with the White
House, State Department, Pentagon, and
agents in the field, by means of the Agency's
wizardry with machines and electronics.
This represents primarily a drawing to-
gether and streamlining of capabilities the
Agency already had, but it is rated as a posi-
tive advance in CIA efficiency.
The other Raborn innovation is a Navy-
like system of long-range management plan-
ning. He has assigned a group of officials to
"look ahead" for decades at the shape of the
world to come.
Out of this continuing study, the admiral
hopes to be able to make more precise plans
for the Agency's needs in manpower, money,
equipment, and organization in, say, 1975, so
that it can be planned for right now.
There persists among many interested in
the CIA, however, a reluctance to accept the
idea that the Agency should be headed by
anyone other than an experienced, strong
executive with a wide grasp of international
affairs and intelligence work, strong ties to
the administration and the knowledge and
determination to keep the Agency's work
within the limits of policy and propriety.
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This concern has been heightened by the
departure from the White House of McGeorge
Bundy, n nv president of the Ford Founda-
tion. As :VIr. Johnson's representative on the
64-12 group, he was probably' second only
to the director of the CIA in maintaining
"control" and took an intense interest in this
duty.
Thus, if the White House replacements,
Bill D. All'oyers and Walt W. Rostow, prove
either less interested or less forceful in rep-
resenting the White House interest in CIA
operations, and it Admiral Raborn's alleged
lack of experience in intelligence and for-
eign affaPs handicaps him, effective control
of the Agency could be weakened without
any change at all in the official processes
of control.
PROMOTION DEBATE
Some people concluded even before the
end of th admiral's first year that the diffi-
culties ol finding a succession of suitable
CIA directors made it advisable to promote
impressive professionals from within the
Agency.
The most widely respected of these is the
Deputy Director, Richard Helms, who was
said to have been Mr. McCone's choice to suc-
ceed him.
Others argue, however, that intelligence is
too clangorous a thing to be left to profes-
sional spi as and that a loyal associate of the
President s with the political qualifications
for a ser.ior Cabinet position should hold
the post.
Whatever his identity, however, the prime
conclusion of the New York Times survey of
the Central Intelligence Agency is that its
Director is or should be the central figure in
establishing and maintaining the actual sub-
stance of control, whatever its forms may
take. Far if the Director insists, and bends
all his efforts' to make sure, that the Agency
serve the political administration of the Gov-
ernment, only blind chance or ineptitude in
the field is likely to take the CIA out of
control.
CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY
A number of other conclusions also emerge
from the .5tudy:
Whatever may have been the situation in
the past, and whatever misgivings are felt
about Admiral Raborn, there is now little
concern in the Johnson administration or
among former high officials, and there Is even
less evide ace, that the CIA is making or sabo-
taging fo::eign policy or otherwise acting on
its own.
When CIA operations acquire a life of their
own and outrun approved policy, they often
follow a.:?attern well known also in less se-
cret arms of Government. Diplomats fre-
quently say more than they are told to say to
other governments or otherwise exceed their
instructions. Foreign aid and propaganda
operations, though "public," can commit the
United Slates to practices and men in ways
not envisioned by Washington. Military op--
erations