MINUTES OF 9 DECEMBER 1982 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: LONG RANGE PLANNING, PHASE IV: SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 22, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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EXCOM 82- 7062
22 December 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
SUBJECT: Minutes of 9 December 1982 Executive Committee
Meeting: Long-Range Planning, Phase I'V:
Support Capabilities
1. The Executive Committee met on 9 December 1982 to review
the DDA's long-range planning paper on support capabilities. Mr.
(ExDir) chaired the session; participants included Messrs.
c anon (DDCI); Stein (DDO); Hineman (DDS&T); Fitzwater (DDA);
Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG); Glerum (D/OP); and Childs
(Comptroller). (AIUO)
2. Mr. Fitzwater noted the additions on security and
training to the original DDA paper and introduced to
highlight the paper. outlined the methodology used
and noted the paper focused on providing support capabilities for
two alternative Agency populations: E -1 He
stressed the need for a much more sophisticated support structure
in the years ahead. Continued emphasis should be placed on the
communications recapitalization program, computer security,
central ADP services, increasing training requirements, automated
support systems and growing space requirements. (AIUO)
3. summarized his reactions to the paper. He
did not vee the requirements to keep up with new initiatives and
to rebuild the DDA support infrastructure as either/or
propositions. He found a heavy emphasis on automation in the
paper but noted the lack of any qualitative discussion regarding
how automation will contribute to enhanced productivity. He
reiterated the conclusion from an earlier session that a separate
scientific computing facility would not be required.
concurred with the suggested increase in computer graphics and
the need to address. new means for data archiving for storage and
backup. He saw nothing dramatic in the communications portion of
the paper other than the acknowledged need to follow through on
the recapitalization program. (AIUO)
4. thought the training section overemphasized
automation. He suggested the need for management training,
focusing on techniques for generalists who manage specialists.
He also noted the need to broaden the focus on the
secretarial/clerical work force to include possibilities for
cross training and restructuring of existing job categories. Mr.
thought the security section was good in the polygraph,
countermeasures, and overseas support areas. He suggested
developing a stronger employee security awareness program. He
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found nothing innovative in the finance section. In the
logistics area, applauded the concept of an
interservices support agreement with the Air Force. He supported
OMS's suggestions for focusing on the impact of increased use of
computer terminals on employees' well being. He also noted the
possibility of including a gym in the new building. 25X1
thought the OIS portion of the planning paper overemphasized
artificial intelligence; he also qualified the concept of an
"uninterrupted exchange of data." suggested that an 25X1
employee population of about would probably be reasonable 25X1
for planning purposes for the coming decade. (C)
5. observed that the future themes contained
some interesting and not unfamiliar ideas, including giving
employees unclassified work to do while awaiting clearances, the
mobile crisis center, formalizing the operations support
assistant positions, and He found the
paper weak in outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the
DDA. He suggested addressing what the directorate needed to do
to attract and retain employees. Overseas service and rotational
assignments should be considered. The DDA should also develop a
strategy for developing support capabilities in nontechnical
areas, including social and psychological areas. He also noted
the need to focus on the impact of the national programs on
administrative support. (C)
6. Mr. Stein observed that the DDA paper seemed to
overemphasize automation. His main concerns were the need for
more people and funds and the seriousness of the security
threat. He saw maintaining appropriate compartmentation as a
serious problem. Mr. Hineman saw the DDA paper stressing closing
the support gap rather than looking ahead--a natural result of
the reductions in recent years. He believed more people were
needed to work on computer security and the polygraph program.
He was concerned about getting the right kinds of people in these
areas and suggested more DDA/DDS&T exchanges might help. He also
thought that the DDA should establish priorities among its
rebuilding needs. noted that when the Deputies were
asked to provide their space requirements, the resulting; list
exceeded the space that the will make
available. Mr. Hineman precipitated a discussion of the training
that will be required for the secretaries/clericals. Mr. McMahon
opined that the skill mix will change considerably, with more
secretaries/clericals functioning more as intelligence
assistants. (C)
7. Mr. Gates was concerned that the DDA paper had been
written in isolation from the personnel paper. He pointed out
that while other directorate planning papers focused on how to
accomplish their missions, the DDA and Office of Personnel should
force the other directorates to focus on people concerns. He
suggested that the DDA should be thinking about nonfinancial
incentives to attract and retain people. Examples included
physical fitness facilities, an aggressive health care program,
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legal counseling, and better use of existing space. Mr. Gates
thought the Office of Security needed to be revitalized. More
attention should be paid to personnel security. Considerable
thought will be required regarding maintaining security standards
in the midst of the evolving social mores of current and future
applicants. Mr. Gates thought in general the DDA paper lacked
imagination for dealing with the Agency's problems in the coming
decade. (AIUO)
8. Mr. Glerum acknowledged the resource dilemma of choosing
between rebuilding the Agency's dwindling infrastructure and
pursuing new initiatives. He supported the program outlined for
operational support assistants. He cautioned that categorizing
the Agency as a Foreign Service agency could have negative as
well as positive effects. He advocated that OMS do more
psychological assessments, particularly for people going
overseas. (AIUO)
9. Mr. Taylor regretted that the planning paper appeared to
call for more money and more people as the answers to all
problems. He pointed out that the paper did not discuss the
important relationships between support entities and other
components. Large charter issues, such as the advisability of
decentralized versus centralized computer support, were also
missing. As another example, he questioned whether ORD was
noted that, the information handling specialist who will be added
to his Planning Staff will focus on the centralized ADP support
issue and strive to anticipate developments rather than react to
them. Mr. Taylor thought some serious thinking was warranted on
what a central support capability should be. noted
the possibility of dividing the DDA into two groups of
activities: one people related and one oriented toward
"things." (AIUO)
10. Mr. Childs praised the many good ideas reflected in the
planning paper. He was not persuaded that automation would
become as pervasive within the next decade as the paper
indicated. He suggested including some ideas on management
training, particularly in the area of managing specialists. Mr.
Hineman noted a reluctance to obtain outside training. Mr.
speculated this was a legacy from the recent budget cuts
in training. (AIUO)
McMahon thought the discussion had fostered some
Mr
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good ideas worth pursuing. He agreed that the Office of Securty
needed to think more about the impact of changing societal values
on the Agency's security standards. He urged more attention be
paid to physical security in the wake of the growing terrorist
threat. He encouraged increased availability of medical services
for employees. He recommended that the Office of Training
prepare for the expected change in the mix of skills among
employees. He also emphasized that increasing the number of
polygraph operators could not wait until 1984. Finally, he said
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that he would like to see more on how to reinstitute a broader
Agency focus to the Career Trainee program. (AIUO)
12. advised that the Planning Staff would
summarize the planning process and develop a draft guidance
document for components. It will also evaluate the process. Mr.
then adjourned the meeting. (U)
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Distribution:
DDCI (Subject File)
ExDir
DDI
DDO
DDA
DDS&T
Comptroller
IG
D/Persndnel
Planning Staff
EXCOM Minutes
ER
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LONG-RANGE PLAN ?- .PHASE IV
SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
ADDENDUM
(SECURITY-TRAINING)
DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION
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During the next decade, the Office of Security (OS) must continue its
commitment to provide full and timely security support on a world-wide
basis; this within the framework of appropriate attention is new
requirements occasioned by an expanding population, changing staff
patterns resulting from the technological explosion, and maintenance of the
capability to service the "traditional" security disciplines. To do so, it
will be necessary to control, expedite, and generally modernize Office
functions through enhancement of automatic data and word processing
capabilities, realize growth in personnel strength and acquire space.
Among the major issues with which OS must deal in the decade beginning
in FY '1983 are: polygraph capability, computer security, technical
countermeasures, leaks, overseas support and the changing psychological
profile of the Agency employee.
The polygraph, as an investigative aid, has been and will continue to
be the most effective tool in the construction of the mosaic that represents
the basis for adjudication of security suitability for applicants, employees,
staff-like associates, contractor's employees, certain operational assets and
others. The tool necessarily is pervasive; the security of Agency
operations and activities is related directly to the trustworthiness of the
people who carry them out. The polygraph capability must grow and in
the near-term (FY 1984), the number of examining rooms will have doubled
will and the staff will increase by 7 examiners to= More examiners 25X1
e required in the mid- and far-term and recruitment will be
approached both through efforts to hire qualified personnel and
establishment of an in-house training capability. The first in-house
training class is now in progress and offers specialized instruction that
equals the quality of commercial counterparts. Since recruitment of
trained polygraphers is difficult, this in-house training capability is our
best hope to obtain and maintain an adequate polygraph service potential.
'Technical security threats and vulnerabilities will fire-ent a steadily
increasing problem through the decade, both domes! and abroad.
Technology that is with us or on the horizon represents a danger to the
Agency's security far beyond the classic threat of surreptitiously planned
"bug". Lasers, fiber optics, television, and the potential for ap-.'ication
of even more exotic positive audio technology. The Office of Security is
acutely aware of the problem and will receive funding in FY '1983 =or the
improvement and enhancement of current audio countermeasures tr; ining
and equipment. the future, OS will concern itself with researc-- and -La
development of The incr =:asing
complexity of positive audio capability and the deployment of CRAFT will
necessitate a need for an enhanced overseas presence of engineers and
technicians In addition, the OS operates and maintains the
This is the only facility in the U.S. Government
which provides I __1 and is open
to representatives from all NFIB agencies. The US' budget for FY 1983
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contains funds to begin a long delayed upgrade of this facility.
Leaks represent the most insidious and damaging form of unauthorized
disclosure and, as such, have been addressed on the national level. The
Office of Security, through representation on the DCI SECOM, has
supported the provisions and recommendations of the "Willard Report"
submitted to the National Security Council. Within the Agency, OS will
continue an attack on leaks and unauthorized disclosures in general
through investigation referral for prosecution when warranted, imposition
of internal administrative sanctions up to and including termination,
information control, enhanced physical security and strict enforcement of
security regulations. A primary goal in combating leaks and other
unauthorized disclosures of classified information is reaching and
maintaining currency in the reinvestigation program (RIP). The RIP has
suffered because of the necessity to apply limited resources to personnel
security functions of immediate and pressing priority. From a
counterintelligence viewpoint and in terms of a viable personnel security
program, the shortfall in the RIP will be reduced in the near-term and
must be eliminated in the long-term.
The OS overseas presence has been diminished from 25X1
people in the 1970s. to a current strength 0 The latter figure does 25X1
not permit rapid response and forces Headquarters-based personnel to
provide supplemental suppc-t that is neither timely r-_=- cost effective. OS
will be called upon to provide additional overseas support in the years to
come in proportion to new requirements, new activities, and the certainty
of expanded technical threat and vulnerability. To address this problem,
we are to lace 25X1
abroad I More 25X1
security personnel exposed to TF-eoverseas experience will nave the
ancillary benefit of the redevelopment of a balanced support capability.
In the security processing of applicants, OS has for some years faced
behavioral and attitudinal changes consistent '. th shifting mores and
lifestyle of the general populace. This will continue with exact direction
unknown; however, it can be assumed that motivation, personal standards,
values and conduct will be far different from those held or practiced 20
years ago and not necessarily similar to today's. This does not mean that
basic security standards will change; a person is either loyal and
trustworthy or he/she is not. What will change is application of basic
standards in the perception of security suitability; i.e., evaluation of
security risk as measured against a realistic understanding of societal
evolution. The impact on OS will include more difficult investigations,
adjudications that require a high de. ee of sophistication, and more.
complexity in determinations re Iat in ; to probationary causes and
reinvestigations. Further, since the Agency must insist on standards of
security eligibility that may not be readily found, OS anticipates that the
number of individuals processed to fill a single vacancy will increase.
Central to the future of the Office of Security is modernization. The
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Office oversees the development of the Community-wide, Computer-assisted
.Compartmentation Control System (4C), which is on track and will permit a
dramatic improvement in control and accountability of Sensitive
Compartmental Information (SCI) access. The ongoing application of ADP
to communications, centralization of records and access to record holdings
must figure as a managerial priority over the decade. While not all
security support lends itself to exploitation of technology, development of
ADP systems will figure significantly in the efficiency and productivity of
OS in the coming decade and beyond.
Computer security is listed as a major DA resource concern in the
body of this current study. We plan to double the current Information
Systems Security Group (ISSG) by 1985 and triple it by 1992. The
following programs areas. will be emphasized both in the re..r- and long-
terms.
NEAR-TERMS ADDITIVES (1983-MID-1985)
a. Finalize current drafts of regulatory issuanc -s (DCID, HR, HHB)
to establish computer security policy and standards.
b. Monitor all information handling systems procurement for
enforcement of fundamental computer security requirements.
c. Develop new audit trail techniques and alerting systems, for better
security management of systems controls and privileges and detect abuses.
d. Provide acceptable, reliable, and verifiable routine and emergency
destruction methods for digitally-stored data.
e. Use new technology to develop better access controls at:
1. The system level for both individuals and users, programs,
and other systems (via networks).
2. The file level for segregating user privileges.
3. The operating level to protect :.-,a systems's safeguards from
modification by privileged but u:,authorized users.
f. Develop for the Agency's more sensitive data '.uses:
1. . Online file encryption for produ,--ion libraries.
2. Improved Systems Management Facility (SMF) utilization and
report generation by system utilities in support of- the
security auditing program.
3. More positive control of privileged functions on Multiple Virtual
System (MVS).
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4. Wider use of check sums.
5. Control of hard copy at remote printer terminals and slave
printers in the Document Logging System (DLS) manner.
6. An in-depth understanding of the causes of spillage.
7. Control and monitoring of system programmers access to
system(s).
g. Build a personnel training awareness and screening program for
computer security and focus on data processing personnel and systems
users alike.
LONG-TERM ADDITIVES (MID-1985 AND BEYOND)
a. Develop innovative authentication method for more secure system
access control by 1986, including testbed development and prototyping.
c. ISSG, together with the Office of Research and Development, will
continue to support research in the design and development of reliable,
trusted information systems by addressing security hardware as well as
software technology development.
d. A priority effort will be to fund research and development
initiatives to explore hardware integrity verifications. Our security
interest centers in the development of methods of component verifications.
e: Research and development initiatives as well as development and
engineering projects must provide the hardware and software techniques to
satisfy new compartmentation and dissemination control requirements
stemming from networking, shared data bases and outsi:'~ users. ISSG
must actively foster these efforts.
f. Finally, we will maintain our support to the Intelligence
Community, particularly the new Department of Defense Computer Security
Center, in effectively influencing ADP manufacturers in developing
security "certified" hardware and software.
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Each Directorate has the responsibility for career development of its
employees. One aspect of- career development is training, and the Office
of Training and Education (OTE) must be sure that the full spectrum of
training, be it professional, functional, or skills related, is available to
supplement each Directorate career development process. Within this
context, the major concern of OTE over the next decade will be to deal
with change. This change will be driven by an expanded Agency which is
much more automated than it is today. The impact of the increased
numbers of new employees requiring training and the new skills that
current employees will have to acquire at an accelerated rate will force
OTE to change its product and the way in which it is delivered to the
Agency. An evolutionary shift of resources from broad educational
programs to narrow and specific skills training will take place. More
training will be coordinated for specific component audiences. The Off
Campus Program and Agency directed assignments to external- training will
grow in conjunction with the need to - upgrade the skills of our analysts,
technicians and operations officers.
A major change in the office setting will be the presence of a more
skilled, sophisticated, and competent clerical employee. Training and
developing the Agency's clerical employees to enable them to meet the
requirements of the automated office environment will become a high
priority requirement. To respond to this, OTE is developing an aggreQate
training and development program so that we will have a skilled
professional clerical work force in the future. As a first step, clerical
employees will receive up to two or three weeks' training before reporting
to their first assignment. During this period, the clerical will receive, in
addition to a general Agency orientation, specific training in office skills
such as the use of the telephone, proofreading, effective written English,
word processing, information handling equipment, and office security.
This program will be expai ded to help the current clerical work force meet
the challenge of automation and to help future clerical employees cope with
changing office automation. .
Training in Intelligence Analysis will become an integral part of the
DDI analyst's professional growth from EOD through mid-career and senior
analyst training programs. New analysts will enter on duty via a six week
orientation and training program which will be similar in concept but more
narrow in scope than the Career Trainee Program. Also, OTE is in the
process of working with the DI to formalize a two week training program
for DI Intelligence assistants, an econometric modeling course for non-
economics analysis, and to establish a course for the military analyst.
Information handling in all of its aspects will experience rapid
growth. The Information Science Center will experience difficulty meeting
internal requirements and maintaining an appropriate level of response to
Community requirements. As our experience in office automation grows,
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we will concentrate on integrating the factors learned from office
.automation into the current offerings of clerical, supervisory, and
management courses. It is too soon to identify spz-~-ific curriculum but,
for example, we will need to change our proofreading course, which
currently addresses written documents, to one which addresses
proofreading via the CRT. , In any case, we anticipate that over the next
ten years we will need to train four-fifths of our entire work force in some
yet-to-be-determined amount of automated systems use. This may
necessitate contracting out on the commercial market for instructors,
facilities, and equipment to accomplish this considerable training
requirement. OTE will need increases in hardware, software and personnel
to .provide training on specific major computer-based systems, such as
CAMS, CRAFT, SAFE, and for basic training in information handling
skills, such as word processing/office automation and use of the Agency
computer system.
Language training requirements will increase in response to
operational and analytic requirements. Language maintenance and
achievement awards will increase proportionately. OTE will need to ensure
the availability of the appropriate resources to meet o,r exceed
requirements placed on the Language School (LS) in the areas of teaching
and proficiency testing. In the teaching domain, the LS will strive to
make instruction more efficient and increasingly tailored to the special
needs of Agency students. The LS will develop and implement fixed
short-term advanced level courses for "2" and "2+" level students in
French, Spanish, German, Russian, and Chinese to ensure continual
proficiency maintenance. In conjunction with ORD, LS will continue to
develop a capability for Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI) in languat. .s.
And finally, the LS will continue its program of intensive survival
language skills and, if appropriate resources can be acquired, will expand
this program. In testing, the LS will continue to elaborate and refine the
definitions of proficiency levels and promulgate a government-wide
standard, improve the quality of oral testing through research and
training, and develop up-to-date tests of reading proficiency.
Operational training requirements will expand significantly requiring
additional instructors. To improve the quality of operations training
courses, the personnel and training resources of Operations Training
Division and . Cover Instruction Division will be integrated to more
efficiently conduct quality operations training. In consultation with
IMS/DO, a determination of the extent to which the CRAFT system should
be included in training courses for DO employees will be made. While
operational training will increase in volume and some of the tools used ~,,,
the case officer will change, the methods of training which have been
tested and proven through the Agency's history will not change
significantly.
During most of this period, properly designed and equipped facilities
will be a continuing constraint on the OTE. With the projected increase in
training requirements over the next ten years, it appears probable that
current planned classroom and conference space will not be adequate. We
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may have to keep some of our currently leased space. We also will explore
the feasibility of ? ?wilding a conference center at the Agency's property at
This site would alleviate the problem of using the
for other than operational training and
could also be used as a crisis center. In FY 1982, students
attended operations training courses, and II students conferees
participated in non-operations training courses and con erences 0
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO: D/Personnel
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
The attached is a supplement
to the DDA Long-Range Planning paper
on Phase IV, Support Capabilities and
will be discussed at Thursday's
Executive Committee Meeting at 2:30
in the DCI Conference Room.
EA/DDCI
Attachment
FROM:
7E-12, Hqs.
T-
ROOM NO. BUILDING
I N
FORM NO.
I EB 55 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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LONG-RANGE PLAN-PHASE IV
SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION
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