CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001300480001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

6 November 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. Id
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
C3 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXTREVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:,20,, - REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS review(s) completed.
//.
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
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GENERAL
Soviet ambassador fears adoption of EDC (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. Soviet anti-American propaganda steppeci UP .
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Chinese Nationalists hint at pressure on US (page 5).
Indonesian Communists exploiting United States tin policies
, ,/ (page 5).
'.Indonesian government party ordered to cooperate with
Communists (page 6).
8. Burmese report Sov'let commercial offer (page 7).
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EASTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on probable new government in Finland (page 9).
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GENERAL
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1. Soviet ambassador fears adoption of EDC:
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be adopted.
trast to his position last summer, appeared to fear that EDC would
In a recent conversation in Paris with
Soviet ambassador Vinogradov, the
French ambassador to Moscow obtained
the impression that Vinogradov in con-
Vinogradov repeated his earlier views
that the Soviet Union and France had a common interest in prevent-
ing German remilitarization, that EDC ratification is not in the best
interest of France, and that the two nations should consequently ex-
change views on the German problem.
Comment: On 8 August Malenkov made
a pointed reference to the Franco-Soviet pact as a basis for European
security, an idea reintroduced in the Soviet note of 3 November.
Soviet propaganda has similarly attempted to capitalize on French
reluctance to accept German rearmament in any form.
SOVIET UNION
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3. Soviet anti-American propaganda stepped up:
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Ambassador Bohlen has noted a revival
of Soviet "hate-America" propaganda
and a sharpened anti-American tone in
current output.
He points out that propaganda since
Stalin's death has been primarily of a general nature, drawing
the usual Marxist distinction between conditions in a Communist
state and those in the outside world where workers and colonial
peoples are subject to capitalist exploitation.
In Bohlen's opinion, however, the more
specific type of propaganda directed toward developing hate and
fear of a particular country, which was prevalent in Stalin's last
years, has been making a comeback during the past two months,
although it is still not predominant and still far below that of the
Stalinist period. He believes that propaganda of this type comes
to the fore in periods when Soviet leaders are unwilling even to
enter negotiations.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Chinese Nationalists hint at pressure on US:
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messag
Chinese Nationalist Foreign ministry offic al9 the also
contained a paragraph asserting that, Tin the event of continued
American,pressure endangering the existence of Nationalist forces
in Burma9 they would "make known to the world the relations which
once existed between our troops and the United States and let the
world pass fair judgment."
p o
g
e
The American embassy in Taipei has
been shown portions of a message, pur-
portedly sent to General Li Mi by sub-
ordinates still at Mong Hsat in Burma,,
American support of the Burmese. According to a
estin
Comment: The message may be genuine9
but might also have been invented or elaborated in Taipei. National-
ist officials in either place might well believe that such a threat
would induce the United States to relax its pressure for evacuation
of Li Mi's forces.
6. Indonesian Communists exploiting United States tin policies:
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American tin purchases are assuming
primary political importance in Indo-
nesia and have been seized on by the
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Communists as an issue on which to attack American policy,
according to Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta. The Com-
munists are encouraging the belief that the United States will
buy tin only to the extent that Indonesia is willing to make po-
litical concessions.
The ambassador comments that the
Indonesians have not forgotten the government crisis of 1952
over the question of American aid, which many of them con-
sidered was being used as an instrument of political policy.
He emphasized that falling markets for Indonesian tin and other
products might well lead to further social unrest which the Com-
munists could exploit.
Comment: The United States is about
to negotiate the third annual purchase of approximately 20,000
tons of tin under terms of a contract signed in March 1952. The
Communists apparently are trying to make it appear that the an-
ticipated decrease in price, which is subject to negotiation in the
third year of the contract, represents an effort to exact political
concessions.
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7. Indonesian government party ordered to cooperate with Communists:
The American embassy in Djakarta
confirms a report that the chairman
of Indonesia's National Party, the
major element in the present govern-
ment, recently stated that he had instructed the party's branches
throughout the country to "establish good connections" and co-
operate with the Communists. He said that since the Communists
were supporting the government in parliament, such instructions
were completely logical.
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Comment: Relations between the
National Party and th Communists have become very close during
the past six months,
T rough cooperation,
Communists have achieved a major voice in Indonesian affairs
while escaping the responsibilities of cabinet office.
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 8. Burmese report Soviet commercial offer:
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Kyaw Nyein, Burmese minister of industry,
told Ambassador Sebald that the Soviet
Union had offered on 30 October to provide
vehicles, medicines, building material and
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that the prime minister had issued instructions to prepare for negotia-
tions,
industrial equipment in exchange for rice, lead and beans. He stated
On the other hand, Kyaw Nyein expressed
the fear that his country was entering a Soviet trap and was concerned
that any trade agreement would lead to an influx of Soviet technicians.
He also indicated that an early American decision to provide Burma
with military equipment would do much to strengthen its anti-Comr?nist
orientation.
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Comment:
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It is probable that Kyaw yetn s remarks were ma e
primar-Ily in an effort to obtain American arms and to get help in
disposing of the current rice surplus.
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EASTERN EUROPE
12D Comment on probable new government in Finland,.
A coalition of the Social Democratic and
right-of-center parties is expected to succeed Premier Kekkonen's
Agrarian-controlled minority government which resigned on 4 Nov-
ember. Such a government, with a working majority of 106 out of
200 parliamentary seats, would be stronger than its predecessor
and be assured of the support of a large share of labor as well as
business interests. Its ability to agree on measures to solve Fin-
land's economic problems will be limited, however, by the wide
disparity of views on economic issues held by the members of the
proposed coalition.
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The Soviet Union has indicated its dis-
pleasure at the prospect that strongly pro-Western elements will
be included in the cabinet by bitter press attacks on representar
awes of the Social Democratic and conservative parties. Since
Soviet-Finnish trade negotiations are currently under way in
Moscow, the USSR could further manifest its disapproval by
engaging in dilatory tactics and attempting to force less favorable
terms on the Finns.
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