DEPARTMENT OF STATE STAFF SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300090014-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 3, 1954
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 Approved For Release 2fGV8A jEjtDP93B01I94RO01300090014-4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STAFFSUMMARY
CONTENTS
T.,4ay 3, t
FAR EAST Paw-
UK Views on " United Action! ? . ].
Nehru' s Position at Colombo 1.
Eden Nf;-~ssagc: to Col.oarmbo Concf? e Fitcci:... ? . .. ,. ? r.
Con-i rtuptist. Bloc united at Ge.nevi.... 2
Corxtrnurrist:Posit:ion. on Korea Ut,cleang< d,
EUROPE
Ne Gert z:i i Paper on Satan. , , . 3
Gert.nan Dissatisfaction with Western Policy..,.3
Italians Skeptical of EDC Prospce:ct:s., 4
NEAR E A S T
Co.rYS nee.r;:t. ont Egypt-UK Attitudes
t:,TNpT.ED NATIONS
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 Approved For Release 08ff CR RDP93B01 I94RO01300090014-4
UK Views on "United Action" The Secretary asked Eden
on Saturday if the British would notreconsi.der their decision and
agree now to participate in an ad hoc: group of ten nations with in-
formal talks starting promptly in Washington, The Secretary stressed
that as matters stood the French literally had no alternative to dis-
guised surrender, Eden's initial reaction was that he would give the
matter some thought, but he remarked that he had a dislike for giving
a public impression of talking about something which he was not pre-
pared to do, i. e. , intervene militarily in Indochina.
However, following a second conversation on this subject,
Eden seemed definitely impressed. The Secretary made the point that
we were seeking some form of military support of the French in Indo-
china which would reduce the drain on French manpower without call-
ing for replacement by Allied ground forces and he said he did not
believe this was beyond the military wit to devise, Eden indicated
that he recognized the distinction between fighting in Vietnam on the
one hand and aggression against Laos and Cambodia on the other He
also tentatively indicated his willingness to join a coalition which would
fight external aggression in an area to include Thailand and Burma
(which he was hopeful of being able to persuade to join) as well as
Malaya. Geneva Dulte 42 5/2 (TS)
Nehru's Position at Colombo .. Pakistan's Prime Minister
told Embassy Colombo April 29 that Nehru was putting the utmost
pressure on him and the Ceylonese Prime Minister to back Communist
China's admission to the UN and to agree to Nehru's views on other
controversial points such as non-intervention. in Indochina. The
Pakistan official said he had no intenti..Ori of. giving in to Nehru and
believed.he would continue to have the support of Ceylon, He also
said he came to Colombo only on the express understanding that any
decisions arrived at by the conference would have to be unanimous..
However, Nehru was now attempting to get the Prime Ministers to
agree to a majority and a minority report,
Colombo 340 4/3(, (S)
Eden Messes e to Coloinbo?Conference .- In a personal message
to the three Commonwealth Pr. ixne Ministers attending the Colombo
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 Approved For Release 2(T 1?8/ FrDP93B01194R001300090014-4
conference Eden assured them he would constantly have in mind the
desirability of maintaining understanding with his Commonwealth
partners and his actions would not be out of line with Asian opinion.
In a separate message to Nehru he noted the "interesting
suggestions" made by Nehru in the Indian Parliament and said he
would give them thorough consideration. He also told Nehru he had
made it clear to the US and France that the UK would be glad to
guarantee any Indochina settlement arising out of Geneva and ex -
pressed the hope the Asian Commonwealth members would do like-
wise, Embassy London was advised that the British were relieved
that Nehru's statement was much milder than had been expected
and that Eden's message was designed to keep the Colombo conference
more or less on the rails, London 4832 4/3t, (S)
Communist Bloc United atGeneva - Our delegation at Geneva
reports that to-date there has been no development at Geneva which
would tend to indicate anything but complete Communist bloc unity..
Both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist delegations are endeavor-
ing to create the impression that Communist China is a great power
which will insist on making up its own -mind on policy.
Our delegation believes that the utmost caution should be
taken in any statements attributed to official US sources to avoid the
implication there are major Sino-Soviet differences at Geneva. Alle-
gations of Chinese independence of policy can only contribute to .Asian
wishful thinking that Communist China is somehow more Asian than
Communist and can therefore be dealt with in a more reasonable way
than the USSR. Geneva Secto 45 4/3c; (C)
Communist Position on Korea Unchanged -- Our Geneva
delegation reports that the restricted meeting on Korea held Saturday
afternoon and attended by the Secretary, Pyun, Bidault, Eden? Nam Il,
Chou En-lai and Molotov did not show the slightest indication of any
willingness of the Communist bloc to modify their positions whatever,
The Secretary distributed a "memorandum of the principal points to
be resolved in connection with the creation of a united and indepen-
dent Korea. "
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 pproved For Release 2002/ / 1 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300090014-4
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Nam IL made a long statement rejecting any international
supervision of elections and demanding withdrawal of UN and Chinese
forces simultaneously within six months. Chou made the flat state
went that the war in Korea was started by the US and that therefore
the US was the aggressor. Our delegation comments that Molotov
was obviously sitting back and letting Chou and Nam I1 take the lead,
Prior to this Pyun stated he had no objections to such a
meeting and that he "now" had entire confidence that the US is not
going to "sell the ROK down the river. " He also said he had been
approached on two occasions by the North Koreans in an apparent
attempt to arrange a meeting between him and Nam Il.
Geneva Secto 69 (2 Secs, 5/2 (C) Geneva Secto 58 4/30 (C)
EUROPE,
New German Paper on Saar - The Secretary advises that
he is not incl eni to w ait much longer for US-UK joint action on the
Saar negotiations? He is not disposed to send a personal message to
Adenauer on this subject at this time,
Blankenhorn has given our Geneva. delegation a copy of a
paper representing the ultimate extent to which Germany can go on
the Saar. Hallstein will give the paper to Maurice Schumann today,
Blankenhorn emphasized that as a result of the total lack of action
on EDC and the Saar in the last six months Adenauer's position in
Germany was daily becoming more difficult and the tide of German
nationalism was rising, He mentioned that there were four elections
in Germany this year which would go badly for Adenauer and German
moderate elements if they went beyond the position expressed ?n this
latest. Saar paper, Geneva Secto 52 4/3( (S) Geneva Dulte 44 5/2 (S)
German Dissatisfaction with Western Policy - Our Bonn
mission comments that German popular support for Western policy
has diminished considerably since the Berlin Conference. Dissatis-
faction stems from the belief that the West, particularly the Federal
Republic and the US, are blocking all opportunities for the improve-
ment of East-West relations, Although most responsible German
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 Approved For Release 20 Ji2 g?P931301I94R001300090014-4
leaders do not share this conviction, it is otherwise generally preva-
lent and the Socialists are capitalizing on it, In the recent foreign
policy debate in the Bundestag, the Socialists showed they now con-
sider it politically advantageous to step up their opposition to US policy.
Bonn 3336 4/30 (S) 3350 5/1 (S)
Italians Skeptical of EDC Prospects - Italian Foreign Office
officials returning from the Paris NATO ministerial meeting are ex-
tremely pessimistic regarding the possibilities of French ratification
of EDC. These officials point out that no Italian government would
risk a major battle on EDC if it believed that the French would not
ratify the treaty. The draft law presented to the Italian Chamber on
April 6 has not yet been printed and distributed to the deputies, but
it is expected that the Foreign Affairs Commission's discussions will
begin the middle of this month and be terminated by the end of June.
Rome 3449 4/29 (C)
NEAR EAST.
Comment on Egypt-.UK Attitudes - Embassy Cairo believes
that a number. of. recent positive ac`ts by the Egyptian Government,
some of them of little consequence in themselves, add up to the
inference that Egypt is endeavoring to set the stage for resumption of
negotiations with the UK. Among such acts are: an outspokenly anti-
Communist drive; few public attacks against the UK; strong efforts
to maintain public order in the canal zone; a non-hostile reaction to
the official announcement of US military aid to Iraq; and more public
friendliness demonstrated for the British Ambassador.
Embassy London believes the UK is still sincerely anxious
to carry through on the new proposals,-I, The Embassy does not believe
the British intend to postpone a decision on Suez until the end of the
Geneva conference but simply until Eden's return to London, which is
expected within two or three weeks after the start of the conference.
Cairo 1374 4/3u (S) London 4841 4/30 (TS)
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 Approved For Release 201 /2SECREPP93B01I94RO01300090014-4
UNITED NATIONS:
L. `
ing some constructive action from the present SC debate on the Israel-
Jordan dispute whether or not the USSR vetoes and to offset the political
effect of a Soviet veto if it occurs, we believe the most desirable action
would be a consolidated resolution which, inter alia, would: 1) censure
Israel for the Nahhalin incident; 2) request the Chief of Staff of the Truce
Supervisory Organization (TSO) to make every effort to find those guilty
of the Scorpion Pass massacre; 3) decide to have a rapporteur of the
SC undertake a survey of what may be done to ensure respect for and
enforcement of the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement and to increase
the effectiveness of the TSO.
Views on Palestine Debate
in
oviet vetoes on the Palestine case and to warn Israel and the
Arab countries of the serious consequences to them if the Soviet veto
is permitted to sweep away the present restraints of the Armistice
Agreements, Beyond this, we intend to seek UK and French agreement
to a joint statement in the SC at an appropriate time applying the
Tripartite Declaration of May 1956 to the situation created by abuse of
the veto power. To New York 534 4/36 (C)
b e h We believe it is increasingly important to expose the motives
A S
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 .t. AMATAMTM7
NATO shipping problem toles' :,3WS,,ihar? MWPhy
Hughes, Roland R. Payment of certain additional war claims EUR;G R: JJReinstein
Max?P
h/G : JI~Ray nd
MCloy, John J. Gener_l tE Policy raard.ing the deposit of S; A.:RWSl iff
local c,.urrency funds in central banks and./or ?P
American branch banks
IV
The President Nomination of new Deputy tS Representative UNA:bBWatts
to the UN Disarmament Commission ~, Smith
(RECORD CLQMD 10:00 A.M., ,y 1, 1954)
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XWOMMMUMMMIMIK
 Approved For Release 2ffjP813t DP93B01I94RO01300090014-4
May 3, 1954
e Under Secretary
e Secretary
The Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISIONS
Date
Decisions by the Acting Secret
Action Office
ORAL
4/29/54 Indochina. Situation - reed in NSC that despite UK FE
unwillingness and without awaiting Geneva conference EUR
developments, the US should continue its efforts to organize
a regional grouping, including initially the TI3, France, the
Associated States and other interested nations, for the defense
of Southeast Asia against any type of Communist efforts to
gain control.
4/29/54 T1S Polioy Toward Iran - Agreed in NSC that If an oil NFA
settlement is still unachieved by Stine 1, 1954 and it appears EUR
the negotiations will fail, the TS will review. its policy
toward the problem, including giving consideration, to taking
independent action with Iran in order to bring about the
resumption of its oil revenues w .a stabilizing influence
tending to obviate the need for II5 emergency assistance.
4/29/54 lb Rubber Policy ? reed in IBC that ; 1) the lB at the Thihber E
Study Group meeting should indicate our willingness FE
sympathetically to consider in cooperatic with others the NEA
possibility of assisting natural-rubber countries to improve. ARA
their producing efficiency without making & precise commitment EUR
of the extent or means of such assistance, should decline to
participate in a rubber buffer stock agreement and should refuse
to free rubber at this time from the "china embargo; and 2) the
IEC Planning Board would study further certain other lB, courses
of action.
WRITTEN
4/30/54 NATO S Min Problem - Suggestedplal reply t~ the MM Director's EUR
goo cy memorandum an the shipping to be pro-allocated to Defense E
in the event. of full-scale mobil l.izaition, that the IBCS Back-
stopping Committee work out hear the matter Is to be presented to NATO.
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 Approved For Release 2002':fP93B01194R001300090014-4
Page 2
Date Decisions by the Acting Socretary_GJ Action Office
WRITTEN
4/30/54 FO Organization in To ro - Agreed that if approached by FE
Director Stassen we should: -. firmly oppose the establishment S/WA
of a TB Operations Mission in Tokyo and thus avoid the
resultant false impression of the size of our econcanic program;
2) suggest that FM and State consider the matter further in the
-light of recently received information from Embassy Tokyo,
4/30/54 Disposition of Enemy Assets - Informed the Budget Bureau of: EUR
IT our firm opposition to the further use of former enenr GER
private assets-pending a final decision on their disposition FE
and possible return; 2) our active consideration of the subject 'L
in view of the Secretary's belief that the TS should adhere to H
its historic policy of non-confiscation of enemy private property;
and 3) our continued opposition to any further use of the proceeds
of German assets to pay claims against Japan,
4/30/54 Fukur u Mani Incident - Endorsed the principle of a lump sum FE
settlement forthe victims of the Fuku. yu Maru incidents subject S/AE
to Congressional concurrence, and recd amended that Embassy Tokyo.. L
when informing the Japanese, also - e cT r the T1S. position A
on providing informations, examining evidence, extinguishing
further claims and obtaining a reasonable compensation figure.,
(SUUMAFY CLCISED 6:00 P%M,, April 30, 1954)
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