LETTER TO DR. JAMES B. RHOADS FROM JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300070044-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: May 16, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

.Approved For?Rel ;e 2002/08/21. ; CIA-OE$p93..#3O11'9
MRO OQO70,04 ;3
rxrcalvlaC of the United States
NNational.Archives and Records Service
Eighth and-Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.'.C:. 20408
Dear. Dr. Rhoads :
'Declassification guidelines have been promulgated to assist:
the revie?.rinsi- mff-fr-oxv-e ?f ., F..7F119~~_ _, _.
e ezm nation and specification of the dat~s.
on which such-.material shall become, declassified.. -~.
same necessary... When completed, this list will be
submitted to me for final d t i
y currently in,the process
of:? developing: a list identifying those. records which require.conti:-ued
classificaticn, indicating in each instance the reason why.. continued
protection is d d
y - . e custody of the National
Archives (NAR.S Record Group 226). The era
??.??. ..x~a v~L~iRtiG@Q oy. t!2e g nc'j .'s predcc^iSor organizati031, the
Office_ of Strategic Services and is th
-7-7"%-cu VL. J.Cers Co tre?
task of conducting a systematic declangi:-rent--r,,.,
.dv c.-a wii4 Ll..
possible use in the broader context..of.the government-wide declassi .
ficatio-n Droaram.. ..
tipeci.zica.tlfi in mind the
gu nco is also 1Iv a lira le
?ra...~.,.._ to related intellixerce records
? * z-;.-~x- a .._ ~ _ _ _ ?
~:. .. "'.'..-~ . Sincerely,
Enclosure
SAIC:CS;GFD:mj
Distribution:
Orig. Ads
2
/08/zi
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Central Intelligence Agency
Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals
1. OSS personnel identities should be protected only if it is
known that they continued their association with US intelligence organi-
zations or were otherwise involved in intelligence activities beyond
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GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RECORDS
General Guidance
The purpose of declassification review is to make available to
.the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the
obligation to safeguard national security interests, to protect
sensitive intelligence methods and sources, to avoid exacerbating
foreign relations, and to respect legitimate rights of privacy. Of
these, the matter of protection of sensitive intelligence methods
and sources will be of paramount concern in determining whether the
defense classification of OSS records must be continued. At the
risk of oversimplification, "s_ources" can be defined as the origins
of information and "methods" as the ways in which things are accom-
plished. Often sources and methods ut ize in pparticuu r programs
$re essentially inseparable and cannot be considered in isolation.
The Agency's declassification jurisdiction is limited to those
records for which the OSS exercised exclusive or final original
classification authority. If, as is likely, non-OSS documents are.
found in the OSS files, such documents should be tabbed or other-
wise noted and eventually referred for declassification action to
whatever agency exercises current security classification juris-
diction over them. Similarly, classified materials which were
received by the OSS from foreign governments or international bodies,
with the express understanding that the information would be kept in
confidence and that security protection be continued, should be noted
for future action but must not be unilaterally declassified or down-
graded.
(ut ;
If it is determined that a document must remain classified,
that could be released provided that certain limited portions
one or two personal names) were- excia d, this fact should be
noted or ha __workheet. This uid_ance will enable Nations chives
reference pars bnne pro; de san r d=7 sr to of__atha wi.s.-_a1ass3.-
ie ?cuments to r earch.er -_ansi-ghoul d_ he--done,-..al.thnsig u3=d
under the f Executiv-e Qrd~r ].].b5.2.
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A.
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the date that the OSS was disbanded. If, however, an individual's
affiliation with the OSS has been previously surfaced in open
literature, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the
classification of the document on the basis-of his post-OSS in
telligence associations. Document-s--not__dec1assified because-OSS
personnel are identified can be declassified-40 years after Che
pub ication o C e document: 0~
2. Coverr,_agents_identities, even though it is not clear
that they were witting of their OSS connections, should continue
to be concealed unless it is known that they have voluntarily
publicized their intelligence roles or were otherwise exposed
beyond any reasonable doubt. If in doubt, do not declassify;
protection of agent sources from compromise is fundamental to
the continued effectiveness of an intelligence organization.
Ideally, aoent_identities should never be revealed, but such
action would be impractical in the real world. Adequate pro-
tection can be afforded them __and their families if c4 meats
identifying them are.withhe d from declassification until
l_7
yea rs.-fCe~f~-t he publzca zQ~ date of the3ocument.
j 3. The identities of liaison Qf i~ers__frpm cooperat ng_
Foreign iatell-l genca or counterintelligence services should be
protected from disclosure. Declassification of such matters re-
quires the concurrence of the foreign government concerned. The
date that such documents can.be declassified is thus impossible
to determine.
4. If a contact in a foreign government is identified as
the source of information, his identity should be protected unless
it is clear that he was consciously passing information to a member
of the OSS in accordance with instructions from his superiors.
the document reveals a degree of collaboration between a foreigner
and the OSS, the disclosure of which could be a source of acute
embarrassment to him, its,classification_should_be continued. Do
nor -Lavor of declass-if declassification if any reasonable doubt
exists. The declassification date for such documents should be
75 wears after the publication date.
5. The identities of US private citizens who had furnished
information, or otherwise cooperated with, the OSS with the under-
standing that their role would be kept in confidence __shoul bee
accorded protection from public disclosure. In those instances
where they are notidentified by name, a judgment should be made
as to whether the source description is specific enough to permit
their identification. The date.that such documents could be de-
classified is, 7~_.years~ after the publication date.
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6. Individuals, particularly_US.citizeps, mentioned in
investigative reports or similar records, the release of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or a breach
of confidence, should be protected from disclosure. Though covered
also in the Freedom of Information Act, the need for protection in
national security related documents justiftes continued classifi-
cation. Such documents could be declassifiecL75_years after the
document's publication date.
7. Any report containing information, the disclosure of which
would place an identified or identifiable person in immediate
jeopardy--whether covered by the foregoing categories or not--should,
of course, continue to be classified. Such documents could be de-
classified 75 years after the publication date. I
Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods
1. Sensitive intelligence methods which must be afforded pro-
tection beyond the 30-year mandatory-review period include information
concerning or rp_uealing_fchnisies of agent recruitment, nonofficial
and other unconventional cover arrangements,. deception techniques,
method's gffcl"equ pment employed for covert cozy un cat ons tecFinical
siarve lance e and strategies, microphotogra,phic methods and
equipment, escape and evasion techniques, i.a., provided'that such
metfiods are "niot essentially z cal to those universally employed
by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that advances
in technology have not rendered such methods and supporting equipment
entirely obsolete. Documents containing such information must remain
classified as long as the methods are utilized in-operations, and
therefore it is impos~ ible to fix a date for automatic declassification.
2. Methods related .t ando~haiz._sup art activities--
as oppose o Intelligence co ection and covert action techniques--
adapted to the particular operations and circumstances of World War II,
do not i--tkems:elues. qualify as sensiti_ve_met`iods..-reo +~ Lr_Ln __c, ta.nued
protection.
3. Information with respect to the internal organization of the1
OSS, the chain of command, component functional missions and personnel
ceilings, and intercomponent working relationships has lost much of
its sensitivity with the passage of time. Moreover, a considerable
amount of this sort of information has already appeared in optE_____,,-1
literature. Documents dealing with the various cover organizations
created-or employed by the OSS, however, should continue to be classi-
fied for 60 years after the publication date of the document.
Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Crypto-raph
1. Communications intelligence, cryptography, and related
activities must be provided with protection from premature dis-
.closure unless technological im ov e h ve rea i e,
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their sensitive nature. Included are any data concerning or revealing
.the processes, techniques, technical materiel and equipment, particular
operations and overall scope of communications intelligence, and
cryptographic security. The date.for declassification of such infor-
mation, being dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore
impossible to predetermine.
2. Decrypted cables should be declassified on the basis of their
subject matter content. Modern techniques of massive computer attack
against encryted intercepts of World War II systems are so effective
that it must be assumed that any hostile intelligence service which
decided to expend the effort to retrospectively process the data could
have read the texts of cable messages.
Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content
1. Classified information contained in OSS documents and other
record media, regardless of the subject, the origin of which can be
clearly traced to another US Government agency, should not be de-
classified unilatera~-ily. Declassifying or downgrading action must'
await the decision of the agency exercising...current_d"-lassification
apt or t~ and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.-
2. Classified information which was passed to the OSS by
representatives of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
an,d subsequently incorporated into OSS documents should
fied unilaterally when it is apparent that this was the
fication of such material must await the concurrence of
government concerned, and the date for declassification
impossible to determine.
liaison
services
not be declassi-
case. Declassi-
the foreign
is therefore
3. Any information which would probably adversely affect the
conduct of present?day or future US foreign policy or inge national_
s cures ar.rang-ements if disclosed should not be declassified without
the prior concurrence of the Department of State and/or the Department
of Defense, even though the document and the information contained
therein is exclusively OSS,in origin. Declassification or downgrading
action must await the decision of the competent agency, and therefore
the date would be impossible to determine.
4. Biographic information of a nature that would be highly
embarrassing or compromising to friendly or collaborating foreign
nationals, the release of which would be likely to impair US re-
lations with the nation involved, should not be disclosed. Documents
containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years
after the publication date..
5. With the passage of 30 years, the reportoria' and analvti.cal
content of the bulk of OSS documentation wii ai ve lost whatever sensi-
tivity it once had. Illustrative of the subject matter which can be
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readily declassified are: translations or summaries from the foreign
press and radio broadcasts; prisoner interrogation reports; translations
or summaries of captured enemy documents; statistical data or other
purely factual reporting, with little or no attempt at predictive
analysis; information dealing with conditions prevailing at a particular
point in time, e.g., enemy order of battle, and thus highly perishable;
and any information which has been extensively and accurately reported
in the press or in other open source publications.
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SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS ORIGINATED
BY THE WORLD VAR II PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS OF. THE.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Director of Central Intelligence exercises exclusive
or final original classification authority over all documents
originated by the__ LoarAi na_tar of Inforn&tion COI) , the
0 "` e of Strafe icprvicesOSS and the_Strate is Services
Unit, SSU In light of the vo minous holdings o
~nereatter used to include COI and S_SU do.cum.ents as
well) in records of those organizations. which used-the OSS
product or otherwise dealt with the OSS, and in light of the
limitations of time and manpo-wer available for the 30-year-
review of World War II materials, this authority is being
delegated to a limited degree so that non-CIA intllig.enc.e
personnel can assist in completion o ask. The following
specia rules shall govern such review:
1. All classified do uments or other material above
described can be declassified, ~t those which, after
review, are determined to contain information of the types
in subparagraphs a. through k. below:
a. I rmation receiv- d_ n
intelli,g_enceervice through OSS liaison, whether
that liaison sourcing is. stated or only inferable.
b. Information which dis.c2 4,&a?s - _.ida nti ty
of fore 'a nnel in official liison with OSS.
c. Information concerning corrr~L i rati ons
intell'ezce, cryptography or related matters.
d. Information which names or effectively
reveals the identity of any__QSE_ssnsitive snT
_ ce--
human or technical, actua.2 or planned.. Classifi-
c~ L~rt~vt""be r d where any doubt exists.
(Note: Captured enemy documents and personnel,
refugees and casual informants are not to be con-
sidered as sensitive.)
GO -
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e. Information which reveals the n-
o.ficial. cove's status-frf pe.~fln1_ ~mp~-oy~d
the ass or the nature of theNOC_arrangement,
inc u in g he NOC name, title,, etc.
f. Information which reveals any of the
arnrslIlg menns involved in placing and supporting
OS5-personnel under official cover with any
degree of sensitivity at aching.
g. Information which reveals any aspect of
a ent_,5.p..o-t:Cing, recruitment, devglapmen-t, hgiL .i.ing
orzjup ort,__the assignment of tasks, '-the lemming
of requirements , --and the agents manner of response
and means of reporting_ orcontact.
h. Information. disclosing the e 'a and
a eratinycharacteristics a 'yes used
or under development by the OSS in support of
operations in the field..
i. Information disclosing the manner.and
degree af-financial support iven to_foreign
political organizations and movements, and the
means use to obtain and transmit such__;aug.p.ort.
j. Information which could adversely affect
the conduct of present and futur _~LS f ejfin
relations.
k. Information which conceivably could place
and _the_._l-i-#e--. any-individual.
in jeep
2. All of the documents exempted from declassification
g
under any of the above provisions of subparagraphs a. through
k. will be tabbed for further review by CIA officers No
down radingto Secret or Confidential is authorized by these
t .e inns .
3. All documents deemed to qualify for declassification
under the guidelines herein provided will be marked with an
appropriate stamp to show that declassification action was
taken under the terms of this declassification authority...
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12 JAtr1977
The following is a revised draft of the CONFIDENTIAL
paper "Guidelines for Declassification of nd Pr aeo-r
Attac-le - a-uggested madifl. -tion 0_form ` - 12, Declas-
sification Review Worksheet. It is submitted-for review,
prior to the 18 January organizational meeting, for comment,
suggestions, or criticism.
I. GENERAL
In accordance with EO 11652, all classified records
originated before the issuance of that order must be system-
atically reviewed for declassification no later than thirty
full calendar years from date or origin. The Agency is
therefore mandated to undertake the systematic review of all
noncurrent classified files in its custody, and all documents
in other repositories (the National Archives, Federal Records
Centers, Presidential Libraries) containing information
originated by or clearly attributable to the Agency and its
predecessors.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION
1. Under the provisions of EO 11652, Section 5B(l),
only two criteria exist for the continued protection of
classified documents and information beyond thirty years from
date of original classification: (1) continued protection
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is essential to the national security, and (2) disclosure
would place a person in immediate jeopardy. Documents containing
such information must be so certified, in writing, by the
Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the
United States. The official list enumerating.the documents
which require continued protection will be unclassified and
subject to public examination.
2. In addition, BO 11652 lists four categories of
information in documents less than thirty years old which are
exempted from general declassification provisions:
a. Classified information or material
furnished'by foreign governments or international
organizations and held by the United States on
the understanding that it be kept in confidence.
9 [Sec. 5(B) (1)]
b. Classified information or material
specifically covered by statute, or pertaining
to cryptography, or disclosing intelligence
sources or methods. [Sec. 5(B)(2)]
c. Classified information or material
disclosing a system, plan, installation,
project or specific foreign relations matter
the continuing protection of which is essential
to the national security. [Sec. S(B)(3)]
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d. Classified information or material
the disclosure of-which would place a person
in immediate jeopardy. [Sec. 5(B)(4)]
3. The National Security Act of 1947 charges the
Director with responsibility for the protection a Intel--
ligence sources and methods from unwarranted disclosure.
This responsibility is reemphasized in the CIA Apt ~__] X49
and expanded to exempt the Agency from any legal requiLnens
for the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency.
III. APPLICABILITY
1. These guidelines have been prepared for the
systematic review of classified material originated in the
1946-1950 period over which the Agency maintains exclusive
or final declassification authority.
2. The aim of the review is to identify documents
and information exempt from declassification under EO 11652
which must be segregated from parent files and be certified
by the Director as requiring continued security protection.
3. The following determinations are to be applied
in the conduct of all declassification reviews:
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a. Reviewing officers will familiarize
themselves with the DCI's "Aspects of Inl-l-
ligence Sources and Methods of the Central
Intelligence Agency That Require Protection
from Unauthorized Disclosure" (classified
SECRET), dated 12 January 1976. Although
this document has a contemporary focus, its
definitions can be applied to earlier intel-
ligence activity. As the most definitive
official statement on the subject issued to
date, it is included as an interpretive annex
to these guidelines.
b. The judgment of "immediate jeopardy"
will be made on the basis ofhi-a o r 11g
jeopardy of that of-political or social
~c The language of the CIA Act makes
retention of 'classification optional on
information pertaining to the Tsclosure
Y
of the organization, functions, names, official
titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency. The individual
judgment of reviewers on this material will
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be guided on precedents developed in the
course of past or-current review projects.
.d.. These guidelines will be applied to
all information originated by or clearly
attributable to the Agency and its predecessors
in the documents of other agencies, wherever
they may be held.
e. These guidelines do not apply to
documents and information originated by, or
clearly attributable to other agencies, nor
to the interests and equities of other agencies
which might be found in documents originated
by the CIA or its predecessors. Such docu-
ments and information should be identified
for further action by the agency of origin
(or its successor) unless declassification
authority has been delegated to Agency repre-
sentatives.
IV. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW ACTION
1. Declassification review action will be based upon
the systematic examination of discrete file units within
the administrative purview of each reviewing component.
P pem&al review of documents will be avoided. The integrity
of the file will be resp ted_ a all-time-s_._
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2. The primary record for all declassification
actions will be the Declassification Review Worksheet.
These forms will be used to prepare the lists of documents
which the Director will certify as requiring continued
or as part of a category, series, or group in a computerized
system. (The Agency has been advised that the Archivist
f identification for future retrieval either individually
security protection for the Archivist of the United States.
The information provided on the worksheet must include
enough basic information about each document to insure ease
..au accept certain series or documents on the certification
lists where an entire series clearly requires protection
component will establish a register which will identify
each project number.
o the declassification of that file unit. Each reviewing
eyond thirty years.)
3. Each discrete file unit under review will be given
project number. This project number should be used on
all memos, worksheets, reports or other papers pertaining
4. If a security sensitive document is located in
any file container, the designation of its folder or case
(if there is such) should be given before the document itself
is listed.
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S. Each security sensitive document should be identified
as to sender, receiver, date, file number, and any other way
which the reviewer believes will assist its later identifi-
cation.
6. In the exemption column, the reviewer will use
25X1
(t the letter "A" to denote national security reasons for
O
' ontinued protection and the letter "B" to denote reasons
of individual jeopardy. Exemption categories under "A""
')will be further cited by the appropriate number from
Section 5B of EO 11652 (e.g., foreign-originated material
not covered by existing declassification authorizations would
be cited as "A/1"). N7, X1(3 ~I/`f
7. The interests and equities of other agencies
of the U.S. Government will be concisely stated in the
exemption column (e.g., Army/A2).
8. Declassification of documents and information
received from foreign liaison can only be done as authorized
by the liaison service involved. The reviewer should there-
,gore list this exemption with an "L" followed by the country
involved and date (e.g., 1948).
'9. If there are multiple reasons for protecting a
document, all should be cited, whether Agency or non-Agency
in origin (e.g.,
1947; NSA/COMINT; Army/A2; DDO/B).
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10. The presence of non-textual records (microfilm,
photographs, motion picture reels, computer tapes, etc.)
should be noted in the "Remarks" column.
11. Unless the reviewer notes otherwise in the
"Remarks" column, all documents to be certified as requiring
continued protection after thirty years will be retained at
the Confidential level. (This downgrading need not be shown
on the individual documents until they are withdrawn from
file.)
12. Concerning documents and information over which
the Agency exercises exclusive or final jurisdiction, which
must be protected beyond thirty years, the reviewer should
cite a year in which the material becomes automatically
declassified (DC) or should be re-reviewed (RR). Decisions
on periods of time required for protection will be made
within the following limits:
Category
SSU
Personnel/Cover
75
Defectors
50
Security/Contracts
so
Finance
50'
General Intelligence
30
Operations
50
Communications
so
Science and Technology
50
Research and Development
50
Named Relationships
so
CIG
CIA
75
75
60
75
60
75
60
75
30
30
60
75
50.
50
50
50
50
50
so
so
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.These periods begin with the date of origin. of the classified
document, using the categories from the Director's 12 January
1976 determination on "Aspects". The time periods may be
lowered, depending on the content of the information under
review.
13. The "Remarks" column should be used by the reviewer
to denote special problems in the records under review
concerning the interests and equities of the CIA, other
agencies of the U.S. Government, foreign liaison services,
etc.; the presence of foreign language material; and any
unique insights helpful to those responsible for taking
further action on material in, which security sensitive
information has been located.
14. The columns marked "CIA" and "non-CIA" under
"Further Action" will be used to denote action by reviewers
examining security sensitive information from Agency components
other than that of the original reviewer and by reviewers
from other government agencies or foreign liaison services.
15. Each reviewing component should, if necessary,
develop supplemental guidelines pertaining to specific
problems present in its records that will assist the reviewers
in other components in their declassification work.
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V. PRECEDENTS
1. Agency reviewers should remember the transitional
nature of the 1946-1950 period for U.S. intelligence. While
the SSU was a vestige of the wartime OSS, thus meeting a
number of the same declassification criteria applicable to
COI and OSS documents and information through 1945, it
(and its successor, the CIG) constituted the nucleus of
postwar centralized organization and activity. While COI
and OSS records and information could be reviewed within
a "prosecution-of-the-war" context, with emphasis on declas-
sification and release, records of the 1946-1950 period are
an integral part of the U.S. intelligence continuum, in
which current and future equities can be affected by declas-
sification of earlier materials.
2. Past experience of CIA officials in reviewing
1946-1950 records for declassification under either the
mandatory review provisions of EO 11652 or the Freedom of
Information Act provides useful precedents to assist the
systematic review of such documents. These areas of past
decision are:
a. The organizational structures of the
SSU, CIG and CIA at the headquarters level
during 1946-1950 can be declassified except for
component breakdowns of those predecessor
elements of the present DDO.
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b. The fact of presence and activity
abroad by the SSU, CIG, and CIA is not sensi-
tive, but the details of location, organization
cover, staffing and activity abroad are usually
to be protected.
c. The functions and missions of the
SSU and CIG are not generally sensitive when
broadly described, but are sensitive when
related to particular areas and circumstances
or to specific capabilities and intentions.
d. The functions of the CIA in the 1946-
1950 period tend to be more sensitive than
those of the SSU and CIG, particularly with
the assignment of covert action by the NSC.
Covert action program details are to be protected
except where prior official disclosure clearly
dictates otherwise.
e. Names and official titles of personnel
in SSU, CIG and CIA during 1946-1950 are
generally protected up through Division Chief
in the DDO and Office Director elsewhere, with
selective exceptions based on prior disclosure,
cover and operational considerations.
f. Numbers of employees and size of
budgets are protected, as should be any other
quantitative factor indicating scope or thrust
of the intelligence effort of the period.
g. Estimative material published prior
to the formation of the Office of National
Estimates on 13 November 1950 is generally
releasable.
h. Situations and analytical reporting
of the period is generally releasable if sensi-
tive sourcing is not stated or otherwise
identified.
i. SSU and CIG reports are generally
releasable except for disclosures of sources
and methods, including sensitive foreign
liaison relationships. CIA field reports must
omit the source line, field report number and
place acquired in order to be. releasable.
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 Approved For Rele1 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO1,00070044-3
25X1
k. Pseudonyms, cryptonyms and codewords
are part of intelligence methodology, causing
need for classification on documents containing
such.
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-12-
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21.z CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300070044-3
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW WORKSHEET
Start ne.r sheet for each box. Use as many continuation sheets as necessary.
226 263
DATE OF REVIEW
(yr-mo-da)
ENTRY NUMBER AND/OR SERIES TITLE
r ---
^OCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
(include no. of pages)
DATE
yr-mo-da)
(
OR(GI,NAL
CLASSI-
FICATI0N
RECLASSf-
FIED TO
EXCAT
REASON FOR
CONT. CLAS?
SIFICgT10N
r
.
A DEUTCOL~`AaS~SIICFAI!E".Y
REMARKS D
~
ON 3i ^ECF. !f FiEP
1
3
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For Re
ease 20d
2/08/21
: CIA-RDP9
B01194R001300070044-3
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)CUM ,TT '
)r.TIFICATION
ENTRY NO./SERIES TITLE
NO. OF PAGES
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION
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DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE DELEGATION OF DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY FOR CIA AND PREDECESSOR AGENCY DOCUMENTS AND
INFORMATION ORIGINATED BETWEEN 1946-1950 TO DESIGNATED
NARS PERSONNEL
1. The Director of Central Intelligence exercises
exclusive or final declassification authority over all
documents and information originated by or clearly attrib-
utable to the Central Intelligence Agency and its postwar
predecessors, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the
War Department (1945-1946) and the Central Intelligence
Group (CIG, 1946-1947). In addition, the CIA has a
subject matter interest in documents and information
originated by or attributable to other agencies which
relate to the personnel, organization, functions, and
responsibilities of the CIA and to similar documents and
information of inter-agency bodies with which the CIA was
associated, such as the National Intelligence Authority
(NIA), Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), and the National
Security Council (NSc).
II. These guidelines apply only to documents and
information originated by or clearly attributable to the
Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessors and over
which the Central Intelligence Agency now exercises exclusive
or final declassification authority. Any guidelines and
declassification instructions issued by any other federal
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 agency oproforeign gove rnm/entl remain Pin B e1 ect an0T7Rgt4 jo be
applied to documents and information originated and clearly
attributable to them. The Central Intelligence Agency does
not exercise final declassification authority over non-CIA
material.
III. In accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order
11652, the Central Intelligence Agency delegates the
following declassification authority to selected staff
members of the Records Declassification Division (NND) of
NARS, after suitable briefing by CIA personnel. All
classified documents and information. originated by or
clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency,
its predecessors, and inter-agency bodies upon which the
CIA was represented which relate to the personnel, organi-
zation, functions, and responsibilities of the CIA (or its
predecessors), may be declassified, if dated between
1 January 1946 and 30 June 1950, unless the following
types of information is present:
(1) documents and information received in
confidence from a foreign intelligence service
through liaison channels, whether that liaison
source is stated or inferred;
(2) information which discloses the identity
(for example, by name, title or function) of any
personnel, including agents and liaison officers,
of foreign intelligence or security services,
irrespective of whether they represent friendly or
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 Approved For R se 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDp93B01194090 30 Q70044-3
(3) information concerning communications intel-
ligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (FLINT), and
related matters;
(4) information which names or effectively reveals
the identity of any CIA human or technical source, either
actual or planned;
(5) information which reveals the non-official
cover (NOC) of personnel employed by the CIA and its
predecessors or the nature of the NOC arrangement;
(6) information revealing arrangements for the
placing and supporting of personnel of the CIA and its
predecessors under official cover;
(7) information revealing the covert connection
of CIA or predecessor agency personnel with other
government agencies of the United States Government,
inter-agency boards and.committees outside the intel-
ligence community, and with non-governmental organi-
zations;
(8) information revealing any aspect of agent
spotting, recruitment, development, handling or
support, the assignment of tasks, the levying of
requirements, and the agent's manner of response
and means of reporting or contact;
(9) information disclosing the manner and degree
of support (including financial and administrative)
given by the CIA and its predecessors to foreign
governments, organizations, and movements, and the
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NMOI
(10) information disclosing the design and.
operating characteristics of special equipment and
devices used or developed by the CIA and its predeces-
sors to support operations in the field;
(11) information revealing the appropriation
and budgeting of CIA funds, the internal distribution
of those funds, and the techniques by which confidential
funds are secretly placed within the appropriations
for other government agencies;
(12) documents and information pertaining to
the letting of contracts by the CIA to private
businesses, commercial enterprises, or non-governmental
P
institutions;
(13) documents and information pertaining'to
the personnel, organization, responsibilities, and
functions of the CIA and its predecessors which were
originated by or clearly attributable to inter-govern-
mental multi-agency organizations upon which the CIA
or its predecessors were represented and/or to which
they reported;
(14) documents and information identifying
American citizens, businesses, and non-governmental
organizations upon whom the CIA was reporting;
(15) information which could have an adverse
current impact on the conduct of present U.S. foreign
relations, or present relations between two or more
foreign states;
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 Approved For Rate 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP93B0119401300070044-3
(16) information which could place an individual
in ,jeopardy.
IV. All documents and information exempted from
declassification by NARS personnel by any of the provisions
cited above will be reviewed by CIA officers. Routine
references to the CIA or its predecessors in the correspondence,
memoranda, and other papers which were originated by other
government agencies may be declassified. Classified documents
originated by the CIA and its predecessors are automatically
i
downgraded to "Confidential." This authority may not be
redelegate~ to any other component, either custodial or
administrative, of,NARS. No declassification authority
issued by any other agency of the United States Government
will apply to information originated by the CIA and its
predecessors appearing in documents originated by those
agencies.
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