CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001000250001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

DOS REVIEW
COMPLETED
31 January 1953
Copy No. 53
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2, Comment on plans for build-up of Vietnam National Army
(page 3).
3, Indonesian Vice President reportedly disturbed over Prime
Minister's contacts with Communist Party (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
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4. Yugoslavs accept necessity for coordinating Balkan pact with
NATO (page 4).
5. Closer Yugoslav-Turkish-Greek relations allegedly causing
trouble in Satellites (page 5).
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FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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2. Comment on plans for build-up of Vietnam National Army,
French
and Vietnamese authorities in Saigon are optimistically dis-
cussing plans for the rapid activation of some 40,000 additional
Vietnamese troops in order to launch a decisive offensive against
the Viet Minh next October. Plans for such a large increase at
this time appear premature in view of reliable information that
morale is very low in existing Vietnamese units, with a consequent
high rate of desertion.
The major weaknesses in the effort to
develop a Vietnamese army have consistently been the failure to
arouse fighting spirit in Vietnamese troops and a badly lagging
program for training Vietnamese officers. Typical of the problem
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of training was the recent discontinuation of a school in Tonkin
for training Vietnamese field-grade officers because the French
instructors were needed for active duty elsewhere.
3. Indonesian Vice President reportedly disturbed over Prime
Minister's contacts wit Communist Partyz
the Communist Party, and has pointed out the potential danger
of such contact. Wilopo justified his frequent consultation with
Communist Party leaders by asserting that if his party did not
accept the cooperation of the Communists, the latter might
assist the Socialist Party in the coming elections.
Indonesian Vice President Hatta has
expressed to Prime Minister Wilopo
his concern over the close cooperation
of the latter and his National Party with
Comment. This is the first report that
the Prime Minister has been consulting with the Communist Party.
EASTERN EUROPE
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4. Yugoslavs accept necessity for coordinating Balkan pact with NATO.-
Turkish defense agreement would have to be coordinated with NATO
because of Greek and Turkish obligations to that organization. The
Yugoslavs also stated that, for "internal and external reasons,"
they themselves did not seek membership in NATO.
According to the Turkish Ambassador in
Belgrade, Yugoslav officials agreed with
Foreign Minister Koprulu during his
recent trip that any final Yugoslav-Greek-
Comment. The Yugoslavs previously
had pressed for immediate specific mutual security commitments,
but evidently now realize that NATO coordination is a prerequisite.
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5. Closer Yugoslav-Turkish-Greek relations allegedly causing
trouble in Satellites:
A high level Yugoslav Foreign Office
nffieinl has infnrmed the American
Unarge in tselga-aM 6114L 1 uVuatav
rapprochement with Greece and Turkey
is producing disintegrating influences within the Soviet Orbit.
? He predicted that the proclamation of a formal Balkan defense
pact would provoke widespread public demoralization not only
in Bulgaria but in Rumania, Hungary` and even Czechoslovakia.
The official speculated that this would
force the Soviet Union to seek means of convincing the Orbit
population of the aggressive nature of the alliance, to increase
troop concentrations,and to provoke frontier incidents along
Yugoslavia's borders.
Comment: It is unlikely that a Balkan
defense pact would have any substantial repercussions in the
Satellites. The official's observations may be designed to in-
duce the United States to give active support to the achievement
of such a pact.
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