CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A009500040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 16, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept., JCS reviews completed
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c 159
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' 16 December 1966
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16 December 1966
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
3.
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
USSR: Draft 1967 budget and plan suggest con-
tinuation of post-Khrushchev pragmatic economic
policies. (Page 4)
4. Spain - Northwest Africa: Madrid to propose
multinational development of Saharan mineral re-
sources. (Page 6)
6. Venezuela: Suspension of constitutional guarantees
may have averted military intervention in govern-
ment. (Page 8)
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Czechoslovakia;
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Turkey- Cyprus-
(Page 9)
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)
Communist Developments: The Communist bloc
has loosed a flood of sharply worded propaganda sup-
porting Hanoi's contention that US air raids on 13 and
14 December struck residential areas of the DRV
capital.
A Moscow broadcast referred to the incidents as
a "grave crime" and reminded the US Government of
the pledge by the Communist states at the Bucharest
conference in July to allow volunteers to go to Vietnam
when and if Hanoi requested them. Peking commentary
in the 15 December Peoples Daily charged that the raids
represented an "extremely serious new war escalation."
While belligerent in tone, the communications em-
anating from Moscow, Peking, and other bloc countries
contained no new threats or any pledges of new aid.
Political Developments in South Vietnam: The Con-
stituent Assembly has voted to incorporate in the con-
stitution provisions for an executive branch having both
a popularly elected president and an appointed prime
minister.
Preliminary reports indicate that the assembly has
provided for a relatively strong chief executive, who
would be empowered to appoint and dismiss the prime
minister without the approval of the national legislature.
The legislature, however, would have the power to re-
quest the president to dismiss all or part of the cabinet
members selected by the prime minister.
As envisaged by the assembly, the prime minister's
role would be limited largely to daily administration of
the government.
(continued)
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NORTH ?Dong Hoi
VIETNAM
1
Afft
Demilitarized Zone
SOUTH VIETNAM
25 50 75 100We,
25 50 75 1 0 Kilometers
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66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE LULLETJN Map
16 D
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The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Allied
combat forces continue to press 29 battalion-size or
larger search-and-destroy operations against known
or suspected Communist troop concentrations and re-
doubts throughout South Vietnam. However, no sig-
nificant contact with the enemy has been reported
during the past 24 hours.
Late on 14 December, an estimated Viet Cong
platoon attacked and inflicted moderate casualties on
an American platoon guarding the western approaches
to the US Marine enclave at Chu Lai. Eleven marines
were killed and 14 wounded before tactical air strikes,
artillery, and reinforcements forced the enemy unit to
disengage. Communist losses are unknown.
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SELECTED (OFFICIAL) SOVIET ECONOMIC DATA ,
FOR 1966 AND 1967*
Percentage Increases Over the Planned Output of the Previous Year
1966 1967
PLAN ACTUAL PLAN
Group A (Capital Goods) 6. 9 7.5
Group B (Consumer Goods) 6.0 6.6
Agricultural Production 8-10 10.0
National Income 6.4 7.4
Per Capita Real Income 6. 5 6.0 5.5
Labor Productivity in Industry 4. 7
Electric Power 10.6 7. 5
Natural Gas 14.6 12. 1
Crude Steel
*CIA estimates of Soviet economic performance are usually somewhat
lower than official claims.
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*USSR: Preliminary Soviet reports on the pres-
entation of the draft 1967 plan and budget to the Su-
preme Soviet suggest continuation of the pragmatic
approach to economic policy and management that
has prevailed since Khrushchev was ousted.
The announced eight-percent increase in military
expenditures is not believed to be a useful indicator of
changes in defense policies or effort. This budget cate-
gory does not cover all military outlays and does not
always move in even the same direction as total military
expenditures. The 1967 figure, 14. 5 billion rubles, is
nevertheless the highest in recent years, and available
information on Soviet military activity indicates that
actual military outlays are increasing. The increase
seems intended to demonstrate a determination to honor
the USSR's defense commitments, particularly in view
of sharp rises in US defense spending and the intensified
Indochina war.
The planned rate of industrial growth-- 7.3 percent
over 1966 achievements- -is about the same as that
actually achieved in 1966 according to CIA estimates,
and is in keeping with the generally slower growth in
recent years. Moreover, the few targets so far avail-
able for specific commodities indicate a continuation of
recent trends in various sectors of industry. The power
industry, machine building, chemicals, oil, and gas
were singled out to grow faster than gross industrial
output. Increased capital investment in the iron and
steel industry is fairly substantial, probably reflecting
the desire to achieve qualitative as well as quantitative
goals.
gricultural production in 1967 is to increase four
percent over the highly successful year of 1966. If the
Soviets attain this goal they will have made a good start
toward fulfilling the draft five-year plan goals for agri-
cult re.
(continued)
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Planning organization chairman Baybakov again
more or less admitted that the five-year economic plan
(1966-1970) remains incomplete, implying that the So-
viet leadership has not been able to reach a consensus
on the difficult problems of resource allocation and eco-
nomic reform.
16 Dec 66
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Spain - Northwest Africa: The Spanish Govern-
ment is readying a proposal for a multinational ap-
proach to the development of the mineral resources
of the Sahara.
Vice President Munoz Grandes told Ambassador
Harriman that Spain sees advantages in a roundtable
consultation with Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania
to get the program going. Munoz cited the important
Tindouf iron deposits, located at the western-. tip of
Algeria where the four countries' boundaries converge,
as a source of discord that could be alleviated by a
regional approach.
Madrid may be looking for ways to protect its
stake in the phosphate deposits discovered in Spanish
Sahara in 1965. The Spanish may hope that a multi-
lateral arrangement to develop the area could reduce
pressure for Spanish withdrawal from the Sahara.
Mauritania and Algeria might agree to such con-
sultations to advance their interests, but Morocco,
which has long entertained territorial claims on
Spanish Sahara, probably would be considerably less
16 Dec 66
(Map)
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Venezuela: President Leoni's suspension of con-
stitutional guarantees, which permitted military occupa-
tion of Central University, probably averted a con-
frontation with the military that could have ended in
direct military intervention in the government.
The recent upsurge in guerrilla warfare and urban
terrorism, the government's release of 31 political
prisoners, and the announced plan to release additional
prisoners added considerably to military discontent
with government indecision.
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The terrorist attacks of 13 December,
enraged military officers. They followed up
earlier calls for more vigorous action with a flat de-
mand that the President suspend constitutional guar-
antees.
Ambassador Bernbaum comments that there is a
good chance that the government's moves will improve
relations between the military and the government. At
the same time, according to the ambassador, "The
question arises as to whether the military, who have
now achieved extensive influence and control, will re-
lin uish this in the near future. "
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NOTES
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Turkey- Cyprus- Czechoslovakia: The Turkish
Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy yesterday that
Czechoslovakia officially informed Ankara that it is
stopping its second shipment of arms to Cyprus.
Ankara intends to continue to press for the transfer to
UN custody of Czech arms already received by the
Greek Cypriots. Makarios, however, shows no sign
of giving in to such pressure, and Athens does not be-
lieve it has much leverage to force his hand.
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(continued)
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 15 Decem-
ber 1966 approved the following national intelligence
estimate:
NIE 53-66, "Problems of Political Develop-
ment in South Vietnam Over the Next Year
or So"
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I op Secret
Top Secret
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