CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A009300250001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 16, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1966
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T00975A009300250001-1.pdf | 573.95 KB |
Body:
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3 November 1966
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C 15g
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
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EXCLUDED FRON-iA;ATt6
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3 November 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. Korea: North Korean raid a retaliation for ROK
attack. (Page 3)
4. Ghana-Guinea: OAU delegates optimistic that
dispute will be ironed out shortly. (Page 5)
6. Notes: USSR; Denmark;
Approve
(Page 7)
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Korea: A North Korean armed penetration south
of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on 2 November was
apparently in retaliation for a South Korean (ROK)
raid into the North Korean portion of the zone on 26
October.
The North Koreans, dressed in army uniforms, attacked an eight-man US 2nd Infantry Division patrol
with hand grenades and automatic weapons about 300
meters south of the DMZ southern boundary. One
South Korean and six US soldiers were killed and one
American was wounded. No enemy casualties have
been confirmed although there is evidence that wounded
or dead were dragged away. The quantity of expended
ammunition in the area indicates that an intensive fire-
fight took place.
The number of UN command personnel killed in moll,
armed attacks in the DMZ area since 15 October now
totals 29. All the fatalities in earlier incidents were
ROK personnel.
It is not known whether the ROK incursion on 26
October extended beyond the northern boundary of the
DMZ. South Korean military officials may have hoped FBI
the raid would boost morale lowered by losses from
North Korean attacks.
Although the North Koreans have clearly engaged
in a general harassing operation along the DMZ, the
targeting of the 2 November raid on American troops
suggests that Pyongyang is seeking to force the US to
prevent further ROK forays. The UN commander has
25X1 made it clear that he will not tolerate further breaches
of the armistice agreement by the ROKs.
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pp
*Ghana-Guinea: African delegates are optimistic
that the Ghana-Guinea dispute will be ironed out in
time for the OAU summit to begin on 5 November as
scheduled.
E P// The most important mediation effort, that of the
three-nation OAU mission, has secured the Ghana
Government's agreement that "present difficulties
would be resolved" by the return of any Ghanaians
now in Guinea who declare to the mission their desire
for repatriation. Guinea has already agreed to per-
mit the mission to interview the Ghanaian exiles, but
its confidence that they do not wish to leave contrasts
sharply with General Ankrah's belief that "all" want
to come back and suggests that this solution may not
prove feasible.
Meanwhile, Guinean political leaders yesterday
worked out what they apparently feel is a face- saving
rationalization of their charges that the US bears the
res onsibilit for their 25X1
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NOTES
USSR: The Soviets have again shown willing-
ness to join in discussions with the US in areas not
touching upon the Vietnam war. F_ I
Soviet scientists said they were willing
to hold technical talks with the US and Britain on the
detection of underground nuclear tests. Previously,
Moscow had insisted that no technical discussions
were necessary, claiming that all such tests are
detectable.
fense policies.
Denmark: Prime Minister Krag has called
special elections for 22 November as a result of his
failure to obtain parliamentary backing yesterday for
his minority Social Democratic government's tax re-
form proposals. Krag's resignation reflects the de-
termination of his party to stick to its own program
rather than make concessions on an issue which Krag
believes has strong electoral appeal. The election
campaign is likely to be fought primarily on domestic
issues, since there is wide agreement among virtually
all non-Communist parties on Danish foreign and de-
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