PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUATION OF LOW-LEVEL PHOTOGRAPHY OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600090040-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 15, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET 19/,Z~LD
Approved For Releap 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR00226600090040-7
15 February 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Proposal for Continuation of Low-Level
Photography of Cuba
1. On 5 February the Director of Central Intelligence
discussed with higher authority a Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
proposal to resume low-level photography against 24 targets in Cuba.
This proposal was generated not on the strong suspicion that any one
target was, in itself, ominous in terms of known activity or equipment
but rather on an accumulation of gaps in our detailed information
which could mean our failure to detect developments of grave concern
to the U. S. While that proposal was not approved when presented,
COMOR still considers it a valid intelligence requirement.
2. Last weekend low-level missions were approved and
carried out against Mariel, the port at. which the Khimik Zelensky
docked, and over three other priority target installations in the area.
As you know, the low-level photography of the port was too late since
the Khimik Zelensky had been already unloaded. In addition, the
'The CIA Member feels that the second sentence of the first paragraph
should be amended so as to read:"This proposal was generated by an
accumulation of gaps in our detailed information which could mean our
failure to detect developments of grave concern to the U. S. "
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installations at Cayo Frances, Guerra, Santiago de las Vegas, and
Artemisa were covered. The photography on these targets was
carefully examined. This examination confirmed and added some
detail to our knowledge of the equipment and installations covered,
but revealed no changes in their status which might point to an
ominous activity. It should be noted however that the coverage was
not complete and the results are therefore not concliisive.
3. As one measure to maximize the use of information
collected and being collected, careful examination of agent reports
since January 1962 has been underway. Thus far there has emerged
no pattern. The details of any single report do not point to any
specific target or targets which we would conclude are in themselves
ominous. Of current grave concern has been the unconfirmed report
of well-like holes approximately 12 to 14 feet in diameter in the
area between Bahia Honda and Cabanas. While no report associates
these wells with missile activity, the possibility of such association
has been very carefully examined. After comparison of these reports
with our information on the Soviet Union we find it is not likely that
such wells could be used for hardened sites for offensive missiles 25X1A
as we know them in the USSR. A careful examination of
photography as far back as early January 1963 does not confirm the
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existence of these holes nor does it reveal in the environs such
security, transportation, or construction facilities or activity
which would be required for the development of a hardened missile
launch silo.
4. COMOR has considered the case of the wells which
was viewed as an example of the kind of alarming reports which
cannot be totally disproved on the basis of our present intelligence.
It also considered the status of our intelligence on Cuba and the
need for action to insure, insofar as possible, against the develop-
ment of some emerging new development or surprise from some
undetected missile capability. It is our strong feeling that the
proposal of 5 February is still valid and that low-level photography
of the targets (excepting, of course, Cayo Frances and Guerra which
were completely covered last weekend) should be instituted. COMOR
specifically recommends at this time that low-level photography
should be directed against the following targets which it considers
to be the most likely to be the location of activities significant to
change in the status. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
selection of these targets does not mean that others previously pro-
posed are no longer of interest. These in the near future should
likewise be covered. The remainder of the list of targets is appended
at Tab A.
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5. The targets are proposed in order of priority for
immediate low-level photography:
a.. Mayari Arriba
Mayari Arriba is one of the principal installations on
the island whose function is not immediately discernible. Access
to the site which is remotely located in rough terrain was created
by the construction of an expensive access road. We have concluded
that the canvas-covered stepped roof vehicle is sensitive in nature.
Its configuration is unlike any known Soviet conventional or missile
weaponry. Nothing so far identified associates this vehicle with
coastal-defense type cruise-missile equipment. Experience with
has shown that we will not solve this enigma from
high-altitude photography. There is a chancre that low-level
photography may provide significant increments toward a solution.
b._ Holguin
cl. Remedios
Holguin and Remedios are of prime importance among
the military encampments previously listed because of their size,
the extreme security measures surrounding them, and the presence
of Soviets. as not provided the detailed information
needed for an accurate estimate of the activity at these two locations.
*DIA and USAF members recommend that a fourth target, either Santa Barbar
or Pepu, also be included at this time. These targets are high on their suspec
list because of the unidentified activity seen, on hotography.
SECRET CorAnittee on Overhead Reconnaissance
A
25X1A
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