CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008900220001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET 21 April 1966
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed
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21 April 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Communist China - Indonesia: -Relations
deteriorating, but neither willing to initiate
formal break. (Page 4)
4. Kenya:, Moderate leaders moving ahead in cam-
paign against Odinga's associates. (Page 7)
5. Turkey-Cyprus: Turkish Government seizes
initiative on Cyprus problem. (Page 8)
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6. Notes: West German - NATO; USSR;
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Communist China-- Indonesia: Relations between
Communist China and Indonesia continue to deteriorate.,
but neither country appears willing to initiate a formal
diplomatic break.
Since the defection of the pro-Communist am-
bassador in Peking, Indonesian representation in
China has been left in the hands of a charg6. All Indo-
nesian students in China have been ordered home, and
a further withdrawal of Indonesian personnel can be ex-
pected. Although Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik
this week publicly claimed that Djakarta wants to main-
tain "good relations" with Peking, the government's
tacit encouragement of anti-Chinese violence suggests
that Indonesia's new leaders would welcome a complete
break and still hope the Chinese can be provoked into
severing ties.
Within the past week the Chinese Embassy and
consular offices in Djakarta were sacked while Indo-
nesian public security forces stood by without making
any real effort to control the student mobs. A general
exodus of Chinese Communist diplomatic and technical
personnel has been under way for some time, and'the
Chinese ambassador left Djakarta on 11 April.
The Chinese probably will reduce their official
representation to a skeleton diplomatic staff in Djd-
karta; they have already suspended the operation of
their three consulates outside the capital, The Chi-
nese have repeatedly insisted that these moves are
only "temporary" and that their ambassador was re-
called to Peking merely for I I consultations. 11 Peking
is probably extremely anxious to avoid the appearance
of abandoning the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia who
have also been the target of mounting student violence
in recent weeks. A C hinese- initiated break in rela-
tions would clearly leave Peking open to such charges.
21 Apr 66
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Kenya: Kenya's moderate leaders are moving
ahead En -their campaign to expose and discredit former
vice president Odinga's radical associates.
The 30 or so members of parliament and 13 trade
unionists who resigned this week from Kenyatta's Na-
tional Union Party (KANU) are backers of Odinga and
have not always supported government policy even
while professing loyalty to Kenyatta and enjoying party
support. The moderate politicians had hoped the dissi-
dents would take this.course, which places them in
open opposition where they can be freely attacked as
disloyal obstructionists.
The moderates are continuing to purge Odinga
men from local KANU organizations. In Odinga's
home district all party officials were replaced on 17
April by government supporters.
To give their movement nationwide appeal, the
dissidents have elected a well-known member of Ken-
yatta's tribe as deputy leader. They presently con-
stitute only 18 percent of parliament but they will be able
to exploit such public irritants as unemployment, land
hunger, and general economic malaise. They may
eventually attract other supporters from amongthosewho,
are becoming increasingly frustrated by the favoritism
Kenyatta shows toward his tribal brothers in the gov-
ernment and the military.
21 Apr 66
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Turkey-Cyprus:fThe Turkish Government has
again_~~e_ized the initia ~,e on the Cyprus problem by
requesting "detailed trilateral discussions" with the
US and the UK anq by implying possible Turkish mili-
tary intervention
[in an aide memoire to the US and the British, the
Turkish Government has again emphasized that the
present "dangerous situation" on Cyprus cannot be al-
lowed to continue indefinitely. Ankara charges, prob-
ably correctly, that the Greek Cypriot administration
is trying to gain its ends by avoiding negotiation while
it resorts to various pressure tactics to erode the re-
sistance of the Turkish Cypriot community'l
[The Turkish Government says it is determinedto
bring an end to these pressures "within the shortest
possible time. 11 Ankara said it intends to deliver a
note "in due time" to both Athens and the Greek Cypriot
administration in Cyprus "requesting" the removal
"within a specific period" of certain restrictions on
the Turkish Cypriot community and the discontinuance
of "harassment tactics" and attempts to terrorize the
Turkish Cypriot population.]
[The Turks deny any military design in seeking
the removal of restrictions on the Turkish Cypriotcom-
munity and agree to allow UN forces on the island to
supervise Turkish shipments to the island to prevent
any traffic in arms and military supplies. However
they warn that noncompliance by the Greek Cypriots
would compel Ankara to "ensure the unhindered supply
of necess ry commodities to the Turkish Cypriot com-
munity. It
7
[The Turkish document further warns that if UN
forces should be withdrawn from the island, Turkish
forces equal in number to the approximately 10,000
Greek national forces on Cyprus would have to fill the
vacuum.1 (continued)
21 Apr 66
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[During the past month the Turks have concen-
trated an unusually large naval force off the southern
coast of Turkey, ostensibly in connection with a series
of large-scale maneuvers. This is probably intended
to demonstrate Turkish ability to back up any ultimatum
the Turks may decide to make following: their current
diplomatic effort.
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NOTES
West Germany - NATO: The meeting on 18 April
between Foreign Ministers ScEiroeder and Couve de Mur-
ville was limited to a presentation of their respective
views on continued stationing of French forces in Ger-
many after 1 July. The talks clearly revealed the wide
gap separating the French and German positions and
the difficult negotiations that lie ahead. Bonn has con-
cluded that the French want to preserve as many of
their present rights in Germany as possible but that
they are ready to consider some modifications. West
Germany's next move will probably be a formal de-
lineation of its position, most likely in the for of a 25X1
re to the French aide memoire of 29 March
USSR: [Soviet military spokesmen are attempting
to counter the adverse public reaction to'.the crash of a
Soviet aircraft in West Berlin on 6 April. In an unusual
interview with West German reporters on 15 April, a
senior Soviet air force staff officer stressed the "heroic"
aspects of the crash and indicated that a posthumous
West Berlin decoration for the deceased pilots would
be accepted if offered. He stressed that the aircraft
carried no weapons, but was unresponsive when queried
on "secret equipment," A Soviet political officer added
that the main reason for flights over West Berlin is
"Warsaw Pact defense considerations. "
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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