CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008700130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
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Copy No. C 141
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DIA and DOS
review(s)
completed.
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCLUDED DM CLA FR-WTT16 T09 Vol ET
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3 January 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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20 Central African Republic, Army coup probably
ushers in period of political turmoil. (Page 4)
3. India-Pakistan: Little progress likely at Tashkent
meeting. (Page 5)
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6. Notes: USSR; Zambia-Rhodesia; Bolivia; Cuba,
(Page 10)
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Fort ? Lamy i
Bangui
Ap
DEMO ATIC REPUBLIC
OFT CONGO
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Central African Republic-. Army chief Bokassaas
sudden overthrew of moderate President Dacko on 1
January has probably ushered in an extended period of
political turmoil in the Central African Republic (CAR).
For the present, Bangui, the capital city of this
extremely underdeveloped ex-French colony, is quiet
on the surface and the pro-French, anti-Communist
Bokassa appears to be in control, However, the US
Embassy reports uncertainty and tension among both
Europeans and Africans as they await Bokassa's at-
tempts to form a new government, The provinces
have not yet reacted to the army coup and could pose
a problem to the new regime, especially in areas where
elements of the rival--and more professionally effec-
tive--gendarmerie are deployed.
An immediate danger is that the ill-disciplined
450-man army may -degenerate, despite efforts by
Bokassa to keep it in check, into a drunken rabble and
a threat to public safety. Some incidents of harassment
of civilians and disorderly conduct by soldiers have
already occurred.
Also problematical is B.okassa's ability to con-
trol the political train he has set in motion--apparent-
ly almost singlehandedly--in order to forestall threat-
ened cuts in the army budget and an anticipated dimi,
notion of his command authority. He has never
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I land is evidently widely disliked by -subor-
dinate o icers, some of whom formally sought his
removal in 1963. In this situation radical domestic
elements, which Dacko was having increasing difficulty
restraining, may turn out to be the principal, ultimate
beneficiaries of Bokassa' s rash action.
The French., who provide vital economic and
technical aid, appear to have been genuinely surprised
by the coup and, at this time, uncertain as to b w_ to
react.,
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India-Pakistan? Little progress toward settle-
ment of major differences appears likely during the
Tashkent meetings, scheduled to begin tomorrow,
between Indian Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistani
President Ayub Khan.
There is no formal agenda for the conference and
its length has not been fixed. Shastri apparently ex-
pects the conference to last five to eight days as he is
now planning to begin a visit to Afghanistan between 9
and 12 January.
Indians and Pakistanis agree that the initial meet-
ing tomorrow will largely determine the final results
of the conference. Neither government wants a resump-
tion of hostilities and both appear to be seeking some
form of modus vivendi. The Indians reportedly will
propose at an early session the signing of a no-war pact
without preconditions of any kind. Ayub, in his mid-
December address to the UN General Assembly, pro-
posed signing a no-war pact with India but only after
the residents of Kashmir were permitted to exercise
their right of self-determination. India steadfastly
refuses to consider a plebiscite for the disputed terri-
tory.
Agreement between the two leaders on key prob-
lems, such as Kashmir or troop withdrawal from the
present front between India and West Pakistan, appears
unlikely, Neither Indian nor Pakistani leaders, how-
ever, appear prepared to accept total failure of the
conference and the USSR, having committed its pres-
tige, presumably would hope to see the conference
record some progress toward a settlement.
Moscow has exe e
pressure on a two governments to adopt conciliatory
positions.
Under such circumstances, it would appear that
agreement is possible on less inflammatory issues such
3 Jan 66
 as normalization of diplomatic and economic rela-
tions, release of prisoners, and consolidation of the
existing cease-fire. Progress on movement along
these lines at Tashkent could prepare the way for
further talks on more difficult problems.
M
ME
U Thant's military representative in India-Paki-
stan, General Marambio, has announced that the first
of a series of meetings between senior Indian and Pak-
istani officers to discuss the withdrawal question will
be held today in Lahore, Pakistan. Hope for success
in his effort to reach agreement on withdrawal of
troops to lines occupied before the August-September
hostilities will depend heavily on the outcome at
Tashkent.
3 Jan 66
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NOTES
USSR-US: Moscow may have decided to lift the
ban on the travel of US military attach6s in the Soviet
Union. The US defense aftach6 -in Moscow report.
that the Soviets have approved a trip request for 3 Jan-
uary--the first approval since the travel restrictions
took effect on 18 November. Publication of the Penkov-
sky papers was originally given as the reason, for the
travel stand-down. The Soviets later allegpd that new
controls placed on procurement of publications by
Soviet military attach6s in a.shington prevented an
enrlier remoyn] of the ban_ I
Zarnbia-Rho4ejs~ia:tZambian President Kaunda,
still anxious to move ahead with the UK and US in a
total economic blockade of Rhodesia, has refused
Prime Minister Smith's unexpected New Year's offer
both to allow petroleum shipments for Zambia to
transit Rhodesia and to rescind "for the time being"
the Rhodesian surtax on coal exported to Zambia.
American officials in Salisbury note that Smith un-
doubtedly sought some international credit for his
"reasonableness. 11 They also believe that a major
factor behind SmiWs offer is the growing concern in
Rhodesian official circles lest a serious deterioration
of the Zambian economy deepen the crisis in the re-
gion to the detriment of RhodesiaJ
Bolivia,, The military junta has announced that
national elections will be held on 3 July 1966 with in-
auguration of the new government to take place on 6 Au-
gust. With the election date finally set, disunity within
the armed forces should be reduced, and the position of
moderate politicians strengthened vis-a-vis those who
advocate the overthrow of the junta as the only alterna-
tive to prolonged military ruli, F_
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*Cuba: In his speech yesterday on the seventh
anniversary of the Cuban revolution and on the eve
of the Tri-Continent Conference, Fidel Castro
concentrated on Cuba's continuing economic prob-
lems, He revealed that Peking would no longer
exchange rice for Cuban sugar because of "economic
and strategic reasons," creating a crucial rice
shortage for Cuba in 1966. Castro's timing for the
announcement may have been calculated to embarrass
the Chinese as the conference openso
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3 Jan 66
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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