EXCEPTION STATEMENT ON ADP COMMITTEE REPORT

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 30, 2005
Sequence Number: 
10
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Publication Date: 
June 11, 1965
Content Type: 
STATEMENT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0.pdf880.31 KB
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ATTACHMENT E Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RD 0010-0 11 June 1965 EXCEPTION STATEMENT ON ADP COMMITTEE REPORT The purpose of this exception statement by the DD/S&T Representative to the ADP Committee is to sharpen the focus on the nature of the or- ganizational issue in question here and to provide Agency Management with some coverage of the economic and the technical considerations relevant thereto. Also included under "Conclusions" is a course of action for consideration. 2. The management question posed in Action Memorandum A-444 is: Given CIA's increasingly heavy investment in computing activities, how should Agency Manage- ment organize those resources for the next five year period to maximize effectiveness at minimum cost? Stated in alternative form, the basic question becomes: Shall CIA continue and extend until complete its present effort to centralize computing resources at the CIA level? Shall CIA dissolve what is now structured at the CIA level (OCS) and reorganize its computing resources at the Directorate level?* The Office of Computer Services (OCS), established in 1963, now provides computing support to all CIA Directorates. OCS is the sole computer facility for Headquarters Building support to three (DD/I, DD/S, and DD/S&T) of the four Agency Directorates. -- DD/P has a separate facility, established prior to the creation of OCS, which is adjacent to the CIA Computer Center on the Ground Floor, Headquarters Building. (Outside the Headquarters Building there is an NPIC computer facility serving NPIC needs also established prior to the creation of OCS. ) ( ~ n r: r I eIc!cda,' rent 3niasaljC dc. ~ratiing and ass!IiCation Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 3. The ADP Committee's majority conclusion is that the CIA-level centralization thrust, which has characterized CIA organizational actions in recent years, should not be continued; instead, it should be checked... and even reversed. The Committee's report is in- tended to lay the groundwork for a) assuring continued separateness of the Agency's present computer centers, and b) creating a manage- ment climate within which additional centers might reasonably be expected to emerge. 4. There are three logical areas of consideration regarding the or- ganization of CIA's computing resources: (a) technical, (b) economic, and (c) political. The Committee has seriously concerned itself in both its discussions and its report with but one of these areas: the political. 5. If it is reasonable to assume that Management, before making this study assignment to the Committee, was already familiar with the major political considerations involved here,then what Management most needs is coverage of the other aspects of the question; i. e. , the economic and technical considerations. The Committee has not provided coverage of same to Management in its report because it was the majority opinion of the Committee that sufficiently reliable technical and economic projections were not now possible as ingredients to Management's decision on the organization of CIA EDP** resources. The DD/S&T Representative, however, feels economic and technical projections not only can be made but, indeed, must be made if Management is to be equipped to consider this or- ganizational question. These are the sine qua non ingredients of such decision. The term "political" is not used to deride or belittle this area of consideration. Political considerations (such as present organi- zational lines, functions, habits, preferences, and plans) are important and must be taken into account by Management in any organizational decision. Directorate security concepts, as a specific, are part of these "political" considerations. (See Para. 8 below) The acronym "EDP" (Electronic Data Processing) is used in this report to mean "computing" or "relating to computers. 01 S Approved For Release 2005/11/21 CL4RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 6. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS: a. State of the EDP Science: The computing science is moving into a dramatic third generation. New generation capabilities in both hardware and software constitute the largest step forward in both productivity and reduced costs in the history of the com- puting era. As a consequence, the new generation capa- bilities will have a major impact on all aspects of computing, including the organization of computing resources. Some new generation characteristics: - New generation gear is faster by several orders of magnitude. - Its high speed memories have much larger capacities. Immediate "on-line" access to very large information files is now feasible (several billion characters of on-line storage). A vast array of remote terminals for input, query, and display can now be handled... a requirement in upcoming computing support to all CIA Directorates. New generation systems will operate under sophisticated Executive Control Programs which enable the computer to pace and control its own work... to the near exclusion . of the Computer Operator in the traditional sense. Manual control of the computer from job to job (serial processing) will be grossly inefficient. The capacity for work is increased manyfold. Thruput for the IBM System 360 Mod 67, for example, is equivalent to eight 7090's or thirty 1410's or thirty-five RCA 501's. . . even when operated serially. -3- Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 The larger models of the new generation computers provide major bonuses over the smaller models. in work capacity, in sophistication of techniques, and in significantly lower costs per unit of data processed. b. Impact on Organization: The impact of the above processing capacities of the new generation hardware and software will be felt in virtually all aspects of computing--management, user, and EDP areas alike. The direction of impact on organizational structure is patently clear. The tremendous work capacity, the far-reaching systems design implications, and the pronounced cost advantages of the larger models relative to the smaller models will force greater centralization throughout the computing field. c. The new generation OCS Computer Center: During the past twelve months, OCS has developed its plan to shift to new generation equipment as rapidly as possible. All computers in the present CIA Computer Center will be replaced by but two IBM 360/Mod 67 computers. The first one will be installed in nine months; the second twelve months thereafter. CIA will be one of the first major centers to shift to new genera- tion capabilities. This is much more than a status symbol; the production and economy gains are truly remarkable. Some specifics on the OCS third generation center: - The OCS configuration will be a twin-Mod 67 system to which the full range of peripheral devices can be attached as required by Agency needs. The OCS system is a complete "fail-soft" system. That is, all components are duplicated in the system so that failure of any component does not stop the functioning of the system... it only reduces thruput. The on-line systems now in development in support of all Agency Directorates will require such fail- soft support. (This fail-soft structuring of the machine configuration will tend to characterize future computing centers of whatever size. ) -4- Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 The specific configuration of hardware selected by OCS is based on the OCS workload as OCS is now charged within CIA (all Headquarters com- puting except RID. ) Projected scientific computing needs of themselves would require a system of similar scale to that planned for the CIA Computer Center because of the stringent speed, memory, and backup requirements which characterize such applications. The production capability of the system, however, would be only very partially tapped if limited to scientific applications alone. The Mod 67, selected for the CIA Computer Center, falls in the "upper middle" size range. There are two larger models and three smaller models announced to date. (The Mod 67 is the smallest model of the new IBM 360 series which possesses the I/O controller and sub-selector multiplexor capabilities. These capa- bilities, in themselves, represent a major third generation stride.) The next smaller model (Mod 50) does not have the capacity to support the Agency's more demanding scientific tasks... and is considerably more costly per unit of information processed. No change in the main frame configuration of the OCS Center would be required to do all Headquarters Building computing as anticipated for the next 3 to 5 years. If and when additional main frame processing power were needed at some future date, a third CPU could be very simply added to the planned configuration at a cost of about $17, 000/month. This additional CPU, at $17, 000/month, would provide additional processing power to the system equivalent to five Mod 501s. each one of which would cost much more. Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 "'~' Approved For Release 2005/11/ w n DP67B00446R000600050010-0 OCS estimates that all Headquarters Building computing (OCS and RID) can be done on the Mod 67 system. within a single shift. This is intended as a measure of work volume only. Any center, of course, which serves remote terminals in user areas must remain open during periods of authorized usage. d. Other pertinent specifics: New generation gear will process most efficiently with a job mix of maximum diversification. If re- stricted, organizationally or otherwise, to a single application, much of its thruput power is wasted. The concept of re-structuring Agency EDP resources along Directorate lines suggests the following penalties: 1) The Mod 67, while doing DD/S&T processing, could concurrently process all other Agency computing with less than 15% delay (under worst peak conditions) to DD/S&T processing. 2) All non-DD/S&T internal computation tasks would be serviced by the Mod 67 in less than half the time required on Directorate centers equipped with their own Mod 50's (the next size down from the Mod 67) and all purely input/output flows (no computation) would run on the Mod 67 system in slightly better time. Software extensions and improvements over time will continue to increase the thruput of the gear under dis - cussion so that appreciable increases in workload can be absorbed without acquisition of additional main frame equipment. OCS has projected a utilization of 130 hours per month initially on the Mod 67. Software improvements should permit-the handling of a four-fold increase in work in something less than double the machine time. Approved For Release 2005/11P67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 SECRET Can the IBM 360 software, which is yet to be proven in operations, be counted on to meet specifications? - OCS feels the risk here is a safe one. IBM has traditionally equipped its users with the strongest software packages in the computer industry. This massive corporation has staked its entire future on the success of the 360 system-- including software. IBM is less likely to fail in its com- mitments than its users are to fail to fully exploit the capabilities being offered. The full exploitation of new generation capabilities will require on the part of user organizations advanced tech- nical capabilities in the systems programming area. Although OCS has made a strong start over the past two years at assembling a pool of such skills, system pro- gramming skills will be in short supply in CIA and throughout the computing industry with the advent of third generation processing. Decentralization of com- puting to the Directorates would serve to make the shortage of such hard-to-find and slow-to-grow skills all the more critical. The Committee's report contains the following statement: if... 'on-line' applications involving complex interplay between manual and computer based reference facilities... are most effectively managed under complete Directorate control. " The above statement is in no way concurred in by the DD/S&T representative. There are no technical arguments to support it,. and it is directly contrary to good economics. This section presents some measure of the price tag attached decentralizing Agency EDP resources to the Directorate level. hree types of resources have been considered: a) machine rental ' Lars; b) people; and c) Headquarters floor space. The figures give are minimum figures in each instance. Although this section on economics is brief, its relevance and import to the organizational issue is second to none. Maior economic overtones are apparent in the preceding section on 'Dkporaimd RdnRe1dase3L2096b11/21.:tiCIA-RDP67B00 treREV 050010-0 -7 Approved For Release 2005/11/2 c4 67B00446R000600050010-0 In measuring the hardware rental costs for additional centers, the following guidelines were followed: (1) Costs of "remote on-line" devices and extra capacity peripheral equipments (such as mule:le data cells) were excluded. (Basically, they are constant costs whether hooked to Directorate Centers or to the CIA Center and are thus irre- levant to Management as a decision factor). (L) Only those peripheral devices necessary to the oper._on of a stand-alone center have been in- cluded. (3) A double -thruput configuration has been assumed for all centers because: EDP systems in development to support all Directorates (CHIVE, MIS, scientific systems, WALNUT, etc.) call for remote terminals in user areas. The machine language data store for such systems is retrievable _ay with great difficulty in the event of equipment failure. Thus, in practice, it would be highly improbable i::at any center, centralized or decentralized, would not find valid justification for double -chruput support within the first two years of the five year period under consideration. The minimum additional annual rental for equipment for any Direccora--tto- eve1 center is presented in Table 1 on the next page. Approved For Release 2005/11/IAP67B00446R000600050010-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000600050010-0 Approved For Release 2005/11/2k -, 4 67B00446R000600050010-0 b. Additional People: The personnel figures given in Table 2 are, in each case, minimums extra personnel requirements to be expected with the endorsement of Directorate -level centers instead of CIA-level centralization. Computer Cperators - Multiple computing centers, of course, mean more computers (2 per enter) and more computers mean more Computer Operators. Two-shift operations are assun.ed in Table 2. Systems Programmers - As pointed out in Paragraph 6 , above, third generation gear and remote terminal systems will force the development and use of Executive Programs for automatic control of operations. Systems Programming will become a must in staffing any center. Our figure of four Systems Programme- s per local co ,?_ er is an initial level only; expansion to more than twice r_