USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100380004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1964
• Content Type: STUDY

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3O-OZ3
88TH CONGRESS i
2d Session J
[COMMITTEE PRINTI
USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Preliminary Study)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
30-023 WASHINGTON : 1964
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Illinois, Chairman
CHET HOLIFIELD, California
JACK BROOKS, Texas
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia
JOHN A. BLATNIK, Minnesota
ROBERT E. JONES, Alabama
EDWARD A. GARMATE, Maryland
JOHN E. MOSS, California
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut
RICHARD E. LANKFORD, Maryland
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts
J. EDWARD ROUSH, Indiana
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania
CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey
WILLIAM J: RANDALL, Missouri
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
R. WALTER RIEIILMAN, Now York
GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
FLORENCE P. DWYER, New Jersey
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
GEORGE M. WALLHAUSER, Now Jersey
JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois
OGDEN R. REID, New York
FRANK J. HORTON, New York
BILL STINSON, Washington
ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois
ALBERT W. JOHNSON, Pennsylvania
CHRISTINE RAY DAVIS, Staff Director
JAMES A. LANIGAN, General Counsel
MILES Q. ROMNEY, Associate General Counsel
RAYMOND T. COLLINS, Minority Professional Staff
J. P. CARLSON, Minority Counsel
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEIG
JOHN E. MOSS, California, Chairman
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut OGDEN It. REID, New York
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
SAMUEL J. ARCHIBALD, Staff Administrator
DENNY L. KASS, Counsel
JACK MATTESON. Chief Iuvestigator
WILLIAM E. BARNABY, Investigator
HELEN K. BEASLEY, Clerk
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OON'T'EN T S`
I_.Prefac-------------------------------------------------------
IL. Summary of Federal polygraph use______________________________
A. Purposes for using polygraphs___________________________
1. Security --______________ ------
------------------ -
2. Criminal---------------------------------------
3. Misconduct.-------------------------------------
4. Personnel screening______________________________
5. Medical measurements _____________.._____-__----_
B. Extent of polygraph Ilse _________--___________________
C. Polygraph tests conducted during fiscal 1963 --------------
D. Polygraph tests requested during fiscal 1963---------
Polygraphs owned by the Federal Government------------
E..
F. Authorized polygraph operators within the Government----
G. Other annual costs -------------------------------------
H.. Safeguards for individuals_______________________________
1.. Effect of refusals_________ -------------------------------
2. Weight accorded polygraph test results_____________
3.. Review of polygraph use-------------------------
4. Availability of results to individuals tested----------
5. Appeals of polygraph test results-------------------
6. Consideration of physical and mental conditions-----
1. . Qualifications of Government polygraph operators ---------
1. Minimum age-----------------------------------
2. Additional requirements ._________________________
3. Grade or rank-----------------------------------
4. Investigative experience--------------------------
5. Agency check or character investigation------------
6. Training program--------------------------------
7. Other requirements------------------------------
III. Table of agency replies-----------------------------------------
IV. Agency replies to polygraph questionnaire ------------------------
Agriculture Department ___________________------------------
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_____________________
Atomic Energy Commission -------------------------------
Central Intelligence Agency--------------------------------
Commerce Department------------------------------------
Defense Department---------------------------------------
Office of the Secretary of Defense_______________________
Air Force--------------------------------------------
Army------------------------------------------------
Navy ------------------------------------------------
Office of Naval Intelligenec_________________________
Marine Corps-------------------------------------
Defense Atomic Support Agency------------------------
Defense Supply Agency--------------------------------
National Security Agency-----------------------------"- -
District of Colmbia-------------------------------------
General Services Administration________ __________________
Health, Education, and Welfare Department_________________
Interior Department---------------------------------------
Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation----------
National Aeronautics and Space Administration---------------
post Office Department------------------------------------
State Department------------ -?---- .-=_-----------------------
Treasury Department ---------------------------------------
Coast Guard---------- ------------------------------
Internal Revenue Service--------------------------------
Narcotics Bureau --------------------------------------
'U.S.Information Agency _________________-__-______-__------
`..':, _ . - - - III
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[Committee Print]
USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Preliminary Study)
1. PREFACE
The Federal Government's use of the so-called lie-detector device;
more properly referred to as the polygraph, has become a topic of in=
creasing controversy in recent years. Serious questions have been
raised both by public officials and private citizens regarding the re-
liability of the device and the propriety of its use.
Consultation with the Library of Congress disclosed that no study
of the Federal Government's use of polygraphs has ever been made by
the Congress, by any agency of the executive branch, or by private
researchers. In April 1963, Congressnr.an William L. Dawson, chair-
man of the house Governin.ent Operations Committee directed the'
Foreign Operations and Government Tnfornration Subcommittee to
study the Federal Government's use of polygraphs. After an analysis
of the available polygraph literature and interviews with experts, the
subcommittee prepared a questionnaire which was sent to 58 Federal
agencies. Some advisory boards and semipermanent committees
whose limited organization and functions obviously precluded the
use of polygraphs were omitted froin the inquiry. The subcornrnittee's
questionnaire and letter' transmitting it follow:
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1963.
DEAR MR. -: The Foreign Operations and Government In-
formation Subcommittee, at the direction of House Government
Operations Committee Chairman William L. Dawson, is looking into
the use of polygraphs by Federal agencies. The survey is being under-
taken in keeping with the committee's duty to study the operation of
Government activities at all levels with a view to determining econ-
omy and efficiency.
In this connection, please furnish full and complete answers to
each item in the enclosed questionnaire which is being sent to the
heads of all executive departments and independent, agencies. Re-
sponses are to cover all subordinate organizations within each agency.
Within some individual departments and independent agencies more
than one major subordinate organization may use polygraphs for
different purposes or under different procedures. In that event,
please break down the requested data by major subordinate organi-
zations in addition to providing an agencywide compilation.
If any portion of the questionnaire seems unclear, please contact
the subcommittee staff for advice or explanation.
In order that the subcommittee can prepare a timely report on the
matter, please provide the requested information by July 31, 1963.
Sincerely,
JOHN E. Moss, Chairman,.
11
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL'. GOVERNMENT,
QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLYGRAPH USAGE
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other
so-called lie detection devices? (If major subordinate organizations
within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those
organizations.)
2. Briefly explain. your agency's general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer the following specific questions,
(Please- explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion in connection with each question. If more than one major,
subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide,
separate responses for each.)
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used (i.e., employ=
ment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected improper,
conduct of duties, or other purposes)?
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in answer to question (a)?
(c) What weight is given the data resulting from tests by these,
devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types Of
invest' ative information?'
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and is
this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in
each case?
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
(J) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected
individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
(g) Are the findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification or
other designation is applied to the data?
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such a
test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the individual's
personnel records?
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs,
if available.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies, public
or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1963?
3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please answer the
following:
(a) How many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
(c) Describe any training program your agency provides to train
its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in con-
ducting such tests.
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(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or schools,
public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please provide
the name and address of the training facility.
4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie detection devices
are the property of your agency?
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other public
or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide the total costs
for such activity during fiscal 1963.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location of
tests, internal and external training. programs, and all other costs.
5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
administrative orders, rules, regulations and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
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II. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL POLYGRAPH USE
In response to the subcommittee questionnaire, 19 Federal agencies
reported that their policies permitted the use of polygraphs in carrying
out Government business. The replies of these 19 agencies, broken
down by their constituent units which use the device, are shown in
tabular form at the end of this section. The following narrative
explains the terms used in the table and provides a general analysis of
the data.
A. PURPOSES FOR USING POLYGRAPHS
1. Security.-Cited by 14 of the 19 agencies, the most frequently
reported purpose for the Government's use of polygraphs involves
security matters. In this context security ranged from investigation
of security leaks to operational uses in intelligence and counterintelli-
gence activities.
The number of defense organizations included among the 19 users
underlines the important role the instrument plays in the many-sided
efforts to safeguard the Nation's security. Each of the military
services was accounted for, with the Intelligence Corps and the
military police both reporting polygraph use within the .^ rmy, and the
Marine Corps and naval intelligence answering the roll within the
Navy Department. The Office of Special Investigations was the sole
reported Air Force user. Civilian components of the Defense Estab-
lishment also were well represented. The Central Intelligence
Agency reported extensive polygraph use, as did the National Security
Agency. Also within the Defense Department, the Defense .^ tomic
Support Agency and the Defense Supply Agency acknowledged use of
the instrument. Several nondefense agencies also indicated that thAr
activities in the security field involved use of polygraphs.
2. Criminal.--Investigation of criminal law infractions was listed
by 10 agencies as an area in which polygraphs are employed., Pr'i ate
citizens as well as Federal employees came within the scope of such
investigations. The Agriculture Department, for instance, has considered
the results of polygraph tests conducted outside the Government in
investigating cases of alleged fraudulent transactions with the Agric?l-
tural Marketing Service.
3. Misconduct,.-Investigation of employee misconduct was a
reason given by eight agencies for utilizing polygraphs. Thie
category included offenses not considered to be criminal violations.
4. Personnel screening.-The Central Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency indicated that poly raph testing is included
as a routine part of preemployment personnelscreening. The armed
services also reported a similar use during fiscal 1963 in connection
with the program of enlisting Cuban refugees. This was a unique
situation, however, since the military normally does not employ the
device"in recruitment or induction processing
5. Medical measurements.-The Health, Education, and Welfare
Department reported that three of its bureaus-the National In-
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statutes of Health, the Public Health Service, and St. Elizabeths
Lospital in the T istrict of Columbia--used polygraphs for medical
purposes. As a device v hich measures pulse rates, respiration rates,
and blood pressure, the polygraph has been used to record the reactions
of patients under anesthesia.
The device also has found use in cases involving patients with
mental or neurological disorders. More frequently, it has been
employed on animals undergoing experiment.
B. EXTENT OF POLYGRAPH USE
Except for the personnel screening category, the user agencies
declared that polygraphs were not used in every case. The Atomic
Energy Commission, for instance, said that the device was involved
in processing only 1 of 29,300 security clearances processed during
fiscal 1963. Similarly, the machine was employed in 0.14 percent of
the FBI investigative matters handled in fiscal 1962.
The frequency of polygraph use in Air Force investigations varied
from once in every 43 cases in 1.959 to once every 18 cases in 1962.
The Internal Revenue Service, which restricts polygraph tests to
employees who request them, reported such tests were used in. fewer
than 10 cases in the last 10 years.
Other agencies indicated that investigative techniques affected
the extent of polygraph use. The Defense Atomic Support Agency
said. the device is used normally "to gain information not otherwise
attainable by other investigative techniques." The Coast Guard
replied that polygraph tests are administered when "there is con-
flicting evidence, Iorl the subject requests an examination, or it
appears that an examination would materially aid the investigation."
The Post Office Department limits the device to "cases of more than
average importance where the investigation is at a standstill because
the inspector cannot prove a suspect guilty or eliminate him from
suspicion even though lie has exhausted all normal investigative
techniques."
Several agencies referred to the polygraph as an investigative "tool"
or "aid" which was used "seldom" or "on rare occasions."
In the area of personnel screening, the two agencies concerned-
the CIA and the National Security Agency-were not clear as to the
exact extent of polygraph utilization. The CIA flatly answered that
"all applicants and employees are afforded polygraph examinations as
part of security screening procedures" while. also implying a less-than-
mandatory practice by saying that a refusal to take a test would be
"considered along with other information developed in processing an
applicant." The NSA advised that polygraph interviews are a re-
quired part of preemployment processing for all civilian applicants.
After becoming a NSA employee, however, a person is subjected to
such a test only in connection with matters "extensively investigated
but difficult to resolve." In the past, polygraph examinations have
not been required of military personnel before their acceptance for
assignment to NSA.
C. POLYGRAPH TESTS CONDUCTED DURING FISCAL 1963
The Federal Government conducted 19,122 polygraph tests during
1963, according to the answers to the subcommittee's questionnaire:
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And this amount did not include the thousands of tests which the
CIA and NSA gave to "all applicants and employees," since the
agencies claimed the number of tests must be classified as "security"
in formation.
The information compiled by the subcommittee showed the Army
to be the heaviest Government user of polygraphs. During fiscal;
1963, the Army conducted roughly 12,500 tests or more than half of
all those reported by the Government. Screening of Cuban enlistees,
a situation presumably unique to the period reported, accounted for
3,494 Army tests with the polygraph. The Federal Bureau of Inves
tigation reported 2,314 tests.
D. POLYGRAPH TESTS REQUESTED DURING FISCAL 1963
Not all Government units using polygraphs maintain their own,
specialized staffs and facilities to carry out the tests. On some
occasions, agencies do not have their own equipment or operators,
available at the scene of investigations.
During f.scal 1963, these conditions led to 322 polygraph tests.
being requested by Federal agencies. The Post Office Department
accounted for 134 requests while the Secret Service requested 110,
tests.
Although there was uniform reluctance to specify the agencies to,
which the requests were directed, it was generally implied that such
matters remained within the Federal Government. The General(
Services Administration, however, requested 10 tests during the year
and indicated that an unspecic.ed number of these were performed by
local law enforcement agencies.
A total of 512 polygraphs or other so-called lie-detection devices
were reported as owned by the Federal Government at an estimated
acquisition cost of $428,066. '['his does not include the CIA and
NAA which claimed that the number and acquisition value of the.
polygraphs they possess is classified as security information.
The Army led the statistics in this department, possessing 261 de-
vices which cost an estimated $182,700. The Navy Department was;
next with 86 machines, including 9 owned by the Marine Corps,,
followed by the Air Force with 72 and the FBI with. 48. The Post
Office Department reported they own 17 "lie-detection" devices, 13;
of which were acquired more than 10 years ago and employ only a.
one-phase; skin resistance detection procedure, The Post Office De-
partment stated that they intend to dispose of these one-phase instru-
tnents in the current fiscal year. (See illustration, pp. _.)
Federal agencies reported 639 employees are authorized to conduct
polygraph tests. 't'heir salaries during fiscal 1963 amounted to slightly
more than $4.3 million. However, administering polygraph examina-
tions is only one of many assigned duties to the great majority of these
Federal workers. For example, the FBI reported that the 46 special
agents authorized to perform polygraph tests spend an estimated 6
percent of their time on such activity. Accordingly, the FBI con-
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8 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
tended that only 6 percent of the agents' $616,667 annual salaries-
or $37,000 per year-can be directly attributed to work involving the
polygraph. On this same point, authorized Army military policemen
devote less than 5 percent of their time to polygraph activities, averag-
ing 1.8 tests per month for each examiner. Post Office Department
inspectors reportedly average less than 3 percent of their total effort
with the device and the Secret Service attributes less than 1 percent
of the total operators' salaries to work involving the machine.
The National Security Agency is the sole organization indicating
that handling polygraph tests is the primary duty of any of its
employees.
Numerically, the Army again was highest, reporting 358 polygraph
operators on its rolls in fiscal 1963. The Navy Department followed
with 106 examiners--86 assigned to naval intelligence and 20 to the
Marines. Next on the list was the Air Force with 73 authorized
operators.
Once more these figures do not include CIA and NSA which claim
they are exempted by statute from disclosing inforlnation regarding
the number and salaries of their employees. CIA claims as authority
50 U.S.C. 403(g),' and. NSA claims as authority section 6 of Public
Law 86-36 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).'
G. OTHER ANNUAL COSTS
More than $56,000 a year in costs related to polygraph use was re-
ported by the 19 agencies. This figure is a bare minimum, as such
costs were very sketchily estimated due to widely varying record-
keeping. Intended to be included in this category were training and
travel expenses of polygraph operators, maintenance of the polygraph
machines, and similar recurring costs. In addition, the Air Force
reported an expenditure of $24,953 during fiscal 1961 for a contract
with Fordliam University (N.Y.) on studies in lie detection.
H. SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS
Included in the subcommittee questionnaire were several queries
designed to reveal the steps taken to safeguard the rights of individuals
who undergo polygraph tests. In this regard the agencies were
asked. what relative weight is accorded polygraph test results or
refusals to be so tested, whether the use of polygraphs is subject to
review, whether tests results are available to the individual, whether
an avenue of appeal exists, and whether an individual's physical and
mental condition are considered..
1. Effect of refusals.-ln response, every agency provided assurances
of one form or another that polygraph tests are given only with volun-
tary consent from. the person to be tested. Even in the employment
screening programs of the CIA and the NSA, where polygraph tests
r 50 U.B.C. 403(g) states: "irl t e Interests of-the security of?the foreign lutelligmrce activities of the ihdted
States and in order further to impibment the proviso of section 403(d) (3) of this title that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unautlprized
disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title, 5, and the provisions,
of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, narrlcs, official
titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this.
section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection '5 ith
the Agency under section 947(b) of Title ~,"
2 See. 0(a) Except as provided In stihsdbtion (h) of this section, nothipg In this Act or any other law
(including, but not Ihulted to, the first section and section 2 of the Act of August 28 1935 (5 U.S.C. 654))
'
number
shad he of an y information with respect to tile octl'vit(es thcrcoff or of t ro names, titles, salaries, or n
,
of the persons employed by such agency..
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approach the point of being mandatory, applicants may refuse to sub-
mit to polygraph testing. Whether a refusal would dire a job appli-
cant's chances is not clear. The CIA simply said that refusalswould.be
"considered along with other information developed * * * " while the
NSA indicated an applicant's refusal. would require "more exhaustive
investigation."
A number of agencies expressly declared that refusals do not
prejudice the outcome of an investigation. The Air Force, for
example, stated "no inference is or may be made from * * * refusals"
while the Army military police assured that "failure to volunteer for
an examination is not construed as a tacit admission of guilt." Simi-
larly, the Defense Atomic Support Agency said that a refusal "cannot
be construed as an admission or even a partial admission of guilt" and
the Post Office Department asserted the refusals cannot formthe
"basis for any recommendation."
While the Marine Corps went along with most agencies in saying a
refusal "is not considered as proof or evidence of facts sought to be
confirmed," the Office of Naval Intelligence thought otherwise. "It
is safe to say," stated ONI, "that this Office realize [sic] that some
subjects refuse to submit to examination on the basis of moral scruples
which they consider valid, in other cases a refusal may be considered a
tacit admission of guilt."
The Defense Supply Agency also had some doubts about refusals.
"While only limited significance is attached to data developed by the
polygraph test," DSA said, "in a clear-cut `did-you-or-didn't-you'
situation refusal * * * is considered as an unfavorable reflection on
the credibility of the individual's statement."
A member of the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police
Department can be ordered to take a polygraph test, and be subject
to disciplinary action if the order is disobeyed, but for any other
suspect a refusal "can be given no weight as to guilt or innocence.
With the exception of the District of Columbia Police Department,
all agencies reported that refusals by employees to take polygraph
tests are not noted in their personnel records, although such matters
might be mentioned in investigative reports.
2. Weight accorded polygraph test results.-No agency admitted
attaching great significance to the results of polygraph examinations,
but there were indications that such tests influence at least the course
of investigations.
The Atomic Energy Commission reported that polygraph test results
alone were not conclusive but if they were at variance with. the findings
of field investigations, additional fieldwork would be carried out to
resolve the discrepancies. The Defense Atomic Support Agency and
the General Services Administration stressed that they attached no
weight to such test results without confirmation by subsequent
admissions.
The results are not used by the National Security Aggency in "reach-
ing any finding" but only to "identify areas in whic}i the individual
should be questioned further." In a similar vein the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration said the device is used "for
formulating additional investigative coverage."
A balanced statement on this point was issued. by the FBI, which
said the "polygraph can be helpful to implement an interrogation and
provide investigative direction but it must not be relied on solely or
used as a substitute for logical investigation."
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The Internal Revenue Service seemed' inclined to give the individual
being tested. the benefit of the doubt. "Where such test is favorable
to the subject, it might be given considerable weight," IRS said.
"When the test is unfavorable, it would simply be considered with
all other information * * *."
The polygraph was felt to be "an invaluable investigative aid" by
the Office of Naval Intelligence, which also cautioned that "an
accuracy rate of 70 percent is considered optimum."
3. Review of polygraph use.-Almost all of the 19 agencies indicated
that use of polygraphs is subject to review by authorities higher than
those persons immediately involved in handling investigations.
One reported exception to this review practice was the CIA. That
Agency apparently considers a system of review for each instance of
polygraph utilization as unnecessary since the Director of Central
Intelligence has established the policy that "all applicants and
employees will be afforded polygraph examinations as part of security
screening procedures."
Likewise, polygraph tests are a required part of the National
Security Agency's preemployment processing of civilian applicants,
and there is no process to review each applicant's case to determine
whether the testing is appropriate. However, there is a system for
reviewing the decision to test NSA employees.
While the Defense Supply Agency maintains a review process for
all recommended tests in criminal investigations, security operations
are handled differently. The use of polygraphs in DSA security
matters is decided, without subsequent review, by the intelligence
officer in charge at the field activity concerned or at DSA headquarters
in Washington.
4. Availability of results to individuals tested.-Five agencies-
Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Supply Agency, Department of
the Air Force, National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation-indicated they do not make known the results to indi-
viduals undergoing polygraph examinations. All other agencies
using the machine said tfiey either routinely advise the individual
tested of the results or provide the information upon request.
5. Appeals of polygraph test results.-A number of agencies reported
that they have no system permitting the appeal of adverse polygraph
test results. Most of these agencies reasoned that an appeal limited
to the results of polygraph tests is unnecessary since no action is taken
against individuals solely on the basis of such examinations; however,
these agencies went on to say that any administrative action resulting
from an investigation would be subject to appeal.
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department an=
swered that the right of administrative appeal does not apply in its
uses of the machine "since all criminal cases must ultimately be
presented to a court of law and the results of polygraph examinations
are not admissible in these courts."
But a sizable number of agencies and their components said they
provide it means of appeal, usually by conducting a new test with a
different operator. Agencies allowing an appeal or reexamination of
some sort are the Army, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Secret Service, the U.S. Information
Agency, and the U.S.. Park Police of the Interior Department:
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT i
6. Consideration of physical and mental conditions.-Each agency
reporting the use of polygraphs, and all of their a('ected units, informed,
the subcommittee that consideration is given to the physical and
mental conditions of individuals to be tested.
A few agencies, including the Air Force, the Commerce Department,
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the National Security Agency,
and the State Department, said they obtain professional medical,
advice when there is a question of physical or mental suitability to
undergo polygraph tests.
While most other agencies simply indicated that consideration. is
excorded, few further details were volunteered. The Post Office
Department, for example, noted that "susceptibility tests are given
to determine * * * mental suitability." Similarly, Naval Intelli-
gence said : "It is well understood the physical-mental conditions of
many subjects will render them unsuitable as testing subjects either
on a temporal or permanent basis."
The U.S,. Information. Agency was slightly more specific, stating
th.4t the matter "is left to the professionalization of the [polygraph]
pp~rgtor."
~. QUALIFITCATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLYGRAPH OPERATORS
ID order to ascertain the qualifications of the polygraph operators
within the Federal Government, the subcommittee, asked those 11
agencies that employed polygraph operators for a breakdown of the
minimum requirements for the operators. Included amopg the
criteria were age, ,education, grade or rank, years of investigative
experience, any character investigation or agency check, and type of
special polygraph training.
1, Minimum age.---Although niost agencies have set 25 years as the
minimum age for a polygraph operator, the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department allows a policeman aged 21 to
conduct the polygraph tests. The Coast Guard minimum age is 22,
while CIA "prefers" their operators to be 30 years old. There is no
minimum. age requirement in the FBI, but all examiners must be
Special Agents and the minimum age for such an agent is 23 years.
2. Educational requirements.-The educational requirements for
polygraph operators in the Federal Government vary from agency to
agency. The minimum requirement is a high school degree, although
an Army military policeman must have 2 years of college education
before becoming eligible to perform polygraph tests. CIA, NSA, FBI,
Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Secret Service all require a college
degree.
3. Grade or rank.- The minimum grade or rank requirement for
polygraph operators varies greatly throughout the Government,
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department has no
special requirement, while the Central Intelligence Agency requires
its polygraph operators to be a GS-11 (with base annual salary of
$9,004). The FBI requires its polygraph operators to be a Special
Agent, which has the grade of GS-10 ($8,450). Other grade or rank
requirements include: Army Intelligence, E-5 ($4,738); Army Military
Police, warrant officer ($6,632), NSA, OS-11 ($9,004); and Post
Office Department, PFS-13 ($12,639).2
2 Salaries derived from tables found on p, 13415, Congressional Record, Aug. 6, 1963.
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12 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
4. Investigative experience.- -Three agencies- -the District of Colu.rrr-
bia Metropolitan Police Department, the FBI, and the Maine Corps?
have no minim um requirement for ,years of investigative experience.
The remainder of the agencies employing polygraph operators vary
in their requirements from 1. year to 5 years.
5. Agency check or character investigation.--All prospective poly-
graph operators within the Federal Government must be given either
an agency check or it background investigation prior to approval as
an operator. NSA reports that all applicants for polygraph operator
must pass a polygraph screening test.
6. Training program.- The majority of agencies that employ poly-
graph operators train them at the Army Provost Marshal General
School, Fort Gordon, Ga. The Coast Guard and the Post Office
Department also make use of it private source of instruction-the
National Training Center of Lie Detection in New York. CIA
requires polygraph trainees to take an internal academic course for
5 weeks plus an additional 4 months on-the-job training. The FBI
also conducts an internal training course and advanced training
seminars.
7. Other requirements.-No one agency can be compared with any
other in their "other requirements" for authorizing at polygraph opera-
tor. The requirements range from a thorough understanding of
communism (NSA), foreign language fluency and physical ability to
travel extensively (CIA), to emotional stability and lack of distracting
scars or impediments (Air Force).
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USE OF+.POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Polygraph Apparatus and Slreria!1y Adapted I'urntyhittgs-The n:a