CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008100470001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
 ? ? Approved For F; ase 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 8100470001-0
'S'OP SECRET
25X1
20 February 1965
Copy No.
State Derpartment
review(s) completed.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
25X1
25X
?`??`?aeo Of KVOMF ICRTI P n- -n --n ~C R ET
Approved For Release 2005/06/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO081 0 00
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
 Approved For elease 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79T00975AO081004 0001-0 25X'9
j j
A
20
February 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Military leaders put down coup but ap-
pear to have ousted Khanh. (Page 1)
2. USSR-Vietnam: Moscow remains non-committal
toward possibility of negotiations. (Page 3)
3. Indonesia: Communists pressing for elimination
of US facilities and properties in Indonesia.
(Page 5)
25
6. East Germany - West Berlin: East Germans ex-
cavating large ditch along sector and zonal borders
around West Berlin. (Page 9)
7. Cuba: Regime continues to strengthen military
defenses around Havana. (Page 10)
8. Note: France. (Page 11)
Approved For
 25
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100 70001-0
?
G CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 February 1965
0
*Vietnam: South Vietnamese military leaders
have put down the coup in Saigon, but they also appear
to have taken this occasion to oust General Khanh as
armed forces commander.
[At a joint meeting this morning of representatives
of the armed forces and the Quat government, Khanh
is reported to have received a no confidence vote. Al-
though Khanh still may seek to contest this action,
General Dong, the military governor of Saigon, ex-
pects him to choose exile abroad instead. Dong also
anticipates that leadership of the armed forces will de-
volve to General Nguyen Van Thieu, a deputy premier
and the minister of the armed force
[Earlier in the morning, senior commanders with
units near Saigon dislodged rebel forces from their
positions in and around the capital with little or no
bloodshed. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao appears to be
under arrest, but former General Phat and former.
Colonel Ton, the two other principal coup leaders have
reportedly disappeared)
I'he ease with which the rebels were dispersed
suggests the possibility of a deal between the coup
leaders and those commanders who opposed the coup
but shared the rebels' distaste for Khanh. It became
quickly apparent yesterday that the coup group would
be unable to attract enough additional military support
to make its takeover stick. The coup leaders may thus
have decided to strike a bargain, settling merely for
Khanh's removal and possibly promises of lenient treat-
ment for themselves
M
M
V
j Approved Fo Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO081004 0001-0 2 5)W
 -------------
Approved For elease 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO081004 0001-0 25X1
I~ven though Khanh appears to have been ousted
and even though the militant Catholic elements repre-
sented in the coup attempt have again been thwarted,
serious divisions will remain in the military estab-
lishment. For example, two controversial officers~
General 'Thi of I Corps and General Ky of the Air
Force, appear to have strengthened their positions
for the moment, but may face increased hostility from
some of their colleagues3
&he Buddhist leadership, while not involved in
IFMI/ the events of the past two days, will probably be grat-
ified by the suppression of a neo-Diemist coup attempt
and the apparent ouster of Khanh, who was increasingly
becoming the target of criticism by Tri Quang7
IRo significant deployment of North Vietnamese or
Chinese Communist military forces has been detected
in the past twenty four hours*, The Viet Cong have
'd
continued wi es ad but generally small scale guer-
rilla activit~j 25X
5
Zelease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08100470001-0
 Approved For
%%/
*USSR-Vietnam: Moscow's extreme caution in deal-
ing with the Vietnam crisis is reflected in its noncom-
mittal attitude toward the possibility of negotiations.
This lack of initiative apparently results in part
from the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid an open diver-
gence with the Hanoi and Peiping regimes. These re-
gimes probably believe that any overture toward ne-
gotiations would be interpreted as a sign of wavering
in the face of US actions. The USSR probably also
wishes to pla for time to assess developments
in US policy.
During talks over the past several days with the
French and Canadian ambassadors, Deputy Foreign
Minister Zorin failed to respond to specific queries
regarding Moscow's position on a Vietnam conference.
He took refuge in vigorous attacks on US actions]
CDeputy Foreign Minister Lapin, in an interview
with the British ambassador on 16 February, repeat-
edly said there could be no question of negotiations
while US bombings continued. He also refused to
answer a direct question as to whether the USSR
would support a conference]
he Soviet press, however, continues to report
differences between the US and its allies and proposals
by Western leaders for convening a conference. Low-
ranking Soviet officials, moreover, have expressed
interest in a Vietnam conference or in "preliminary
discussions" of a cease-fire. Other Soviet represent-
atives have privately stressed the danger that the
Vietnam crisis may develop into a major war and
have suggested the need for US-Soviet talks on meas-
ures to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asi
(continued)
20 Feb 65
25
r
rd
25X1
 -7^^^ A 25
Approved For lease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08100
0-oviet spokesmen continue to emphasize that
the USSR had no foreknowledge of Viet Cong attacks
on US personnel. Some have claimed that these in-
cidents were inspired by the Chinese Communists
in order to embarrass Premier Kosygin and to dis-
rupt US-Soviet relations. This line was taken by
Marshal Rotmistrov, head of the Soviet armored
forces, in a 15 February talk with Ambassador
Kohler]
Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State.
20 Feb 65
Approved For elease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0810(470001-0
25
2 5) PENN
 Approved For
lease 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0810047 001-0 25X1
Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI continues to pursue its aggressive campaign
to eliminate US facilities and properties in Indonesia.
The USIS library in Medan, North Sumatra, re-
opened yesterday after having been occupied for sev-
eral hours the previous day by members of a Commu-
nist youth front. Indonesian police evicted the in-
truders, lowered the Indonesian flag and sanctioned
the re-opening. However, three USIS installations
in other parts of the country that have been subjected
to mob attacks over the past six months have been
closed under "temporary protective custody" of the
central government.
Demonstrations by Communist-dominated labor
groups continue at American-owned rubber planta-
tions in North Sumatra. The Communists hope either
to occupy the estates themselves or to force govern-
ment seizure.
Medan officials have told the US consul that the
plantations might be taken over "by proclamation."
The ranking area police official, however, assured
the consul that any such seizure would not go so far
as a "physical take-over." There are seven Ameri-
can-owned plantations in Sumatra totaling about
70,000 acres.
The Indonesian Government and the PKI at the
present time appear to have the same objective of
ridding the country of Western influence. The PKI
seems to be in more of a hurry, however, and has
repeatedly pressured Djakarta to take earlier action
than probably had been planned.
20 Feb 65 5
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100 70001-0 25
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
 Approved For Relea 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOO 470001-0
VELTEN
HENNIGSDORF
Nieder
euendorf
p XBabelsberg
Steinstuecken
0Golm
S T G E
Saaimund (SOVIET 2
Ludwigsfelde o
M DITCH CONSTRUCTION
BERLIN WALL
Autobahn
Highway
Railroad
Railroad (elevated)
(S-Bahn)
25X1
-0
70o Feb 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
 Annroved For elease 2005/06/01 - CIA-RDP79TOO97SA00810047 001 0
25X1
0/
"M
*East Germany West Berlin: CThe East German
regime has ordered the excavation of a large ditch
along the sector and zonal borders around West Berlin,
apparently to supplement or replace existing fortifica-
tionp]
CThe ditch is approximately 16 feet wide and 9 feet
deep. One 1,600-yard portion has already been com-
pleted
. E: I
excavation in progress at five other sites on the zonal
border opposite the British and 'French qPPtnr-q I
~IMPMI
(A large number of bulldozers and other earth-
moving equipment has been massed at Busendorf,
15 miles outside Berlin, presumably in preparation
for an all-out effort on the p oiect-I I
I
20 Feb 65
2 5 X 1 Me"
Release 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0810 470001 0
 Approved For Releaa^ 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08470001-0
25X1
Campo Florida Santa Cruz del Norte
Guanalay
20 FEBRUARY 1965
A Cruise missile facility
A Cruise missile site
NOTE: Red symbols denote vacated installations-
CUBAN CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
25X1
25X1
'20 Feb 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
Mayari Arriban
Santiago de Cuban
 M
NO
M
ROM
/M
MEMON
M 7 -
Approved For lease 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0810047(ooi-o 25X1 ~1/
41~
/ffi
IRE
al
j ?//,
~ Vog,
M
00/
011111"
1 0
Cuba: The regime continues to strengthen mili-
tary defenses in the Havana area.
The Cubans appear to be establishing a new cruise-
missile site at Guanajay, west of Havana, where two
unrevetted cruise-missile launchers, eight transport-
ers, and seven crates, apparently containing missiles
were observed on the 17th. This equipment may have
been shifted from the training sitp qf (nmnn
Cuba has two types of cruise missiles, one for
coastal defense and the other for use against ground
targets. There are about 150 cruise-missile crates
on the island. The only operational sites at present
are on the Isle of Pines and at Santa Cruz del Norte
both for coastal defense and both in western Cuba.
A, third site at Banes, was deart'vated early this
month. = I
20 Feb 65
Approved Fo
10
25X
~ffm
25M
25X1
'~g
J1711111M
 25
Approved For elease 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0810047 001-0
ditionsa
France: [Paris will probably turn down the US
request for approval of TAB-V, an exercise involv-
ing dispersal of tactical air squadrons to operating
bases in France, Germany, and the UK. A Foreign
Ministry official stated that this request, which is
supplemental to the already approved annual exercise
list, is inopportune and would attract special atten-
tion in the National Defense Council, over which De
Gaulle often presides personally. He said the coun-
cil would "certainly reject" a proposal based on the
implied assumption that nuclear-armed planes would
be able to use airfields in France under alert con-
25
P 11
20 Feb 65
Approved For R Iease 2005/06/01 CIA-RDP79T00975A0081004 0001-0 25
 Approved For FI a 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00 75A"8100470001-0
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Relea
e 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TO
25X1
 Approved For ReleVA4 2TOP1 SE 0975A00 0470001-0
fF0975A008100470001-0
Approved For Release -7-Vp1 :5
mLicr.
 STAT Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100470001-0