RELATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS IN USSR AND USA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 30, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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RELATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS
IN
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS IN USSR AND USA
30 JANUARY 1946
Classified SECRET
Auth: bqo bJ.. -0
Date: 3
Initials: d
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRAOT
page 1
I.
INTRODUCTION
2
II.
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
5
III.
LAG IN AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
6
IV.
GROUND WEAPONS
7
V.
ROCKETS
11
VI.
ELECTRONICS
14
VII.
OIL REFINING
14
VIII.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
14
I%.
RELATIVE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
15
TIME LAGS IN AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
Figure
1
TIME LAGS IN ARTILLERY AND TANK DEVELOPMENT
2
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT:
Rated Take Off Engine Power
3
Fighter Speed
4
Fighter Range
5
Bomber Speed
6
Bomber Range
7
Bomb Load
8
TANK DEVELOPMENT:
Armament
Armor
Weight
Speed
ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT:
Anti-Aircraft Vertical Range 13
Anti-Aircraft Calibre 14
Anti-Aircraft Muzzle Velocity 15
Anti Tank Penetration 16
Anti Tank Calibre 17
A. ELECTRONICS A.1
B. COMPARISON BETWEEN STATUS OF PETROLEUM
REFINING AM IN THE TT. S. and U. S. U.S.S.R. B. 1
C. CHEMICAL WARFARE C.1
D. ON THE THEORY OF TREND LINES D.1
E. BASIC DATA FOR RELATIVE PRODUCTIVE CAPAC"TTY E.1
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30 January 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Edward L. Bowles.
From: Dr. W. B. Shockley.
Subject: Relative Technological Achievements in Weapon
. Characteristics in USSR and USA.
ABSTRACT
For the purpose of this study, information. has
been gathered and systematized eo as to show the relative techno-
logical advancements made in various weapons by the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. prior to and during the War. The data and the analysis
are given in the following sections. The conclusions reached
from the study in regard to the time lag in reaching equal achieve-
ments and the rate of development are as follows:
Subject
Aircraft
Rate of Development
approximately equal
Time Lag
USSR ranging from 1 to
3 years behind
Ordnance
Tanks
Rockets
Electronics
Oil Refining
Gas Warfare
approximately equal
approximately equal
data inadequate
USSR as fast
data inadequate
USSR ranging from 2 years
behind to 2 years ahead
US ranging from 1 to 3
years behind
plus or minus about 2. years
USSR at least 2 years'behind
TJSSR at least 5 years'behind
data inadequate
On the basis of aircraft production information, it,
is estimated that for 1944 U.S.S.R. total war production was 1.O% of
U.S. total war production.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
There are several reasons for selecting the development of weapons
during war time as an index of the technological potential of a nation.
During war time, questions of priority and emphasis are nxuch simpler
than in peace time and a nation must inevitably advance the quality
and number of its weapons to the best of its ability. In general, the
objectives towards which development is aimed are so obvious as to be
the same for all nations and frequently expressible simply in quantita-
tive form; the horsepower of aircraft engines, the speed of fighter air-
craft and the penetration of anti-tank guns are good examples. Weapons,
furthermore, tend to be the product of an individual nation more than do
peace time technologies; this is due to the reduced contact between na-
tions, the need for self reliance and the general atmosphere of secrecy
about such developments - all of which increase the isolation between
weapon developments indifferent nations. These considerations illus-
trate the.particular importance of including weapon development in the
assessment of the relative technological potential in the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. The developments in the two nations have been compared graphi-
cally and the time lag between them analysed.
In order to understand the method of. estimating the time lag between
the two nations, consider Figure 4 which portrays Fighter Speeds.* Since
the U.S.S.R. put little emphasis on high altitude performance, only the
1`j,000 foot altitude curves are to be considered. We see that each na-
tion introduced a series of new types having ever increasing performance.
Between the dates of the introduction of new types, there was some im-
provement of old types so as a consequence an exact representation of the
increasing performance would be a stairway with the steps sloping up'
slightly and abrupt jumps at the dates of the new types. For purposes
of presentation and analysis, the exact step-wise rise is inconvenient
and instead we use a "trend line", made in some cases by connecting the
performance points by a continuous line and in other cases by "averaging"
the points with a smooth curve. (More exact procedures are possible;
however, the results will be essentially the same as those obtained by
the method just described. See Appendix D.)
Once the trend lines have been drawn to represent the performance as
rising continuously, it is possible to analyse the time lag. Thus we
see that the U.S.S.R. achieved 300 miles per hour early in 1938. The U.S.
On all charts the vertical date lines indicate 1 January of the desig-
nated year.
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trend line reaches this speed in the middle of 1937. Hence we say
the U.S.S.R. lag was 0.5 years at 1938. Similarly we say that at
the beginning of 1944 the U.S.S.R. lag, was 1.1 years.
It is better to deal. with time lags rather than time leads for
the reason that hindsight is more accurate than foresight. Thus we
can say quite definitely that at the beginning of 1944 the U.S.S.R.
lag was 1.1 years but we cannot predict as reliably the U.S. lead
in 1944 because we do not know when the U.S.S.R. will achieve the
U.S. trend value of 430 miles per hour. For this reason, time lags
are used to express all time intervals between the dates when the
nations reach equal achievements in any weapon characteristics.
A considerable number of charts have been worked up for various
weapon developments. For each of these, where the data permits,
time lags have been found. The results have then been plotted so
as to show how the time lag had varied for each characteristic from
year to year. These time lag curves are assembled on two graphs --
Figure 1 for aircraft development; and Figure 2 for tank, anti-tank
artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and ether developments.
The conclusions stated in the Abstract are based principally
upon the time lag graphs. However, some items have been includect
for which the data did not warrant drawing graphs; these are dis-
cussed in later sections and appendices.
The time lags quoted here are probably a reasonable guide for
estimating the future relative position of the two nations in tech-
nologies similar to those represented in this study. However, several
qualifying comments should be borne in mind.
During the war, Russia was under attack and a certain portion of
her research and development establishment was destroyed. This un-
doubtedly had the effect of increasing her time lag as of 1944 and
1945. For this reason the figures quoted probably overestimate her
lag for the future when her facilities are rebuilt.
On the other hand it may be pointed out that in some cases our,
development appears farther behind than it actually was or needed
to be because our emphasis was'placed on factors other than those
,plotted. This may well be true; for example, no information on miles
per breakdown on tanks has been included because adequate data was
not available. However, such qualifications, especially those involving
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questions of decisions on policy may tend to obscure the main
issue. An inspection of the curves shows that the values of
most of the characteristics considered did in fact increase'
steadily under the development programs of both nations. With
this fact as a basis, comparisons of the dates when equal devel-
opments were achieved by the two nations can be made and the time
lag found. In this study the existence of the time lags is the
main point; it should not be lost sight of in detailed - although
probably profitable and informative - inspection of the reasons
for and meanings of the differences of development involved.
The type of conclusion reached from the data is in a sense
more negative than positive. There is so much scatter, even in
a single item such as aircraft development, that it is unwarranted
to predict any specific time lag for any particular development.
However, there is a general consistency in the data in the sense
that U.S.S.R. time lags of as much as 3 years are practically ab-
sent. For this reason the negative assertion can be made that in
technologies closely related to those involved in building planes,
tanks, guns, etc., as covered in this report, the U.S.S.R. will
not lag by more than 3 years.
At this point I should like to acknowledge the wholehearted
and ingenious cooperation of my collaborators in G-2, A-2 and
Statistical Control, without whose aid this study could not have
been prepared.
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II. AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
The information on U.S.S.R. engines has been largely obtained
from captured German documents. There are a sufficiently large
number of points so that it is reasonable to average them with a
smooth curve. The trend curve for U.S. types is based on data
which is at present being checked, for this reason no exact dates
or powers are shown; however, when definite values are established,
the trend curve will certainly not be materially altered. For both
cases, the dates involved correspond not to design or acceptance
tests but to the dates at which quantity production commenced for
military use at the indicated rated take-off power.
No particular comments are required for Fighter Speed except
to remark that dates correspond to initiation of quantity production
of the indicated type.
The Fighter Ranges are maximum distances which can be flown by
military type aircraft with no bomb load but with external tanks
when authorized at optimum cruising speed and altitude with no allow-
ance for fuel reserve at the end of the range.
In working up information on Bomber Speed, any aircraft (includ-
ing heavy, medium, light and fighter bombers) carrying a bomb load of
at least 2,000 pounds has been included.
Since Bomber Range and Bomb Load are closely related, the follow-
ing convention has been adopted. Bomb Load is the maximum authorized
for each particular type of aircraft; aircraft considered have been re-
stricted to heavy and medium types capable of carrying a minimum speci-
fied load of at least 4,400 pounds. Maximum range is at optimum cruis-
ing speed with the heaviest corresponding load, no allowance for fuel
reserve on landing being made.
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III. LAG IN AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
The range from 1500 to 2200 horsepower was covered by the
U.S.S.R. in 2 years compared to 4.5 years for the U.S. This is.
reflected in the Lag graph which shows a continuously decreasing
time lag for the U.S.S.R. This increased rate of development in
the U.S.S.R. is due in part to increased urgency during the War
years. The engines developed were modifications of German, French
and U.S. designs; however, the higher horsepower developments were
not copies of similar developments in the U.S. but instead repre-
sented original engineering along independent lines by the U.S.S.R.
Fighter Speed has been discussed in the Introduction. It is
pertinent to point out that although we have kept ahead in this
field, we did not materially widen the gap between 1937 and 194+.
This means that the U.S.S.R. development went at the same rate as
ours with the whole program between six months and a year behind.
In considering the time lag for Fighter Range, it should be
borne in mind that the U.S.S.R. concept of a fighter involves close
support of ground force operations and that additional armament is
'preferred to more range. Consequently, little if any effort has
gone to increasing the range.
No particular comments are called for in the case of Bomber
Speeds, Range or Bomb Load.
The material on Aircraft Development was furnished and checked
by the Defensive Branch of the Technical Advisors Section of A-2.
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IV. GROUND WEAPONS
The method of plotting and analyzing the data is essentially
similar to that for aircraft developments and will not be discussed
again here. The dates of introduction are defined as follows:
Tank Development: date at Which quantity production fc" mili-
tary use commenced in both countries.
Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Artillery Development: date of
acceptance of type involved.
The following comments prepared by the Military Research Section,
Military Branch of M.I.S. give general background about the nature of
this data:
General
It is imperative to realize that the information furnished
for the graphs on Russian equipment is extremely inadequate. Our
most valuable sources of technical information on Russian equipment
are:
(a) Russian handbooks sent from Military Attaches in
Moscow, Finland and Stockholm, etc.
(b) Observer reports from overseas theaters and Military
Attaches.
(c) Documents by the German Army on Russian weapons cap-
tured or used by the Germans.
Of these sources,
(a) has been very inadequately exploited owing to
the paucity of Russian technical translators.
(b) Observer reports from overseas theaters'are
based on examination of specimens of equipment captured
by the Germans on the Eastern front, and possibly modi-
fied by them to suit their own (German) needs. These
reports, while therefore of a limited value, have been
fully exploited. Observers in Russia are highly limited
in the variety of equipments which they may see, and are
rarely allowed a close inspection.
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(c) The Germans took an intense interest in
Russian equipment, and made a continuous study of it,
adapting many weapons to their own needs. Examples of
this are shown in the fact that the Germans took the
Russian 85 mm AA gun and rebored it to fire their own
88 mm ammunition. When American troops over-ran Hillers-
leben Proving Ground in May 1945, a specimen of the 100 mm
antitank gun Model 44 (1944) and ammunition were recovered.
The Germans therefore had built up considerable studies of
Russian capabilities. Exploitation of such German studies
has reached a very early stage, and the number of documents
awaiting processing in America, Great Britain and Germany
is measured in tons rather than individual documents.
It is only by bearing these facts in mind the general. picture
of Russian development as compared to American development can be seen
in its true perspective.
Antiaircraft Artillery
The Russian antiaircraft. organization is divided into two
groups, the tactical group and the strategical group. The tactical
group was used in forward areas, whereas the strategical group was
deployed in the defense of the big cities, such as Leningrad, MOSCOW,
and other places of strategic importance. Of the two groups the stra-
tegic group had the highest priority on new weapons, and only when their
demands had been satisfied were those of the tactical group met. Infor-
mation on Russian AA weapons is therefore limited to the older types as
very few, if any at all, belonging to the strategic group were captured
by the Germans.
The graphs do not indicate any production beyond the 85 mm
stage with a ceiling of 3+,500 feet. It is inconceivable that research
did not continue during the war years, and, indeed, German documents
tentatively list a 122 mm and a 152 mm. AA gun. These weapons would have
correspondingly higher ceilings.
Antitank Artillery
The graphs show that the Russians were ahead of the Americans
in both aspects of caliber and armor penetration. The 37 mm. gun was
some 8 years ahead of the American 37 mm gun, which was based largely
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on the German 37 mm Pak designed by Bheinmetall.
The advance by the Russian antitank artillery to higher
calibers and performance figures, is understood if the picture
of the armor race between Russia and Germany is borne in mind.
Each country was producing tanks of greater armor thickness, or
using spaced armor necessitating more powerful antitank guns.
With the advent of the hollow charge principle, assisted
by rocket-fired projectiles, weapons in the form of the bazooka
appeared: These weapons tended to retard pure antitank guns as
such in the American development.
Both hollow charge projectiles, and guns designed on the
tapered bore principle were produced by the Americans and Russians.
Of the former, little is known of Russian development, while of the
latter, development took place almost simultaneously in the two
countri3s and appears to have originated in the German designs.
It is interesting to note that both countries had to make
use of old field guns when small caliber antitank guns became out-
classed by armor. The Russians used their Model 36 (1936) 76.2 mm
Field Gun, while the Americans used a 75 mm Field Gun of Schneider
1897 design.
The graphs show that, the U.S.S.R. is ll to 2 years ahead
of the U.S. in this field. Although in the years prior to World
War II, the Russians had not progressed beyond other large nations
in the production of tanks, defense of their homeland against the
German army in 1941 called for drastic steps. It was not until
1943 that the U.S. army came face to face with German tanks, and
although the experience gained by the British in desert tank warfare
had been available to the U.S. army.-this cannot be compared with the
terrific tank battles fought on Germany's eastern front, where the
Russians encountered the German 'Panther' aAd 'Tiger' models, the
latter with more than 100 mm armor protection and mounting the
famous 88 mm gun.
Although during the period U.S. tanks were rapidly developed,
production never made up for the original boost given to Soviet tank
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production. By the end of hostilities Russian tanks were more
heavily armored, had more powerful armament, and, as a direct re-
sult, lower speed than U.S. tanks. (Because speed has decreased
rather than increased, no use of it has been made for time lags.)
On the armament'graph, American development stops at a
90 mm gun. The Americans did mount a 105 mm Howitzer on tanks,
but as this weapon has an inferior performance to the 90 mm guns,
it has not been included.
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V. ROCKETS*
Information on Rockets, while; not permitting a comparison in
the form of'graphs, is in sufficient detail to allow some compari-
son to be made in more general terms. A table showing general char-
acterisitics is shown at-the end of this section. Before drawing any
conclusions from this table, the contents of the table will be first
clearly evaluated.
U.S.S.R. Tables
a. Sources of the material are first considered. The tables
are based upon data concerning 5 different projectiles; these are
the 82-mm, 132-mm, Elongated 132-mm and two 400-mm rockets, the TS-
16 and TS-20, representing five of the total number of seven projec-
tiles about which any data at all is available. These tables there-
fore represent almost the whole known picture of Russian rocket devel-
opment up to 1943. Information concerning the 82-mm has been obtained
from translations of Russian documents and may be regarded as completely
reliable. An Italian report, an Intelligence Summary dated 1943, sup-
plied data regarding the 82-mm, 132-mm and Elongated 132-mm rockets;
the layout of this information and the fact that data applying to the
82-mm agreed with those already received indicate that the existence
of these two projectiles may also be accepted as certain. Slight doubt
exists concerning the two 400-mm projectiles, the TS-16 and TS-20.
They were first reported in 1943 in an M.A. report (evaluation A-l)
giving brief details; mention has been made of them also in German
documents. No drawings have ever been received and a recent though
most. vague report from Moscow indicates that the largest caliber of
rocket is only 300-mm; this recent report'is uncertain and the others
were fairly reliable, so it is assumed that the projectiles do exist.
These tables, therefore, can be said to present a fair, if limited,
picture of Russian development.
b. Dates given in the table represent dates that information
was first obtained. They therefore do not give a more accurate picture
than that the Russians were using that type of rocket at that time.
Whether the rocket was in the experimental stage (denoted in the U.S.
by the letter "T") or whether they were in general manufacture at that
time is not definitely known from the dates available. At best these
* Prepared by Military Research Section, Military Branch of M.I.S.
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dates give an optimum, in that the rockets may have been in use
for some time in which case the date of general production for
military use will be earlier than that shown.
U.S. Tables
a. Dates given in the table attempt to present the time
when the rockets were first used. These dates, though reliable
in themselves, are not comparable to the Russian dates. In some
cases the rockets were designed and test-fired, and manufactured
in limited quantity for operational use. In the cqurse of the
following year, either production for military use began, or small
quantities were produced for "limited procurement", or the projec-
tile design was dropped in favor of later and more efficient designs.
It is. therefore extremely difficult, accurately, to present dates,
in a form from which any comparison could be made.
Conclusions
Bearing in mind these comments, the following general con-
clusions can be reached.
a. Russia was striving towards longer range and had achieved
a range of 7,100 meters with a projectile of 42 kg. The American op-
timum range was 4,800 meters with a projectile of 19.3 kg. The Rus-
sians therefore lead in this field, though the time factor is not ac-
curately known.
b. On the Air to Ground side, the Russians are ahead in range,
though at the expense of weight of the projectile. On fire delivery
(weight of projectile multiplied by range) the Americans are ahead,
as shown by the final column of the table.
In both these conclusions, no reference is made to "Accuracy";
this being one of the major criteria of rocket performance. While ac-
curacy and dispersion figures are available for American rockets, no
such figures are available for Russian rockets, and no comparison can
be made.
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Russian -- Ground to Ground
Name
Date
Weight*
Kg.
Range
Meters
No. fired Fire delivery
per salvo per salvo
82-mm
1942
6.85
5500
42
400-mm TS-16
1942
81
2500
4
400-mm TS-20
1942
77
3000
4
Elongated 132-mm
1942
42
7100
16
Russian -- Air to Ground
82-mm
1942 6.85
6200
8
4.25 x 104
132-mm
1943 23.1
7100
8
16.4 x 104
American -- Ground to Ground
2.36 in.
1942 1.6
550
1
(Bazooka)
4.5 in. M8
1942 18.2
4250
8,
16, &
60?
4.5 in. M16
1944 (end) 19.3
4800
7.2 in. T24
1943 (A) 23.5
3000
Note (a) - 1943 is date when a "limited procurement" was made,
this rocket was standardized in 1945.
American -- Air to Ground
4.5 in. M8 1942 18.2 4250 7.7 x 104
5 ins. HVAR 1944 61 3700 22.6 x 104
* This is the weight of the unfired round. The weight of propellant is of the
order of 15% in most cases.
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VI. ELECTRONICS
Data was sufficient for comparison only on-two items of.informa-
tion. A pentode manufactured in 1937 or 1938 was about I..5 years
behind U.S. art. Furthermore, this development was based largely
on imported skill and equipment.
The U.S.S.R. had frequency modulation equipment in military use
in 1943, about two years after we did.
These two items are plotted as points on Figure 2.
VII. 0]L REFINING
The evidence for oil refining is not such as to.justify drawing
graphs. The information obtainable (Appendix C) indicates (,1) that
the U.S.S.R. did not place high priority on self reliance in this
field; (2) putting a refinery up and into operation in the U.S.S.R.
takes between 2 and 3 times as long as in the U.S.; and (3) the U.S.S.R.
would probably require 5 to 10 years to catch up to our present skill
if they gave this project higher priority.
VIII. CHEMICAL WARFARE
Insufficient information is currently available to make any state-
ment regarding relative technological position on this subject.
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IX. RELATIVE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
In order to complete the picture of U.S.S.R. and U.S. techno-
logical war potential, it is desirable to have a comparison between
the productive capacities of the two nations. Such a comparison is
difficult because of the diversity of materials to be considered
and the lack of adequate information on these. However, a reasonably
good estimate can be made on the basis of production in a single field
-- aircraft production is actually used.-- provided an estimate can be
given of the entire production compared to the single field.
The estimate made here is admittedly rough and approximate. How-
ever, since the comparison is made along strictly parallel lines for
the two nations, the resulting ratio may well be more accurate than
the indices used for each nation. However, the main purpose of this
section has been not so much to derive an accurate ratio but rather
to show that U.S.S.R. production efficiency cannot be negligible com-
pared to ours but must be of the order of one-fourth to one-half as
great.
The U.S. War Expenditures in 1944 were 76 billion dollars, of
which 23 billion were directly and indirectly for the Air Forces. In
other words, the Air Forces represented about 30% of the total expen-
ditures. The total war production must, therefore, have been approxi-
mately 100?/30% - 3.3 times as large as aircraft production. Since
the U.S. production of AAF aircraft amounted to 52,000 aircraft weigh-
ing 1.1 x 109 pounds in 1944+, this implies that the total war production
was equivalent to 3.6 x 109 pounds of aircraft.
U.S.S.R. military aircraft production in 1944 is estimated as
57,000 aircraft weighing 3.8 x 108 pounds. However, before comparing
this with U.S. production, the ratio of total U.S.S.R. war production
to aircraft production must be known.
The U.S.S.R. emphasis on aircraft can be estimated from the size
of the armed forces. These are as follows:
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Million
Million
%
U.S. AAF
2.li
21
U.S.S.R. Air
1.11
15
U.S. AGF and ASF
5.3
47
U.S.S.R. Ground
7.5
82
U.S. Navy
3.6
32
U.S.S.R. Navy
0.3
3
TOTAL
11.3
100
TOTAL
9.2
100
It is incorrect to compare industrial efforts to personnel in the
Armed Forces directly. This is seen from the fact that the AAF,
with 21% of the personnel, accounted for 30% of the War Expendi-
tures; whereas the remaining 79% of the personnel accounted for
70% of the expenditures. Thus each AAF member is more expensive
than the remaining types in the ratio of 30/70 times 7921= 1.6
Hence the U.S.S.R effort should not be taken as 15 for Air versus
85 for other but 15 times 1.6= 24 for Air versus 85 for other,
thus giving 22% for Air. On this basis we estimate that the total
U.,S.S.R. war production in 1914 was equivalent to 100/22 = 4.5 times
the aircraft production; that is, equivalent to 1.7 x 109 poundp of
aircraft.
Comparing the U.S. figure of 3.6 x 109 with .the U.S.S.R. figure
of 1.7 x 109 indicates that in 19141. their productive capacity was 47%
of ours.
One further correction should be introduced. In addition to
production for the Armed Forces, the U.S. produced between 10 and
20 per cent additional equipment for Lend-Lease. This means our pro-
duction should be represented by 4.2 x 109 pounds of aircraft. Lend-
Lease is not included in the U.S.S.R. production estimate so that their
figure is unaltered. On this basis U.S.S.R. production in 19141. is esti-
mated as equivalent to 40% of the U.S. production.
Several qualifying comments should be made. Because of our exten-
sive use of air transport, which involves a large ratio of equipment to
personnel, it may well be that while our airmen are equivalent to 1.6
of the remaining types (so far as industrial production is concerned),
the U.S.S.R. airman is equivalent to less, perhaps only to 1.3,. If this
is true then actually U.S.S.R. production will be relatively higher than
the 40% estimated above.
U.S.S.R. construction involves more wood and fabric than ours. This
may introduce some modification in estimating the equivalent value per
pound.
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
LAG BETWEEN DATES OF
EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT
YEARS
7r
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
2
J
U)
3
/ENGINE POWER
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
DATE OF ACHIEVEMENT BY LAGGING NATION
28 JAN, AWoved For Release 2001/08/2?Eo f DP64-00658A00010001000 '92ure
 Approved tx(5se ifQrWEJ~ffR64ffATff0060P-2
EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT
ORDNANCE, TANK, AND ELECTRONICS
YEARS
7r
@,.PENTODE
'-AA CALIBRE
4
ANTI - TANK PENETRATION
L I I . I M.
L\ y
STANK WT
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
DATE OF ACHIEVEMENT BY LAGGING NATION
28 JAN (Approved For Release 2001 /08/2c$E ITDP64-00658A00010001000f-2g ure 2
 HORSE-
POWER
4 , 000
31000
2,000
I,000
935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
I 1943 1944 1945 1946
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AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
RATED TAKE OFF ENGINE POWER
~
000
US
/
-USSR
'
solo
X
OOV
x
p
X.,01
mo
ago*
domw
28 JAN 1946 SECRET F
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
MILES
PER
HOUR
600
- USSR 1 30,000 FEET
400
300
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
FIGHTER SPEEDS
..emu S
~~USSR
US
P-36 ?- *
P-35 ~~X~16
,X~ 153
X YAK-1
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
SECRET
Figure 4
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
MILES
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
FIGHTER RANGE
1,000
/ USSR
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JAN 1946 SECRET
Figure 5
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
MILES
PER
HOUR
600
500
BOMBER SPEEDS
LEGEND
W-US 15 000 FEET
USSR) '
US 30,000 FEET
P-51 H
400
P-47Co/4-29
300
200
i
_ B-23
sow 0000
X IB-3 B-I8
?X TU-2 ,
100
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
B-25
0 B- 7 X
W8-24 00 fE-3
B-17 B?
f XmXR-2
B- 1749 IL-4
I/0
400
28 JAN 1946 S R E
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P-61A B-32
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AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
BOMBER RANGE
1-U I SSR
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JAN. 1946 SECRET
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POUNDS
30,000
25,000
20,006
15,000
10,000
5,000
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD
0 t-
sow
U1 SSR
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JAN 1946 SECRET figure 8
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
GUN CALIBRE
IN
MILLIMETERS
120
-USSR
TANK DEVELOPMENT
ARMAMENT
lit
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JAN 1946 SECRET Figure 9
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
TANK DEVELOPMENT
ARMOR THICKNESS
MILLIMETERS
120
110'
100,
60
935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 194
I 5 1946
28 JAN 1946 SECRET Figure 10
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,USSR
-
US
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TANK DEVELOPMENT
WEIGHT
70
30
T l I I I
201935 1936 193 938 939 940 1941 942 1943 1944 1945 1946
4f
40
00~
aop*
'
1"040000
USSR
-U
S
10000,
Ole
40
Ole
28 JAN 1946 SECRET Figure II
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TANK DEVELOPMENT
MILES
PER
HOUR
40
30
20
935 1936 1937 19
1 38 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
CRUISING SPEED
-us
-USS
R
28 JAN. 1946 SECRET Figure 12
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ANTI-AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT
VERTICAL RANGE
FEET
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,1000
us
?
x
USSR
x
~~.x
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JANAApJrgSed For Release 2001/08/28 :I64-00658A000100010005-2
Figure 13
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ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT
CALIBRE
MILLIMETERS
125 r
'USSR
..~.X~~?X
75
1935, 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
ANTI -AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT
FEET
PER
SECOND
3, 2 00 1
3,000
2,800
2,600
2)400
USSR
-r
MUZZLE VELOCITY
2,200
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010005-2
ANTI-TANK ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT
PENETRATION OF ARMOR AT 500 YDS
PENETRATION AT NORMAL INCIDENCE
IN INCHES
7
,90 MM
100 MM
IN 1944
-3"
7 MM-X
'
/
X
76.2 MM
fT
h-
/
-5 7 MM
U
SSR-.
/
-75 M
M
X37 M
M
'
45 MM
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
28 JAN. *f?ovedFor Release 2001/08/28$FIA 64-00658A000100010005F2gure 16
 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010.005-2
ANTI=TANK ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT
CALL B RE
(Muzzle Velocity In Feet Per Second)
MILLIMETERS
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
\ ?AV. 29 0
M.V. 2950
/
MODIFI
ED FIELD
GUNS
INTROD
UCED INT
O ANTI-
TANK U
SE
M.V.
Z 20
X 4
0
'M.V. 2
800
20
30 2
310
M.V
. 3340
-
p sop
M.V. 2
340
0 000 loo
USSR
000 0100 0
7
i
r
l
1
-
I
i
M.V. 22
00
U
S
"M.V. 29
0o
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SECRET
APPENDIX A
ELECTRONICS
The statements made on electronics are based on the following two
communications:
5 January 1946
"SUBJECT: Development of Electronics in Russia.
TO: Office of the Secretary of War
Room 4E935, Pentagon Building
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Dr. W. B. Shockley
1. In response to your request for information on the
technological advance of electronics in Russia, the following informa-
tion based on correspondence and telephone conversations between Captain
H. E. Morgan of this Branch and Mr. Karl Dreyer of the Radio Corporation
of America, Lancaster, Pa., is submitted. For purposes of information
Mr. Dreyer recently spent some time in Russia on matters of vacuum tube
negotiations between RCA and the Soviet Union.
2. The operating characteristics of two Soviet vacuum
tubes (2K2M and C0257) were submitted by Mr. Dreyer. Both of these
tubes are of the variable-mu Pentode receiving type having a 5-pin octal
base and a glass-metalized bulb and are completely of Soviet design,
probably based on similar American and German types. The nearest Ameri-
can prototype for these tubes is the series of tubes such as the 6C6,
6D6, 77, 78, 57 and 58 as were developed and in production by the Radio
Corporation of America in 1933. The best estimates by Mr. Dreyer on the
date of the first production for these Soviet tubes is 1937 or 1938.
3. The facts noted in paragraph'2 indicate that pro-
duction of Soviet designed tubes took place from four to five years after
the similar American types.
4. Although information on other types of Russian tubes
is not readily available, it is. believed by the representatives of RCA
and the Scientific Branch that the technological development of elec-
tronics equipment in Russia has been about four to five years behind
that of the United States. N
(signed) ROBERT L. SNIDER (GSC)
ROBERT L. SNIDER
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Scientific Branch, MIS"
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An informal communication on 11 January 19+6 for
Dr. W. B. Shockley states thc.t:
"Lt. Hall reports that in the field of frequency modu-
lation, we had SCR-509 and 510 in August 19)+1. From the exami-
nation of the material, Lt. Hall says they had (it) in September
1943, and consequently in that field of development were a little
over two years lag.
Lt. Hall and Major Kingman went over the material care-
fully and say that for frequency modulation and pentode tube they
did not find any really good items. for comparison."
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON BETWEEN STATUS OF PETROLEUM REFINING
ART IN THE U.S. AND U.S.S..R.
1. In order to estimate the technological position of the U.S.S.R.
in chemical engineering an appraisal of oil refining has been made.
The information presented herewith is based on a discussion between
Mr. Herman B. Dunn of the M. W. Kellogg Company and Dr. W. B. Shockley.
During 1944 and 1945, Mr. Dunn was associated with the Petroleum Ad-
ministration for War as Chief of the Russian Section in the Office of
the Director of Foreign Refining. In this office he made a study of
refining capacity in the U.S.S.R. making use of files in FEA, OSS and
PAW. Furthermore, during 1930 and 1931 he worked in the U.S.S.R. in
connection with installing U. S. refining equipment. He has read and
concurs with this summary.
2. Information about U.S.S.R. activity in this field is insuf-
ficient to permit a good appraisal of their potential ability to de-
velop refining methods and equipment. It Is believed this is'partially
due to the fact that they have been able to rely upon imports of equip-
ment and techniques prior to the war and in addition upon imports of
products during the war. It is probable that they have not tried to be
foremost in this field but have, instead, been content to count on
using foreign art. For these reasons, the actual U.S.S.R. development
may lead to an underestimate of what their potential development could
be with first priority in this field.
3. In 1931 and 1932, Mr. Dunn's experience lead him to the con-
clusion that to assemble and install a refining plant from completed
component parts in the U.S.S.R. took between two and three times as
long as in the U.S. A Houdry Process plant shipped to the U.S.S.R. In
August 1943 was not in satisfactory operation in_January,1946, since,
under comparable conditions, It would require not more than one year
In the U.S., the U.S.S.R. rate is more than twice as slow.
4. Mr. Dunn estimates on the basis of his general experience and
information that without outside aid, the U.S.S.R. would require at
least five years to advance their art to our present stage if they
gave this project higher priority. It might well take twice as long.
Mr. Dunn stated that based upon his experiences, the U.S.S.R.
engineers show a definite reluctance to take chances in oil refining
engineering development. This is confirmed from his own personal ex-
perience in Russia in getting the Russian engineers to assume the
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responsibility for oil refining operations after the new refining
units had been placed in operation and had met guarantees. Also
another example in this regard is evidenced by the fact that in 1942
a Russian delegation to this country selected the Houdry process
to be furnished them under Lend-Lease in spite of the fact that all
the latest developments in other catalytic cracking processes were
made available to them. At that time the Houdry process was the only
catalytic cracking 'process which had several years of proven refinery
operations, behind it although there had been developed but not com-
pletely perfected, other catalytic cracking processes which gave
evidence of soon outstripping the Houdry process in economy and pro-
duction; and which processes had been almost universally accepted in
1942 for all future catalytic cracking units that were subsequently
installed in the U.S. The delegation was unwilling to gamble on what;
from an engineering point of view, was a relatively sure thing.
As further evidence on this point, there were trained in
this country 55 Russian engineers over a period of 6 months to two
years in order to acquaint them with the oil refining equipment being
furnished to Russia under Lend-Lease. At the end of the training
program the Russian Government requested the assistance of American
operators to place the Lend-Lease oil refining equipment in operation.
The lack of completing the construction of the equipment before the
end of the war with Japan prevented the sending of the American
operators who had been signed and under contract to go to Russia for
that purpose.
W. B. Shockley
14 January 191+6
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APPENDIX C
CHEMICAL WARFARE
The statements about chemical warfare are based on the following
document:
Comparison of U.S. and Russian Reasearch and
Development.on New War Gases
9 January 1946
1. As requested of Captain W. E. Schmertz, Scientific Branch,
MIS, the following report is submitted:
a. Information on Russian research and development on
new war gases has been obtained almost completely from German or
Japanese intelligence sources and is sparse and incomplete. No in-
formation is available on how many man-hours of work were devoted to
this subject, what funds were allocated to the project, nor what re-
sult's were obtained by this research.
b. It is therefore concluded that there is insufficient
information to draw a comparison such as is desired by Dr. Shockley in
the. compilation of this present report.
2. These results were concurred with by the Chief of Rus-
sian O/B Section, Military Branch, Lt. Col. Shimkin, and by the Acting
Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Office of the Chief, Chemical War-
fare Service.
C.
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APPENDIX D
ON THE THEORY OF TREND LINES
In the introduction it was stated that a "trend line"
would be drawn through the points representing the performance of
each newly introduced model. It was also stated that this method
is only approximately correct. We shall see why it may lead to a
serious error and what can be done to correct it. Suppose nations
A and B achieve'fighter aircraft performance as follows:
Jan. 1940
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1942
Jan. 1943
Jan. 1944
400
420
440
400
41o
420
430
440
The."trend" lines for these two cases will be the same, but B's will
have two more points on it. Furthermore, It is clear that half the
time B has 10 miles more speed than A. Hence, although B is obvi-
ously ahead, the trend lines do not show the difference.
What we should do is take into account the duration over
which the speed was held. Proceeding in this way, we say that A had
400 at Jan. 1941 and 420 at Jan. 1943; i.e. A held 400 from Jan. 1940
to Jan. 1942, so that the average date was Jan. 1941. Using these
average dates we have:
A
400
Jan. 1941;
420
Jan. 1943.
B
400
July 1940;
410
July 1941; 420 July 1942;
430 July 1943.
Trend lines drawn through these points will show that B is six months
ahead of A. This is consistent with the fact that B's speed is five
miles. faster than A's on the average (i.e. 10 miles faster half the
time) which corresponds to a time difference of six months with a
rate of progress of 10 miles per hour increase per year.
An alternative procedure is to say that the speed at the
date of introduction of a new model is taken as the average between
those of'the new and old models. This leads to the same trend line
as taking the average date.
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Mathematically, both of these procedures produce a trend line
having the same area under it as the step function. Such a line has
a further advantageous feature (which will not be proved here) in
that it predicts correctly the aver-age date at which an achievement
will be attained - dates earlier and later than the predicted date
being equally likely. On the other hand, a line drawn through the
performance points tends to be too early by half the average. interval
between models.
The refinements considered in this Appendix have not been in-
troduced in the body of the argument for several reasons: (1) They
would not alter the conclusions materially; (2) They would complicate
the argument; (3) Improvements of models between introductions of
new types would have to be considered and sufficient data would not
be available. The reason why no important change would come about
is as follows: the correct trend line is delayed by half the inter-
val between models from the approximate one. For the U.S. and
U.S.S.R., the interval between models is much the same on each chart
(although it differs markedly from one chart to another); conse-
quently, both trend lines would shift by the same amount, leaving the
relative position essentially unaltered.
D.Q
SRCP=
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APPENDIX E
BASIC DATA FOR RELATIVE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
The U.S. expenditure figures are taken from Memoranda prepared
in the Research and Analysis Branch of Statistical Control on 4 December
1945 and 28 January 1946. The Armed Forces Personnel figures are from
the latter memorandum. The production of U.S. aircraft is based on a
report from the.same source dated 29 January 1946.
The U.S.S.R. personnel figures and aircraft production was obtained
through the Science Branch of M.I.S. The production in 1944 was given
in terms of types as shown below and other data was furnished for one
month (January 1945) which permitted estimates of the average empty
weight per aircraft to be made:
Number of
Aircraft
Weight Per
Aircraft
Total Weight
(millions of lbs.)
Fighters
22,000
4,600
100
Bombers
6,400
12,000
77
Ground Attack
15,500
9,50C
147
Trainers
8,860
4,8oo
42
Transports
4,980
2,500
12
57,740
378
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