MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS-PROCUREMENT, TRAINING SUPPLY, ADMINISTRATION, AND UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

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RESTRICTED
REPORT
OF
THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS-PROCUREMENT, TRAINING
SUPPLY, ADMINISTRATION, AND
UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
G-2 SECTION STUDY NUMBER 12
RESTRICTED
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United States Farces, European Theater
The Military Intelligence' Service in the
_urope;n Treater of Operations
Study Number 12
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THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
MISSION; Prepare report and recommendation on the Military Intelli-
gence Service in the European Theater,of Operations--the
procurement, training, supply, administration and utiliza-
tion of intelligence personnel.
The General Board was established,. by General Orders 128, Headquarters,
European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as
amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders
312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces,
European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tac-
tics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the
European Theater.
File: R 013/1 Study Number 12
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THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Prepared by:
Colonel Robert A. Sehow, 0 12180, GSC (G-2), Chairman and Chief
of Section
Colonel John H. Claybrook, 0 15817, GSC (G-2)
Lieutenant Colonel William E. Eckles, 0 254154, GSC (G-2)
Major James K. Robison, 0 264548, Cav (G-2)
Major Parkhurst C. Hough, 0 1288056, Inf (G-2)
Major Le Roy C. Hill, 0 357943, Cav (G-2)
Major Michael A. Cavanaugh,. 0 1015294, Inf (G-2)
First Lieutenant John S. D. Eisenhower, 0 26607, Inf (G-2)
Second Lieutenant Bert P, Schloss, 0 2026795, AUS (G-2)
Principal consultants:
Brigadier General Edwin L, Sibert, 0 11193, USA
Brigadier Genera]. G. Bryan Conrad; 0 12226, USA
Colonel Carter Collins, 0 6959, GSC
Colonel Hamer P. Ford, 0 16417, GSC
Colonel Cleo A. Harper, 0 232778, GSC
Colonel Charles A, Masson, 0 103691, GSC
Colonel Francis P. Miller, 0 524591, GSC
Colonel Charles J. Norman, 0 217635, GSC
Colonel Georg H. Swerderski, 0 285051, GSC
Colonel James M. White, 0 251611, GSC
Lieutenant Colonel William M. Black, 0 138988, GSC
Lieutenant Colonel John H. Montgomery, Jr. 0 20754, Inf
Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Reinecke, 0 23284, Inf
Lieutenant Colonel Cooper. B. Rhodes, 0 258656, GSC
Lieutenant Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, 0 22017, Inf
Lieutenant Colonel Dupre Sassard, 0 352b82, GSC
Lieutenant Colonel John C. Schmuck, 0 141251, GSC
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Wallace, 0 914071, Armd
Major William H. Correale, 0 196483, Engr
Major Maurice P. Frary, 0 295765, Inf
Major Joseph C. Hazen, 0 324219, FA
Major Martin M. Phillipsborn, 0 370523, Cav
Captain Thomas E. Cassidy, 0 1302599, Inf
Other consultants:
Replies were received to the questionnaire (see Appendix 2) from
the following:
38 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Infantry Divisions
12 Assistant Chiefs. of Staff, G-2, Armored Divisions
4 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Airborne Divisions
15 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Corps
3 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Armies
4 Assistant C?'iefs of Staff, G-2, Base Sections.
-1.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Chapter 1: The military Intelligence Service . . . , . , , . , 1
Chapter 2: Procurement and Training of Personnel for
Military Intelligence Teams 7
Section 1 Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Section 2 - Training . . ? . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter 3: Administration and Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Section 1 - Administration . . . . . . . ? . ? . ? . . . 19
Section 2 - Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 4: Operations . . . . . . * ? . ? . , , . . . . . . 25
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . ? . . . . 30
Section I - Conclusions . , , 30
Section 2 - Recommendations , 31
Appendix 1 . . . ? . a . . . . 33
Appendix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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CHAPTER I
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
1. Definition of Military Intelligence Service. The term "Mili-
tary Intelligence Service," as employed in the European Theater of
Operations, may be defined as an over-all grouping of intelligence
agencies which had operational, as distinct from staff, functions. It
comprised most of the field agencies which operated under the ultimate
direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. It was conceived as a
means of relieving the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater
of Operations, from'the necessity of exercising administrative control
over a multitude of units and individuals operating in the field, while
at the same time giving the field agencies the advantages of a reason-
able degree of autonomy.
2. Establishment of the First Operational Intelligence Agancies.
The first operational intelligence agency to be established, in point
of time, for operation overseas, and which later operated extensively
in the. European Theater of Operations, was the Counter Intelligence
Corps. This body, however, was never closely integrated with the Mil-
itary Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations.
a. MIS-X (Military Intelligence Section-X), The history of
the Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations
began, for practical purposes, with the organization in Washington,
District of Columbia, in November, 19L,2, of a highly specialized intel-
ligence unit which was given the arbitrary designation of MIS-X.2 The
symbolic designation of this unit was intended at the time to mask its
real functions, and, as a matter of fact, it carried on its activities
behind a carefully drawn veil of secrecy. MIS-X was concerned with the
problems presented by the capture of our personnel by the enemy. It
trained selected military personnel, particularly Air Forces personnel,
in what their conduct should be in case of capture by the enemy or of
imminent danger of such capture; how they should conduct. themselves in
an enemy prison camp; under what circumstances they should attempt es-
cape and the means of effecting escape; and how they might contact and
utilize agents of the escape routes established in occupied countries.
An important feature of the work of ivIIS-X was to collect positive in-
telligence concerning the e.nemy. To this end, it taught an elaborate
code by means of which timer. icans confined as p3-1sonors-of-war might
send out intelligence in ttijir letters, and it interrogated Americans
who succeeded in escaping 'rom enemy territory. A part of MIIIS-X was
;transferred to the United Kingdom, where it began operating in Febru-
ary, 1943.
b. MIS-Y (Military Intelligence Section-Y). Another intelli-
gence agency, designated,as MIS- , was sot up in the European Theater
of Operations in February, 1943,5 This was the parent of the many
agencies concerned with the collection of intelligence by means of the
1. See "Organization and Operation of the Counter Intelligence
Corps. in the European Theater of Operations;" Study No 13, of the
General Board, USFET, December, 1945.
2. See draft of "History of the Military Intelligence Service,
European Theater of Operations," compiled by the Historical Section,
Military Intelligence Service, no date, Chap 1, Par 1. This work,
still in the course of preparation in November, 1945, will be referred
to hereinafter as "History of MIS."
3. See "History of MIS," Chap 1, Par 2..
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also it close cd'operation w.th the British. in the preparation of topo
graphical materials as aids in stratepieal planning.
?. Censorship Service. Several branches of censorship were
established and functioning in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943.
These included a half-dozen Base Censor Offices; the Press. Radio. and
Cable Censor Office; and the Prisoner-of-War. Postal Censorship Office--
the latter being engaged in the censorship of the mail of enemy prison-
ers-of-war who were confined in the United Kingdom. All of these agen-
cies of censorship were engaged in work which was deemed to be of im-
portance in military intelligence. For this reason they had all. been
placed under the nominal supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff.
G-2. European Theater of Operations.
4. establishment gf the Miltay Ietel7ia?ence Service, Eurapear~
Theat~ex of Operations.
a. The direction of so many and such highly specialized field
services presented problems of serious proportions to the G-2 Section.
European Theater of Operations. As the massing of troops and materials
in the United Kingdom progressed. with the attendant increase in milita-
ry intelligence personnel and .functions, the G-2 Section was ibe danger of
top-heavv1with administrative personnel and duties. and gng
finding its proper functions of poli'cv-forming and planning on the staff
level obscured behind a mass of detail. At the same time, the field
agencies tended to lose contact with the G-2 Section, and thus did not
have the broad supervision and direction which was needed to co-ordinate
their activities with the policies of the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-26
During the summer of 1943, these problems received serious considera-
tion. and a staff study resulted in recommendations designed to reduce
the G-2 Section to reasonable proportions and to safeguard it in its
proper functions. It was decided to relieve the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2. of the necessity of providing for the detailed supervision
and administration of field agencies, and to set up a new agency to
achieve these ends, while preserving to the Assistant Chief Of Staff,
G-2, the broad power to direct the operations of the field agencies.
b. The Military Intelligence Service, European Theater of Ope
rations, was agtivated by an order dated 17 August 1943, effective as of
1 August 1943. This order had the effect of consolidating most of the
existing field agencies into a single service for the major purposes of
administration, procurement and training of personnel. and the day-by-
day direction of operations. The order contained a Table of Organiza-
tion which gave an allotment of grades and ratings for the Headquarters
of the Military Intelligence Service and for all of the operational in-
telligorce agencies that have been mentioned above, except the Military
Intelligence Specialist Teams. Subsequent orders.. dated 6 September
1943. and 1 October 1943,7 assigned the above-mentioned agencies to the
newly created Military Intelligence Service. Including the Interrogator
of Prisoner-of-War Teams that had alr.eadydarrived In,tbe
and Base Censor Offices Numbers 1.2.3,
Intelligence Corps. Other Base Censor Offices and Censorsh;p Services
were soon after added to the Military Intelligence Service. For all
practical purposes, these early additions may be considered as going to
-r- .._.--.+ ....r---w....----w---.._._......_-. ....-- -.-...,.._..w......_-r..~---._-_ _
6. Hq Special. Troops. ETOUSA, General Order No 3, 17 Aug 1943, file
38346, G-2. ETOUSA. No ~3,
7. Hq Special Troops, ETOUSA. General Order No 4, 6 Sep 1943;
1 Oct 1943.
8, Base Censor Offices Nos 5 and 6, and the Press, Radio. and Ca-
ble Censor Office; see Hq Special Troops, ETOUSA. General Order No 9,
-3-
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make up the original composition of the Military Intelligence Service in
the European Theater of Operations. Thus, the plan of uniting all the
field intelligence agencies into a single Military Intelligence Service
was realized in its entirety, with the important exception of the
Counter Intelligence Corps. Originally, only the Headquarters of the
Counter Intelligence Corps was assigned to the Military Intelligence
Service. and the latter had jurisdiction over the former only in the
publication and distribution of orders relating to the assignment of
personnel.. Even later on, beginning in July, 1944, when detachments of
the Counter Intelligence Corps were attached to the Military Intelli-
gence Service, the relationship was limited to certain administrative
matters.
5. Outline of the Subse ug ent History of_th e Military Intelli-
genc__e Service.
a. Composition as of 17 December 1943. A study made by the
G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, as of 17 December 1943,
showed that the composition of the Military Intelligence Service had not
changed in any important respect, except that it included at that date
Military Intelligence Specialist Teams in all four categories, namely:
(1) Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War.
(2) Military. Intelligence Interpreter.
(3) Photo Interpreter.
(4) Order of Battle,
b, Composition as of 19 April 1944. A study prepared for the
G-2 Section, European Theater of Operations, detailing the composition
of the Military Intelligence Service as of 19 April 1944, showed that
it had not by that date undergone any change as to its component agen-
cies, but that some of them had,been rechristened with more descriptive
titles, as follows:
(1) Home Forces Intelligence Detachment had by this date
acquired the new designation of Photo Intelligence
Indoctrination Center, (Later, it was known simply
as the Photo Intelligence Center.)
(2) Inter-Service Topographical Detachment had by this
date acquired the new designation of United States
Army Topographical Research Department.
c. Later Changes in Composition. Most of the agencies com-
prising the Military Intelligence Service underwent an expansion in
personnel and an internal diversification in structure commensurate with
the increase in their responsibilities. Headquarters soon expanded into
a Headquarters Company, and was later sub-divided into four standard
staff sections with a Headquarters Command. Headquarters also included,
by mid-summer of 1944. Liaison Sections for action with Army Groups and
Armies. The Field Interrogation Detachment expanded to include Docu-
ments Sections and Mobile Field Interrogation Units. The first major
Footnote S (Contd).
6 Oct 1943. The Prisoner-of-war Postal Censorship Detachment was as-
signed to the Military Intelligence Service on 12 Feb 1944: See Ltr, AG
322 OpGC, 12 Feb 1944.
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addition to the Military Intelligence Service occurred on 25 October
1944 in the creation and assignment,to It of the 6857 Order of Battle
,Center.9 At the ent?of October,.1944, two new units were assigned to
the Military Intelligence Servi?ce, namely the 6823 Headquarters Com-
pany and the 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center.l On 21 February
1945, the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Thea-
ter of Operations, was consolidated with the Military Intelligence Ser-
vice.2~ The Mobile Intelligence TraibIng Unit was assigned on 21 March
1945.::
d. Strength of the Military Intelligence Service. The
strength of the Military Intelligence Service, as of selected dates for
which figures are available, is shown in Table I.
TE I
'R NGTH OF
IT ~TI~R INTELLIGENCE UUICE
it
Hq & Detachments
Censorship
MIS1 Teams
Date
O's
EM
Total
O's
EM
Total
09s
EM
Grand
Total Total
17 Aug 432
943
1563
2503
357
175
532
244
40`'
724 - 854
19 Apr 445
121
202
323
390
185
575
776
812
158?3 2486
Oct 445
135
- 301
436
305
165
470
659
1379
2038 294.4
25 Feb 455
210
593
803
290
185
475
945
2389
3334 4612
31 Mar 455 209
584
793
295
184
479
1031
2470 j
3501 4773
References for Table I:
1. Military Intelligence Specialist,
2. Authorized; figures of actual strength not available.
3. Counter Intelligence' Corps not included, because it was at no
time integrated with the Military Intelligence Service.
4. Estimate.
5, Actually present,
The fo2lcwing observations may be made upon the basis of the figures
Just presented:
(1) The Censorship Service, in terms of personnel, compri-
sed a large proportion of the Military Intelligence
Service. The personnel of Censorship decreased stea-
dily, and due to the increase of personnel in other
branches of the Military Intelligence Service, the
relative importance of Censorship decreased to a
marked degree,
9. Hq MIS, General Order. No 25, 25 Oct 1944.
10. Hq Command, ETOUSA, General OrderNo 80, 31 Oct 1944.
11,,..Hq MIS, General Order No 12, 21 Feb 1945.
12. Hq ETOUSA, Troop Assignment Order No 53, 21 Mai 1945.
5
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(2) The over-all strength of the Military Intelligence
Service increased during the period under considera-
tion. The personnel of the Headquarters and the De-
tachments increased moderately, but the increase in
over-all strength was due primarily to the great ex-
pansion in the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.
6. Sc2Re of_this Study. From this point, this study will be lima-
ted to the consideration of the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams.
Some of the reasons for so limiting the scope of this study are as fol-
lows:
a, Numerically, the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams
were the largest element in the Military Intelligence Service.
b. The Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were a field
agency, going everywhere and coming into contact with many other ele-
ments of the military forces. Consequently, it is.possible to obtain
more, and relatively impartial, judgments of their work.
co Due to their numerical preponderance and the wide range of
their operations, the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams attracted
more attention than any other part of the Military Intelligence Service,
and to many people they represented the work of the larger organizations
To a large extent; the record of the Military Intelligence Service must
be judged in terms of the work of the Military Intelligence Specialist
Teams.
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Nao~
C PTER~ 2
PROCUREI NT AIM TRAINING OF PERSONDTEL FOR
MILITAR'INTELLIGEtiCE SPECIALIST TEAMS
PROCUREMENT
Statistics of Personnel of Militiary Intelligence Specialist
Teams. The classification of the personnel of the Military Intelli-
gence Specialist Teams in the European Theater of Operations, at dates
for which figures are available, is indicated in Table II.
TABLE II
STRENGTH OF MILITARY INTELLIGE?1CE
__ ~ SP!CIALI ~T TEAMS
IPW Interrogator of Prisoner-of-.War
MI
II Military Intelligence Interpreter
Px Photo Interpreter
OB Order of Battle
Date
Category
Officers
EM
Total
28 Max 1944
Allotted grades
IN
369
720
1098
and ratings
miI
1 8
5
73I+
P1
27
56L
S
B
1
20
Total
89
1 74
2 1
Apr 1944
Actual Strength
Total
776
812
1559
Oct 1944
Actual Strength
IPW
225
486
711
MZI
117
240
357
~
_
2,
794
..
62
5
-
176
Total
59
1379
2039
28 Dec 1944
Allotted grades
IN
436
? 2
1309
25 Feb 1945
and ratings
MIT
99
31 Mar 1945
PI
302
0
906
B
1
231
Total
1013
202
3039
25 Feb 1945
Actual Strength
IP[17
373
1044
141
MI
192
59
760
PY
02
1
2
OB
8
159
2
Total
945
2399
3334
31 Mar 1945
Actual Strength
IN
14
MI I
2110
09
a
OB
~i01
Key a ab rev a one use in Table II:
EM Enlisted Men
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The following observations may be made upon the basis of the figures
presented in Table II:
a. During the period of approximately a year covered by these
figures, the total personnel of the Military Intelligence Specialist
Teams actually present in the European Theater of Operations increased
by 199 per cent.
b. The rate of increase in total personnel present in the
European Theater of Operations of the four different kinds of teams was:
(1)
Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War
105.0%
(2)
Mili-tart' Intelligence Interpreter
135.0%
(3)
Photo Interpreter
19.6%
(1E)
Order of Battle
44.3%
c. The Photo Interpreter Teams, which held first rank in
point of.total personnel present in the European Theater of Operations,
at the beginning of the period under consideration, soon gave place to
the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams. The Military Intelligence
Interpreter Teams held third place throughout, and the Order of Battle
Teams fourth place.
d. The proportion of officer personnel in the total decreased
in the period covered by the figures in Table II from 40.8 to 22.9 per
cent.
e. The proportion of officer personnel in the total Ziresent
in the European Theater of Operations for the four different kinds of
teams was as follows, for the earliest and latest dates for which fig-
ures are available:
Oct 44 Mar 45
(l)
(2)
Interrogator of Prisoner'-of-
War
Military Intelligence Inter-
31.6%
29-5%
preter
32.7%
25.0%
(3)
Photo Interpreter
32.5%
33,.3%
(1E)
Order of Battle
33.5%
31.6%
Thus, it is clear that the Photo Interpreter and. the Order of Battle
Teams received the most favorable treatment in this respect, having
the constant proportion of one third of their personnel of commis-
sioned grade, while the proportion of officers in the other two kinds
of teems bhowed a marked decline.
f.. It may further be observed that,. while at first the al-
lotted grades and. ratings were not filled up by -personnel. arriving
from the United States, there soon developed a lag, and grades and
ratings were not made available in sufficient numbers to take care
of those arriving from the United States. The deficiency, was not
made up in the period covered by the figures in Table II.
S. Procurement of Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel in
t. Zone of the Interior. Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was responsible for
the oribinal procurement of per.so.nnel for specialist teams, as well as
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the essi.r nment of indiv duals to a snacia;lty.1 Personnel was ordered
to C.,.-,,p kitchie from ell Army instal'ati:8ns--1n many inst:n.ncos direct-
ly from the Induction Centers.2 The aut;,hortties of Camp Ritchie ;were
further responsible for seeing to it that the names of all members of
specialist teems were submitted for security check br Counter Intelli-
;ence end clearance by the War Departure t before transfer ovsrscr s.3
$u-nol!r of Personnel for S.p~PCi list 't'etras in uroyyer+n `l' eater
2f Onernttons. There was some difference of opinion es to whether
the sire ly. of '?ersonnel for ;Military Intelligence Specialist Teams
in the Europeen Then.ter of Operations was adequate to meet the demand.
On the one hand, officers who were closely associated with flendnua.r-
ters, 2.ilitn.ry Intelligence Service, state that the demand alwa7rs ex-
c-pded the supply. On the other hb.nd, the great majority of 0,?2 of-
ficers consulted in t .e preparation of this study state that opera-
tions in the field never suffered in any serious ease from the lack of
perso--ne1 for the specialist teams. The following matters have a bear-
ing upon this subject:
a. The schools which were established in the European Theater
of Operations to indoctrinate newly arrived specialists, had litr;ited
capacities. When tactical uai s be4,?u.-i arriving at a ? ree.tl;r acceler-
ated tenro, difficulties, were encountered in imnarting the training
believed by those in charge to have been necessary.
b. Rerl'a.cerents of ?nersonnel coming from the United States
were based on an estimate of 5 per cent lose. To some observers, this
appeared to be an i:ns,?.fficient allowwrance. While casvalti^s from enemy
action were light, there was some loss of personnel because some in-
dividuals were found to be unsuited to the work. Intelligence ens-
cialists confined, to hospitals for wounds or illness tended to get
lost from their tear1s, and it has been estime.t-d that the loss from
this cause alone amounted to r') per cent.
c. As th.e armies advenc.d towards Germany, there were delays
in obtaining r6?nlace--.ants in forward. areas. Unit comanderc~. who re-
quested renlacemsnt's found that r.uch time was lost in trrnsmitting
their eom :unieettons to Headquarters', Military Intelli. ence Service,
end that from 14 to IF dnvs were reouired to deliver reinforcements.
These delays .have been attribut d largely to the failure of the Mili-
tarsr Intelligence Service to move forward with combat nd.vnnoes.S
d. Some temporary breakdowns in the-schedule of arrival
of Military Intelligence, Sraecialist Teams led to temporary shortages
of personnel in the Furopern Theater of Operations. Teams were made
up at Cain Ritchie, Maryland, and tr-nsferred to the Euronean Thea-
ter of Ope.rotions according to a policy which provided for their ar-
rival at least '30 days before the combat units with which they were
to work. In a few instances. the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, faiVAd
to notify Headounrters, Military Intelii-once Service, sufficiently
in advance of the arrival of certain units, and consequently
1. Ltr, Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting AC of S, G..? Iiq Corn Z,
to iMaj Gen Clayton L Bissell, AC of S, G-2, ?^,D, 29 Jun 1945.
2. ~Memorandun., Col C A Harper, tiq MIS, USFET, to Col flamer F
Ford, Co:raandin ; Officer, MIS, 13 Oct 1915.
3. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 22 Oct 19145.
2+. Sae "Iii story of MIS."
5. Interview with Lt Col BR E t.Zal.lace, Hq MIS, 23 Oct 1945.
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,%W S-Wo
no rreparation had been made to provide them with snecia.list tearas.6
Furthermore, in August and September, 1944, the speeding up in the
ehi.nment of combat units and a current shortage in shirring space
resulted in a number of specialist teems arriving behind schedule in
the European Theater of Operations.?
10. Irocurement of Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel in
the European Theater of Oerations. When the Military Intelligence
Service requested authority to screen nersonnnel fro%, reinforcement
depots and to train them within the European Theater of Operations,
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, European Theater of Operations,
pointed out that all personnel with the necessary qualifications were
already assigned to other branches of the service, and none were avail-
able for the Military Intelligence Service, in the European Theater of
Operations. The personnel of specialist teams were required to be
screened by both the Counter Intelligence Corns and. the War De-oart-
nent, and this was difficult to arrange in the case of personnel al-
ready oversees. These difficulties contributed to the fact--,that
only 204 specialists were recruited and trained in the European The-
ater of Operations. Among these were 10 rhoto Interpreter Teams, re
quiring 20 officers and 40 enlisted men, recruited with good results
within the European Theater of Orerations in October and. November, 19W'
11. ualifications So ht in Recruiting Personnel for Military
ntelliennc? Specialist Teams.
a. The qualifications ordinarily given weight in recruiting
personnel for the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were:
(1) Candidates should have a good workinggknowled.ge of
at least one foreign language, extent for members
of Photo Interpreter Teams,,
(2) They should be familiar with the customs and modes
of living in foreign countries.
(3) They should have a special aptitude for intelligence
work, such as previous experience in professional,
comr:,ercial, or political ende=ivors in foregin coun-
tries.
(4) They should have a high score in the Army General
Classification Test. It has been claimed that the
average score of candidates for specialist tea^:s at
the Military Intelligence Training Center, Came
Ritchie, Maryland, was never below 130, but it is
obvious that this is an exaggeration.
(5) They should meet high standards of integrity and pa-
triotism in order to be a.cce7?tebla from the ^oint
of view of military security,
6. This is said to have been the case with 6 Army Group, Seventh
Army, 1 Armored Division, and the 45 Infantry Division. See notes of
interview with Lt Col R.]? Wallace, Hq MIS, 22 Oct. 1945.
7. Memorandum, Col C A Harper, Hq MIS, USFET, to Col Haver F, Ford,
Commanding Officer, MIS, 13 Oct-45.
S, Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq, MIS, 23 Oct 1945.
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b. Military Intelligence specialists arriving in the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations usually did. not meet these standards.
Some specialists were linguists of insufficient caliber to perform
their duties. Some reasons for the failure to meet these standards
ate as follows t
(1) The pressing need for Intelligence Specialist Teams
overseas and the resultant rush in filling rersonnel
vacancies made the careful selection of recruits
difficult.
(2) Many commanders were reluctant to give up their
highest tyre German?st eaking rersonnel to the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service.
SECTION 2
TRUNIS.7G
12. Trains ; of Personnel in the Zone of the Interior.
a. All members of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were
required to take a course of tr?ainin(g of eight weeksl duration in the
Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. As no
basic military training was included., it was a matter of chance whether
or not a specialist received such training before going into combat.
Most specialists joined their units too late to be given any basic
training. There were two outstanding results,,
(1) Military Intelligence Specialists were regarded as
poor s-)Idiers by the units to which they were as-
signed.-
(2) A lack of appreciation of Military fundamentals and.
lock of military discipline song Military Intelli-
gence Specialists resulted in friction with their re-
spective G.-2 officers and troubles within the teams
themselves.
b. The G-2 officers, whose oDinions were sought in the pre-
paration of this study, agreed that the training course of the Mili-
tary Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Ma.ryltand, was well-
planned, but inadequate to rrerare intelligence specialists to enter
upon their work in the European Theater of Operations. Not a single
dissent from this view was registered., The opinion was thus unanimous
that the trainin-; received in the Zone of the Interior had to be sur--
lemented by additional training and, indoctrination in the European
Theater of Operations. A d.efrct in training stressed by many officers
was the failure to insure that all Military Intelligence Specialists
should have the basic qualifications of a soldier, and time be able to
care for themselves in the field, as well as to be willing; to accept
the. responsibilities of working in a military hierarchy.
13- State of Morole of i ersonnel Upon Arrival in the '"'Arop
9. See "A Study of Operations of G-2 (Intelligence Branch) in the
12 Army Group, for the period from .1 Aug 19414 to 9 May 1945," Sec 30.
This work was prepared by G-2 Intelligence Branch, Hq, 12 Arny Group,
and was, transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, 1? Army Group, 1 Jul 19145.
This work will hereinafter be referred to as "A Study of Operations of
G-2, 12 Army Group."
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?_r of 61er,tions. Morale in specialist teams upon arrival in
thp_'ttc.ropeari Theater of Operations was high because of such factors
F,s\t~: following:
41
a. The supervision of the activities of the specialist teams
was usually not close, which resulted in their personnel enjoying
more freedom and independence than others.
b. Military Intelligence Specialists were constantly aware
that they were selected, highly-trained specialists. A certain feel-
ing of superiority seems to have been one of the results of the train-
ing received at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp
Ritchie, Maryland.
c. The intensive course offered at the Military Intelligence
Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, gave most of the graduates
a great measure of inspiration and enthusiasm for their work.
14. Basic Problems in Establishing a Training Program in The Z'uro--
Pe,n Theater of Operations.
a. In the spring of. 1943, when the training of Military In-
telligence Specialist Teams was begun in the European Theater of
Operations, the following problems were encountered:
(1) The lack of contact with enemy forces on the Con-
tinent made it impossible to provide an operational
training for intelligence specialists.
(2) The lack of enemy prisoners-of-war caused difficulty
in the training of interrogators and interpreters.
(3) The lack of captured enemy documents meant a defi-
ciency in the raw material for develonine, information
concerning the enemy forces.
b. This situation was partially remedied when the German
Afrika Ko rps was defeated. in Tunisia in the summer of 1943, and
thousands of German prisoners-of.-war and many enemy documents started
to our into the British Isles. Intelligence specialist teams were
then able to begin operational training. The exrloitation of captured
enemy documents affected many intelligence agencies, among them being
the Military Intelli.~ence Research Section 16 and the Photo Intelli-
gence Center, In these agencies, the new information was collated,
evaluated., and processed so that the newly gained intelligence
could be disseminated rromntly and efficiently. These documents dis-
closed many changes in the organization of the German Amy, as well
as the equipment, taactics, personalities, and reinforcement system.
This information was incorporated immediately into the existing
training programs, and new orientation courses were set up for sup
elemental training.
15. AFeneies in C e of Training in the European Theater of
Operations, General direction of the training of Military Intelli-
gence Specialists was in the hands of the Training and Operations
Brranch, G-2 Section,. European 'T'heater of Operations.
10. See below,. Chap 2,,, Par 19 b,.
12-
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a. Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams. The problem of
training intelligence specialists in the European Theater of Operations
first arose in the spring of 1943, when a few Interrogator of Prisoner-
of-War Teams arrived from the United States, These teams were found
to have a good theoretical training, but with no experience in con-
tact with prisoners-of-war and with a lack. of grounding in the basic
training of the soldier. A training program was improvised to correct
these defects, consisting of experience at a Prisoner--of.-War Enclosure
and field training with a combat unit then on maneuvers.ll Later, a
training rnrogram was developed under the'direction of the Field In
terrogation'Detachment..
b. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams. The field In-
terrogation Detachment was also in charge of the training of Military
Xntelligence Interpreter Teams.
co Photo Interpreter learns. The egency in charge of the
training of Photo Interpreter Teams was until May, 1944, the Home
Forces Intelligence Detachment, and after that date, the Photo Intel-
ligence Center.
d. Order of Battle Teams. The agency in charge of the trein-
ing of Order of Battle Teams from January to October, 1944, was the
Order of Battle School, a subsidiary of the Military Intelligence Re-
search Section, and after. October, 1944, the Order of Battle Center.
e. General; Another agency of importance in the training
program was the Military Intelligence School, operated. as part of
the American School Center. In addition, other agencies of both the
American and the British Armies were brought into the training pro-
gram at one time or another, by the device of attaching trainees for
a brief period of observation a.'. apprenticeshirp. In 1943, the
training program for intelligence specialists onerat?d in a fairly
leisurely manner, two or three months often being available for the
training of an individual. Later, the training period was shorter,
Since the bulk of the specialist personnel arrived in the European
Theater fo Operations after D-day, the training facilities of the
Military Intelligence Service continued to operate after D-day and
were moved to the Continent, All the rrincipal training agencies,
except for the Photo Intelligence Center, were still functioning in
October, 1945.12.
16. Training of Interrogator of_ Prisoner?of.-WarTeams. The train-
ing of interrogators was a combination of basic military training,
courses of study in which the organization of the German Army was
emphasized., and rrabtical experience in the art of interrogating prim
soners..of..war.
a. As much time as possible was devoted in the training.nro-
gram to the physical hardening of the students, the use of wearons,
the driving of vehicles, and the maintenance of motor equipment,
Concurrently, the students took courses of study related to their
specialty. German language classes were rrovided for students not
11, Ltr, Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting Deputy AC of S, Q..2, Hq
Corn Z, USFET, to Maj Gen Clayton L Bissell, AC of S, G2, WD, 20 Jun 45.
12. Memorandw , Col C A Harper, Hq MIS, USFET, to Col Hamer P
Ford, Commanding Officer, Hq MIS, USFET, 13 Oct 1945.
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Sufficiently fluent in that language. The latest data concerning the
organization of the German Army, and the identification of German mil-
itary personnel, materiel? and documents were made available to all
students. Courses were offered in the geography of France; signal
communications; and map-reading and military signs and symbols. Some
officers of the Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams also attended a
six weeksr course at the British Military Intelligence School, and
others received training in the interpretation of enemy documents at
the Order of Battle School.
b. The most important training received by Interrogator of
Prisoner-of-War Teams in the European Theater of Operations was gained.
from. rractice in interrogating German and Italian prisoners-of-war.
American personnel was admitted to practice interrogation under Brit-
ish supervision at three Prisoner-of.-War Cages. Facilities were
available for only a limited number of Americans, and the British did
not admit enlisted men for such practice until 1944. In November,
1943, five Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams were attached to the
Fifth United States Army in Italy for -practical experience in the
field., These teams served two months in combat operations and many
of their members later became instructors in the school conducted by
the Field l,nterrogation Detachment.
17. Tra,ininC of Milit y Intelligence Interpreter Teams,
a. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams received basic
military training and instruction in the 7eograrhy, economics, and.
politics of France end the organization of the French Army. Later,
the emphasis in the instruction was upon the organization, tactics,
weapons, and materiel of the German Army.
b. A number of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams under-
went an extended course of training conducted by the Theater Intelli-
gence Section, an organization directed by Supreme Headquarters, Al-
lied Expeditionary Force, under the supervision of the British Home
Forces Intelligence. The principal work of the Theater Intelligence
Section was the interpretation and classification of information
bearing on the plans for the invasion of the Continent. This infor-
mation woe obtained from every conceivable source and had to be col-
lated for military use. Non--corer:issioned officers were assigned to
the various sub-sections to study reports and documents, and as a re-
cult of their work a huge amount of material rerta.ining to enemy de-
fenses, communications, Order of Battle, trand?,ortation, suer>ly, and.
power and production systems was sifted and classified. This informa-
tion then was localized. and checked by photo interpreters, who check-
ed eves report and confirmed or supplemented it for use in future
operations.
.a, Training for Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams was
also conducted at the Royal Patriotic School. This training agency,
maintained by the MI-19 Branch of the British War Office, provided
training for Military Intelligence Interpreter officers in the inter-
rogation of civilian refugees who had escaped from France, The Field
Interro=gation Detachment sent two Military Intelligence Interpreter
officers to the Royal Patriotic School every 10 to-14 days, through-
out the winter and srnrin,7 of 1943 and 1944.
d. The conversion of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams
(French) into Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (German) did
not present any major training problems for the following reasons:
.. 14
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(1)
(2)
Many Military Intelli%.-,ence Interpreter Teams (French)
had some personnel who could also speak German.
By the addition of two German-speaking men to a Mili-
tary Intelligence Interpreter Team (French), it
could operate as a Military Intelligence Interpreter
Tear. (German), by using the others as drivers and in
similar capacities.
19. Training of i ho to Interl,re ter T! ams .l3
a. The training of American personnel in the interpretation
of aerial photogr phy, for service with the Ground Forces, was based
largely upon British experience. In the summer of 1943, a small
grour of American officers and enlisted men were assigned to work
in the British Army 'hoto Intelligence Section. On 6 September 1943,
this group of Americans, numbering at the time 15 officers and 17 en-
listed. men, was activated no the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment,
and. cher ,ed with the training of personnel arriving from the United
States.1 The first contingent of photographic interpreters, con-
sisting of 23 officers, arrived in the United Kingdom on 27 October
1-043, end. their training was begun Tromttlyi Soon after, the first
group of 12 Photo Interpreter Teams, each consisting of two officers
and four men, arrived in the United Kingdom, This personnel had al-
ready passed through the course in the interpretation of aerial photo-
graphs at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie,
Maryland, and they were found to be well grounded in the rudiments
of the art, but, lacking in practical experience.
b, From the outset, the training program for photographic
interpreters was Y'lanned to give each individual a maximum of practi-
cal experience in all processes connected with the interpretation of
aerial rhotographhs, and to develop the tear as a working ,nit. The
officers who origiially planned the tr-qinin program believed that
oaerational training with these objectives could not be accomplished
in less than three months, basing; their estimate upon British exper-
ience. The course was devised to train the personnel in the making
of aerial maps and. related. techniques, and included field trips which
gave the students experience in recognizing objects as they appear
from the air.
c. Early in the training grogram, the personnel involved was
handicapped by a shortage of equixament. Assistance was obtained. from
the British who turned over to the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment
a collection of several thousand nhotograrhs taken by the Royal Air
Force, which were of great value for instructional purros-s. The
Home Forces Intelligence Detach..e nt was de-n-1-Indent upon the First Photo
Procurement Detachment for a current supply of photographs for train-
ing purroses, and the latter was in turn embarrassed bar the short+,ge' of
photographic materials which existed. in the early cart of 1944.15
13. Par 18 is based rr.incinally upon 1111istor7r of -hoto Inter?oreta-
tion, Military IntelliTence Service, United States Army Ground. Forces,
European Theater of Operations, World War II, t' com-oiled. b`r the Histori-
cal Section, MIS, 1945-
14, Hq, Special Troops, ETOUSA, General Order. No 4, 6 Son 1943-
15, On the shortage of supplies, especially grease pencils and ace-
tate, for use by ihoto Interpreter Teams, see, in addition to the gen-
eral work already cited, notes of interview with Lt Cal R E Wallace.
Hq MIS, 22 Oct 1945.
"15-
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There Vat also a diffi0ulty in the procurement of competent instruc-
tors. For some time, the majority of the instructional staff was
British and Canadian, but later some American instructors and super-
visors were developed by a sort of most--graduate training for some of
the most promising individuals who tassed through the regular course
of training. A good many American officers were placed on detached
service for 14 to 30 days with British agencies, such as the Army
Photo Intelligence Section, the Central Interpretatign Unit, and ap-
propriate branches of the Royal Aix Force. In April, 1944, two Photo
Interpreter Teams and four additional officers (a total personnel of
16) were sent to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, where they
worked for 30 days with photographic interpreters of the American
Eighth Air Force on the tactical problems which they had before them.
Most of these individuals became instructors in the training,progran
of the Rome Forces Intelligence Detachment upon their return to the
United Kingdom. Another group of 10 officers went to Italy in May,
1944, for similar poet-graduate training.
d. The urgent demand for photographic interpreters forced a
curtailment of the training program. Some teams were assigned to
tactical units before completion of the first three months' course;
those which finished the curse were assigned immediately. The pres-
sure for trained personnel forced a reduction in the training period.
The course was shortened to eight weeks, but the 'ba?ining and Opera-
tions Branch, G-2 Section, E-uropean Theater of Operations, soon
ordered that the training period be reduced to 30 days. To meet
this drastic measure, the Home Force Intelligence Detachment devised
a summation of one week's duration, conceived as a refresher course
for what had been studied at the Military Intelligence Training Cen-
ter, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and used the balance of the 30 days'
training period for what was deemed the most important in the original
training program. The officers immediately concerned with the training
program, apparently without exception, have placed on record their
judgment that 30 days were insufficient as a training period.
e, Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the research and
training conducted by the Home Forces Intelligence Detachment was
that they developed the techniques of interpreting aerial photographs
to serve the purposes of the Ground Forces, Most of the previous
work by both Americans and British had been primarily for the Air
Forces.
19. Training of Order of Battle Teams.17 The Order of Battle
School, which began functioning in the European Theater of Operations
in January, 1944, passed a total of 1,271 officers and men through its
regular courses up to the end of March, 1945, while its mobile field
units gave familiarization course to many hundreds more. Included
in this number was practically the entire strength of the Order of
Battle Teams in the European `.'heater of Operations, which was, at the
later date mentioned, 254 officers and men, and many me.-hers of In-
terrogator of Prisoner-.of-War and Military Intelligence Interpreter
Teams.
a. The ground work of our knowledge of the organization, dis--
16. Interview with Brig Gen G Bryan Conrad, Acting Deputy AC of S,
Q-2, Hq Com Z, USFFT, I Nov 1945.
17. Par 19 is based principally upon 'rHistory of Order of Battle
in the European Theater,'t compiled by the Historical Section, MIS, no
date.
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Position-of units# and methods of operation of the German Army was
laid over a period of years by the staff of the Military Attache at
the American Embassy, Berlin. The information thus collected became
the material of instruction in an informal course of training in Order
of Battle which was begun in the fall of 1942 in the War Department
at Washington, and of a training course which was begun in the erring
of 1943 at the Military Intel'.igence Training Center, Camp Ritchie,
Maryland.
b. In the course of 1943, research on the German Army had
been carried on in the United Kingdom in the Military Intelligence
Research Section, London'Branch. The Military Intelligence Research
Section was a joint British.-American enterprise, attached to the Aner-
ican Embassy, London, through the office of the Military Attache. Its
primary mission was the exploitation of captured enemy documents, the
most important source of information relating to Order of Battle, and
in the course of this work it had built up a large library of documents,
voluminous reports on the uniforms and insignia of the German Army,
charts showing the org^nizatiorp.of German divisions, and much other
material well designed to become the basis of instructing specialists
for operation In the field, The Order of Battle School of the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations was established in close conjunction with
the Military Intelligence Research Section, not only because the lat-
ter already r_ossessed the materials of instruction, but also because
its members were the best qualified instructors available. The Order
of Battle School of the European Theater of Operations was opened on
17 January 1944. It continued to operate In the United Kingdom until
October, 1944, when it was transferred to France. It was not,during
this period, a part of the Military Intelligence Service. When the
Order of Battle School was transferred to France, it was activated
as the 6e57 Order of Battle Center and was assigned to the Military
Intelligence Service.18
co During its operation in the United Kingdom from January
to October, 1944, the Order of Battle School gave two principal courses
of instruction, namely, a nine days' basic course in Order of Battle
and a six days' course in the interpretation of captured enemy docu-
ments, The basic course in Order of Battle covered all the subjects
needed by an Order of Battle Teen operating in the field. Great
stress was placed upon a mastery of the organization of the tirinci
pal types of German divisions, and the location and strength of
German units# Students were trained in tie-interpretation of raw in-
telligence received. at the front, and were given practical exuerienee
in its reduction into usable Order of Battle information. The course
further included intensive training in the recognition of German wea-
nons, uniforms, insignia, and military signs and symbols. Some
training'in the use of captured enemy documents was included. The
training course in Enemy Documents was taken by a relatively small
number of intelligence specialists, mostly members of Order of Bat-
tle and Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams. Only students having
a good. reading and fair speaking; knowledge of German were admitted.
The course consisted of background lectures and practice in the tech-
niques of develonin ; intelligence from captured enemy documents, in-
tensive studies of certain types of documents, especially the German
eoldierrs pay book, and German military terminology and abbreviations.
1S. Hq MIS, 'TOUSA, General Order No 25, 25 Oct 1944.
17
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'd. After the Order of Battle School was moved to France,
it becme more nnd,more a school for specialists, its period of in-
struction being lengthened by retaining students in a holding pool
while they had the opportunity to gain practical experience by en-
gaaging in the research and publication work carried on at the school.
After removal to France, the school continued to train personnel
other than members of specialist teams largely through the agency of
two Mobile Order of Battle Familiarization Units.
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C
Al AT O ATvD SUPPLY
SECSECTION I
ADMINISTRATION
20, nterrelation of Administrative Problems of Head natters
Military Intelligence Service, and Military Intelligence Specialist,
Teams, The administrative problems of the Military Intelligence Spec-
ialist Teams were closely related to those of Headquarters, Military
Intelligence Service, In analyzing the major administrative problems
experienced by the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams, it is there.-
fore necessary to discuss them from the standpoint of both Headquarters,
Military Intelligence Service, and the specialist teams,
21, Assignment to ecial Troops, Upon activation, the Military
Intelligence Service was assigned to Headquarters, Special Troops,
European Theater of Operations.1 From the administrative standpoint,
this assignment proved disadvantageous, for the following reasons:
a, A large number of reports pertaining to administrative
details were required of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service,
by Headquarters, Special Troops,
be The correspondence of the Military Intelligence Service
was routed through Headquarters, Special Troops, resulting in unneces-
sary delay,2
co The personnel of Headquarters, Special Troops, was not
familiar with the subject matter contained in the correspondence; of
the Military Intelligence Service, and consequently were slow in pro..
cessing it, causing additional delays,
To avoid these inconveniences, the commandin&, officer of the Military
Intelligence Service requested that his unit be relieved from assign-
ment to,special Troops, but remain attached.for rations and querters,3
Shortly thereafter, this request was approved and the Military Intelli-
gence Service was assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Opera-
tions,4
22, Shortage of Personnel in Headquarters, Military Intelligence.
Service. Upon separation from Special Troops, the Military Intelligence
Service found itself with additional administrative duties to perform
and an inadequate staff with which to perform then. The Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-l, European Theater of Operations, disapproved a request
for additional personnel,-5 and Headquarters, Military Intelligence Ser-
vice, was'obliged to perform its administrative duties with limited per-
sonnel and with the aid of team members who were temporarily present
awaiting assignment to operational units.
1, See "History.of MIS," Chap 4-
2. The following portion of a letter from the Office for the AC of
,S, G-2, ETOUSA, serves as an illustrations
"Over my desk today are several requests for leaves for officers
assigned to Censorship Detachments, Their routing has. been through
the Base Censor's Office to the Theater Censor; from him to Mili+
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23. Supervisory Functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff
European Theater of Operations. In supervising the Military Intelli<
genee Specialist Teams, it was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, tot
a, Determine the number of Military Intelligence Specialist
Teams required for the European Theater of operations,
b, Requisition a sufficient number of teams from the War
Department through channels, and phase them to arrive in the European
Theater of operations according to the flow of troops,
c, Issue all directives and fix the policies as to the em-
ployment of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams,
d. Supervise the training of teams#
e. Maintain operational control of teams in the field.
24. Administrative Functions of Headquarters, Military Intelli-
gence Service, From the beginning of its existence, Headquarters,
Military Intelligence Service, was responsible for all the administra-
tive affairs of the detachments and specialist teams, Upon arrival
from the United States, personnel of the specialist teams was attached
to the Field Interrogation Detachment, Photo Interpretation Center, or
Order of Battle School for training until such time as they were attach-
ed as a team or as reinforcements to a field unit by the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, Orders were issued by
Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, concerning travel, assign-
ment, promotions, and reductions of all its personnel upon the recom-
mendations of the detachment commanders and officers in charge of teams,
Weekly and monthly personnel and study reports were submitted by each
detachment and team to Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service,
which retained extracts of the service records, 201 files and locator
cards of all assigned personnel. As the number of units assigned to
the Military Intelligence Service increased, administrative functions
of the Headquarters became more complex,
2$. Confusion as to Division of Authority, Although the division
of responsibility between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European
Theater of Operations, and the Military I}telligence Service was clearly
defined as between those two authorities,6 there were frequent rnisunder.
standings on lower levels for the following reasons:
a, Gat officers of combat units were not fully acquainted
with the details of the-division of responsibility between the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, and the Military
Intelligence Services and often dealt directly with the latter without
going through G-2 channels,
Footnote 2, Contd,
tary Intelligence Service, to G-2, to Commanding Officer, Special
Troops. 411 this has taken in the neighborhood of at least a week
..40'1 (Ltr, AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, t9 Commanding Officer, MIS, 27
Dec 1943)-
3* Ltr, Col W R Philp, Commanding Officer, MIS, to AC of 'S, G-2
ETOUSA, 30 Dec 1943.
4, Hq ETOUSAA, Troop Assignment Order No 2, Par 2, J5 Jan 1944,
5* Ltr, AC of S, G--l, ETOUSA, to MIS, 19 Feb 19144
6, See nHistory of MIS,"
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b., Officers of Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service,
frequently visited combat units and made commitments concerning the
attachment of specialist teams that were beyond their authority and
without the previously expressed approval of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, European Theater of operations,
26,, Consolidation of the Train and Operations Branch G-2
.Qection, with the Military Intelligence Service. The confusion as to
the division of authority was corrected in February, 1945, when the
Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, was consolidated with Head-
quarters, Military Intelligence Service, by a directive issued by the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations,? At the
same time, the operational control of the Military Intelligence Service
was delegated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of
Operations, to the Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service.
This change had the effect of combining administrative and operational
control under a single commander. All matters relating to Military
Intelligence Specialist Teams and intelligence training, which had pre.
viously been routed through the Assistant Chief of Staff., G-2, European
Theater of Operations, were subsequently sent directly to the Military
Intelligence Service, resulting in a more efficient administration and
better. operations.. Shortly after this consolidation, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, published the fol-
lowing memorandum defining the administrative responsibilities of the
Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service;
*As Commanding Officer of Military Intelligence Service, you are
charged with the command and administrative responsibilities of
specialist teams assigned and attached to that headquarters as
follows $
(1)
Those assigned units not attached to field forces or
Communications Zone Sections are completely under your
control for both command and administration, including
training.
(2) Those units assigned to Military Intelligence Service and
attached to field forces for operational duty are your
responsibility for initial supply and assignment, When
items for re?.supply are requested by units in the field,
you will mike every effort to assist them by providing
such re-supply,ff$
Thus., for the first time, in the history of the Military Intelligence
Service, its operational and administrative functions came under the
control of a single commander and the limitations of his responsibil-
ities,, as regards the detachments under his command, were clearly de.
fined.
27. Division of Authority Over Military Intelligence Specialist
Teams in the Field,
a, When Military Intelligence Specialist Teams had complc;ted
their training and'were sent into the field, their personnel continued
to be assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, but the teams and
the individuals who composed them were attached for duty with combat
7. Directive, AC of S, G-2., ETOUSA, to Commanding Officer, MIS,
25 Feb 1945-
Memorandum by AC q S, G..2, ETOUSA, 27 Feb 1945.
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units or Sections of the Communications Zone. The 1;ssistarit Chief of
Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, retained jurisdiction over
teams and individuals to the extent, if necessary, of recalling then
and attaching them for duty with some other unit, as well as to provide
reinforcements as needed by teams in the field. Headquarters, Military
Intelligence Service, also continued to perform certain administrative
functions for the personnel attached to combat units, for it retained
and processed extracts of the service records and 201 files of all its
personnel in the field, and maintained a locator card file. Moreover,
the Military Intelligence Service retained an absolute veto power over
all promotions and demotions of individuals.
b. In theory, all other elements of command and administra-
tion came within the jurisdiction of the unit to which the specialist
tear was attached. Thus, the team was under the operational control of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which it was attached.
The unit to which a team was attached further had the responsibility of
providing the team with such replacements and repairs of its supplies
and equipment that it might need, and with rations and quarters? More-
over, the operational unit had the power of initiative as respects the
promotion and demotion of members of teams.
c. It was inevitable that this division of authority would
lead to misunderstanding and friction, both on the higher plane-of oper-
ational control and in smatters of administration, The blaze for the
difficulties which arose in the field rests partly upon the units to
which specialist t?ar..ls.were attached, and partly upon the teams them-
selves* On the one hand, the personnel of the operational units did
not always fully understand the scope of their authority over the per-
sonnel of specialist teams. Some used poor judgment in the employment
of specialist teams, which brought Irornpt outcries from the specialists
that their rights were being invaded. On the other hand, some members
of specialist teams did not hesitate to capitalize upon their position
to increase their liberties. l:lthou&h well aware of the controls to
which they were subject, some team members were guilty at tines of us-
in6 improper channels for official cos .iunications and reports.
d. In the administrative field, the principal difficulties
were related to questions of promotions and demotions, delays in the
routing of correspondence and supplies. With reference to the last of
these, it may be said that specialist tear'is, from time to time, atterzpt-
ed to obtain supplies directly from Headquarters, Military Intelligence
Service, instead of from the units to which they were attached.
28, Pron"lotions and Demotions. In August, 1944, the Commanding
Officer, Military Intelligence Service, published and distributed to
commanders of army Groups, Armies, Corps,, and Divisions a letter stat-
ing the following policy governing the promotion of commissioned and
enlisted personnel of Military Intelligence Specialist Tearis.9
a, Officers, Promotions were in.tiated in coripliance with
Theater regulations by the lssistant Chief pf Staff, G-2, of the organ-
ization to which the team was attached, and. were sent directly to the
Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service.
9, Ltr, Commanding Officer, MIS, to Adjutant General, ETOUS+l, 15
4ug 1944.
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b, Enlisted Alen, Pfomotions were initiated by the Officer,
in-Charge of the team and were forwarded through the 1,ssistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, of the organization:. to which the team was attached directly
to the Corr:ianding; Officer, MiLttery Intelligence Service, The recozm.-
me,ndation of the Issistant ChiAf of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which
the team wE s. attached was abso utely necessary before a teen member
1,
could be promoted,
29. Delays in Correspondence, & long delay in correspondence to
and from Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, was created when
the 12 United States Army Groin issued a directive to its armies stat-
ing that all correspondence pertaining to specialist teens would be sent
through command channels.10 This directive, and the fact that Headquar-
ters, Military Intelligence Service,. was always a great distance to the
roar, meant that 30 to 34 days were required for correspondence to make
the round-trip between Division, Corps, and i,rmy Headquarters and Head.
quarters, Military Intelligence Service, In case the correspondence re-
lated to a need for reinforcements, it likewise required approximately
30 days from the time the requisition was initiated until they were de-
livered. This directive was later rescinded, and units sent correspond-
ence relating to all routine matters directly to Headquarters, Military
Intelligence Service, through G-2 channels.
SECTION
SUPLY
30. The Special List of Egui .,ent for Military Intelli ems nce Spec-
ialist Teals,
a, The Special List of Equipmentll authorized for Military
Intelligence Specialist Teams was considered adequate for efficient
field operations and, with reference to some items, excessive,12 For
instance, it was wasteful to issue binoculars to all members of teens.
Tear-is were authorized one radio set (SCR-511) per vehicle, but these
were later returned through supply channels when it was discovered that
radios were impractical in team operations. The consensus of opinion
among the officers who were consulted in the preparation of this report,
and among those who were associated with the Military Intelligence Ser-
vice in the European Theater of Operations during the period under con-
sideration, was that a detailed and comprehensive study should be made
of the Special "List of Equipment authorized for Military Intelligence
Teens .
b, The specialist teams were initially supplied by Headquar-
ters, Military Intelligence Service, anc, the units to which the teams
were attached assumed responsibility for re-supply, This plan was gen,-
erally satisfactory, The Officer-in-Charge of each specialist team was
supplied with a copy of the Special List of Equiirient'by Headquarters,
Military Intelligence Service. By requisition directed to the lissist-
ant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the unit to which they were attached team
10-. Interview with Lt Col R E Wallace, Hq MIS, 20 Oct 1945,
11, Is copy of the Special List of Equipment for Military Intelli-
gence Specialist Teams, dated 18 Jug 1944?, Hq hrmy Service Forces, Wash-
ington, DC, is included in this-report as Appendix 1,.
12, See "i, Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Exmy Groups,u and "His-
tory of M1,9,, ii
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commanders were assured of rapid replacement of equipment and su plies
authorized by the Special List of Equipment, except for certain items
such. as special optical and drafting instruments; In order to obtain
replacement of such items, it was necessary to requisition them from
Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service, It usually required from
20 to 30 days for such.a requisition to be processed, due largely to
the fact that Headquarters, Military Intelligence Service# was maintain-
ed at a position far in the rear.
31. Su lly Section. HeAd quarters, Military IrltelliEerice Service.
a, The supply section at Headquarters, Military Intelligence
Service, experienced no difficulty in maintaining a sufficient stock to
supply initially all specialist teams as they were sent out to opera-
tional units, Replacements of lost, worn, or damaged equipment for spec-
ialist teams were available when they returned to Headquarters for reas-
signment or rehabilitation.
b. The equipment authorized for Headquarters, Military Intel-
ligence Service, was founu to be adequate and, in the case of motor trans-
portation, excessive, On 27 March 1915, Headquarters, Military Intelli-
gence Service, returned 37 surplus motor vcl4cles to the Ordnance Depart-
men t,
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CHAPTER 4
OFWATlNS
32. Organization Milit arv Intelligence Specialist Teams.. The
personnel assigned to Military Intelligence Specialist Teams and the
normal duties of each individual are listed below:l
a . T n t e r r Q Z a t o r of P r i s o n e r - o f T a r Team.
Captain . , . . . . . . . Officer-in-Charge and Chief
Interrogator
First Lieutenant . . , . Interrogator
Master Sergeant . . . . . Assistant Interrogator
Staff Sergeant . . . . . . Documents Analyst
Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist
Technician Fifth Grade . , Driver
b. =2, tars Intelligence Interpreter Team.
Captain . . . . . . . . Officer-in-Charge, and
Interpreter
First Lieutenant . . , . . Interpreter
Master Sergeant . . . . . Assistant Interpreter
Staff Sergeant . , . . . . Documents Analyst
Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist
Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist and Driver.
c. Photo_Intrpreter Team.
Captain . . . . . . . Officer-in-Charge and Chief
Interpreter
First Lieutenant . . . , Interpreter
Master Sergeant . . . . . Assistant Interpreter
Staff Sergeant . . . . Draftsman
Technician Third Grade . Assistant Draftsman
Technician Third Grade . . Clerk-Typist and Driver
d. Order e Batttle Team.
Captain . . . . . . . . . Officer-in-Charge
Master Sergeant . . . . . Order of Battle Analyst
Technician Third Grade . Order of Battle Analyst
/
33. Adeouacv,-of OOrganization,of Specialist Teams in the European
eatgr_of Operations. Representative G-2 officers of the 12 Army Group
have gone on record to the effect that the organization of all four
types of specialist teams was generally satisfactory.2 Interro.Qator of
1. This chapter is based almost entirely on "An evaluation of Mil-
itary Intelligence Specialist Teams, European Theater of Operations,
United States Army," which is a consensus of opinions of G-2 officers
of the following units: 38 Inf Divs, 12 Armd Divs, 4 Abn Divs, 15
Corps, 3 Armies, 4 Base Sections.
2. See the report of a conference with representatives of Army
G-2 Sections concerning the organization of Army intelligence, 12 May
1945, contained in "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Group.
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Prisoner-of-War Teams proved to be quite flexible in that they could be
and were frequently divided into two groups-and attached to separate
headquarters for operation. This was usually practiced at division le-
vel, where it was often necessary to provide interrogators at regiment-
al, division artillery, reconnaissance, and infantry and armored bat-
talion headquarters. The opinion has been expressed that each Inter-
rogator of Prisoner-of-Wa.r Team needed at least one additional member
to servo in an editorial capacity in the preparation of reports, since
it was found that experienced interrogators were required to spend a
large part of their time in writing and clerical work. A Military In-
telligence Interpreter Team also was often used as two half teams. At
Army Headquarters, an Order of Battle Team of one officer and two en-
listed men was found to be too small to function on a 24-hour schedule
over a long period of time,
34. Deployment of Militate Intellige-nef_Specialist_Teams. The Mil-
itary Intelligence Service Specialist Teams were attached to operational
units, and their deployment to the various echelons is indicated in
Table III. Representative G-2 officers of. the 12 Army Group have ex-
pressed the opinion that the number of specialist teats attached to the
various echelons was adequate, except that they believed two Interroga-
tor of Prisoner-of-War Teams to be insufficient for a division.3
TABLE ill
DPLOY T OF MILITARY INTELLIGEME SPECIALIST TE ~IVIS
Unit No,of teams attached
IPW
MII
PI
OB
Total
Infantry, Armored, and Airborne Divisions
2
1
1
1
5
Corps
3
2
4
1
10
Armies
4
3
4
1
12
Army Groups
0
2
5
1
8
CHANOR Base Section
2
8
0
0
10
SEINE Base Section
1
5
0
0
6
OISE Base Section
4
5
0
0
9
United Kingdom Base Section
2
0
0
0
2
Continental Advance Section
3
0
0
0
3
Advance Section, Communications Zone
0
15
0
0
15
Key to abbreviations used in Table III:
IPW Interrogator of Prisoner-of-W,r
Mil Military Intelligence Interpreter
PI Photo Interpreter
OB Order of Battle
3. See "A Study of Operations of G-2, 12 Army Group."
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35. Dut.Lies of Mjlitarv Intelligence Specialist Teams.
a. The duties of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams were
(1)
Interrogate enemy prisoners-of-war and report all in-
formation obtained to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2.
(2.) Co-ordinate with Order of Battle Teams by furnishing
th9m military information concerning the enemy.
(3) Report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, any
prisoners-of-war who possessed vital technical, tac-
tical, or strategical information.
(4) Identify and report any important enemy documents
found in the possession of enemy prisoners-of-war.
(5) Attend daily briefings directed by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2.
b. The duties of Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams were
(1)
Provide commanders with competent and trained inter-
preters.
(2) Provide liaison with Allied Armies, resistance groups,
and civilian agencies.
(3) Assist Military Government and G-5 Sections when
necessary,
(4)
Report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, all mil-
itary information obtained from documents and the in-
terrogation of civilians.
c. The duties of the Photo Interpreter Teams were to:
(1) Procure aerial photographs.
(2) Prepare photo overprints and overlays of enemy defense
plans, positions, and installations.
(3) Prepare terrain estimates from aerial photos.
(4) Identify and locate enemy materiel,
(5) Report the condition of roads, bridges, and rail-
roads.
(6) Construct aerial photo mosaic maps.
d. The duties of Order of Battle Teams were to prepare, upon
request, reports covering the following subjects pertaining to the ene-
my forces:
(1) Strengtb and location.
(2) Types and number of weapons and status of equipment
and supply.
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State of training and morale,
Changes in organization and commanders.
Troop movements and changes in deployment.
Inasmuch as personnel properly trained to process documents were not
attached to units below Army level, Order of Battle Teams attached to
Corps and Division had, as a secondary mission to process and evaluate
all documents captured from the enemy.
36. Va et of 5erv ce P e r f o r m e d - b y Person a of Tearn .
a. The evidence tends to show that the Military Intelligence
Specialist Teams were not often diverted from the duties for which they
were trained, Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams, however, were
frequently used to reinforce the other specialist teams in emergencies.
Because of their linguistic qualifications, Military Intelligence spe-
cialists of all categories were called upon quite often to serve as
interpreters and translators. Their most important work of this kind
was done for the Counter Intelligence Corps, G-5 Sections, and Military
Government. Military Intelligence Service personnel also served as
interpreter-translators in such non-intelligence activities as liaison,
billeting, procurement of supplies, and interpretin.g at civil and mil-
itary courts. G-2 officers have stated that they used specialists,
other than the :Jilitary Intelligence Interpreter Teams, in these non-
intelligence functions only when their services were not required in
their specialties. Combat units reported various other uses for lin-
guists of the Military Intelligence Service, such as the criminal in-
vestigation of civilians, organizing civilian law-enforcement agencies,
screening German prisoners-of- war for discharge, and negotiating for
the surrender of German towns.
b. The Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French) at-
tached to Base Sections found that their duties consisted primarily of
interpreting for Counter Intelligence Corps agents, the majority of
whom did not speak French. The Military Intelligence Interpreters as-
sisted in surveillance, sabotage cases, security surveys, loyalty in-
vestigations, arrests of French collaborationists, and in the capture
of German soldiers who had concealed themselves behind our lines, and
they aided the appropriate authorities in the apprehension of black-
market operators. They also interviewed Freiich civilians to determine
those acceptable for employment with the United States Forces and they
scanned French newspapers for matters of political and economic inter-
est.
c. German-speaking personnel from Military Intelligence Spe-
cialist Teams of all four categories were also called upon to translate
and interpret for the Counter Intelligence Corps, G-5 Sections, and the
Military Government authorities. After the cessation of hostilities,
many Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were regularly assigned to
missions of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
37. Quantity of Combat ILlelligenaProduced MilitaryIntelll-
gence S ecialist Teams. The consensus of opinion among G-2 officers
was that approximately 58 per cent of all combat intelligence gathered
by the United St.tes Army in the European Theater of Operations was
the product of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams. The proportion
of intelligence obtained by the different types of teams was estimated
to have been as follows:4
4. Order of Battle Teams do not appear in this list because they
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Interrogator of Prisoner-of-??Tar Teams 36%
Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French), . . . . . . 4%
Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (German). . . . . . . 3%
Photo Interpreter Teams
Total by Military Intelligence Specialist Teams . . . . . . . 5
Other Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 42%
The authorities believed that these figures were about equally valid
for Army, Corps, and Division levels. Certain factors peculiar to the
European Theater of. Operations influenced the effectiveness of the dif-
ferent kinds of specialist teams. The overwhelming success of the In-
terrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams may be attributed, not only to the
high level of skill that they revealed, but also to the fact that large
numbers of prisoners were taken, many of whom were not security cons-
cious and -'ere ealver to volunteer information. Military Intelligence
Interpreter Teams (French) obtained some information concerning the ene-
my from the French Forces of the Interior and other resistance groups,
but found that the average French civilian possessed little knowledge
of military importance. While the German civilian was usually better
versed in military matters, fewer informants were available because of
the enemy policy of evacuating German civilians, Photo Interpreter
Teams were dependent in their production of intelligence upon a con-
tinuous supply of photographs, and there were times when conditions be-
yond their control, such as weather, brought their work to a standstill.
3n. uali of IntelllgeneProdued by Military,,Intelli ence
Sreci.a,list Teams. In the opinion-of the majority of the G-2 officers
consulted, the Prisoner-of-War Teams produced, not only the greatest
quantity, but also the most valuable information. The Photo Interpreter
Teams were rated second, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and
as the most reliable source, One weakness of the intelligence furnished
by the Photo Interpreter Teams was its frequent lack of timeliness.
Information obtained from French and German civilians was of small
value when compared to these two major sources. Although nearly every
G-2 officer consulted granted that, at some time during operations,
the Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams had made some contribu-
tions of value, the majority of intelligence officers interviewed as
a basis for this report considered them to have been limited almost
wholly to the function of interpreting. Although Order of Battle
Teams were not Intelligence collecting agencies, they were, in the
opinion of a majority cf the G-2 officers consulted, the most valuable
teams of the Military Intelligence Service.
Footnote 3 (contd).
were not, properly speaking, sources of intelligence.. They processed
information furnished by other agencies..
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CHAPTER
CONCLUSIONS AND REC CI?MDATI ONS
SECTION 1
ONCLU S IONS
As a result of this study, he General Board, United States Forces,
European Theater., has reached th, following conclusions:
It The Military Intelligence Specialist Teams were extremely val-
uable to all commands to which they were attached,
2, The policy of attaching, rather than assigning, Military In-
telligence Specialist Teams to operational units proved to be a mis-
take, Numerous disadvantages flowed from the anomalous status of the
specialist teams,:
3a The experience demonstrated the need in Military Intelligence
work of specialists of the following types:
at Interrogator of prisoners.-of.-war.
b, Interpreter and translator,
c. Interpreter of aerial photographs.
d. Order of Battle analyst.
e. Analyst of enemy documents,
4, The lack of basic military training. and a certain ineptness
in caring for themselves in the field on the part of some members of
specialist teams undermined the usefulness of such teams and created
friction with the personnel of the units to which they were attached,
5, Intelligence specialists needed to have the training'they re-
ceived in the United States supplemented by indoctrination and practi-
cal experience in the European Theater of Operations.
6. The period of training required, respectively, by` interroga-
tors of prisoners-of-war, Order of Battle analysts, and Military Intel-
ligence interpreters was so brief, and the training had so much in com-
mon, that results would be better if all such specialists ;were required
to take the same training within their respective language' groups. In
that case, the personnel would be interchangeable and reinforcements in
emergency situations would present less serious problems, Further spec-
ialization would be a natural development from work in the:field.
7. A training period of at least three months( duratipn is desir..
able for interpreters of aerial photographs,
8. The shortage of personnel for service in specialist teams was
more apparent than real, and was due for the most part to adrr}inistra-
tive delays and confusion arising from the attached, rather than assign-
ed, status of the specialist teams and the failure of Headquarters, Mil-
itary Intelligence Service, to advance promptly enough with the progress
of combat units,
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9, The Tables of organization for specialist teams were, on the
whole, adequate, except that Interrogator of Frisoner,.of-War Teams did
not have sufficient technical assistance for the preparation of their
reports,
10, Two Interrogator of Prisoner..of.,War Teams per Division were
inadequate,.
11. One Order of Battle Team per Army Headquarters did not, in
practice, provide sufficient personnel to operate on a 24-hour sched-
ule over long periods of time,
12. Insufficient personnel was provided at Division and Corps
Headquarters for the efficient processing of captured enemy documents.
13, The practice of promoting members of specialist teams to the
first three noncommissioned grades, before they had proved their worth
in their specialty was undesirable,
14. The Special List of Equipment authorized for specialist teams
was excessive in some particulars,
13, There was much misunderstanding as to the functions and cap-
abilities of Military Intelligence Specialist Teams,
16, The organization of the Military Intelligence Service, Europ-
ean Theater of Operations, was a wise move in the circumstances, Some
decentralization of administrative control in the G.-2 Section was nec-
epsary, due primarily to the lack of planning and preparation, and the
creation of the Military Intelligence Service was a practical solution
which served a useful purpose at that time,
17, The consolidation of the Military Intelligence Service and
the Training and Operations Branch, G-2 Section, European Theater of
Operations, was desirable.
?EC TION 2
PBC OA~V~NDl.TIONS
The General Board, United States Forces, Luropean Theater, makes
the following recommendations;
1, That all Military Intelligence Specialist Teams be assigned,
rather than attached, to the G??2 Section of the operational units with
which they work, thus being organic with such units.
2,- That the necessity and value of the following specialists in
Military Intelligence work be recognized on a permanent basis, and that
steps be taken in accordance with other recommendations contained herein
to procure and train personnel for the following;
a, interrogator of prisoners-of-war.
b, Interpreter and translator,
co Interpreter of aerial photographs,
d. Order of Battle analyst.
W 31 1-
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e, Analyst of enemy documents.
3, That all personnel accepted for service in Military Intelli-
~;cncc in any of the above-mentioned specialties be required to complete
basic military training or its equivalent, and, to obtain some exper-
ience in living and workinC, unuer field conditions, such as may be ob-
tained in the training maneuvers of combat units.
4, That, insofar as practicable, all Military Intelligence spec-
ialists who are to work with combat units be assigned to such combat
units in the United States in time to serve with such units in field
maneuvers .
5,. That personnel accepted for service in Military Intelligence
as interrogators of prisoners-of-war, Order of Battle analysts, and Mil-
itary Intelligence interpreters be required to take a common course of
training, within their respective language groups, consisting of instruc-
tion in all three of these specialties.
6* That specialist teams be given tours of duty in foreign coun-
tries in time of peace.
7. That the number of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teams at+*
tached at Division level be increased from two to four.
84 That editorial personnel be adc,ed to the Tablc of Organization
of Interrogator of Prisoner-of-War Teamms.
9, That the number of Order of Battle Teams attached to each 4rmy
Headquarters be increased from one to two,
10. That intelligence specialists should not be promoted to high
non-co_missioned officer grades upon graduation from the Intelligence
School, but only after having proved their ability as a member of a
specialist tearm.
11. That a detailed study be made to determine the adequacy of
the Special List of Equipment for Specialist Teams.
12, That basic field manuals in all of the Military Intelligence
specialties mentioned in paragraph-2 above be prepared, and that they
be made available to all officers to acquaint them with the functions
and capabilities of such specialists,,
13. That an intelligence service be established to procure, main-
tain, train, initially supply, and assign intelligence teams to units,
in the United States and to provide reinforcements for the Theater of
Operations.
14. That this intelligence service establish a reception center
in the Theater of Operations to receive and provide indoctrination for
all intelligence teams and reinforcements, and to attach such teams to
operational units for brief periods of combat experience,
Approved For Release 2001/08r83:2CrA-RDP64-00658AO00100010002-5
 Approved Fo Iease 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A400100010002-5
API NDIX 3.
Headquarters Army Service Forces
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington 25, D. C.
r
STX 4+00 (16 Auk; 44) OB-S-STM00.-M EM/ale 2B-939 Pentagon
IMMEDIATE ACTION
19 August.194+4
SUBJECT: Special List of Equipment for Intelligence Specialists.
TO Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation
1. Inclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of
special list of equipment for the subject unit.
2. Subject unit is'on Movement Orders, Shipment 9159.
By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:
s/ Lester E. Jensen
I Intl: Adjutant General
as listed above.
SIECIs1L LIST OF E(UI?MENT
for
Intelligence Specialists
Interrogator Prisoner of War Team (III-0
Military Intelligence Interpreter Tear. (MII)
Photo Interpreter Team (rI)
Order of Battle Tear, (OB)
ITEM
ALLOWANCES
Authorized Teams
IT-w 11,11 71 OR
2-0 2-0 2-0 1-0
4_EM 4-EM 4-EM 2-EM
MY AIR FORCES E . UIPMM. T
Kit, Interpretation, Photo
Type F-2
Interpretometer, Photo (Austin)
(Item 73)
-33-
RE.uIARKS
3 per PI Team.
a-1per12PI
Teams (To be
issued only
when mission
involves con-
tinuous Engin-
eering study).
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010002-5
 Approved Foelease 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-006500100010002-5
Rule, Slide, Photo Interpreter 2
Scale, Magnifying, Trans-
parent, Clear plastic,
(Austin), 1/1000 foot
graduation. (Item 66).
CEEMI CAL WARFARE
Alarm, Gas 1 1 1 1
Mask, Gas, Service 6 6 6 3
Respirator, Dust, M2 6 6 6 3
ENGINEER
Alidade, Boxwood,
Triangle, 82" 2 2 2 1
Board, sketching, w/water--
proof cover
Tube, tin, or fiber sub-
stitute, Map.Storage,
4" x 43"
Compass, lensatic, luminous
dial 2 2 2 1
Compass, wrist, water-filled 4 4 4 2
Dividers, Draftsmans
Preoortional,
6" w/case 1
8" w/case I
Dividers, plain set 1
Glass, Reading 4- in, w/case 1
Glass, magnifying, self-illumin-
ated w/spare bulb & battery 3
Knife, Pocket, Engineer, 4.-
blade, w/clevis 6 6 6 3
Measurer, Magnifying (Mi17.i
meter) Leitz manufacture,
or equal
Measurer, Map
Net, camouflage, cotton
shrimp 221 x 221
36' x 44'
Pen, Drawing:
Railroad 5* in
Ruling 5 in
Protractor, Semi-circular,
plastic, w/mils
Ruler desk, beveled, Eng-
lish Scale 24"
- 34 -
2 per 'PI Team (Auth-
ori.zed only rend-
ing inclusion of
this item in Kit;
interpretation,
photo, Type F-2)
2 per PI Team (Auth
ized only pending
inclusion of this
item in Kit, inter-
pretation, Photo,
Type F.2),
1 per Team
1 per indiv
1 per indiv when auth-
orized by T of
Opns Comdr.
1 per-officer
2 per MII Team: PI Team
1 per MII Team: PI Team
1 per officer
. per EM
1 per PI Team
1 per PI Team
1 per MII Team
1 per PI Team
1 per PI Team; per off
in PI Team
1 per indiv
1 per Off PI Team
1 per Off IPW; MII &
OB Team
1 per +-ton truck; per
4-ton trailer
1 per 1j,.-ton truck
1 per PI Team
1 per PI Team
1 per officer
1 per PI Team
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010002-5
 Approved Folease 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065
Scale, Coordinate, Plastic, 1/20000
and 1/62500 gr in yds and 1/25000
and 1/50000 gr in meters.
2
2 per PI Team
Stereoscope, Magnifying;
Mirror, w/binoculare and case
1
1 per PI Team
Pocket
4+
1 per EM in PI Team
MEDICAL
Kit, first ai?, motor
vehicle, 12-unit 1 1
1
1 per four fuel con-
ORDNANCE'
Wea ons and. Miscellaneous
Binoculars, M13
6
6
6
3
Carbine, Cal. ,30, MI
6
6
6
3
Gun, Submachine, C.al.45 M3
4
4
4
Knife, Trench, M3, w/
scabbard MS
6
6
3
Pistol, Automatic, Cal
.45, M1911A1
Watch, Wrist, 7-jewel
6
6
Work-light, detachable
w/20 ft cord and 6-volt
storage battery
Trailer, *ton, 2 wheel
cargo
Truck;
ton, 4x4
Vehicles
suming motor vehicle,
or fraction thereof.
1 per indiv
1 per indiv in lieu of
Pistol, Auto. Cal ,45
for officers and sub-
machine gun, cal .45
for EM.
I per EM in Teams IFW,
MII & rI.
1 per indiv
1 per officer in Teams
IPW, MII & PI; per
officer and EM in
Team OB.
1 per individual
1 per team
1 per team
2 per IN & MII Team;
1 per PI & OB Team
1 per PT team (Pending
availability truck
3/4 ton, 4x4 weapons
carrier may be sub-
stituted).
l1-ton, 6x6, cargo 1
Motor Trpnsport Equipment
Axe, Hendled, chopping, Single
bit, Standard, grade, 4..1b 2
Defroster and deicer, electric
windshield 2
Mattock, handled, pick, tyre
II, Class F, 5..1b
Rope, tow, 201 long, 1" diam 2
2
2
1 per fuel consuming
motor vehicle
2
2
1
1 per fuel consuming
motor vehicle
1 per 17-ton truck
2
2
1
1 per fuel consuming
motor vehicle
M 5 -
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A00010001000'2-5
 Approved Fo lease 2001108/28 : CIA-RDP64-0065800100010002-5
Shovel, general purpose, D-
handled strapback, round
point, No 2 2 2 2 1 1 per fuel consuming
motor vehicle.
S A TEBMASTER
Individual Equipment
Bag, Canvas, field, OD,
M.?1936 6 6 6 3 1 per indiv.
Belt, pistol or revolver
M-1936 6 6 6 3 1 per indiv
Cover, canteen, Dismounted,
M:1910 6 6 6 3 1 per indiv
Pocket, Magazine, Double..
web, EM-M--1923 2 2 2 3 1 per indiv armed
Pocket, Magazine, for
w/pistol
Carbine, Cal .30 Ml a a a a a 1 per Indiv armed
Strap, carrying, General
prupose
Suspenders, Belt, M--1936 6 6
w/Carbine
6 3 1 per bag, canvas, fid,
CA, M.-.1936
6 ' 3 1 per indiv
Qrganizational Equipment
Bucket, Canvas, Water,
1 qt
1 per fuel consuming
Cabinet, file, wood, 2-
motor vehicle
drawer, letter size
1
1
1
1
1 per team
Case, canvas, dispatch
2
2
2
1
1 per officer
Chair, folding, wooden
1
1.
3
1
1 per team; per off
File,
paper, clip, wood
in rI Team
back
Desk,
field, empty, fiber,
1 per indiv
Headquarters
1 per team
Drum, inflammable liquid
(gasoline) with carrying
handle, 5 gal.
Goggles, M-19}43, w/clear
2
2
3
1
1 per -.ton truck; 2
per 1ton truck.
lens
1 per motor vehicle
driver
Kit, sewing
Machine, paper fastening,
lever or plunger-.type,
wire staples, preformed,
1 per team
light duty
1
1.
1
3
1 per team
Paulin, Canvas, small
Tent, command post, complete
1
1 per PI Team
(w/fly-pins and poles)
1
1
1 per IPW and MXI Team
Stove, cooking, gasoline,
M-19}-41, one burner
1
1
1
1
1 ter team.
Table, camp, folding
1
1
2
1
1 per team, IFW, MII &
OB; 2 per FI team
Tube, flexible nozzle
2
2
2
1
1 per fuel consuming
motor vehicle
- 36 ..
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010002-5
 Approved Forlease 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658`40100010002-5
Typewriter, portable, w/
carrying case
2 1
SIGNAL
1
1 per field desk, Head-'
quarters, 1 add per
IPW Team,
Camera, PH-.324+
1
1
1 per PI and OB Team
Flashlight, TL-122.. ( )
6 6
6
3
1 per indiv
photographic Set, PH.-261
1
1 per PI team
Radio Set, SCR-511
2 2
2
1
1 per motor vehicle
Telephone, EE-9
2 2
2
1
1 per rotor vehicle
Tool Equipment, TF,33
1. 4
2
1 per EN,
Wire, W-130--A on Reel DR-S
l 1
1
1
1 per team
Speakaphone
1 1
1 per IPW and MII Team.
--37"
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010002-5
 Approved For'
ease 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-006580100010002-5
APPENDIX 2
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO g$7
12 May 1945
SUBJECT: Employment of Miulitary Intelligence Service
Specialist Teams.
TO Commanding General,
(Attn: AC of S, G.,2)
THRU A C of S, G-2, Hq ET(USA
1. This Headquarters is compiling information concerning the
past employment of Military Intelligence Service Specialist Teams.
2, It is requested that all G.-21s who have employed such teams
submit a complete report on their activities, using the following pro-
nosed outline as a guide. Any additional information deemed important
to make the report more comprehensive may be included.
3, Proposed outline:
a. Approximate percentage of Intelligence obtained from (1)
IVW Teams (2) MII French Teams (3) MII German Teams (4)
PT Teams (5) Document Sections.
Evaluation of the importance of the information obtained
directly from MIS Specialist Teams through (1) Prisoners
of War (2) French civilians (3) German civilians (4)
Aerial photos (5) Document Sections.
c. Qualifications of personnel:
(1) Qualifications as field soldiers
(2) Qualifications in speciality
(3) qualifications for participation in, general in-
telligence activity over and above their specialty.
Participation of team personnel in military activity other
than intelligence operations.
e. Difficulties and problems encountered as a result of the
system used for training, attaching and administering
Military Intelligence Service Specialist Teams and sug--
gestions as to how such difficulties might have been
arc ded in the future in the event of similar operations.
4. It will be appreciated if these reports are prepared on a, sep-
arate sheet of paper and returned to the Commanding Officer, Military
Intelligence Service, by 5 June 1945.
/sf S. A. Harper, Lt. Col,,
for HAMER P. FORD
Colonel, If.,
Commanding.
p38.-
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010002-5