A REPLY TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW: 'INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200210002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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A REPLY TO
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW:
"INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY"
This past summer I read a report put out by the "Members
of Congress for Peace 'through Law". It proposed a number of far-
reaching changes in'the scope and conduct of U.S. intelligence.
Among 'these were proposals 'to cut back drastically the work of 'the
Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence services
and 'to establish a new Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence.
On August the 13th, 1970, a concurrent resolution to establish
such a committee was referred to the Committee on Rules of 'the
House of Represen'tatives.
When I first read the report, I was not inclined to take it
very seriously. It deals with important issues, but its assertions
and recommendations are not based on a grasp of 'the facts. In fact,
it is shot through with misinformation. Butthe introduction in the
House of a resolution to establish a watch-dog committee, 'to be
added to the fifteen committees now dealing with U.S. intelligence
matters, led me to reconsider. I 'think that it is important to answer
'the charges made by the Members of Congress for Peace 'through Law
not because 'they are new but because they are very old. They have
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CRC, 7/17/2003
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been repeated so many times, in places ranging from the floor of
this Senate to the pages of Pravda, that we are in danger of being
numbed into credulity. The time has come to set the record straight,
once and for all.
It is particularly important that we understand the facts
be-eofiw s.c about our intelligence program and the services 'tha't carry
it out because grave misunderstanding and action based on it can only
be disastrous. If the recommendations of this paper were put into
effect, U.S. intelligence would be crippled. I do not know if any other
country in the world has ever considered fastening upon itself the shackless
that this report urges, but I do know that no country has ever done so.
The members of Congress who sponsored this report are hard-
working men. They may not have had 'the time 'to examine its language
closely or to ponder its consequences. As for the authors of the paper,
they are not named, and I do not know who they are. I raise no question
of their integrity or sincerity.
But the fact remains that the views expressed are 'those of
intellectual isolationism. The authors have closed their eyes and
made the rest of the world go away. The real world, however, is
still very much with us. It includes strong enemy forces. Yet the
report shows no awareness 'that Communist countries exist. It
recommends, for example, that U.S. covert action programs be
drastically curtailed and that our intelligence services sever all
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intelligence association with other agencies of the government
and with American business. If we are short-sighted enough,
we can indeed forbid all intelligence access to 'these broad areas.
But we cannot forbid that same access to the intelligence services
of the Communist world. Are we really prepared to create for
them--in academia, government, and commerce- -vacuums in
which they can operate unobserved and unchecked?
Consider how 'the USSR handles such matters. All Soviet
visitors going abroad--trade delegations, sports teams, cultural
groups, students, scientists, artists, and even religious bodies--
are carefully screened in advance by the major Soviet intelligence
service, the KGB, and by security police. Intelligence and counter-
intelligence officers are hidden in their ranks. Members of these
groups are drilled in what to say and do. No Soviet citizen whom the
authorities consider a liability to communism is permitted foreign
travel. All of them serve the authorities according to the KGB's
es'tima'te of their best talents. The sole Soviet travel agency,
INTURIST, is under KGB control and staffed by KGB selections.
I am certainly not suggesting that we emulate 'them. But
I certainly am suggesting that blindfolding our intelligence services,
our eyes, is not the way for us to protect our freedoms, freedoms
that the Communist World lacks and seeks not -to gain for itself but
'to destroy.
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There are other compelling reasons for defending and
strengthening American intelligence today. If we succeed in moving,
as President Nixon phrased it, toward "an era of negotiation, rather
than confrontation", the role of intelligence will not dwindle. It
must, and will, grow. The reason is simple. No agreement
between the superpowers will prove workable unless each is sure that
the other is honoring the terms of the agreement. Each will main-
tain to the full its ability to detect violations. National security
depends upon verification, and verification depends upon good intelli-
gence. Every kind of international accommodation requires intelligence
support at some stage.
Thus we could not hope to negotiate an agreement with the
Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms through the SALT talks if
the means to monitor did not exist. It is confidence in its national
intelligence capabilities which makes any government willing to risk
limitations on its deployment of strategic arms. The greater the
capability, the less is the risk, and the broader is the area of
potential agreement. The same formula applies to Vietnam and the
Middle East.
The superpowers also share a common interest in defusing other
threats to peace. For example, the situation in Korea could rapidly
grow ominous if the intelligence capabilities of the great powers did
not permit them to head off a crisis in time.
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Intelligence is not a hindrance to international cooperation.
It is one of its foundation stones.
A 'third reason why intelligence needs our support today is
the growth of Soviet military power. The operational force supporting
Soviet ICBM's now totals about 1, 250 launchers. They have nearly
completed development of a multiple warhead system. They have
been operating ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic since
mid-1969. Last summer they began 'testing a new, submarine -launched
missile with a minimum range of 3, 000 miles. In brief, this is not
a time 'to know less about our adversaries.
One of the statements made in the report of the Members of
Congress for Peace 'through Law is so illogical that simply quoting it
suffices. Arguing that CIA distorts its reports to the President for its
own devious reasons, the paper says, The problem here is that new
intelligence data presented to the President may often be inconsistent
with previously submitted data, but the reason may be 'to bear out the old
data. " That's a real mind-bender: to prove you were right in the first
place, contradict yourself.
Other arguments, however, are more dangerous because less
patently unsound. Here are some of them:
The results of satellite and technical collection
are increasing in quality and value, particularly
with regard to military intelligence. "Human
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resources overall have dec ine in importance.
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Let's look a little closer at the human versus the technical
source. First, technical sources can tell us only what forces and
weapons the enemy has now, what his present capabilities are. They
cannot tell us his intentions- -whether and when he's going to use those
forces. Human sources can and do provide us with information about
hostile intent and thus give us the lead time that is indispensable for
the development of countermeasures.
And compare costs. The expense of technical collection is
soaring, especially in research and development, as the equipment
grows more complex. The facts given us by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
about Soviet weaponry would have cost us many millions of dollars if
collected by technical means--if in fact that kind of collection had
been possible. Colonel Penkovsky provided microfilm of some
10, 000 pages of highly classified Soviet documents. Yet the total
cost of that operation- was less than $20, 000 a year.
The Soviets understand these facts well. They put substantial
sums into scientific research, but ever since Klaus Fuchs we have
all known that they also value highly the power of,the agent.
Of the various kinds of human sources, two are of paramount
importance: the penetration agent and the defector. Such sources
are the key to the final evaluation of information gained by electronics,
communications intelligence, aerial photography, and the like. The
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inviolability of our security depends upon the inviolability of theirs.
We must give unstinted protection to such men as Colonel Piotr Popov,
whose dangerous work for the West began in Vienna in 1954 and ended
with his execution in the USSR in 1959; Pyotr Deryabin, who also
defected in Vienna in 1954; Yuriy Rastvorov; Raino Hayhanen, who
exposed Colonel Rudolf Abel in 1957; Lazlo Szabo, who asked for
political asylum in London in 1965 and appeared on 17 March 1966
before the CIA Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives; and Erno Bernat, who made an
important contribution to internal security after his defection in 1966.
We need such men. To win them to our cause and gain their
invaluable help, we must be able to defend them and they must be
convinced that we can and will protect them. They know better than
others that the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services continue to
maintain departments trained and equipped for terror, kidnapping,
hijacking, and assassination. If they doubt the security of our environment,
they will not enter it. The key potential defector is privy to the counter-
intelligence reporting of his present Communist service and thus is
keenly aware of the insecurities of the West. He is also an avid
reader of the Western press and an expert in spotting leaks. It would
be instructive to hear the comments of such a man on the proposals
put forth by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law.
Perhaps the authors of the paper felt constrained to take this
line becaus if the importance of human sources is accepted then
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we must also accept our moral and legal responsibility to protect
those sources. If we could get the information we need from
technical devices only, then we could be less concerned about protecting
them than we have to be about protecting human lives. But in fact the
quantity and quality of vital data provided by human sources is growing,
not shrinking. Therefore the Director of Central Intelligence must
give full weight to his responsibility under the National Security
Act ". . . for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." This responsibility persists beyond
revelation to original recipients, in Congress or elsewhere. It
embraces the full protection of the source. The device of the
closed or executive session cannot be relied upon to provide that
protection. For example, on 17 July 1970 the New York Times
printed an article called, "The U. S. Assumes the Israelis Have
A-Bomb or Its Parts. " Here is a quotation from it:
"Reliable sou rces reported that a somber
appraisal of Israel's nuclear program was conveyed
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by
Richard Helms. . . at a closed-door hearing on
July - 7 . "
In its entirety this article comes perilously close to jeopardizing
important sources. Let no one charge that I am assailing the freedom
of the press. What I am pointing out is that it is the job of the govern-
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I touched earlier upon a charge levelled in this paper
against CIA, the accusation that the Agency distorts its reports to
the President for its own purposes. The paper asserts that ". . . the
President does not always receive an unbiased interpretation of the
facts germane to a decision on national security. As stated earlier,
this problem stems in part from the CIA functioning as a body protecting
its own credibility. "
The Central Intelligence Agency and the other U. S. services
report on a world of swift change. Doctoring the facts about today
in order to align them with yesterday's would not make intelligence
reporting believable. It would simply create a credibility gap.
But the paper persists. "By determining what information
the President will see, the intelligence officer plays an integral role
in policy making. " The intelligence officer does not make policy,
nor does he try to con the President. He doesn't want to, and
he couldn't if he did. All the U. S. services contribute to national
estimates, and all have access to-them. Thus the Director of Central
Intelligence, the heads of all the intelligence services of the United
States, key personnel in all of those departments and agencies, and
hundreds of other professionals who have access to finished intelligence
reports would have to be party to the plot. I am reminded of the flood
of crackpot charges that swept through the press, as though from a burst
sewer main, after President Kennedy's assassination. These stories
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conjured up a similar conspiracy which involved President Johnson,
the Supreme Court, the Warren Commission, the CIA, the FBI, and
the Dallas police, as well as assorted and mysterious groups of
refugee Cubans.
Foolish as such paranoiac claims are, they are also dangerous,
especially when issued in the names of American Congressmen. I
think that the author or authors of this document have a clear moral
obligation to identify themselves and to furnish proof that our intelligence
services are misleading the President of the United States, If they
do not have facts to support 'this canard, they ought to say so publicly
and apologize.
A final example. The paper asserts that there is some overlap
of jurisdiction" between the FBI and CIA. The fact is that there is no
such overlap. The National Security Act, which created CIA, specified
'that it would have ". . . no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal security functions. . . . " I am confident 'that Messrs. Helms
and Hoover would be delighted to have the author or authors present
their facts--or retract this vague charge if they can't.
And now, a look at the eight recommendations made in this paper.
"1. There should be a drastic curtailment of covert action
programs. Where appropriate, 'these programs should be continued
overtly by the Department of State, Department of Comore rce, AID. "
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Covert action is action not attributable to the U. S. Government.
It is not employed to attain objectives which can be reached by overt
means. For example, any U. S. government needs ties abroad both
with parties or groups in power and with parties or groups out of
power. Without the latter, we should suffer an endless series of
rude shocks. Would the writers of this paper have our State Depart-
ment or Department of Commerce maintain such connections, overtly
or covertly?
Underlying this recommendation there-is or seems to be a
notion that covert action programs are un-American, a sordid
business. But if the writers really think that covert action is un-American,
then what do they think Ben Franklin was doing in Paris and London?
In recommending drastic curtailment of covert action operations,
which are conducted at the behest and under the control of the President
and his designees, the writers of this paper seem to be unaware that
such operations have already been cut back severely. In recent years,
and especially since the Katzenbach report bf 1967, CIA has adopted
operational guidelines which have the effect of restricting covert action
chiefly to individuals rather than organizations. Moreover, CIA is
itself on the look-out for ways to turn over CIA-sponsored covert
programs to overt U.S. Government agencies and to sources of private
funds. One prerequisite is a favorable political climate in recipient
countries and the willingness of the recipients to acknowledge an open
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covert action funded by U.S. money is greatest, the risk of open
acknowledgement is unacceptable 'to the recipient. Another pre-
requisite is experience in this field. The State Department, the
Department of Commerce, and AID all have major responsibilities
quite different from covert action. Burdening them with this kind
of task would compel them to assign it a lower level of attention,
incompatible both with its importance and with the need to acquire
e xpe rti s e.
Geography and history have combined to spare us until
recently from having to carry out an extensive covert action program.
The pressures of the future, however, may well be stronger. Even
now we must have a covert action capability for the following
minimal needs:
(1) To avoid a tense overt confrontation with
a hostile power. To illustrate: the U-2 operations
showed that the Soviets can maintain a high level
of tolerance for annoyance and frustration if their
prestige is not openly challenged.
(2) To protect friendly governments and leaders
abroad who want to cooperate with us but fear
swift retaliation by the Communist powers if their
help must be publicized.
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(3) To protect covert action agents in both
the free and dictatorial worlds against detection
and reprisal.
(4) To deny the adversary exclusive control
of covert action assets and to keep an eye on his
covert work against us.
In short, before we cut back CIA's covert activities or assign
'them to other elements of the government, we had better be clear about
the consequences. This is particularly 'true of any course of action
'that 'the Communist Bloc has repeatedly urged upon us.
"2. The intelligence community should end the use of legitimate
U.S. business and government agencies for operational cover overseas
and domestically. "
There have long been prohibitions against the use by U.S. intelli-
gence of certain segments of American life; examples are the Peace
Corps, officials and employees of major foundations, Fulbright
scholars, and many others. More recently, in 1967, we virtually
declared the whole of 'the academic world off-limits. The 'tightest
of restrictions apply to many other categories. If we now deny this
Agency all diplomatic and military cover- - something that no other
government has done--and all commercial cover to boot, just what
is left?
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I repeat, the United States exists in this world, not the next. This
world requires us to protect the security of this country ;through the prudent
use of both covert and clandestine operations. The basic requirement of a
clandestine operation, unsurprisingly, is that it be clandestine: not unattri-
butable but in fact hidden. Unless there's a new kind of vanishing cream on
the market, our operatives abroad have to be there in some capacity. Is
it seriously proposed that they hang out a CIA shingle, so that our enemies
can spot them and their agents without difficulty? Could we expect other
governments to take us seriously or foreign intelligence services to work
together with us if we said that the first principle of a secret service is
that it should not be secret?
Operational personnel who need it--especially those in hostile
areas--should not be stripped of the protection of a diplomatic passport
and exposed to arrest.
All operational personnel need fast access to secure communi-
cations facilities and safe storage for classified documents. They also
need normal association with their colleagues in the State Department
and elsewhere, for on-the-spot coordination.
Like governmental cover, commercial cover has been used by all
great powers for centuries. To forbid all such cover is to forbid all
secrecy in the conduct of our affairs. Furthermore, no one is forcing
American industry to cooperate with intelligence. Why should we require
the intelligence services to reject voluntary assistance that is vital
to their mission? To put this matter in clearer prespective3
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I should like to quote from a e-le4'r
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sent to Colonel Elias Dayton on 26 July 1777. "The necessity of pro-
curing good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged--
all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter
as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most
Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated,
however well planned and promising a favourable issue. "
"3. Clearer lines of responsibility must be drawn between
CIA, DIA, and NSA. Duplication and unhealthy competitiveness must
be eliminated. "
The lines of responsibility are completely clear. They are
established in a law, the National Security Act. They are extended
through a series of directives from the National Security Council,
directives that set forth the primary responsibility of CIA for the
coordination of national (in contrast with departmental) intelligence.
The most important of CIA's responsibilities under law is that of
correlating, evaluating, and disseminating information that affects
11Z -It_e_
the national security. Guidance and coordination mss- also provided by
the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence. I feel sure 'that he, like the heads of the other two
agencies named, would be glad to receive from 'the authors,-'of this
paper, or from any other source, information about specific and significant
examples of duplication and unhealthy competitiveness.
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114. Information obtained by satellites in earth resources,
fisheries, forestry, and crop management fields should be
declassified and shared with competent scientists world-wide."
Are the authors unaware of such programs as Nimbus,
Tiros, ESSA (Enviromental Science Services Administration),
and ATS (Application Technological Satellite) ? They contribute to
weather forecasting, meteorology, oceanography, studies of sea
patterns, storn surveillance, wind data, ice mapping, etc.
Photography contributing to studies of earth resources and land use has
been released from manned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.
There are minor inhibitions resulting from the sensitivities
of foreign governments and the need to protect new, advanced
techniques. These scarcely merit mention in comparison with the
abundant information from space programs released by the United
States .
"5. Since inter-service parochialisms distort the estimative
process and lead to unnecessary weapon procurement all military
services should be required to cite only the majority position on
NIEs before Congress, rather than their service footnote."
First, the assumption. A primary reason for the centralization
of the intelligence community through such bodies as the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency was to
eliminate service parochialism. But alleged parochialism
and ~OPVd'o4ffi~ff dp~ `btpj~bb % 260~~1b 6b-,s ame
thing
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as national estimates. Intelligence estimating cannot be wholly accurate.
It is a process of highly educated guessing, and it sometimes happens that
that majority position turns out to be wrong. In any event, Congress, like
the Executive Branch, is entitled to hear the considered intelligence judg-
ments of individual services whether these represent a majority or a minority.
To choke off dissent would be to do exactly what the writers of this report
have falsely accused the evaluators of doing. It would amount to suppressing
facts and views in favor of a pre-selected position. I should certainly not
want to be the representative of the Executive Branch who was charged with
telling, say, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: "You may
hear from CIA, but henceforth you will not be allowed to listen to testimony
from the Army, Navy, or Air Force. "
"6. The Board of National Estimates should include representatives
from a non-intelligence, non-government source. "
Perhaps it would be foolhardy to expect this kind of report to result
from research in depth, but what's wrong with just raking the topsoil a little?
The Board of National Estimates does include non-intelligence, non-government
members, two of them--and each spends three to four months a year on the
Board. It also has a panel of some fifteen consultants, drawn mainly from
university faculties. They meet twice a year to comment on finished estimates
and advise on future submissions. Most members of the Board have sub-
stantial backgroundsin non-governmental work.
This feckless recommendation resulted from a needless ignorance.
A simple inquiry would have produced these facts. There is
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of the intelligence community are leaving Congress out in the
cold or, at least, are keeping us inadequately informed. I want
to make it completely clear that it is Congress itself which has
determined which committees shall be briefed by the Director of
Central Intelligence and by CIA. There are presently fifteen
committees that are so briefed.
1. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The
Director of Central Intelligence customarily briefs
this committee biannually on atomic energy pro-
grams in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and
elsewhere. CIA representatives are in close touch
with 'the Staff of 'the Joint Committee andlrovide
briefings for the Chairman and staff members.
2. Joint Economic Committee. CIA main-
tains liaison contact.
3. Senate Armed Services Committee, and
4. House Armed Services Committee. The
Director appears regularly before 'the CIA Sub-
committees of both of 'these committees for an average
of four to six briefings each year. The 'topics are
world developments, CIA programs, and such
other subjects as the committees themselves
select.
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5. Senate Appropriations Committee, and
6. House Appropriations Committee, The
budget of CIA is reviewed in detail by the CIA
Subcommittees of both these bodies. The
Chairm/n of 'the full committees also chair the
sub-committees, as is also `true of the Armed
Services Committees. Moreover, the Director
annually briefs the Defense Subcommittees of
'these bodies on 'the Soviet threat.
7. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
8. House Foreign Affairs Committee. The
Direc'tor'appears before both of these bodies at
their request 'to give 'them briefings on subjects
of interest to 'them. The Senate Committee has
requested such appearances much more often
'than its opposite number.
9. Senate Judiciary Committee, and
10. House Judiciary Committee. CIA pro-
vides information to the Immigration Subcommittees
of both bodies.
11. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of
'the Judiciary Committee, and
12. House Internal Security Committee. CIA
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security information and, as appropriate, access
to intelligence defectors.
13. Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations, Senate Committee on
Government Operations. CIA provides the sub-
committee with information bearing on national
security and with intelligence and security data
about the organization and functions of foreign
governments .
14. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Committee, and
15. House Science and Astronautics Committee.
CIA briefs the Chairmen and designated staff mem-
bers of both on Soviet scientific and space programs.
But 'these more formal relationships are only part of the story.
The log of CIA's Office of the Legislative Counsel shows that during
1969 it had about 1,400 personal contacts with Congressmen or members
of their staffs, about five per day for every work day of the year. It
made and received countless phone calls to and from the Hill.
It arranged for written replies to about one 'thousand congressional
queries. It arranged for 23 briefings of congressional committees
and provided or made arrangements for 65 additional briefings of
individual members of Congress.
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In the light of such a record, it seems plausible that the
errors and misapprehensions in which this paper abounds resulted
not from any refusal by the Director or the Central Intelligence
Agency to cooperate but from the failure of the writers to ask for
the facts.
"7. The number of personnel working in covert action and
human resource programs should be cut back drastically. "
I noted earlier that the U.S. covert action program has
already been cut back and explained why we cannot afford.lp cut
it any more. "Human resource programs" is apparently bureaucratese
for intelligence operations employing agents. These have been
increasing and should continue to increase, unless we intend to
give the Soviets, 'the Bloc, and the Chinese a free hand.
Do those who make this recommendation know what they
are talking about? If any Congressional body has a real need to know,
the CIA will tell us--with appropriate safeguards--how many of its
personnel in the U. S. and abroad are engaged in covert action programs
and in operations involving agents. It would be the 'total of all
operational personnel. Under the same conditions it would tell us
how many agents it has. But I very much doubt 'that the writers of
'this paper have that information. If not, how can they tell whether
cuts are needed at all, let alone drastic cuts?
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Finally, the paper recommends -the establishment of a
Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence. Its functions
"could range from reviewing intelligence data to serving as an
official liaison for Congress with the National Security Council."
The paper continues, "Considering the mounting criticism of
CIA activities in the last decade, a Congressional watchdog corn-
mittee could add insurance 'that intelligence operations do not
interfere or undermine non-strategic interest activities such as
foreign aid and educational programs abroad." If the proposed
committee functioned properly, "the danger of an intelligence officer
becoming a policy maker could be minimized. " The writers add
that they do not seek to manage CIA or the other services: "Lack
of experience in this area and the complexity of the organization
render such a task impossible." Thus the proposed committee would
not :manage our intelligence services; it would just make 'them
inoperative. The concern is not with administration but with "the
objectivity of the information presented to the President. " By
broadening the national assessment, the new committee "would not
only strengthen our foreign policy, but would also enable us 'to
formulate a more realistic appraisal of our defense postures and
strategic concerns. "
This recommendation and its accompanying admissions 'tha't a
Congressional committee can't run CIA and that in some areas CIA
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". . . has performed its tasks with an extraordinary amount of
expertise" convey an unpersuasive air of candor and openness,
like W. C. Fields looking naive.
If this were just a proposal to add a sixteenth Congressional
committee to CIA's list, and if the new committee could maintain
the level of security called for when human life and liberty are
at stake, I should still oppose it as superfluous; but I should not
be making 'this speech. The recommendation, however, calls
for a watchdog committee--and does so as blandly as though a number
of Congressmen had not made similar recommendations for such a
committee in the past.
Here I should like 'to stress 'that in opposing the establishment
of another committee concerned with U. S. intelligence affairs,
I speak only for myself. The directors of the Central Intelligence
Agency have consistently maintained that Congress has the right to
appoint as many watch-dog committees as it wants. My own view
happens to be that we have already stretched security to the breaking
point.
The paper says 'that there has been mounting criticism of
CIA for a decade. It's true that 'the criticism of CIA by 'the Soviet-
controlled media has grown shriller over the years, a fact which
seems 'to me to speak well for the effectiveness of the Agency. A magazir
called Ramparts has specialized in scurrilously
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false accusations against it. Various Congressmen have questioned
its motives, as I shall refrain from questioning 'theirs. The U. S.
press and other media have sometimes shown an understandable
pleasure in lampooning the paradox of a secret service in an open
society.
As for genuine public concern or animosity, if it is
directed toward the Central Intelligence Agency--and I most
sincerely doubt that it is- -then in my opinion it is misdirected.
It would be like hating doctors because sickness exists. We
should reserve our animosity for those forces that have compelled
an increasing American involvement in espionage ever since
World War II and have forced us to hurry to match their far older
expertise.
The Soviet intelligence services are well into 'their third
generation. The KGB alone employs within the boundaries of
the USSR 300, 000 at the national level and some 600, 000 at
local levels. It has 10, 000 abroad. The 25 services of the
European Communist Bloc extend its capabilities and respond to
its guidance. A vast but uncounted number of experts in clandestine
and covert operations frequently make 'trips into the Free World,
and to 'these must be added all the so-called "illegals" like Colonel
Abel.
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In the face of their numbers and their skills, do we really
want to turn the clock back, except for 'technical advances, 'to the
days before Pearl Harbor? Since the end of last year the Soviets
have had more irtelligence specialists in Latin America than we
have, and the discrepancy is growing. Instead of hastening that
kind of trend, I think we ought to stop it.
Intelligence services are primarily the instruments of the
Executive Branch, not the Legislative. If the President were
receiving distorted reports, he would be 'the first to know it.
Plainly, he does not see exactly eye-to-eye with the framers of
this paper. When he visited CIA headquarters in March 1969,
President Nixon observed, ". . . I understand that when President
Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on
it which, as I recall, went something like 'this: To the CIA, an
organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of
the United States, From one who knows.
"I know, And I appreciate what you do.
Perhaps the time will come when the Communist World will
put away both the sword and the stiletto, although thus far they've
been swinging 'twice as hard with one whenever they've slackened
off with 'the other. But we must not rationalize our wish for a peaceful
and open world into a belief that they are about to grant it to us.
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The leaders of the Communist world remain committed
to their doctrine of irreconcilable hostility and to the conviction
that their system will and must prevail. U. S. intelligence remains
our first line of defense against this dogmatism and its conse-
quences. It is also our best insurance for world peace. For even
if the Communists remain reluctant to rely upon nuclear or other
military power, the threat of war through miscalculation remains.
The Communist leaders are isolated from our kind of reality. Mis-
reading our history and our ideology, they are also prone to misunder-
stand our intentions and our actions. And because of the intellectual
isolationism that they have imposed upon themselves--and that we must
avoid most scrupulously--we too stand in danger of miscalculation.
Our only remedy is solid intelligence that keeps our policy-makers
informed about what the Communists are doing and about how they are
likely to interpret and react to our own undertakings.
I know that I have spoken at length. Perhaps you feel that
I've used a huge swatter on a very small fly. But I want to deal
with more than this paper, its illogic, contradictions, and distortions.
My concern is with the continuing campaign to denigrate U.S. intelligence.
I do not for a moment suppose that the writers of this paper are
deliberately serving Soviet purposes. But neither do I suppose for a
moment that the Soviets would not enthusiastically second their
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recommendations. Cut-backs have already been made in
our military and intelligence services. But 'they were made
prudently, regretfully, and for reasons of fiscal necessity. They
were made with the understanding that we are calling upon 'the armed
forces and intelligence to do even more, and with less. They were
not made with any intent to cut back functions or capabilities.
I suggest 'that we declare a moratorium on CIA, that we help
them get on with their job, and that we get on with ours.
I thank you.
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A REPLY TO
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW:
"INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY"
This past summer I read a report put out by the "Members
of Congress for Peace 'through Law". It proposed a number of far-
reaching changes in the scope and conduct of U.S. intelligence.
Among 'these were proposals to cut back drastically the work of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence services
and to establish a new Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence.
On August the 13th, 1970, a concurrent resolution to establish
such a committee was referred to.the Committee on Rules of the
House of Representatives.
When I first read the report, I was not inclined to take it
very seriously. It deals with important issues, but its assertions
and recommendations are not based on a grasp of the facts. In fact,
it is shot 'through with misinformation. But the introduction in the
House of a resolution to establish a watch-dog committee, to be
added to the fifteen committees now dealing with U.S. intelligence
matters, led me to reconsider. I think that it is important to answer
the charges made by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law
not b roeedtHeig setOWD3i&Za - 3 lfl2 f%fiQAM021Q -save
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been repeated so many -times, in places ranging from the floor of
this Senate to 'the pages of Pravda, that we are in danger of being
numbed into credulity. The time has come to set the record straight,
once and for all.
It is particularly important that we understand the facts
about our intelligence program and the services that carry
it out because grave misunderstanding and action based on it can only
be disastrous. If the recommendations of this paper were put into
effect, U. S. intelligence would be crippled. I do not know if any other
country in the world has ever considered fastening upon itself the shackless
that this report urges, but I do know that no country has ever done so.
The members of Congress who sponsored this report are hard-
working men. They may not have had the time to examine its language
closely or to ponder its consequences. As for the authors of the paper,
they are not named, and I do not know who 'they are. I raise no question
of their integrity or sincerity.
But the fact remains -that the views expressed are 'those of
intellectual isolationism. The authors have closed their eyes and
made the rest of -the world go away. The real world, however, is
still very much with us. It includes strong enemy forces. Yet the
report shows no awareness -that Communist countries exist. It
recommends, for example, that U.S. covert action programs be
drastApprgec or elease`ZOU O '/fir! ' j~X 1 0~~6 21 '1$~0 ~
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intelligence association with other agencies of the government
and with American business. If we are short-sighted enough,
we can indeed forbid all intelligence access to these broad areas.
But we cannot forbid that same access to the intelligence services
of the Communist world. Are we really prepared to create for
them--in academia, government, and commerce- -vacuums in
which they can operate unobserved and unchecked?
Consider how the USSR handles such matters. All Soviet
visitors going abroad--trade delegations, sports teams, cultural
groups, students, scientists, artists, and even religious bodies--
are carefully screened in advance by the major Soviet intelligence
service, the KGB, and by security police. Intelligence and counter-
intelligence officers are hidden in their ranks. Members of these
groups are drilled in what to say and do. No Soviet citizen whom the
authorities consider a liability to communism is permitted foreign
'travel. All of them serve the authorities according to the KGBis
estimate of their best talents. The sole Soviet travel agency,
INTURIST, is under KGB control and staffed by KGB selections.
I am certainly not suggesting that we emulate them. But
I certainly am suggesting that blindfolding our intelligence services,
our eyes, is not the way for us to protect our freedoms, freedoms
that the Communist World lacks and seeks not to gain for itself but
to destroy.
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There are other compelling reasons for defending and
strengthening American intelligence today. If we succeed in moving,
as President Nixon phrased it, toward "an era of negotiation, rather
than confrontation", the role of intelligence will not dwindle. It
must, and will, grow. The reason is simple. No agreement
between the superpowers will prove workable unless each is sure that
the other is honoring the terms of the agreement. Each will main-
tain to the full its ability to detect violations. National security
depends upon verification, and verification depends upon good intelli-
gence. Every kind of international accommodation requires intelligence
support at some stage.
Thus we could not hope to negotiate an agreement with the
Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms through the SALT talks if
the means to monitor did not exist. It is confidence in its national
intelligence capabilities which makes any government willing to risk
limitations on its deployment of strategic arms. The greater the
capability, the less is the risk, and the broader is the area of
potential agreement. The same formula applies to Vietnam and the
Middle East.
The superpowers also share a common interest in defusing other
threats to peace. For example, the situation in Korea could rapidly
grow ominous if the intelligence capabilities of the great powers did
not permit them to head off a crisis in time.
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Intelligence is not a hindrance to international cooperation.
It is one of its foundation stones.
A third reason why intelligence needs our support today is
the growth of Soviet military power. The operational force supporting
Soviet ICBM's now totals about 1, 250 launchers. They have nearly
completed development of a multiple warhead system. They have
been operating ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic since
mid-1969. Last summer they began testing a new, submarine-launched
missile with a minimum range of 3, 000 miles. In brief, this is not
a time to know less about our adversaries.
One of the statements made in the report of the Members of
Congress for Peace through Law is so illogical that simply quoting it
suffices. Arguing that CIA distorts its reports to the President for its
own devious reasons, the paper says, "The problem here is that new
intelligence data presented 'to the President may often be inconsistent
with previously submitted data, but the reason may be to bear out the old
data. " That's a real mind-bender: 'to prove you were right in the first
place, contradict yourself.
Other arguments, however, are more dangerous because less
patently unsound. Here are some of them:
The results of satellite and technical collection
are increasing in quality and value, particularly
with regard to military intelligence. "Human
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resources overall have declined in importance. 11
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Let's look a little closer at the human versus the technical
source. First, technical sources can tell us only what forces and
weapons the enemy has now, what his present capabilities are. They
cannot tell us his intentions--whether and when he's going to use those
forces. Human sources can and do provide us with information about
hostile intent and thus give us the lead time that is indispensable for
the development of countermeasures.
And compare costs. The expense of technical collection is
soaring, especially in research and development, as the equipment
grows more complex. The facts given us by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
about Soviet weaponry would have cost us many millions of dollars if
collected by technical means--if in fact that kind of collection had
been possible. Colonel Penkovsky provided microfilm of some
10, 000 pages of highly classified Soviet documents. Yet the total
cost of that operation, was less than $20, 000 a year.
The Soviets understand these facts well. They put substantial
sums into scientific research, but ever since Klaus Fuchs we have
all known that they also value highly the power of the agent.
Of the various kinds of human sources, two are of paramount
importance: the penetration agent and the defector. Such sources
are the key to the final evaluation of information gained by electronics,
communications intelligence, aerial photography, and the like. The
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inviolability of our security depends upon the inviolability of theirs.
We must give unstinted protection to such men as Colonel Piotr Popov,
whose dangerous work for the West began in Vienna in 1954 and ended
with his execution in the USSR in 1959; Pyotr Deryabin, who also
defected in Vienna in 1954; Yuriy Rastvorov; Raino Hayhanen, who
exposed Colonel Rudolf Abel in 1957; Lazlo Szabo, who asked for
political asylum in London in 1965 and appeared on 17 March 1966
before the CIA Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives; and Erno Bernat, who made an
important contribution to internal security after his defection in 1966.
We need such men. To win them to our cause and gain their
invaluable help, we must be able to defend them and they must be
convinced that we can and will protect them. They know better than
others that the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services continue to
maintain departments trained and equipped for terror, kidnapping,
hijacking, and assassination. If they doubt the security of our environment,
they will not enter it. The key potential defector is privy to the counter-
intelligence reporting of his present Communist service and thus is
keenly aware of the insecurities of the West. He is also an avid
reader of the Western press and an expert in spotting leaks. It would
be instructive to hear the comments of such a man on the proposals
put forth by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law.
Perhaps the authors of the paper felt constrained to take this
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line because if the importance of human sources is accepted, then
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we must also accept our moral and legal responsibility to protect
those sources. If we could get the information we need from
technical devices only, then we could be less concerned about protecting
them than we have to be about protecting human lives. But in fact the
quantity and quality of vital data provided by human sources is growing,
not shrinking. Therefore the Director of Central Intelligence must
give full weight to his responsibility under the National Security
Act ". . . for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. " This responsibility persists beyond
revelation to original recipients, in Congress or elsewhere. It
embraces the full protection of the source. The device of the
closed or executive session cannot be relied upon to provide that
protection. For example, on 17 July 1970 the New York Times
printed an article called, "The U. S. Assumes the Israelis Have
A-Bomb or Its Parts. " Here is a quotation from it:
"Reliable sou rces reported that a somber
appraisal of Israel's nuclear program was conveyed
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by
Richard Helms. . , at a closed-door hearing on
July j.7. "
In its entirety this article comes perilously close to jeopardizing
important sources, Let no one charge that I am assailing the freedom
of the press. What I am pointing out is that it is the job of the govern-
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I touched earlier upon a charge levelled in this paper
against CIA, the accusation that the Agency distorts its reports to
. the
the President for its own purposes. The paper asserts that ". .
President does not always receive an unbiased interpretation of the
facts germane to a decision on national security. As stated earlier,
this problem stems in part from the CIA functioning as a body protecting
its own credibility. "
The Central Intelligence Agency and the other U. S. services
report on a world of swift change. Doctoring the facts about today
in order to align them with yesterday's would not make intelligence
reporting believable. It would simply create a credibility gap.
But the paper persists. "By determining what information
the President will see, the intelligence officer plays an integral role
in policy making. " The intelligence officer does not make policy,
nor does he try to con the President. He doesn't want to, and
he couldn't if he did. All the U. S. services contribute to national
estimates, and all have access ta'them. Thus the Director of Central
Intelligence, the heads of all the intelligence services of the United
States, key personnel in all of those departments and agencies, and
hundreds of other professionals who have access to finished intelligence
reports would have to be party to the plot. I am reminded of the flood
of crackpot charges that swept through the press, as though from a burst
sewer main, after President Kennedy's assassination. These stories
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conjured up a similar conspiracy which involved President Johnson,
the Supreme Court, the Warren Commission, the CIA, the FBI, and
the Dallas police, as well as assorted and mysterious groups of
refugee Cubans.
Foolish as such paranoiac claims are, they are also dangerous,
especially when issued in the names of American Congressmen. I
think that the author or authors of this document have a clear moral
obligation 'to identify themselves and to furnish proof that our intelligence
services are misleading the President of the United States,t. If they
do not have facts to support this canard, 'they ought 'to say so publicly
and apologize.
A final example. The paper asserts that there is "some overlap
of jurisdiction" between the FBI and CIA. The fact is that there is no
such overlap. The National Security Act, which created CIA, specified
that it would have ". . . no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal security functions. . . . " I am confident that Messrs. Helms
and Hoover would be delighted to have the author or authors present
their facts--or retract this vague charge if they can't.
And now, a look at 'the eight recommendations made in this paper.
"1. There should be a drastic curtailment of covert action
programs. Where appropriate, these programs should be continued
overtly by the Department of State, Department of Comore rce, AID. "
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Covert action is action not attributable to the U. S. Government.
It is not employed to attain objectives which can be reached by overt
means. For example, any U. S. government needs ties abroad both
with parties or groups in power and with parties or groups out of
power. Without the latter, we should suffer an endless series of
rude shocks. Would the writers of this paper have our State Depart-
ment or Department of Commerce maintain such connections, overtly
or covertly?
Underlying this recommendation there-is or seems to be a
notion that covert action programs are un-American, a sordid
business. But if the writers really think that covert action is un-American,
then what do they think Ben Franklin was doing in Paris and London?
In recommending drastic curtailment of covert action operations,
which are conducted at the behest and under the control of the President
and his designees, the writers of this paper seem to be unaware that
such operations have already been cut back severely. In recent years,
and especially since the Katzenbach report bf 1967, CIA has adopted
operational guidelines which have the effect of restricting covert action
chiefly to individuals rather than organizations. Moreover, CIA is
itself on the look-out for ways to turn over CIA-sponsored covert
programs to overt U.S. Government agencies and to sources of private
funds. One prerequisite is a X.avorable political climate in recipient
countries and the willingness of the recipients to acknowledge an open
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connection with the U. S. Government. Frequently where the need for
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covert action funded by U.S. money is greatest, the risk of open
acknowledgement is unacceptable to the recipient. Another pre-
requisite is experience in this field. The State Department, the
Department of Commerce, and AID all have major responsibilities
quite different from covert action. Burdening them with this kind
of task would compel them to assign it a lower level of attention,
incompatible both with its importance and with the need to acquire
expertise.
Geography and history have combined to spare us until
recently from having to carry out an extensive covert action program.
The pressures of the future, however, may well be stronger. Even
now we must have a covert action capability for the following
minimal needs:
(1) To avoid a tense overt confrontation with
a hostile power. To illustrate: the U-2 operations
showed that the Soviets can maintain a high level
of 'tolerance for annoyance and frustration if their
prestige is not openly challenged.
(2) To protect friendly governments and leaders
abroad who want to cooperate with us but fear
swift retaliation by the Communist powers if their
help must be publicized.
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(3) To protect covert action agents in both
the free and dictatorial worlds against detection
and reprisal.
(4) To deny the adversary exclusive control
of covert action assets and to keep an eye on his
covert work against us.
In short, before we cut back CIA=s covert activities or assign
them to other elements of the government, we had better be clear about
the consequences. This is particularly true of any course of action
that the Communist Bloc has repeatedly urged upon us.
"2. The intelligence community should end the use of legitimate
U.S. business and government agencies for operational cover overseas
and domestically. "
There have long been prohibitions against the use by U. S. intelli-
gence of certain segments of American life; examples are the Peace
Corps, officials and employees of major foundations, Fulbright
scholars, and many others. More recently, in 1967, we virtually
declared the whole of the academic world off-limits. The tightest
of restrictions apply to many other categories. If we now deny this
Agency all diplomatic and military cover- -something that no other
government has done--and all commercial cover to boot, just what
is left?
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I repeat, the United States exists in this world, not the next. This
world requires us to protect the security of this country :through the prudent
use of both covert and clandestine operations. The basic requirement of a
clandestine operation, unsurprisingly, is that it be clandestine: not unattri-
butable but in fact hidden. Unless there's a new kind of vanishing cream on
the market, our operatives abroad have to be there in some capacity. Is
it seriously proposed that they hang out a CIA shingle, so that our enemies
can spot them and their agents without difficulty? Could we expect other
governments to take us seriously or foreign intelligence services to work
together with us if we said that the first principle of a secret service is
that it should not be secret?
Operational personnel who need it--especially those in hostile
areas--should not be stripped of the protection of a diplomatic passport
and exposed to arrest.
All operational personnel need fast access to secure communi-
cations facilities and safe storage for classified documents. They also
need normal association with their colleagues in the State Department
and elsewhere, for on-the-spot coordination.
Like governmental cover, commercial cover has been used by all
great powers for centuries. To forbid all such cover is -to forbid all
secrecy in the conduct of our affairs. Furthermore, no one is forcing
American industry to cooperate with intelligence. Why should we require
the intelligence services -to reject voluntary assistance that is vital
'to their mission,? To put this matter in clearer prespective;
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I should like to quote from a letter that General Washington
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sent to Colonel Elias Dayton on Z6 July 1777. "The necessity of pro-
curing good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged--
all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter
as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most
Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated,
however well planned and promising a favourable issue. "
"3. Clearer lines of responsibility must be drawn between
CIA, DIA, and NSA. Duplication and unhealthy competitiveness must
be eliminated. "
The lines of responsibility are completely clear. They are
established in a law, the National Security Act. They are extended
through a series of directives from the National Security Council,
directives that set forth the primary responsibility of CIA for the
coordination of national (in contrast with departmental) intelligence.
The most important of CIA's responsibilities under law is that of
correlating, evaluating, and disseminating information that affects
the national security. Guidance and coordination 3-s- also provided by
the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence. I feel sure that he, like the heads of the other two
agencies named, would be glad to receive from the authors.,of this
paper, or from any other source, information about specific and significant
examples of duplication and unhealthy competitiveness.
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114. Information obtained by satellites in earth resources,
fisheries, forestry, and crop management fields should be
declassified and shared with competent scientists world-wide."
Are the authors unaware of such programs as Nimbus,
Tiros, ESSA (Enviromental Science Services Administration),
and ATS (Application Technological Satellite) ? They contribute to
weather forecasting, meteorology, oceanography, studies of sea
patterns, storn surveillance, wind data, ice mapping, etc.
Photography contributing to studies of earth resources and land use has
been released from manned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.
There are minor inhibitions resulting from the sensitivities
of foreign governments and the need to protect new, advanced
techniques. These scarcely merit mention in comparison with the
abundant information from space programs released by the United
States.
115. Since inter-service parochialisms distort the estimative
process and lead to unnecessary weapon procurement all military
services should be required to cite only the majority position on
NIEs before Congress, rather than their service footnote."
First, the assumption. A primary reason for the centralization
of the intelligence community through such bodies as the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency was to
eliminate service parochialism. But alleged parochialism
,nnr
Fg$`6egtFS @a" ~2' 9 { `v~~Pp~o t$~ 44a J0914Z-dame thing
and A 4
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as national estimates. Intelligence estimating cannot be wholly accurate.
It is a process of highly educated guessing, and it sometimes happens that
that majority position turns out to be wrong. In any event, Congress, like
the Executive Branch, is entitled to hear the considered intelligence judg-
ments of individual services whether these represent a majority or a minority.
To choke off dissent would be to do exactly what the writers of this report
have falsely accused the evaluators of doing. It would amount to suppressing
facts and views in favor of a pre-selected position. I should certainly not
want to be the representative of the Executive Branch who was charged with
telling, say, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: "You may
hear from CIA, but henceforth you will not be allowed to listen to testimony
from the Army, Navy, or Air Force. "
116. The Board of National Estimates should include representatives
from a non-intelligence, non-government source. "
Perhaps it would be foolhardy to expect this kind of report to result
from research in depth, but what's wrong with just raking the topsoil a little?
The Board of National Estimates does include non-intelligence, non-government
members, two of them--and each spends three to four months a year on the
Board. It also has a panel of some fifteen consultants, drawn mainly from
university faculties. They meet twice a year to comment on finished estimates
and advise on future submissions. Most members of the Board have sub-
stantial backgrounds in non-governmental work.
This feckless recommendation resulted from a needless ignorance.
A simple inquiry would have produced these facts. There is
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of the intelligence community are leaving Congress out in the
cold or, at least, are keeping us inadequately informed. I want
to make it completely clear that it is Congress itself which has
determined which committees shall be briefed by the Director of
Central Intelligence and by CIA. There are presently fifteen
committees that are so briefed.
1. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The
Director of Central Intelligence customarily briefs
this committee biannually on atomic energy pro-
grams in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and
elsewhere. CIA representatives are in close touch
with the Staff of the Joint Committee and7ovide
briefings for the Chairman and staff members.
Z. Joint Economic Committee. CIA main-
tains liaison contact.
3. Senate Armed Services Committee, and
4. House Armed Services Committee. The
Director appears regularly before the CIA Sub-
committees of both of these committees for an average
of four to six briefings each year. The topics are
world developments, CIA prog-rams, and such
other subjects as the committees themselves
select.
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5. Senate Appropriations Committee, and
6. House Appropriations Committee, The
budget of CIA is reviewed in detail by the CIA
Subcommittees of both these bodies. The
ChairmX-n of the full committees also chair the
sub-committees, as is also true of the Armed
Services Committees. Moreover, the Director
annually briefs the Defense Subcommittees of
'these bodies on the Soviet threat.
7. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
8. House Foreign Affairs Committee. The
Director'appears before both of these bodies at
their request to give 'them briefings on subjects
of interest to them. The Senate Committee has
requested such appearances much more often
than its opposite number.
9. Senate Judiciary Committee, and
10. House Judiciary Committee. CIA pro-
vides information to the Immigration Subcommittees
of both bodies.
11. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of
the Judiciary Committee, and
12. House Internal Security Committee. CIA
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cooperates with both groups, providing national
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security information and, as appropriate, access
to intelligence defectors.
13. Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations, Senate Committee on
Government Operations. CIA provides the sub-
committee with information bearing on national
security and with intelligence and security data
about the organization and functions of foreign
governments.
14. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Committee, and
15. House Science and Astronautics Committee.
CIA briefs the Chairmen and designated staff mem-
bers of both on Soviet scientific and space programs.
But these more formal relationships are only part of the story.
The log of CIA3s Office of the Legislative Counsel shows that during
1969 it had about 1, 400 personal contacts with Congressmen or members
of their staffs, about five per day for every work day of the year. It
made and received countless phone calls to and from the Hill.
It arranged for written replies to about one thousand congressional
queries. It arranged for 23 briefings of congressional committees
and provided or made arrangements for 65 additional briefings of
individual members of Congress.
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In the light of such a record, it seems plausible that the
errors and misapprehensions in which this paper abounds resulted
not from any refusal by the Director or the Central Intelligence
Agency to cooperate but from the failure of the writers to ask for
the f acts.
117. The number of personnel working in covert action and
human resource programs should be cut back drastically."
I noted earlier that the U. S. covert action program has
already been cut back and explained why we cannot affordlp cut
it any more. "Human resource programs" is apparently bureaucratese
for intelligence operations employing agents. These have been
increasing and should continue to increase, unless we intend to
give the Soviets, the Bloc, and the Chinese a free hand.
Do those who make this recommendation know what they
are 'talking about? If any Congressional body has a real need to know,
the CIA will tell us - -with appropriate safeguards - -how many of its
personnel in the U.S. and abroad are engaged in covert action programs
and in operations involving agents. It would be the total of all
operational personnel. Under the same conditions it would tell us
how many agents it has. But I very much doubt 'that the writers of
this paper have that information. If not, how can they tell whether
cuts are needed at all, let alone drastic cuts?
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Finally, the paper recommends the establishment of a
Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence. Its functions
"could range from reviewing intelligence data to serving as an
official liaison for Congress with the National Security Council. "
The paper continues, "Considering the mounting criticism of
CIA activities in the last decade, a Congressional watchdog com-
mittee could add insurance that intelligence operations do not
interfere or undermine non-strategic interest activities such as
foreign aid and educational programs abroad. " If the proposed
committee functioned properly, "the danger of an intelligence officer
becoming a policy maker could be minimized. " The writers add
that they do not seek to manage CIA or the other services: "Lack
of experience in this area and the complexity of the organization
render such a task impossible. " Thus the proposed committee would
not manage our intelligence services; it would just make 'them
inoperative. The concern is not with administration but with "the
objectivity of the information presented to the President. " By
broadening the national assessment, the new committee "would not
only strengthen our foreign policy, but would also enable us to
formulate a more realistic appraisal of our defense postures and
strategic concerns. "
This recommendation and its accompanying admissions that a
Congressional committee can't run CIA and that in some areas CIA
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has performed its tasks with an extraordinary amount of
expertise" convey an unpersuasive air of candor and openness,
like W. C. Fields looking naive.
If this were just a proposal to add a sixteenth Congressional
committee to CIA's list, and if -the new committee could maintain
the level of security called for when human life and liberty are
at stake, I should still oppose it as superfluous; but I should not
be making this speech. The recommendation, however, calls
for a watchdog committee--and does so as blandly as though a number
of Congressmen had not made similar recommendations for such a
committee in the past.
Here I should like to stress that in opposing the establishment
of another committee concerned with U. S. intelligence affairs,
I speak only for myself. The directors of the Central Intelligence
Agency have consistently maintained that Congress has the right to
appoint as many watch-dog committees as it wants. My own view
happens to be 'that we have already stretched security to the breaking
point.
The paper says that there has been mounting criticism of
CIA for a decade. It's true 'that the criticism of CIA by the Soviet-
controlled media has grown shriller over the years, a fact which
seems to me 'to speak well for the effectiveness of the Agency. A magazine
called Ramparts has specialized in scurrilously
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false accusations against it. Various Congressmen have questioned
its motives, as I shall refrain from questioning 'theirs. The U. S.
press and other media have sometimes shown an understandable
pleasure in lampooning the paradox of a secret service in an open
society.
As for genuine public concern or animosity, if it is
directed toward the Central Intelligence Agency--and I most
sincerely doubt that it is--then in my opinion it is misdirected.
It would be like hating doctors because sickness exists. We
should reserve our animosity for those forces that have compelled
an increasing American involvement in espionage ever since
World War II and have forced us to hurry to match their far older
expertise.
The Soviet intelligence services are well into their 'third
generation. The KGB alone employs within the boundaries of
the USSR 300, 000 at the national level and some 600, 000 at
local levels. It has 10, 000 abroad. The 25 services of the
European Communist Bloc extend its capabilities and respond to
its guidance. A vast but uncounted number of experts in clandestine
and covert operations frequently make trips into the Free, World,
and to these must be added all the so-called "illegals" like Colonel
Abel.
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In the face of -their numbers and their skills, do we really
want to 'turn the clock back, except for technical advances, to the
days before Pearl Harbor? Since the end of last year the Soviets
have had more inl lligence specialists in Latin America than we
have, and the discrepancy is growing. Instead of hastening that
kind of trend, I think we ought to stop it.
Intelligence services are primarily the instruments of the
Executive Branch, not the Legislative. If the President were
receiving distorted reports, he would be the first to know it.
Plainly, he does not see exactly eye-to-eye with 'the framers of
this paper. When he visited CIA headquarters in March 1969,
President Nixon observed, ". . . I understand that when President
Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on
it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an
organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of
the United States, ? From one who knows.
"I know, And I appreciate what you do. "
Perhaps the time will come when the Communist World will
put away both the sword and the stiletto, although thus far they've
been swinging twice as hard with one whenever they've slackened
off with the other. But we must not rationalize our wish for a peaceful
and open world into a belief that they are about to grant it to us.
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The leaders of the Communist world remain committed
to their doctrine of irreconcilable hostility and to the conviction
that their system will and must prevail. U. S. intelligence remains
our first line of defense against this dogmatism and its conse-
quences. It is also our best insurance for world peace. For even
if the Communists remain reluctant to rely upon nuclear or other
military power, the threat of war through miscalculation remains.
The Communist leaders are isolated from our kind of reality. Mis-
reading our history and our ideology, they are also prone to misunder-
stand our intentions and our actions. And because of the intellectual
isolationism that they have imposed upon themselves--and that we must
avoid most scrupulously--we too stand in danger of miscalculation.
Our only remedy is solid intelligence that keeps our policy-makers
informed about what the Communists are doing and about how they are
likely to interpret and react to our own undertakings.
I know that I have spoken at length. Perhaps you feel that
I've used a huge swatter on a very small fly. But I want to deal
with more than this paper, its illogic, contradictions, and distortions.
My concern is with the continuing campaign to denigrate U.S. intelligence.
I do not for a moment suppose that the writers of this paper are
deliberately serving Soviet purposes. But neither do I suppose for a
moment that the Soviets would not enthusiastically second their
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recommendations. Cut-backs have already been made in
our military and intelligence services. But they were made
prudently, regretfully, and for reasons of fiscal necessity. They
were made with the understanding that we are calling upon the armed
forces and intelligence to do even more, and with less. They were
not made with any intent to cut back functions or capabilities.
I suggest that we declare a moratorium on CIA, that we help
them get on with their job, and that we get on with ours.
I thank you.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
25X1
x^
Legislates Counsel
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OFFICER'S
INITIALS
SECRET
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
It is suggested that this draft
be released to the DCI, but it is
noted that C/CI has not expressed
any views about it.
INTEAL
FOR 3-62 USE PREVIOUS ? ^ ^ US
~2 EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED
E ONLY