COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000200050011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: RP

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COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
TO NORTH VIETNAM
Introduction
North Vietnam's role in the insurgency in South Vietnam is that of
a command and control center, a source of manpower, and a channel
for supplies. Its economy has made only a marginal contribution to
Vietnamese Communist military strength. Hanoi's ability to provide
continued logistic support to Communist forces in South Vietnam, as
well as to withstand the effects of the bombing of North Vietnam, is
largely dependent on the continued receipt of materiel from Communist
China and the USSR. All countries of the Communist camp responded
to the intensified US/GVN air offensive in 1965 by extending military
and economic assistance as proof of their support. The major aid
programs have been undertaken by the USSR and Communist China.
The Eastern European Communist countries have extended only
limited amounts of assistance.
The total amount of aid extended since early 1965 is not known pre
cisely. We estimate that military aid amounting to about $250 million
and economic aid amounting to $150 million was delivered in 1965. The
amount of aid has increased in 1966, and recent trends indicate that it
will continue to increase in 1967.
The material assistance provided by the USSR and Communist
China is a highly significant factor in the North Vietnamese attitude
toward continuing the war. The importance of this assistance has been
attested to in Vietnamese public statements. The Vietnamese view Bloc
support as valuable in sustaining, if not increasing, the military pres-
sure that the Communists can bring to bear in South Vietnam. They
also see it as a protective umbrella which partly inhibits direct allied
military pressure on the DRV and helps to negate the effects of the
bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, this aid serves to affirm the
ideological unity of the Communist camp in supporting the "war of
liberation" in South Vietnam.
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Material assistance to North Vietnam is also significant as an
apparent commitment of other Communist countries to underwrite the
material costs of the war and to assist in the reconstruction of North
Vietnam's economy. These assurances undoubtedly underlie North
Vietnam's apparent willingness to lose its economic facilities to air
attack and to persist in its pursuit of the war in South Vietnam. This
attitude is strengthened by the knowledge that even more assistance
will be forthcoming. During 1966, total imports have been well above
1965 levels. At the same time, exports have continued to decline, so
that the growing import surplus can only be financed by additional
assistance from Communist countries.
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1. Military Aid
Communist military assistance delivered to North Vietnam
between 1953 and mid-1966 totaled more than $500 million and may
substantially exceed $600 million by the end of 1966 (see Table 1).
Three-fourths of the total has come from the USSR and the balance
from Communist China. The contribution of other Communist coun-
tries has been negligible.
Soviet and Chinese Communist Military Aid
Delivered to North Vietnam
1953 - June 1966
Year
Total
USSR
Communist China
Total
504
377
127
1953-63
99
44
55
196+
25
15
10
1965
250
217
33
1966 (first half)
130
101
29
More than 75 percent of Communist military assistance has
been delivered to North Vietnam after 1964. Soviet and Chinese mili-
tary aid in 1964 totaled about $25 million and was about evenly dis-
tributed between the two donor countries. In 1965, however, total aid
was ten times this amount, or about $250 million, delivered principally
from the USSR. Military aid deliveries have been maintained at a high
level during 1966 and should exceed the aid provided in 1965.
b. Composition of Military Deliveries
The large increase in value of military deliveries to North
Vietnam in 1965 reflected a substantial shipment of air defense equip-
ment, primarily surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) and fighter aircraft.
Deliveries of military equipment other than SAM's in 1966 are esti-
mated to be at an annual rate of about $220 million, approximately 50
percent higher than in 1965 (see Tables 2 and 3).
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About 85 percent of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam has
been delivered after 1964 (nearly $320 million). Between 1953 and
1964, Soviet aid consisted largely of artillery, small arms, ammuni-
tion, about 75 aircraft (largely trainer and transport aircraft), and 20
small naval craft. The emphasis in 1965 shifted to establishing an air
defense network, and the Soviet authorities delivered 88 assorted air-
craft (including 60 MIG jet fighters) and a SAM system consisting of
24 firing battalions. About 1, 600 antiaircraft guns also were provided
to North Vietnam. In addition, as many as 1, 500 Soviet military tech-
nicians were engaged in training North Vietnamese military personnel
in the use of SAM's and aircraft.
About half of total Chinese military assistance has been pro-
vided after 1964. The primary Chinese contribution during the past
two years has been in the form of small arms, trucks and vehicles,
military technical assistance, and technicians and laborers for military
related construction activities.
The largest share of Chinese aid
delivered between 1953 and 1964, which totaled about $65 million, con-
sisted of 30 Swatow-class motor gunboats valued at $26 million and a
variety of artillery, small arms and ammunition, and radar equipment.
In 1964, Communist China delivered 36 MIG-15/17 jet fighters.
2. Economic Aid and Balance of Trade
Communist countries extended an estimated $956 million in eco-
nomic aid to North Vietnam during 1955-64 (see Table 4). After a
lull in economic assistance during 1963-64, deliveries of aid were
stepped up in 1965 to about $150 million, two to three times the
average annual level of 1955-64. This sharp rise has continued in
1966, and during the last nine months deliveries totaled about $200
million.
The DRV generally maintains a favorable balance of trade
with the Free World, but most of North Vietnam's imports from Com-
munist countries are financed through assistance programs (by grants
and low-interest credits). As indicated in Table 5, the excess of DRV
imports from the Communist world over exports to these countries
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increased from about $34 million in 1964 to nearly $100 million in
1965.., Preliminary reports indicate that the trade imbalance will
be even larger in 1966 as the result of a continuing decline in DRV
exports and a sharp increase in DRV imports from the Bloc.
Economic aid to North Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, unlike that
in previous years, involved nearly all the members of the Communist
camp, reflecting growing pressure on them to give tangible proof of
their support to North Vietnam's military effort. The token response
by some countries, however, is suggested by the failure of Communist
propaganda to publicize a single figure on 1965 aid.
Nevertheless, the total amount of aid deliveries increased substantially
in 1965 to about $150 million. The DRV appears to be using the exist-
ence of a wartime situation as a means of pressing for and receiving
substantial increases in economic assistance, which will be used more
for general economic purposes than for the production of military goods
and services. The DRV is now acquiring aid from the Bloc on a larger
scale than it was able to obtain prior to the escalation of the war in
Vietnam.
Although little information is available on the composition of
economic aid, it appears that most of the 1965 deliveries consisted of
materials and equipment made necessary by the war, such as medical
supplies, and equipment to restore transport, power, and other eco-
nomic activity. A large fraction of the aid commitments made in 1965
and 1966, however, were not intended to replace assets destroyed by
US attacks against the North. There is little evidence that assistance
from the Bloc is intended to develop North Vietnamese capabilities for
producing goods directly associated with the war effort. It is clear
that the Communist Bloc has implicitly guaranteed that economic losses
incurred by the DRV in pursuing the war will be replaced. So far, how.
ever, the North Vietnamese industrial base has not been the main target
of US air attacks.
The USSR has been the major contributor of economic aid to
the DRV and has channeled it primarily to the heavy industrial sector
,< The excess of imports over exports in 1965 compared with 1964 would
be even greater if the value of military assistance -- which is not in-
cluded in these trade figures -- were taken into account.
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of the economy, especially the mining, manufacturing, and power in-
dustries. The largest mining projects, contracted for prior to 1964,
are the Mong Duong Mine and the Vang Danh Coal Mine. Construction
on both projects got under way in early 1966. In February 1966 the
USSR was building a slurry reservoir, a lumber yard, and an adminis-
trative-domestic service combine and was planning a chemical laboratory
at the Vang Duon Coal Mine
Although to
USSR had several ongoing electric power projects in 1964, only two
are now of interest. The plant at Uong Bi, which was bombed in early
1966, is still receiving Soviet deliveries, probably to replace some
machinery destroyed b the bombin
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The costs to the Communist countries of supporting the DRV are
increasing because of greatly accelerated deliveries of both military
and economic aid. The bulk of the new assistance is being provided
by the USSR, however, which is the best prepared to bear the increased
burden. Moreover, the costs are still small in terms of Soviet and
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Chinese capabilities to extend military and economic aid. In 1965, for
example, the USSR supplied the less developed countries of the Free
World with more than twice as much military equipment (by value) as
it supplied to North Vietnam. Similarly, Soviet economic aid to the
less developed countries in 1965 was about twice the amount that the
USSR is believed to have extended to North Vietnam. There is no in-
dication that the burden of rising aid costs on the Soviet and Chinese
economies represents in any way a deterrent to continued Bloc support
of the DRV war effort.
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Soviet and. Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965
Value in Million US
Communist China
Quantity Quantity Quantity
Units Value (Units) Value Units Value
250.0 217.2
32.8
Surface-to-air missile
firing battalions 20 106.0 20 106.0 0 0
Aircraft 56 16.1 48 15.1 8 1.0
I1-28 light jet bomber 8 2.8 8 2.8 0 0
MIG-21 jet fighter 11 8.8 11 8.8 0 0
MIG-1517 jet fighter 33 4.2 25 3.2 8 1.0
Mi-l helicopter 4 0.3 4 0.3 0 0
Armor 20 0.5 20 0 0
PT-76 amphibious tank 5 0.3 5 0.3 0 0
BTR-40 armed personnel
carrier 10 0.1 10 0.1 0 0
SU-76 assault gun 5 0.1 5 0.1 0 0
Artillery 1,184 30.1 1,184 30.1 0 0
loo-pi AAA 64 3.2 64 3.2 0 0
85-mm AAA 250 1p.0 250 10.0 0 0
57-mm AAA 350 12.2 350 12.2 0 0
37-mm AAA 500 4.5 500 4.5 0 0
Other artillery 20 0.2 20 0.2 0 0
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Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965
(Continued)
Total USSR Communist China
Quantity
(Units)
Value
Quantity
Units
Value
Quantity
Units
Value
R
d
81
12.7
41
7.8
4o
La
ar
a
l
i
000
2
10.0
000
1
1,000
es
c
Trucks and veh
,
,
Small arms and infantry
0
13.2
0
6.6
0
6.6
weapons
0
61.1
0
46.1
0
15.3
Ammunition
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Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966
Value in Million US
Communist China
Quantity Quantity Quantity
(Units) Value (Units) Value (Units) Value
130.0 lol.4
Surface-to-air missile
battalions 4 21.2 4 21.2 0 0
Aircraft 4o 31.3 40 31.3 0 0
MIG-21 jet fighter 14 11.2 14 11.2 0 0
MIG-1517 jet fighter 10 1.3 10 1.3 0 0
Mi-6 helicopter 6 12.0 6 12.0 0 0
Other aircraft 10 6.8 10 6.8 0 0
Naval craft 4 3.6 0 0 4 3.6
Shanghai-class PTF 4 3.6 0 0 4 3.6
Armor 20 0.5 20 0_5 0 0
PT-76 amphibious tank 5 0.3 5 0.3 0 0
BTR-40 armed person-
nel carrier 10 0.1 10 0.1 0 0
SU-76 assault gun 5 0.1 5 0.1 0 0
Artillery 457 7.8 457 7.8 0 0
85-mm AAA
57-mm AAA
75 3.0 75 3.0 0 0
50 1.8 50 1.8 0 0
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Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966
(Continued)
Artillery
(Continued)
37-mm AAA
Other artillery
SI,P..71_ arms and infantry
weapons
Value in Million US $
Total USSR Communist China
Quantity Quantity Quantity
(Units) Value (Units) Value (Units) Value
300 2.7 300 2.7 0
32 0.3 32 0.3 0
1,000 5.0 500 2.5 500
2.5
0 29.6 0 14.8 0 14.8
0 31.0 0 23.3 0 7.7
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Table 4
Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam J
1955-64
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 196o 1961 1962 1963-64 1955-64 J
Communist China
200
J
cl
cJ
100
J
157
J
c
457
USSR
100
8
12
21
25
200
4
N.A.
J
369
Eastern Europe
50
8
7
J
2
Negl.
62
J
J
130
Total
350
16
19
21
128
200
223
N.A.
J
956
a. This is the minimum of economic aid extended by the USSR, Eastern Europe, and
Communist China. In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by
Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown,
b. Total of known amounts.
c. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.
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North Vietnam:
Direction of Trade
1964-65
Mill
ion US $
1964 19.6
5
Exports
Imports Exports
Imports
Total
107.8
10.7 103.8
19+.6
Communist countries
84.5
118.2 80.2
179.6
USSR
34.8
47.2 30.6
74.9
European Satellites
22.4
14.8 26.6
29.7
Communist China and
'
othbr: -Communist countries 27.3
.2 23.0
56
75.0 b
Free World 23.3
12.5 23.4
14,8
a. Because of-rounding, components may not add to the totals
shown.
b. Preliminary estimate.
ORR/CIA
18 November 1966
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 App
r
App
UNCLASSIFIED $Fh~-Mbfl?r( ftla-M&IM29po,
IDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
DD/I
2
7E 44 IIq.
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached is the memorandum which
you asked us to prepare for Walt Rostov
on the subject of Ctunist Aid to
North Vietnam.
DIRE
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
D/RR 4F 18 Hq.
I8 Nov
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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