PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF MOBILE SEA LAUNCH OF LARGE BOOSTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00584R000200260001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL %
PRELIMINARY REPORT
G
THE FEASIBILITY OF MOBILE SEA LAUNCH
OF LARGE BOOSTERS
OCTOBER 1962
J.S. NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL WEAPONS
Navy has no objection to declassification ASTRONAUTICS OFFICE
and: release.
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
NAVY review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Preliminary Report
The Feasibility of Mobile Sea Launch
of Large Boosters
October 1962
Department of the Navy
Bureau of Naval Weapons
Astronautics Office
Washington 25, D. C.
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTER-
VALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200. 10
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
SUMMARY
i
FIGURE INDEX
ii
SECTION I
Characteristics of Ship Launch Operations
I-1
SECTION II
Advantages of Mobile Launch
II-1
SECTION III
Launch Vehicles
III-1
SECTION IV
Orbit Accuracy Achievable with Ship Launch
IV-1
SECTION V
Ships as Mobile Launch Platforms
V-1
SECTION VI
Programming
VI-1
SECTION VII
Feasibility
VII-1
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SUMMARY
This report submits findings on the over-all feasibility of placing
military payloads into orbit from an Astronautics Launch Ship. Orbits
of 100 mile altitude are of particular concern. Fully developed boosters'
and upper stages are shown to be satisfactory both as to payload capa-
bility and compatibility with the over-all system. Naval operations at
sea are studied from the point-of-view of past and present success in
mating major military gear to ships. The advantages of mobile launch
are found to be numerous and include special orbits to overfly selected
geography from various directions in a single pass. Payload advantages
due to mobile launch are reported in numerical form. Guidance and con-
trol are studied- -these results show no degradation in the essential
accuracy that would make sea launch less feasible than land launch for
the types of missions considered. Representative ship conversions are
presented with their salient features and the major equipment and struc-
ture items to be included. Both stern mounted launchers for large
liquid fuel boosters and tubes for cold launching of solid fuel boosters are
included. Costs and time estimates are made for a number of conversions
having different degrees of refinement and capacity and including the con-
version of a large combatant hull. In assessing feasibility, all the
essential subtasks of mobile launch are found to have been demonstrated
and reliability and accuracy are estimated to stand at essentially current
levels for land-based systems so that a positive feasibility conclusion is
reached.
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FIGURE INDEX
Figure No.
Page No.
I-1
System Block Diagram
1-3
1-2
Ascent Sequence
1-5
1-3
Logistic Flow Diagram
1-7
II-1
Total Payload Penalties
11-3
11-2
Relative Payload Weight
11-6
III-1
Available Boosters
111-2
111-2
Existing Systems with Demonstrated Capability
111-3
111-3
Future Systems Requiring Further Development
111-5
IV-1
Guidance Accuracy
IV-7
V-1
Ship Summary
V-3
V-2
Typical Ship Conversion, "Liquid" Boosters
V-5
V-3
Typical Ship Conversion, "Solid" Boosters
V-6
V-4
High Speed Ships
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CONFIDENTIAL
Figure Index Continued
Figure No.
V-5 Ship Stabilization
VI-1 Program Phasing
VI-2 Summary Existing Vehicles
VI-3 Summary Future Vehicles
VII- 1 Operability
VII- 2 Reliability and Maintainability
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CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION I
GENERAL CHARACTER OF SHIP LAUNCH OPERATIONS
A. THE NATURE OF SHIP LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Through history sailors have managed, with considerable suc-
cess, to take many land based systems weapons and methods to sea.
While the sea environment imposed many problems such as confined
space salt water corrosion and often times undesirable motion, these
problems were generally solved to the point of creating useful opera-
tional systems. A few examples might be in order. Major calibre
guns, through sixteen inch, were installed and stabilized in large
ships with tactical capabilities which at times exceeded the capabil-
ities of their land based counterparts. A wide variety of rocket pro-
pelled missiles have been installed and fired. These range from
Tartar, Terrier, Talos, Regulus I and II and Polaris. On an ex-
perimental basis the V2, Argus and Viking were fired.
The problems addressed in this report involve adapting present-
ly available large boosters to existing ships for the purpose of in-
jecting useful military payloads into one hundred mile high single
orbits. The usual constraints of space, the problems of position and
motion and the over-all aspects of the sea environment must be over-
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In whole or in part all of the facets of launching large boosters
from ships have been experienced in the past years of naval technical
development. The major problems would seem to be associated with
accomplishing the necessary adaptations. These involve stabilized
platforms for determining the local vertical and in turn ensuring that
the resulting accuracy of orbit is within useful limits for the assigned
mission. Certain conversions in selected ships will have to be made
in order to accommodate the large boosters on the launch pad. The
solid fueled boosters adapt the Polaris "cold shot" concept of tube
launch. The liquid fueled boosters would be launched from pads on
outriggers over the fan tail so that the rocket blast mainly impinges on
the water. Limited stabilization will be required for the fan tail launch-
ing pad. Ships's stabilizers would also be used. Certain additional
conversions are necessary for safety and for fuel handling. These too
are mostly adaptations of well developed capabilities to new but re-
lated circumstances.
The existing technical competences coupled with the long es-
tablished arts of seamanship and navigation would appear to indicate
that all problems of adaptation and improvisation can be solved to the
point of demonstrating a useful single orbit 100 nautical mile altitude
military mission.
B. The Over-all Operation
All essential operations, and only those, for a mission which
includes recovery are shown in the block diagram (Fig. I-1). It is
noteworthy that the kinds of operations that show up in the diagram
are typical of all naval operations.
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 VEHICLE LOADING
SHIP
REPLENISHMENT
NAVIGATION TO
LAUNCH AREA
PREPARATION
OF VEHICLE
CNIDENTIAL FIG. I-1
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LAUNCH
INITIAL TRACK BY
LAUNCH SHIP
TRACKING BY RANGE
SHIPS AS REQUIRED
INJECTION
DECISION
MAKERS
FIRE
DATA 'S/s NOT
ACCEPTABLE
DELIVERY OF
DATA
RECOVERY BY
RECOVERY UNITS
RE-ENTRY
RE-ENTRY
COMMAND
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The command and control function is apparent in the "decision
block" particularly and prevails throughout the operation. As part of
a coordinated military operation, the launching would need to be timed
and located in conformance with the over-all plan. Efficient communi-
cations facilitates this. Depending.on the requirement of the mission,
the launch ship might participate in recovery operations > It could be
the means for commanding by radio the control events in the space-
craft which will initiate re-entry. It can be a unit of the recovery
force.
Preparations for launching are performed aboard ship but are
minimum as compared with the preparations which take place at a
land-based launching site. This is made possible by rigidly adhering
to acceptance procedures prior to loading launch vehicles and payloads
aboard ship. The flight vehicles will be in a T-2 day condition at load-
ing. Thus, the assembling of stages and meticulous checkout during
assembly will all have been performed. A transporter-erector is mat-
ed to the flight vehicle to act as a strongback during all handling and
loading operations. Environmental conditioning is provided for large
liquid fueled vehicles in a hangar and for solid fueled vehicles in a
launch tube, For the former the major items of checkout to be per-
formed abuardvship are done with the flight vehicle horizontal. After
mechanized transfer from the hangar to the stern launcher, final check-
out is performed including fueling; control, propulsion, and payload
systems final check; and separation of the strongback. For solid fuel
launch a port in the launch tube provides access for checkout operations.
The ascent sequence is show in greater detail in Fig, 1-2. For
purposes of example, an Atlas/Agena-B vehicle would, after launch,
go through the staging operations as shown. The booster section of
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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/ IA- P 05 4
LAUNCH SHIP
TRACKING LIMIT
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? It
DOWN RANGE
TRACKING LIMIT
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CONFIDENTIAL
the Atlas sustainer is jettisoned after it cuts off and then at burnout
there is a second separation leaving the final stage, Agena-B, to attain
orbital conditions. The latter, with its restart capability, permits
powered and coasting flight in accordance with the requirements of
optimizing payload-orbit relationships. Engine cutoff at orbital injec-
tion conditions is either on command from the ground or from on-board
intelligence generated from inertial sensings.
Tracking ships would be employed for particular missions as
necessary. They can play a role in guidance and control of the launch
vehicle where radio command systems are used, especially of the mul-
tiple antenna type. For any type of control it can be required that
tracking is an essential for immediate confirmation of the orbit. An-
other function for tracking ships may be in conjunction. with range
safety.
Referring back to the block diagram it may be seen that the
mission in question contains re-entry and recovery. This involves
attitude control and firing of retro rockets at a position to give impact
at a predetermined location. Recovery units include winged aircraft
for both search and mid-air recovery and helicopters for recovery
from the sea, all in conjunction with high speed naval units afloat.
C a LOGISTICS
The logistics of such an operation also involve adaptations and
improvisations based on extensive previous experience. Planning and
foresight loom importantly here. As shown in Fig. 1-3, the ships
would be loaded at one or more ports depending on the location of the
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 AIRLIFT
LAUNCH SHIP
arm
HELICOPTER
SHIP
FUEL AND
SUPPLIES
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r Lo `"4 IC I I Y" it',
a
FUELS
VEHICLE
COMPONENTS
R
SPARES
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PAYLOAD
HELICOPTER
EMERGENCY
REPAIRS AND
REPLACEMENTS
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CONFIDENTIAL
several major items such as boosters, satellites, booster fuel and
ship's fuel.
Because of the space limitations the boosters would be expected
to be in the T minus 2 day ..condition. Final assembly and adjust-
ments would be made enroute to the launch area. Minimum delays
would be expected upon arrival. It would appear that at least three
vehicles would be placed aboard. This will permit flexibility in
event of technical difficulty or it would furnish a quick back-up mission
if ordered.
Resupply and any necessary replenishment falls back on the
normal logistics procedures. There will be a main base of operations
in the Pacific, this might be a California port or Pearl Harbor. There
will be a nearest base depending on the launch area. This could be
one of a large number of island facilities such as Eniwetok, Kwajelein,
Canton, Guam, Midway, etc. Combinations of replenishment ships,
transport airplanes and helicopters will ensure a resupply service
.comparable to that achievable at a continental base.
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SECTION II
ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE LAUNCH
A. ORBITAL CAPABILITIES
Mobile sea launch provides the capability to select at will a
launching point from approximately 70% of the earth's surface.
This is of particular importance in missions where a single orbital
launch can be from the antipodal point with respect to an area being
observed. In fact, any location on the track of a selected orbit will
suffice.
On such missions there are two contributions to a covert
operation if mobile launch is used. By gaining complete freedom in
launch azimuth and by launching from the antipodal point of the tar-
get it is possible to select any great circle for the orbit so long as
it contains the launch site and the target. Hence, the orbiting pay-
load overflys the target from an unpredictable direction. This
--makes hostile detection much more difficult and reduces oppor-
tunities for hostile countermeasures. The other security aspect
is that observers can be barred from the launch area. It is fur-
thermore possible, when using a converted merchant ship, to em-
ploy camouflage measures to conceal the identity of a launching
ship. The tube launch system as employed with solid fuel boosters
is more conducive to this than is the stern launcher for large liquid
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fuel boosters. The conduct of covert operations! from fixed instal-
lations is deficient in all regards.
Other special orbits may also be obtained much more readily
by selecting optimum launch location:
1. Single orbit for recovery in selected area.
2. Polar orbit.
3. 'Trajectory to avoid overflight of populated areas.
4. Trajectory to overfly existing range instrument.
B. PAYLOAD CONSIDERATIONS
By selecting a launching site on the equator and launching in
an easterly direction, maximum advantage of earth's rotation is
taken in placing a payload in orbit. For a specified launch vehicle,
a fractional part of the payload capability is lost as the launch
azimuth departs from 900 (easterly) and as the launch site departs
from the equator. This penalty also varies with altitude of the
orbit, being less for higher orbits. Typical results are plotted
in Figure II- 1 for a 100 nautical mile altitude circular orbit and
values of final stage specific impulse of 265 and 425 to cover a
range from solid fuel to the hydrogen system of Centaur. It may
be seen that this penalty goes as high as 30%.. For AMR the pen-
alty for most of the launch azimuths would be between three and
eight percent. The values are all on the basis of total weight in
orbit. The percentage penalty in net payload will be higher; the
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 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. II-
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lww
FINAL STAGE SPECIrIC IMPULSE (TYPICAL)
FROM 265 TO 425
20`~ 307 4
90
LAUNCH
LATITUDE
(DEG)
57 3.37
0 o r- -,--K m e ? 0
0
!
270 300 330 ON 30, 60 90 v,~ v?.
W 270 240 210 !80(S)150 120 90 )
LAUNCH AZIMUTH (DEG
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actual value depends entirely on the structure factor or ratio of
net useful payload weight to total weight for the final stage; typi-
cal current developments attain a factor of approximately 0.5.
There is also a performance penalty for turning the plane
of an orbit either during boost or at injection in order to achieve
an equatorial orbit from a non-equatorial launch site. This is
the maneuver often referred to as the "dog-leg". The penalty is
usually stated in terms of the velocity increment required of the
propulsion system to perform the injection with a dog-leg as com-
pared to a purely planar boost and injection. As in the case of the
earth's rotation penalty, this one is also dependent on the altitude
of the orbit and the structural ratio, and in addition the sequence
of maneuvers influences the result. Typical results are tabulated
as follows :
Velocity Increment Comparison - Equatorial and AMR Launch
Orbital Altitude (N. Mi.) .
100
300
300
Reqd. Circular Orbit Velocity (fps)
25, 560
24, 800
10,
100
Velocity Increment (fps)
12,400
11,300
1,
170
Earth rotation effect (fps)
180
180
180
Total velocity penalty (fps)
12, 580
11,480
1,
350
Penalty as percent of regd. velocity
.49
.46
.13
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In the case of higr
to be of less sign
small penalties L.
of even the large:
The velocii
reckoned al-
for a large l
stage. For
ity of the Al
Considei
torial orbits ii
obtained.
On,
(1)
i
(2)
(3)
titude orbits, the percent penalty would seem
ance but this is a deceptive appearance since
have large consequences as the capabilities
.unch vehicles need to be utilized to the limit.
-:rement
)ad pe
boos:.
ni. circus
h is 20% of
Af the sec:
es the
ne proc-
.ial low alt
tined, plan:
)lanar trans
initial alti,
de.
)gee of the
vert to a
uatorial
"dog-leg" maneuver can be
Figure 11-2 there are results
ry high specific impulse upper
bit the useful payload capabil-
,quatorial launch.
)f events for obtaining equa-
)f simplification which may be
follows:
rcular orbit (100-200 n. mi.)
e launch point.
ipse is initiated with perigee
Ad apogee at the desired end
al orbit an impulse is applied
orbit, and for the case of the
m t to turn the plane of the
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 CONFIDENTIAL F]G, 11-2
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100,000
80,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,00
0
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-
VF
LAUNC
EQUATORIAL LAU
NC
NOTE: 1. Due-east launch
2. Rotating spherical earth.
3. Circular orbits obtained
with two Centaur restarts
4. First Centaur burnout
establi
h
s
es a 100-nautical
mile circular parking orbi
RELATIVE PAYLOAD WEIGHT
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It is obvious that the thrust vector of the last impulse, most of
which is expended in the direction changing (for low altitudes),
must be controlled accurately in direction and also in time dura-
tion. An attitude control system would need a range of nearly
800 and a longer period over which the control was maintained
as compared to the case where no turning was required.
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SECTION III
LAUNCH VEHICLES
AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
In order to provide a system with orbital capability quickly and
with minimum cost, the use of existing. equipments should be consid-
ered, wherever possible. Additional advantages accrue from this
choice, as a result of operational experience with each system, name-
ly developed payload compartments, established reliability, available
maintenance experience, developed maintenance and checkout equip-
ment, and satisfactory guidance, control and tracking-, equipment.
The vehicles considered in the study are primarily those cur-
rently in use to put payloads into orbit from PMR, AMR and Vanden-
berg AFB, In addition, those vehicles that are currently under active
development or that require only payload package development are
considered as potential launch vehicles for future ship launch systems.
The approximate gross weight that each of these launch vehicles
is capable of placing into 100 nautical mile orbit is shown on Figure
III-1, and those vehicles that have a .demonstrated orbital capability
are high lighted. The particular vehicles.that are recommended for
almost immediate use in this operation, are.the Thor-series, (includ-
ing Thor-Delta, Thor-Ablestar and Thor Agena B, ) and the Atlas
Agena B,. as shown in Figure 111-2. All of these vehicles have
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 Approved For Fuse 2002T1DT78:BFA-il TUB00584 200260001-4EIG. 111-1
r "4.9
Ls 7'p
DEMONSTRATED ORBITAL CAPABILITY
TITAN I[ 0TITAN II/CENT..
J 0 ? ATLAS CENT.
TITAN 1? ATLAS/AGENA B
THOR/DELTA 0 r, THOR /Ar,FNie B
MINUTEMAN
SEA- SCOUT
0 0 o. POLARIS A3
POLARIS A2
2 -j NASA SCOUT
104
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j I [iV R/ MULLV I .-%r%
102 2 3 5 7 103 2 3 5 7 104 2 3 5 7 105
TOTAL WEIGHT IN I00 N.M. ORBIT - LBS.
 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. 111-2
Approved F2 k$ T T7
~~ T~ L~ 7715
EDV~DR, 27 RATED CAPA Bc, IN
ATLAS AGENA B
HEIGHT FT.
79.3
DIAM. FT.
,..8.0
LAUNCH .
WT. LBS.
1191000
STAGES
1 2
98.8
10.0
290,000
2
 i
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demonstrated their capability to place appreciable payloads into orbit
with a high degree of reliability, all are well-established production
items, for which proper operating and maintenance procedures have
been established, and all are equipped to carry scientific payloads
rather than warheads, the gross payload range in 100 nautical mile
orbit covered by the group being from about 500 pounds to about 7000
pounds. In particular the Thor has been used many times with pre-
cision and with greater reliability than the other vehicles. Those
vehicles that are considered appropriate for future development are
shown in Figure 111-3, and are Polaris, Minuteman, Titanl, Titan II,
Atlas-Centaur and Titan II-Centaur. The first four are ballistic
missile vehicles, and for missions of interest will require develop-
ment of payload packages to replace warheads, while the remaining
.two are specifically under development for the national space pro-
gram, and will accommodate scientific payloads.
B. ADAPTABILITY TO SHIP ENVIRONMENT
Vehicles for Immediate Use. The Thor series.and the Atlas Agena
series are all liquid-fuelled vehicles, so the first consideration is one
of adequate and safe storage and handling of their fuels. The type of
launch that can be best utilized in the ship environment is. also fairly
well determined for these vehicles; since the only valid experience
that exists for Thor and Atlas series. rockets is launch from an above
ground pad, under rocket power all the way, such prospects as either
"cold" or "hot" launch from silos, or cold launch from a pad, cannot
readily be considered. The structural integrity of the vehicle must
also be examined to ensure that the ship's motion will not endanger
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 Approved For
Ril
QtOGOQv~ U icap E Lo P~~^`CjtU
MINUfEMA6V 1 AN I I TBTAM R
FIG.. 111- 3
HEIGHT FT. 53.7 98 T
103 108
DIAM
. FT. 6.2 10 10 10
LA
UNCH
WT. LBS. 658000 220,000 330,000
29,000
sTA~
ES %)
Y. 2 2
133
10
350,000 +
3
,
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i 979
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what is inherently a light-weight low-strength structure in bending when
erected, Investigations have shown that the Thor has a good reserve of
strength and can withstand ship's motion of + 200 without any stabilized
launch platform; the Atlas, on the other hand, has a thin-walled pres-
sure-stabilized structure with limited bending strength, and requires
the use of a launch platform stabilized to + 1/4 0 of the horizontal.
Launch vehicle maintenance and preparation is a complex procedure,
and very time-consuming even with automation processes in use, and
should be minimized. The concept of loading vehicles in the T-minus-2?
day condition is to be recommended as it reduces the number of person-
nel and the amount of equipment required on board ship, and hence
either reduces the required degree of ship modification or provides the
potential for carrying more vehicles. The salt water environment must
be borne in mind: easily removable plastic covers can protect the. vehicle
from any direct contact with spray. Great care must be taken to protect
the electrical equipment from the prolonged effects of a salt-laden atmos-
phere; much experience has been already gained in this connection with
the development of guided missile cruisers. The structure that will
be required on board ship, as on land, for supporting the missile hori-
zontally and vertically, must be stressed to account for ships motion
and high winds at sea. Some modifications to the vehicles may specifi-
cally be required by virtue of the specific electronic equipment necesr
sary for sea operations. For example,'the identical radio-guidance equip-
ment cannot be used at both PMR and AMR in land-based operations, and
quite probably further changes would be necessary for ship launch.
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CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION IV
ORBIT ACCURACY ACHIEVABLE WITH SHIP LAUNCH
A. CRITICAL PORTION OF SYSTEM
The most critical part of the system, with regard to final accur-
acy in orbit is "injection", the accuracy of orbit depending. entirely on
the vehicle velocity, magnitude and direction, and the vehicle altitude,
at the moment of injection or final thrust termination.. All of the ve-
hicle performance, from launch to final burnout, contributes to these
final conditions, and a complete comparison can be drawn between ac-
curacy on land and accuracy at sea by considering the lard-based per-
formance, and then by considering the perturbations introduced by the
ship-board environment.
B. ; GUIDANCE SYSTEMS REVIEW
Fundamental to the whole question of vehicle trajectory is the
question of vehicle guidance. The function of the vehicle guidance is
to ensure that the vehicle is commanded to follow a flight path from
the moment of launch that will bring it to the desired injection conditions
within acceptable limits. The flight path may or may not be an ideal
one--natural environments being what they are, it is extremely unlikely
that a theoretical flight path will.ever be completely followed so, that
guidance accuracy in part is determined by how well deviations from
CONFIDENTIAL IV- 1
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 Approved For Vase 2002/10/18: CIA7RDP70B0058410200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
the desired flight conditions can be detected, and corrected. The differ-
ent, guidance systems accomplish this in several distinctly different ways,
as follows:
Fully Programmed Autopilot. In this system a three-axis autopilot
is provided prior to launch with commands that are issued, as a function
of time, ,to change orientation of the vehicle, with respect to the vertical
reference to which the gyroscopes were set at the start of the flight. The
path of the vehicle is completely determined by the initial conditions, the
environment and the program, and once launched, no ground control is
possible, other than destruction.
Radio-Guidance. In this case, the vehicle attitude is sensed by
gyroscopes or horizon seekers but is controlled by ground commands.
The vehicle is tracked using a special antenna system, and range, range
rate and elevation information are used to compute present position and
track, and desired future heading and attitude for correct burnout con-
ditions. The vehicle path is therefore determined by reference to a
ground-borne datum, and accurate control is possible.
Inertial. This system, like the autopilot system, is completely
independent of ground commands. It measures instantaneous accelera-
tions and attitudes, computes velocities and distances travelled, and
then derives control commands for the desired future course. Its accur-
acy is dependent on the initial conditions set in, and the instrument ac-
curacy and drift rates.
Radio-Inertial., A combination of radio data input and inertial
data input provides, via smoothing technique, very accurate velocity
CONFIDENTIAL IV-2
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 Approved For (ease 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B00584W00200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
data for computation of the vehicle's flight path, with considerable
improvement in accuracy over the pure radio system.
These systems are all subject to instrument errors, gyro drift
and so-on, so that each one has an expected variation about the desired
flight path that is characteristic of the system.
C, ACCURACY OF SHIPBORNE OPERATIONS
The potential accuracy of shipborne operations can be demon-
strated by reference to actual operational equipment in use today, sup-
ported by a number of analytical studies.
Of great significance, because of the demonstrated capability that
is apparent, is a comparison between guidance systems of the same
type, on land and at sea, and the influence of their difference in accur-
acy on the injection parameters, and consequently on the orbital para-
meters.
Apart from the changes in the natural flight environment due to
operating over water rather than land, changes common to all of the
systems that are introduced by shipborne operations are those in the
datum conditions existing at the launch point. These datum conditions
are position, azimuth, velocity and vertical reference. The flight
path from launch is directly related to the accuracy with which they
are determined. Additional errors are introduced resulting from the
effect of ship's motion, for some systems such as radio-guidance.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Base 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B005844p0200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
By comparing current equipment, such as is available on
board the Polaris-firing submarines, with current land-based
inertial systems, the difference between land and sea datum ac-
curacies that is obtained is shown in Table IV- 1. In addition to
these degradations, the radio systems utilize an antenna which
is slaved to the local vertical, (as measured by a servo-operated
stable platform on board ship) which introduces some further
angular error. These are the only factors that introduce any sig-
nificant difference in the accuracy achievable from land and from
sea.
The implications of the datum accuracy changes are simply
expressed in terms of their effect on orbit injection parameters,
and in turn the changes in orbit injection parameters are reflect-
ed in changes in the orbital parameters. These are shown in
Tables IV-2 and IV-3 in which the difference due to initial errors
are illustrated.
TABLE IV-1
Initial Errors
Land
Sea
Positio i - Feet
0
600
Vertical - Arcsecs.
5-10
30
Azimuth - Arcsecs.
10-20
60
Velocity - Feet/sec.
0
.8-1.6
CONFIDENTIAL IV-4
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 Approved For lase 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B00584W0200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE IV-2
Difference Between Injection Errors, (Sea Minus Land)
For 100 Nautical Mile Circular Orbit
Altitude - Feet
60
to
120
Velocity - Feet/sec.
.,8
to
1.6
Flight Path Angle - Degrees
. 06
to
. 07
Inclination - Degrees
. 11
to
. 14
Position - Feet
660
to
670
TABLE IV-3
Differential Orbital Parameter Errors
Major Axis - Feet
160
to
320
Eccentricity
.00003
to
.00006
Inclination
Degrees
.11
to
.14
These figures indicate the comparative errors that would be in-
herent due to launching a payload from sea rather than land. Develop-
ments in equipment and new techniques in measurement will reduce
these appreciably; the expected sea and land errors by 1965 are shown
in. Table IV-4. It is clear that those systems that depend purely on
initial data for their basic input will suffer practically no degradation
in accuracy as a result of sea launch.
CONFIDENTIAL, IV-5
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 Approved For ase 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B0058400200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE IV-4
Initial Errors - 1965
Position - Feet
0
600
Vertical - Arcsecs
5-10
20
Azimuth - Arcsecs
10-20
15
Velocity - Arcsecs
0
. 35
The remaining systems, primarily those utilizing radio-guidance,
will suffer some loss in accuracy due to the need to transfer tracking
data through the medium of an antenna which has to be designed and
powered to overcome the effects of ships motion. An assessment of the
accuracy of several different systems, all applied to the Thor-Ablestar
vehicle, is shown in Figure IV-1, and indicates the small error intro-
duced by ship launch, even with current equipment and minimum stabili-
zation? The first two systems make use of a simple ship-borne stable
platform which is only accurate to + 1 1/4 0 in the vertical direction,
and yet 99% of the resulting orbits will have an increase in error of no
more than 1.67% over the land-launch case. The equipment most widely
used for this vehicle is the radio-guidance single antenna; this uses an
antenna which is stabilized to counteract ship's motion slaved to a highly
accurate, stable platform. This results in a lower degradation than for
the fully programmed autopilot case. Note that in this assessment the
assumed stabilization equipment is less accurate than might be expected
by at least a factor of 2. The inertial guidance cases also assume stable
platform accuracies that are conservatively rated, again showing that the
changes due to sea launch can be appreciably less than indicated.
CONFIDENTIAL IV-6
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 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. IV-1
Approved For ease 2002/10/1.8 : CIA-RDP70B00584p0200260001-4
SHoR-ABi.EsIAR
(WITH OPEN LOOP CONTROL AT INJECTION)
ACCURACY
3e (APOGEE - PERIGEE)
ERROR
SYSTEM
OF 'VERTICAL
VALUES FOR
900 NM ORBIT
DIFFERENCE
(%ORBIT,
ALTITUDE
?
IN SHLP
S EA '
LAND
,
FULLY
PROGRAMMED
.14 ?
300
270
30
? 1.67
AUTOPILOT
SAME, WITH
DELTA SYSTEM
? 14 ?
200
170
30
? 1.67
IN THOR
RADIO GUIDANCE
RADIO GUIDANCE
SINGLE-ANTENNA
? 1 ? (EST.)
190
166(EST)
.24 (EST.)
? 1.33
(STL)
INERTIAL
C ? T?
162
156
6
? .33
INERTIAL
THROUGH
C ? 4 ?
20
1.4.
6
? .33
INJECTION
i.!
CONFIDENTIAL
FOYRelbase 20021/0/18 CIA-RD157005841 00200260001-4
IV-?
 Approved For lease 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B00584W0200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION V
SHIPS AS MOBILE LAUNCHING PLATFORMS
A. SHIP CAPABILITIES PERTINENT TO MOBILE LAUNCH
All the favorable attributes of mobile launching system are re-
lated to the capabilities of ships of the Navy. On a global basis, ships
have superior mobility; 'they can traverse more than 70 percent of the
earth's surface. Ships can handle loads and employ support gear which
is greater in size, weight, and capacity than that available :to mobile
land operations. Ships are self-contained operational units which can
remain at sea for extended periods.
There are two approaches for developing an astronautics ship for
mobile launching: (a) design and build a ship from the keel up for this
specific function, and (b) convert an existing, hull to the degree required
for. the function. The spread of characteristics in existing-hulls is so
broad as to indicate that the desired qualities can be found. A repre-
sentative listing is contained in. Table V-1 below. Victory hulls (VC-2)
(approximately 6, 000 tons displacement) are considered to be inadequate
as to space. and are not included, Speed and displacement data are sum-
marized graphically,in Figure V-1. Pictorial representations
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 Approved For lase 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B005840200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Table V-1
Naval Hull Characteristics
(full load) Length Beam Power
Tons Feet Feet . H. P.
Speed
Knots
Comple-
ment (1)
Carrier (Midway Class)
62,
000
974.
113
212, 000 '
.33
2,604 +
Carrier (Essex Class)
38,
500
786
93
150, 000
33
1,300 +
Battleship (Iowa Class)
57,
950
888
108
212, 000
33
2, 000
Cruiser (Baltimore Class) 17, 200
673
71
120"000
34
1,400
Missile Ship (AVM1) .
15,
100
540
69
12, 000
19.2
555
Seaplane Tender (AV4)
13,
500
527
69
12, 000
19.7
550
Mariner - C4-S-1
18,
000
563
76
19, 250
20
400
Mariner - (EAG 153 ,Compass Island) -- has activated fins-rolls 1. 5o vs. 15? for
sisters.
Mariner - (EAG 154 Observation Is.) -- has two launch tubes, fired first Polaris
AKA - C3-S-A2 16; 000 492 69 9,500 18.5 250
Notes: (1) Complements indicated are peace time levels. + indicates that
air group personnel are not included, - indicates that the number
could be less for some functions.
CONFIDENTIAL V-2
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 SPEED vs SliZE.
cV BB ?0CVA
SUSTAINED SPEED FOR COMBATANT
HULL CONVERSIONS
DISPLACEMENT - TONS/1000
CONFIDENTIAL V-3
CONFIDENTIAL FIG. V-1
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SUSTAINED SPEED FOR
AUXILIARY HULL. CONVERSIONS
10 20 30 410 50 60 70
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 Approved For Fuse 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B005840200260001-4
CONFIDF,NTIAL
of a converted Mariner for launching large liquid fuel boosters, and a
converted C-3 for launching solid fuel are shown in Figs. V- 2 and V-3
respectively. Two of the more appropriate combatant hulls are shown in
Fig. V-4.
. HULL SELECTION
If a particular capability is hypothesized- -say three launch vehicles
in the Atlas/Agena B Class--and if,, furthermore, budgetary limitations are
overriding, then hull selection is straightforward and a Mariner as shown
in the illustration is selected. Space is adequate for a minimum hangar,
the overhung stern launcher can be accommodated, personnel safety is
provided in the forward block house, speed/endurance are in line with other
auxilliary units, and operating costs are minimum. For solid fuel launches
with a more compact vehicle--say Minuteman or Polaris A-3 and assuming
an appropriate final stage to be available--the boosters can be stowed
vertically and cold-launched. In this case a smaller hull will suffice, the
C-3-S-A2.
It is suggested in this report that.-full consideration be given to selec-
tion of a combatant hull. These qualities would be gained:
(1) High speed and greater endurance,
(2) Improved "sea kindliness" during launch operation,
(3) Greater deck and bulkhead strength for load carrying and safety,
(4) More space to receive succeeding generations of launch vehicles
and/or increase numbers carried,
(5) Availability for recommissioning- -particularly applicable to a
battleship of the Iowa Class.
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 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. V- 2
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U'rlUlD" BoOsTo4s
DISPLACEMENT
TONS
LENGTH
FT.
BEAM
FT.
POWER
H.f
SPEED
KTS.
18,000
563
76
19,250
20
ENDURANCE - 101000 MI. AT 12 KNOTS
MISSILE HANGAR
AND STORAGE LAUNCH
CONTROL
NAVIGATION CENTER
STRONGBACK
LHg
BLOCKHOUSE
IRFI LOX
~ I ~ - A1-1.
STABILIZED Het R06.1 'C SHIP STABILIZATION
LAUNCH PLATFORM N2 UDMH SYSTEM
MISSILES
MONTHS
3ATLAS
84 MILLION
48
D1-4
 CONFIDENTIAL- FIG. V-3.
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'S~LBD BOOSTERS
ENDURANCE -10,000 MI. AT 12 KNOTS
'D ,ISPLACEMENT
LENGTH
BEAM
POWER
SPEED
TONS
FT.
FT.
H.P.
KTS.
:Ib,000,
492-
69
8500
18.5
LAUNCH TUBES
j~ ENVIRONMENT
II CONTROL
,SHIP STABILIZATION LAUNCH CONTROL LAUNCH AIR
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
kiISSILES
MONTHS
12
50 MILLION
24,
MINUTEMEN
CONFIDENTIAL
App "oyecl..Fx ease, X002/10/18 : 'CIA-RDP70 00384ROOO
~'0"'
 ,
v
CONFIDENTIAL FIG. V,-4
a
se- 2002/ 0/1 -RDP70BOO58 10200260001-4
E fo P Pn
H- -tl
DISPLACEMENT
LENGTH
BEAM
POWER
SPEED
COMPLEMENT
INSTALLED
1300 (NO
38,500 TONS
786 FT.
93 FT.
I50,000HP.
33KTS.
AIR GROUP
ABOARD)
ENDURANCE-61000 MI. AT 25.2 KNOTS
? ~ T
DISPLACEMENT
57,950TONS
Approv
Ca. +r.. G v i~ y
LENGTH
888 FT.
1 0 z" I /-,, I Pr 9, 9
SPEED
COMPLEMENT
33 STS.
2000
BEAM
108 FT.
POWER
INSTALLED
212000 HR.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved.;For Release, 2002/10/18 :.CIA-RDP70B00584R00020n2 0001-4
.V-7
 Approved Forelease 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B0058Mwb00200260001-4
CONFIDPNTIAL
In the summary data on costs versus capabilities (Section VI) a
wide spectrum is presented. It starts with a minimum conversion capable
of launching a Thor vehicle and employing much of the ' existing mobile
support gear. At the other extreme is the high speed, high capacity com-
batant hull with a complement of the most potent launch vehicles. A hull
selection must be viewed in the context of the capability to be purchased with
the available funds.
C. SHIP CONVERSIONS AND FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED
The AGSL based on the conversion of a Mariner hull (refer to Fig. V-2)
and equipped for the launching of large liquid fuel boosters will be considered
here in more detail. Other conversions for liquid fuel vehicles would have
most of the features in common with this conversion.
A stabilized launch platform is mounted on heavy structure over-
hanging the stern. This location is selected so that flame is dispersed over
the surface of the sea and no blast deflector is required. In case of a
malfunctioning booster, jettison into the sea is possible. The inability of
Atlas to resist ship motions once its strongback is removed necessitates,
the stabilization mechanism (to + 1/40).
Handling and erection space is provided on the deck. just forward of
the launcher. Movement between the hangar and launcher is on rails. An
erector mechanism is hydraulically actuated. An umbilical tower handles
fueling and final checkout connections to the launch vehicle. Provisions for
rapid washoff of fuel spillage include high camber on the deck and high
water flow rates. The deck in this area is strengthened to take the con-
centrated loads of all handling operations.
~N ~pE TI V-8
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 Approved For 0164ease 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B00584Wb0200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
A hanger is large enough to stow, checkout, and service the three
boosters of the Atlas class with their upper stage and payload. The
maintenance concept does not provide for servicing comparable to that
at land bases but major components and stages can be changed with the
handling equipment provided. The hangar structure is designed with
adequate strength to protect the launch vehicles from catastrophic explosions,
even though it becomes deformed. Environmental control is maintained in
the hanger, humidity, free from contamination, and vibration isolation as
required.
Stowage tanks have adequate fuel capacity for all three launch vehicles.
The illustration shows locations for all tankage required by boosters and
upper stages. Liquid helium, as would be needed if Centaur were included,
is in tanks on the upper deck. Boiloff from cryogenic fuels is captured,
reliquified, and returned to the tanks but there are no facilities on board
for bulk production of propellants.
Launch control, tracking, and ship's navigation take place in a
forward superstructure which is highly blast resistant. Noise is attenuated
within this area to acceptable levels (110 db. ). Since all personnel will be
in the forward part of the ship, facilities are included in the protected
superstructure for remote engine operation. Closed circuit television
gives observation of launch operations.
Instrumentation is provided to include these principal items:
tracking radar, telemetry, command and control with a minimum function
of self-destruct, navigation and timing system, communications, meterology,
search radar, data display and other equipment which is normally located
on naval ships.
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 Approved For j1ease 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B0058 00200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
A stabilizing system would consist of passive means for simplicity.
4600 tons of high density ballast in the lower levels will produce satisfactory
draft and roll stability.
The salient feature of the conversion of a ship (Fig. V-3) for launching
of Minuteman powered vehicles is the disposition of the launch tubes. In
the illustrated design 12 launch tubes are installed in holds Nos. 3 and 4
of a converted Maritime Administration C-3 hull, just ahead of the deck
house. Space in the after holds'provides accommodations for the additional
crew. The equipment for powering the ejection from the tubes and for
conditioning the environment within the tubes is nearby the missile
installation. Polaris techniques are completely applicable. Launch tubes
are hinged and positioned at 7? off the vertical at launch to improve safety
in the event of a failure to ignite--this is a very remote reliability hazard.
The positioning of the tubes near the center of pitch and roll minimizes
the effect of ship's motion. A passive tank device is included to further
improve the roll characteristics. The active system employing control-
lable fins (demonstrated so , strikingly on U. S. S. Compass Island) is not
necessary.
Use of the ship system for Polaris is even more straightforward.
The missile was designed from its inception for this kind of launch and few
guidance changes are involved.
D. SHIP STABILIZATION AND NAVIGATION
If the ship launch operations are to be effective from a military
viewpoint then adverse weather conditions must be included as a design
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 Approved Fc elease 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70BO058wiR000200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
criterion, Estimates coming out of all the feasibility studies indicate
that Sea State 3 can be coped with. This is a generally moderate sea but
with some waves as high as 12 feet, Sea State 4 operations are rated as
feasible for only part of the time for open deck operations since wave
heights can be much higher and considerable wind driven spray would be
encountered.
Ship motions can be reduced by application of proven methods
(Fig. V-5). To reduce roll excursions either fin stabilizers or passive
tanks can be used. The fins are effective in proportion to the ships speed
reaching about 80 per cent stabilization at 18 knots; at 15 knots there is
50 per cent stabilization. The tank method gives about 50 per cent
stabilization regardless of ship speed. Therefore at all launchings from
ships at speeds under 15 knots the tank system is more effective. Since
wind loads must be kept low in the period when the strongback is off the
booster, and there may be a heading into the wind, it is apparent that
speeds lower than 15 knots may be used. The passive system is selected
on-this basis.
To show how a set of launching conditions effects the Atlas booster
the following typical figures are supplied:
Sea State
Wind
Waves
Wave encounter period
Base moment (pitch)
Base movement (wind)
Total base moment
Allowed base moment
3
15 Knots
10 ft (peak to trough)
4. 5 sec (at 6 knot ship speed)
940, 000 in lbs.
260, 000 in lbs.
1, 117, 000 in lbs.
4, 000, 000 in lbs.
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 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. V-5
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Approved 'F,Qr'Release'200PV/'18DEfi4 RDFs70B00584R000200260001-4
V-12
 Approved For Rase 2002/10/18,: CIA-RDP70B00584RR0000200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
The safety margin is ample. Careful ship navigation can further
reduce wind velocity over the missile and pitching motions of the hull
so that a selection of numbers from statistical sea descriptions is not
conclusive. The indications are that, with discretion, launching oper-
ations could take place under many of the conditions prevailing during
Sea State 4.
In the study of guidance and control accuracy (Sd-ction IV) it was
apparent that ship navigation played a part. For the utmost precision
within the state-of-the-art a multiple capability is to be provided con-
sisting of:
Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS)
Star tracker - N7D
Loran A and Loran C navigation receivers
Transit satellite navigation equipment
Omega VLF navigation equipment
E. SAFETY
The system design includes many measures to make the safety of
personnel and material the highest order. No conflicts between safety
and operating characteristics have been disclosed. The following are
the specific measures:
(1) Capability to jettison the launch vehicle into the sea if mal-
functioning indicates potential explosion,
(2) Dispersal of fuel tanks,
(3) Blast resistant bulkhead to confine major damage to stern
area in case of catastrophe,
CONFIDENTIAL V-13
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 i
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CONFIDENTIAL
(4) Blast resistant hangar,
(5) Protected personnel areas,
(6) Three deluge systems and numerous sprinklers,
(7) Gas detector systems and temperature alarms,
In the case of a solid fuel launch, safety is inherently superior.
Handling is similar to that customarily employed with ammunition.
Ignition of rocket motors takes place off the ship and the tubes are
tilted to prevent a dud from falling back.
The measures to enhance safety are taken as a normal matter
of prudence. There is no reason to expect that the probability of an
explosion on a ship is greater than it would be at a land launching site.
In a catastrophic explosion of Cape Canaveral damage is on the order
of 2. 5 millions of dollars and there is no loss of life. The figures are
believed to apply to the ship launch case with at least order of magni-
tude accuracy.
CONFIDENTIAL V-14
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 Approved For lease 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B00584iI 00200260001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION VI
PROGRAMMING
A. TASK,BREAKDOWNS
A major task arises early in the program of matching the hardware
and timing against the budget and operational requirements. In Figure
VI- 1 on the subject of Program Phasing this is listed as preliminary
engineering and preliminary PERT. There are a number of essential
technical studies which must be carried beyond the level of effort and
thoroughness that is found in the feasibility investigations, e. g. , the pre-
ferred guidance and control subsystems and adaptations as required to
match the ship mounted items of support equipment, also the range of
motions and weight capacity to go into a stabilized platform as part of
a.launcher for liquid fuel boosters. As a part of this phase contract
plans are marked up for the ship conversions. Maximum use must be
ntiade of PERT techniques to predict the time scale for the various options
and also the critical paths.
Contractor selection involves evaluation of the technical merit in
their response to the invitation. Also there will be evaluation of general
competence in past contracts as to technical proficiency and ability to
complete work at this magnitude on time.
Referring again to the figure, the major laboratory and contractor
tasks are itemized. Concurrently with ship conversion there will be
a test program to uncover operational problems with the selected
Approved For Release 2002/10/199 - 0~$4R000200260001-4 VI-1
 CONFIDENTIAL FIG. VI-1
Approved For'#ease 2002/10/18: CIA-RDP70B00584W00200260001-4
P ji-)
UROGU'121~' J k2' 112 P'~"~]a2s ~ N"07
'.CONTRACTOR SELECTION
PRELIMINARY ENGiNEERING
AND PRELIMINARY PART
1;
INITIATION OF PERT AND MAJOR.
TASKS SUCH AS:
A. SHIP CONVERSIONS
~. SHIP LAUNCH TESTS
C. MANUFACTURE AND TEST
INSTRUMENT ,TION
D..ORDER BOOSTER COMPONENTS
AND ADAPTERS
INSTALL AND TEST EACH
SUB-SYSTK
-. TEST OF SYSTEMA
G. FIRE LIVE SHOTS
VI- 2
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 i
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CONFIDENTIAL
..launcher. Subsystem tests and mechanical compatability checks are
included to provide maximum assurance of system operability at the
time of integrating them with the ship.
B. TIME SCALES AND COSTS
In the summary chart (Figure VI-2 and VI-3) there are estimates of
ship conversion costs and time for completion. For the existing and fully
developed launch vehicles, the ship conversion time governs the availa-
bility of the system. The range is one to one and one-half years for a
minimum conversion and three to four years for the completely equipped
and hardened hulls. The spread in both those estimates shows the gain
that could be made by assigning high priority to the job ("crash program"
status) and also effective management.
The spectrum of costs is shown for the degree of conversion. Five
categories range from approximately 20 millions to 100 millions. The
least expensive conversion would use a C-3 hull with the fewest structural
modifications to install a launcher for Thor. Maximum use would be made
of existing ground support equipment which alread has a high degree of
mobility. The capacity for launch vehicles is minimum; two Thor with
Agena-B upper stage would be the limit. At about the same time and cost
levels, a conversion for cold launch of solid fuel vehicles would increase
the capacity to four.
At the high end of the cost-time scale are the hardened Mariner
AGSL and the combatant hull. Support electronics would be most appro-
priate to the ship environment, maintenance provisions would be best,
handling and checkout facilities would result in the shortest "reaction
time" to a .launch order, and safety provisions are most elaborate. In
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 a.v~vrA JJ4J.' A11E X llx. Vi-G
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S
A
Rift, a4z
V C417--i-A m.
MAXIMUM GROSS PAYLOAD LBS.
1000 -1500 ?
2000 - 2500
7000 - 8000
THOR-
THOR-
ATLAS
VEHICLES
ABLESTAR
AGENA B
AGENA B
GUIDANCE
CHANGE IN ORBIT ERROR
LEAD TIME
CONVERSION TYPE
CONVERSION
MIL ` RS
C3 H~1L1 MINIMUM CONVERSION
THOR
-
ABLESTAR
2 OR
70-30
I-IZ
ATLAS
-AGENA
BOR
POLARIS
C3 HULL SEMI-HARDENED
3 OR 4 THOR-ABLESTAR OR
30-40
L2-2
2 OR 3 ATLAS-AGENA B
.
C3 HULL SEMI-HARDENED
10-12 MINUTEMEN OR
40-60
2-3
10-16 POLAk'C
MARINER HULL
FULLY HARDENED
COMPLETELY EQUIPPED
60-85
3-4
3 ATLAS-CENTAUR OR
4 ATLAS-AGENA B OR
20 SOLID-TYPE
COMBATANT HULL
FULLY HARDENED
85
-
COMPLETELY EQUIPPED
MIN
4
$
6-8 ATLAS-AGENA B
.
PLUS A FEW SOLID-TYPE
CONFIDENTIAL VI-4
....__.-.__.~?~..,. ~ .. v7n~h.? ~ 5;,~~,. ;:tR..lw+~"r...~....-~+..ss..e ,; Ftfa~. ,-?-.-w+.... .r.w....
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 CONFIDENTIAL'
d-.For.Rotcase 2002/1.8/-14--el* RE}P7OB9
D
MAXIMUM GROSS PAYLOAD LBS.
500-1000 1
000-2000 2
000-4000 4
000-800018
000 F. OVE!
VEHICLES
POLARIS M
1~~UTEMAN
ATLAS
TITAN I
A
TITAN II
TLAS?CEITAt
ITAN II CEN'
GUIDANCE
CHANGE IN ORBIT ERROR
LEAD TIME
CONVERSION TYPE
CONVERSION
COST
MIL $ YEARS
C3 HULL MINIMUM CONVERSION
2 THOR?ABLESTAR OR
20-30
1-12
1 ATLAS-AGENA B OR
4 POLARIS
C3 HULL SEMI-HARDENED
1
30k 4 THOR-ABLESTAR OR
30-40
-2
I
2 OR 3 ATLAS-AGENA B
C3 HULL SEMI-HARDENED
10-12 MINUTEMEN OR
40-60
2-3
10-16 POLARIS
MARINER HULL
FULLY HARDENED
COMPLETELY EQUIPPED
60-85
3-4
3 ATLAS-CENTAUR'OR
4 ATLAS-AGENA B OR
20 SOLID-TYPE
COMBATANT HULL
FULLY HARDENED
85
COMPLETELY EQUIPPED
MIN
'
3-4
.
6-8 ATLAS-AGENA B
.
PLUS A FEW SOLID-TYPE
CONFIDENTIAL FIG. VI-?3
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short, this kind of conversion gives maximum assurance of a suc-
cessful accomplishment of the mission.
In using Figures VI-2 and VI-3, for both present and future
launch vehicles, it will be apparent that the row-column intersections
of the upper right and lower left regions are the most appropriate ones.
The larger sized launch vehicles would not find adequate space on the
C-3 conversion for expeditions handling, checkout, and erection. Con-
versely, for the solid fuel vehicles and for Thor, the greater space
of the Mariner or a combatant hull is not essential.
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SECTION VII
FEASIBILITY
A. REVIEW OF OPERATIONS PERFORMED AT SEA
In Figure VII-1 there appears an abbreviated indication showing
that all the subtasks of sea launch operations are within the state-of-
the-art. Taken all together these produce the capability to perform the
.mission. Consider them in more detail. (numbers match those of the
figure):
(1) Ships operate at will in all seas and under adverse weather
conditions. Naval ships are high speed units. Hulls are
available for conversion. All support facilities, both base
and mobile, exist and are available, including shipyards,
supply and ammunition depots, depot and repair ships, and
command ships.
(2) Resupply and replenishment at sea is a well-practiced art
vastly multiplying the endurance of naval unit. Fuel and all
types of small stores are transferred. High line operations
have been applied to 6, 000 lb. articles.
(3) Instrumentation of ships is advanced to a degree comparable
to land installations. Range ships at both AMR and PMR and
the Advent/Syncom ship are capable of all, functions including
command and control. Naval communications are world-wide
in scope.
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 FIG. VII-1
Approved For,
CONFIDENTIA
OPERATION
DEMONSTRATED
YES
YES
SHIPS AND SUPPORTING
EQUIPMENT
RESUPPLY AND REPLENISHMENT.
AT SEA
INSTRUMENTATION, TELEMETRY
COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS
PRECISE NAVIGATION AND STABLE
PLATFORMS- SINS
FUEL HANDLING AT SEA-
HYDROCARBON AND CRYOGENIC
BOOSTER CHECKOUT AT SEA
BOOSTER RELIABILITY
(OFF-THE-SHELF)
TUBE FIRING AT SEA (SOLIDS)
ERECTION AND FIRING AT SEA
(LIQUID)
SHIP CONTROL AND INJECTION
. OF ORBITING PAYLOADS
ERECTION AND FIRING AT SEA
OF VERY LARGE VEHICLES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
CONFIDENTIAL VII-2
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?a~p1~
 i
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(4) The most advanced components available from the inertial
instrumentation art are employed in SINS. This type of
system has been employed to navigate submarines under
the polar ice cap. Multiple systems are employed in ;ships
each having different error characteristics yielding the
minimum possible net error. Transit equipment is progress-
ing to operational status and will be available for sea launches.
(5) Fuel handling at sea is a routine practice since aircraft
carriers have been using immeasurably large quantities of
high octane gasoline. Various other liquids, inflammable and
toxic, have been handled including cryogenic propellants.
(6) Numerous missiles and rockets have been taken to sea,
handled with mechanized equipment in various degrees of
development and checked out for operability prior to launch:
V-2, Aerobee, Viking, Regulus, Terrier, Talos, Tartar, and
Polaris.
(7) The launch vehicles to be employed in this mission are fully
developed both as to reliability, compatibility with orbiting pay-
loads, and compatible with the launch environment. For
example, the Thor system; highly mobile, has been air trans-
ported and emplaced at overseas bases.
(8) Tube firing at sea was first performed from a surface ship;
U. S. S. Observation Island. The Polaris system is operational.
(9) Missiles and rockets have required erection and launching on
the deck of a ship. These have included Aerobee, Argus, 'V-2,
C N DENTIAL
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and Viking. The latter two employed liquid fuel and at the
time of their launch were regarded as large vehicles.
(10) In connection with range operations, instrumented ships have
tracked and commanded flight vehicles as part of the sequence
into orbit. The critical signal for orbital injection are trans-
mitted from ships as part of routine launching operations at
PMR.
(11) At the present time the category of very large flight vehicles
consists, mainly of Atlas with an Agena-B upper stage. This
booster has not been fired at sea at the time of this writing.
B. RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
Reliability estimates in simplified form are shown in the table
(Figure VII-2) for both a land based system and ship based system. The
ranking for the various subsystems are in.line with those coming,out of
detailed analyses for satellite programs which emphasize reliability.
The distinction between a land based system and a sea launch using
the same launch vehicle is seen to be slight. The basis on which similar
figures are estimated for the two cases is that the checkout equipment for
the ship system is equally capable of detecting a defective or marginal
subsystem as is the land checkout. Less information would be available
to track down the defect. A simple "go" indication is preferred. The
checkout equipment and other essential ground support items would have
most effect on over-all system reliability due to the sheer quantity of
components involved and a small advantage is given to the land system.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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mcn?
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
PROPULSION LIQUID-
SOLID -
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL. ETC -7
PAYLOAD ------------
GROUND ELECTRONICS -----
OTHER GROUND SUPPORT, FUELING
FIG. VII-2'
~7,ZVUTV
MAINTENANCE COMPARISON
PRELAUNCH ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING
REPAIR BY MODULE REPLACEMENT
SUBSTITUTE PROPULSION STAGES, PAYLOAD
EMPHASIS ON 'PREDELIVERY SERVICE
FINAL CHECKOUT DETECTS DEFECTS
FREQUENT MAINTENANCE OF CHECKOUT
EQUIPMENT
LAND
BASED
LAND
BASED
YES
YES
YES
SOME
YES
YES
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SEA
LAUNCH
SEA
LAUNCH
YES
SOME
YES
YES
-YES
YES
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CONFIDENTIAL
The ship system would ride for long periods in a motion environment and
require more frequent maintenance which is not conducive to highest
reliability.
With.regard to the launch vehicle and payload the maintenance con-
cept contains two obvious differences. Flight articles are given intensive
checkouts prior to acceptance for delivery to the ship and the burden on
the contractor to produce a reliable product is maximum.: Following
acceptance and delivery to the ship there is less maintenance and only
a designated group of packages and modules may be replaced where
accessability is present and where the replacement does not require
intricate adjustments. Actually this is only a full exploitation of an
already established trend where weapons and other equipment proceed
from a developmental to an operational status.. Substitution at complete
propulsion stages and payloads is also possible. Environmental- con-
ditioning is part of the maintenance concept and the flight vehicles get
a conditioned atmosphere and anti-vibration mounting.
C. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
To reach a final feasibility assessment of sea launch these questions
will be considered:
(1) Are all the subtasks associated with ship launch contained in
the demonstrated operations both as to kind and degree of
difficulty?
(2) Are reliability and maintainability of at least the order of
magnitude level as land-based launch operations?
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CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Are guidance and control capable of producing satisfactory
orbits?
The answers are all affirmative. In assessing the feasibility it is rather
pointless to attempt a numerical percentile rating. No subtasks have
been uncovered which qualify the affirmative answers. The fuels which
have been handled are as difficult as those which must be handled. Many
of the components being used in land based systems would be employed
without change. The differences in reliability at sea are not appreciably
different from those on land- -probably the difference one way or the other
cannnot. even be predicted to closer accuracy than the difference itself.
In guidance and control the situation is the same-possible errors in
estimating the errors are as large as the degradation in taking a control
system to. sea. The conclusion is: Positive feasibility..
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 `/
Y Irv t--e6
rv Jo " Lt '7 K 1 t,
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CONFIDENTIAL
A STUDY OF THE MOTIONS OF THE MARINER HULL AT
CERTAIN SEA STATES APPLIED TO THE ATLAS CENTAUR
AND ATLAS AGENA VEHICLES
Approval
N. J._ Ne' i, Group Supervisor, Analytical Mechanics
R. B. Palmer, Program Manager
H. F. Mc Kenney, -Dior of Research and Advanced Development
Approval -V
Prepared By
Advanced Development Branch
CHRYSLER CORPORATION MISSILE DIVISION
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espio-
nage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C. Sections 793 and 794, as
amended. The transmission or the revelation of its con-
tents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
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 Approved For Release 4N)MAb00584R000200260001-4
Now
The motions of the Mariner hull as a launching platform are applied
to the Atlas/Centaur flight configuration to define the highest sea state
at which the combination would be operationally feasible. By comparing
the maximum design upset moment of the Atlas/Centaur vehicle with the
moments induced upon it by the motion of the ship (including random
waves and gusts), it is concluded that operations up to and including sea
state 3 are structurally acceptable to the vehicle.
Some of the launching, handling, stowage, and blast damage caused
by catastrophic failure at the pad or soon after lift-off are touched upon,
indicating catastrophic failure of the vehicle as a major design problem.
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 Approved ForRafeaseQ 4)9 ,44400584QR00200260001-4
Frontispiece
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 Approved For ase 2002/10/18 : CIA-RDP70B00584W0200260001-4
Table of Contents
Part I
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Part II
Introduction and Description of Proposed Shins Launchin
Facilities and Flight Configuration Criteria g
Philosophy of Ships Modification
Description of Hangar
Flight Configuration Criteria
Launching, Stowage and Handling Criteria
Mobile Strongback Description
Erection Equipment Description
Hydraulic System Description
Retraction and Launch Sequence
Motion Studies of the Mariner Hull as Applied to the Atlas
Centaur Vehicle During Certain Sea St 4-
a es
Page
10
A.
Derivation of Force and Moment Equations
11
B.
Determination of Missile Base Moments and Deck Acceleration
15
C.
Roll Motion of Ship in Waves - Cross-Seas Motion of Ship
16
D.
Pitch and Heave Motion of Ship in Meeting Seas
20
E.
Moments Due to Wind
25
Part III Conclusions and Recommendations
27
Nomenclature
31
Numerical Data
33
References
34
Distribution List
35
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iv.
 Approved For Fase 2t11FI DE&RJA00584?0200260001-4
INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SHIPS
LAUNCHING FACILITIES AND FLIGHT CONFIGURATION CRITERIA
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1
 Approved F eleasb. 1E~ll: -RD IHB005MR000200260001-4
This report is written under contract (Nobs 84751) to the Navy Department,
Bureau of Ships as a part of their contribution to the joint Army, Navy, and Air
Force Mobile Sea Launch Operations Studies. It is intended to cover the following
specific assignment from the Bureau of Ships:
*1. At what sea state do structural considerations become critical for Atlas/
Agena and Atlas/Centaur?
Consider: Transportation
Erection
Handling
Launching
*2. Define the total launching weight ratio (F/wl) required by. Atlas/Agena and
Atlas/Centaur for launching during the various allowable sea states.
*For both assignments:
(a) Consider Mariner class ships only.
(b) Consider launching over the stern.
(c) Consider stabilized platform, passive hydrodynamic ships stabilization
system.
A. Philosophy of Ships Modification
Bureau of Ships has elected to raze all superstructure of the Mariner class vessel
above the main deck and rearrange the main deck to include:
1. A hangar to provide horizontal housing of three Atlas/Centaur and/or Atlas/
Agena flight configurations (not to extend forward beyond the after boiler room bulk-
head).
2. A stabilized launching pad to be installed aft of the fantail in such manner that
the vehicle blast is dispersed over the stern of the vessel.
3. A system of tracks and conveyors to ensure positive control of the flight as-
semblies while moving them on board and, to effect selection of any one of these
vehicles for firing.
4. An erector mechanism to install the selected vehicle in the vertical position
, b 60bb4-ring.
on the kppiuiv@d(Fg..' orzo02/ iS1gC14qqbp#9 Ajtp
 Approved Forleaseg0'02/7VP~fA=RAAOB005800200260001-4
5. Provision for stowage of small boats and cryogenic propellants on topside,
forward of the hangar.
6. Provision for all facilities necessary to handling functions of the ship such
as anchoring facilities, dock lines, etc. on topside.
7. Rearranging the boiler uptake to exhaust at the sides of the ship.
8. A blockhouse and bridge containing adequate space for launch control and
tracking functions conceived in such a manner ae to resist blast in the event of an
explosion of the flight configuration at the launching pad or very soon after lift-off.
This general arrangement is shown in Figure 1.
B. Description of Hangar
Three Atlas/Centaur and/or Atlas/Agena flight configurations would normally
be stowed abreast, (i. e., center, port, and starboard) on a track system which pro-
vides positively controlled movement by flush type conveyors fore and aft or athwart-
ship. Investigation of available space shows that clearances would be adequate to
arrange all three vehicles on the transverse tracks in such manner that selection of
any of the three for firing would be assured without the inconvenience and hazard of
hoisting a unit off the restraining tracks (Figure 1).
The housing or hangar which contained these facilities would be so positioned as
to permit adequate provision for the erecting function described later in this report.
While the hangar (See Frontispiece) would be so shaped as to efficiently resist blast
and heat resulting from malfunction explosion of the vehicle on the pad, it must be
emphasized that positive survival of the structure 'in the event of the catastrophic
explosion of the Atlas LOX/fuel complement at the pad or very soon after lift-off ap-
pears extremely doubtful.
Aerospace Corporation has instrumented a series of actual catastrophic explo-
sions of Atlas. They are now in the process of deriving empirical equations by which
over pressure intensities vs. distance from the explosion center may be calculated
for any propellant combination involved. Since gage calibration is still a problem,
however, certain uncertainties remain concerning the proven formula.
By the shock tube method of gage calibration, for over pressures greater than
one (1) psi, the basic equation is as follows:
3758 256 41
=- + --+-~ =P
where Z = R
W:a7s
A distance in feet
W = total propellant weight in lbs.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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A later gage calibration, however, has modified the equation to:
336+2~2 +321 =P
Both curves have been plotted (Figure 2) and, it is assumed that over pressures
vs. distance would be somewhere in the corridor described.
In order to resist overpressures of 96 psi (Figure 2), the structure appears to
require a skin of 1.75 -inches supported by I-beam arches on 30 inch centers, each of.
which would weigh some 8500 lbs. Total weight of the blast-proof hangar (allowing
for diminishing skin gages toward the forward region of the structure) then, is esti-
mated at 325 tons, approximately. Since the center of gravity is approximately 30
feet above the center of gravity of the ship, an overturning moment of about 9,750
ton-feet could be anticipated. Time does not permit investigation of the effect of this
mass on the characteristics of C-4, however, the structure appears to be so massive
as to appear economically infeasible.
Accordingly, the skin is tentatively specified as 0.25 inch plate with a suitable
refractory coating and, total weight of the correspondingly reduced support structure
is estimated at about 160 tons, resulting in a moment of 4,800 ton-feet. Blast over-
pressures of about 15 psi appear acceptable with this structure. The weight distribu-
tion of the hangar will be ignored in the following ships motion studies, the assump-
tion being made that the new superstructure would yield about the same moment as
that removed from the original ships configuration.
C. Flight Configuration Criteria
Since Atlas/Centaur configuration is longer and heavier than Atlas/Agena, it is
assumed critical and the following studies are based upon the use of this vehicle.
Pertinent criteria of Atlas/Centaur are shown below from the sources described
(Ref: (2) TWX 7 July 1961):
(1) Bureau of Ships (2) General Dynamics Astronautics
(1) Length 105 ft.
(1) Diameter 10 ft.
(2) Mass of vehicle on launcher 9212 slugs
(2) Mass of vehicle at lift-off 9112 slugs
(2) Total thrust at lift-off 360,000 lbs.
(2) Allowable axial load at lift-off 1.5g
(2) Maximum design moment about ~h/
Approve Fgr KWLi4~ ~'ItO nt6lA-RDP76 >~RROU0100260001-4
5
 Approved Fo eleaseG tiFJD EINRtJ JB0058,g000200260001-4
4 . 5 6 7
DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CATASTROPHIC EXPLOSION - ATLAS BOOSTER
Figure 2 Overpressure ve Distance Based on Two Gage Calibrations for Atlas Tests
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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(2) Height of cg above launch support point 32 ft
(2) Moment of inertia about launch support point 12,580,000 slug/ft2
3,150,000 slug/ft2
(2) Moment of inertia about cg
Approximate weight distribution measured above launcher support point as a *zero
reference:
(2) 0 to 20 ft
(2) 20 to 52 ft
(2) 52 ft to 65 ft
(2) 65 ft
(2) 65 ft to 81 ft
(2) 85 ft
(2) 87 ft
4500 lbs/ft
5400 lbs/ft
41 lbs/ft
23,500 lbs/concentrated
406 lbs/ft
1200 lbs/concentrated
1000 lbs/concentrated
D. Launching, Stowage, and Handling Philosophy
Since the Atlas/ C entaur/Agena flight configurations are extremely sensitive to
bending, a mobile strongback providing rigid support over the full length of the con-
figuration is indicated for all stowage, handling, and checkout functions to be per-
formed with the vehicle in the horizontal attitude.
The three vehicles would be loaded on board, fully assembled, from dock side.
The vehicle/strongback assembly would be lowered into tracks extending from the
after deck by a dock-side crane, made fast to a flush deck conveyor and transferred
forward, inside the hangar. A further transfer operation by an athwartship conveyor
would move them to their respective stowage positions where they would be secured..
Thus, positive ship board control of the strongback dolly would be achieved at all
times.
Major checkout functions would be executed with the vehicle in the horizontal
attitude on the strongback and, inside the hangar space.
After major checkout, the empty vehicle would be transferred outside the hangar
by conveyor to the erecting position on the after deck. Erection would be accom-
plished by fixing an erector frame to the strongback, the whole actuated to the ver-
tical position by means of telescoping hydraulic rams. The umbilical mast would be
erected independently and, simultaneously. When erected, the vehicle restraining
feature of the strongback would double as work staging for final checkout and fueling
operations. After fueling and final checkout, the vehicle, independently supported
and restrained upon the stabilized launching platform, would be disengaged from the
strongback erecting frame assembly which would retract to the deck. The strong-
back would then be disengaged from the erecting frame and transferred back into its
permanent stowage position. in the hangar.
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The umbilical mast would remain in position until main stage ignition, at which
time all connections would be quickly disengaged and the mast pivoted to stowage
alongside the rail by conventional methods. support scheme
It appears that a modification to the conventional Atlas launching would be mandatory for shipboard launching missions, probably leading to the modifi-
cation of Atlas in the pad support region of the flight structure about eight feet above
the base.
E. Mobile Strongback Description
This component would consist of a welded steel framework with a suitable sus-
pension system mounted on high pressure rubber-tired castors. Service platform
sections would serve also as restraining members for the flight configuration. The
combined weight of the empty missile and the strongback is estimated at 50,000 lbs.
F. Erection Equipment Description
This system would consist of an erecting platform and an actuating system.
The erecting platform of welded steel construction is in the configuration of a
semi-"A" frame, owing to the desire for transverse stability. It is shown pivoted
in tapered bearings at the bae , (See Frontispiece) supported by outriggers extend-
ing port and starboard from the stern of the ship. The platform would be positively
fixed by tapered shank bolts or other suitable means to the-strongback, resulting in
a rigid integral structure to contain the flight vehicle and restrain it vertically during
fueling and final checkout,
G. Hydraulic System Description
The actuating force for the Erecting sequence would be supplied by two (2) twelve
Bach hydraulic cylinders, each containing four (4) fourteen foot telescoping sections
(incorporated in a 15 foot housing) for a total extended length of 71 feet. The hydrau-
lic system would contain the necessary controls, accumulators, etc., to ensure con-
stant, surge-free erection and lowering by a servo valve. The system would be
designed "fail-safe" and remain locked in position until hydraulic energy is again
supplied from the pump. ears ade-
quate hundred twenty-five (125.) horsepower delivered to the pump app
quate to erect the combined weight of the empty flight vehicle, strongback, and erect-
ing platform which is estimated at 75,000 lbs. The center of gravity of the assembly
to be lifted appears to be about 0 feet from the fulcrum point. The total erection
time is assumed at two minutes.
The launcher table is stabilized by servos, essentially damping pitch and roll
thisalignments. The relationship of these motions of the ship to a stable platform
reference would provide actugtiorn signals to the servos.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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H.. Retraction and Launch Sequence
After fueling and performing the remaining checkout functions, hydraulically
actuated hold-down arms clamp the missile to the supports or "tippers" applying
essentially the same principles as the conventional Atlas launching gear but, utiliz-
ing a greater number of the combination suitably spaced for the requirements pecu-
liar to the sea launch mission. It is again pointed out that the ship board require-
ment may well necessitate a completely new design concept for restraining the,
missile to the launching support.
With the vehicle secured to the launch pad, the empty strongback is disengaged
from the vehicle and lowered to the deck by the erecting platform. The strongback
is then released and transferred to the hangar. A salt water deluge is then applied
to the after deck of the ship immediately prior to ignition from nozzles mounted in
the base of the hangar.
The exhaust blast from the vehicle engine,is deflected outboard, astern, and
downward by refractory-lined deflectors.
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 Approved For RReleas pp E): -T B00584R000200260001-4
MOTION STUDIES OF THE MARINER HULL
AS APPLIED TO THE ATLAS CENTAUR
VEHICLE DURING CERTAIN SEA STATES
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.10
 CONFIDENTIAL
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A, Derivation of Force and Moment Equations
The forces and moments acting upon the missile as a result of ship motion can
be found by assuming a 3 degree-of-freedom (pitch, roll, heave) mathematical model
of the ship. Additional assumptions required are:
1. The motion of the ship in pitch, roll, and heave is sinusoidal and the angles
in pitch and roll are small.
2. The effect of cross coupling between pitch and roll planes is negligible.
3. The missile is supported only at its base and is perpendicular to the ship's
deck.
(1)
(2)
The motion of the missile's c. g. as a function of the ship's motion is written by
inspection (see Figure 3):
The ;Notion of the ship is defined by a pitch equation
cos wt
and a heave equation
ys = Y Cos (wt+ ?).
0=Os
(3)
y =ys + A cos 4) - B sin 4
(4)
x=-Asino -13cos4.
(5)
Referring to Figure 1, the equations of motion can be written by a summation of forces
and moments. In the horizontal direction,
mx=Fsin4)+Vcos?
in the vertical direction,
rn Fcos0+Vsin0-mg
and summing; moments about the missile's e.g.,
(6)
(7)
10 = Vb + M. (8)
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CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
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 Approved Fo eleaCre`2002/TP> :NIA-RQP70B005 2000200260001-4
Conclusions and Recommendations
Assignment #1
At what sea state do structural considerations become critical to Atlas/Centaur
Atlas/Agena flight configurations? Consider:
Transportation
Erection
Handling
Launching
In the matter of transportation, erection, and handling of the vehicle, it is our
conclusion that a judicious system design which ensures positive control of the unit
at all times, with adequate safety-locking device and, which does not require that
the unit be hoisted or removed from these restraints is quite feasible, and presents
no overly difficult problems at any reasonable sea state. These operations, in other
words, would not be critical in the overall operation and would impose no undue
stresses upon the flight configuration.
The launching phase becomes the critical problem. In compiling Tables I
through IV, certain assumptions were made which should be emphasized here.
1. We have used Atlas/Centaur as the model in all motion studies, since this
configuration is longer and heavier than Atlas/Agena and we have considered
it critical.
2. All motion studies refer to the Mariner (C-4) hull.
3. All computations concerning the flight configuration have assumed a rigid
vehicle and have given deflection in bending no consideration. For this
reason, the results are somewhat optimistic for the flight configuration.
4. Launching would always be effected with the ship heading into meeting seas
at a velocity of 6 KTS.
5. All computations have been made assuming the vehicle is fixed to a perma-
nent platform and, that neither the ship nor the platform is stabilized.
Many factors are involved in the identification of the operational sea state. In
the first place, the seas are not so cooperative as to maintain constant wave heights,
directional consistency, constant winds, etc. In the final recommendation we must
consider random waves approaching from a critical direction and groups of waves
followed by smooth seas followed in turn by other groups of waves. We must also
consider gusts. These phenomena are significant to the motion of the ship and to the
implied moment imparted to Atlas/Centaur. Should. they occur during what we define
as a given sea state, they may well induce a considerably more severe reaction of
the hull to the seas than that imparted by action of the regular sea state. For this
reason, O/'f8e LTi KUP7gagg4 $QO~Oglf 1-4 design
 Approved For Rele 7OB00584R000200260001-4
upset moment of 4, 000,000 inch-lbs. at the Atlas pad restraining point, we recom-
mend the various stabilizing devices be considered as safety measures only, to
damp the results of combined random gust and wave reactions to the vehicle. We
believe consideration of the stabilizing devices in this sense will result in a more
realistic approach to the operational problem.
6. Table IV shows that sea state 4 induces a combined moment to the Atlas
at the launch support point of 10; 400, 000 inch-lbs. in the roll plane (in the
trough) and, 4,300,000 inch-lbs. in the pitch plane (heading into meeting
seas). By the above reasoning, then, to launch Atlas at sea state 4 (the
ship heading in to meeting seas) failure of the vehicle on the pad in the
launching support region of the flight structure is indicated in the pitch
plane.
7. Sea state 3, on the other hand, appears to apply no critical base moment
to the flight configuration as long as the ship heads into meeting seas for
the launching function.
Therefore, it is our studied opinion that sea state 4 is that at which structural
considerations become critical to Atlas/Centaur and that launching should be
attempted in sea states no greater than 3.
Assignment #2
Define the total launching weight ratio (F/WL) required by Atlas/Agena and
Atlas/Centaur for launching during the various allowable sea states.
1? F/WL for Atlas/Centaur (from Criteria in Part I)
WL
mass of vehicle at lift-off x g
9112x32.2
= 293, 406.4 #
#
F = thrust at lift--off` 360,000
FiWL = 360,000 1.225 (g)
293,406.4
2. In Assignment #1, it was concluded that launching must be limited to state
3 seas. The maximum vertical acceleration of the launch deck in this sea
state is expected to be 1, 025 g (refer to'section on "Deck Accelerations").
3. Therefore, it is our opinion that a large safety span exists concerning the
deck acceleration i-: sea state 3 and, that launching Atlas/ Centaur with
respect to heave of the C-4 hull may be accomplished with confidence without
the synchronization of lift-off to ships heave motion.
In conclusion, it is to be emphasized that Atlas/Centaur was. designed for max-
imum performance, The price paid for this flight efficiency emerges in the
complexity of the system; the reliability record of the configuration; the hazardous
propellants to be transported, stowed, and handled; and the sensitivity of the
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 Approved For R elleasC 1 tD 7tB00584R000200260001-4
structure to motion of its launching pad with respect to the shipboard environment.
This price has proved acceptable for tactical and R & D utilization of the vehicle
in the land environment for which it was intended when weighed against improved
performance.
This report concludes that launching of Atlas/Centaur is feasible in state 3 seas
from the stern of the Mariner vessel with regard to the environmental structural
loads imposed upon it. It does not presume to judge all of the factors incident to its
overall feasibility as an R & D vehicle in the shipboard environment since, such
judgment would be premature and unfair in the absence of a considerably more
comprehensive investigation.
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Nomenclature
A, B, C Vertical, longitudinal, and lateral distances from missile's e. g. to ship's
c. g. , respectively, feet.
b Longitudinal distance from missile's c. g. to plane in which missile is
supported, feet.
B1 Beam of ship, feet.
CD Aerodynamic drag coefficient.
D Base diameter of missile, feet.
F Axial force at the base of the missile, lbs.
g Acceleration of gravity (32.2 ft/sec2).
H Wave height, crest to trough (2 X wave amplitude), feet.
7 Moment of inertia of missile about its e. g. in pitch or yaw (excluding mass
of missile below support), slug-ft2.
L Water line length of ship, feet.
Le Effective aerodynamic length of missile from support, feet.
m Mass of missile above plane of support, slugs.
M Moment at the supporting plane of the missile, foot-lbs (unless otherwise
specified).
Mp Moment resulting from ship motion in the pitch plane, foot-lbs (unless
otherwise specified).
Mpl Base moment due to pitch at wave encounter frequency.
Mpp Base moment due to pitch at resonance frequency.
Mpt Total maximum pitch rao_cnent, M. + MP (sum).
Mr Moment resulting from ship motion in the roll plane, foot-lbs (unless
otherwise specified).
Mrt Total maximum roll moment, Mw Mr (sum).
Mw Base moment due to wind.
N Aerodynamic normal force on missile, lbs.
t Time, seconds.
T Natural or resonant roll period (16.5 sees).
Tl Wave period. Also period of wave encounter in pitch, sees.
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