AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN AFGANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00309A000200060023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 30, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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NO CHANGE in Class.
(] DECLAS.1I IED
Class. TC: TS S C
DDA L,': m3 , 4 Apr 7/7
Auth: r-'a. ?7/1763
Date: / DA/7 r By: d0
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U. So RESPONSE TO TFIE
SOVIET ECONOMIC O TSIVE IN AFGHANISTAN
Submitted by STATINTL
T"..d.Career Course an Foreign Affairs
Foreign Service Institute
Department of State
September 30, 2.959
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p`:iCX)NNONiC O3jFE31SIVE IN 1TG ANISEA
Short.?.y after the dv~ath of Stalirrz. the la
?:t?. c ,;o ain imaerdeveiope countries a major p og am `oD conom Gc
..si, , tance and developient4 One of the major recipients of this
:5-ogran has been ifghanissnd publicly to a group of visiting Congressmen in 19550 "We,
,,aluae trade least for economic reasons and more, for political
reason s.""6
A study of Cowtunist statements and propaganda broadcasts
r=sa.ke? it apparent that the Soviets are deliberately misrepresenting
S. trade and aid programs as a disguise and substitute for the
-)Id irxperialism' o in an effort to influence the newly emerging
3.+. P. 233.
. Quoted i x State Dept. Publication #6632, a S$ S91ae -t
2mo c Off'ene ve in the Less bgvslope Count .qSa D. 6.
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countries toward making friendly trade agreements with the -U .S.3 , ,
These countries, some of which are having difficulty disposing o :-'
exports at stable prices in the free world markets find conside-
able interest and hope in the more flexible and reasonable
mente which the Soviets are offering. The Stave Department sun.?..ry
of the Soviet economic aid program points out that ne=J gory ;:,;t?:ucGan i,
of the emerging countries are under constant pressure to take
measures which give the appearance of hastening internal. economic
development, and that the Soviet Union is often in a better and
more flexible position than the United States to meet the do nand ,,
o~. a short-range basis.?
In terns of the Communist dialectic, the Soviets see the ]_c as
of the Western colonies after World War II and the rise of insurgent
nationalism as a natural,, evolutionary step in the decline of
capitalism, and are using the economic aid program as one aubt e
and long-range method of exploiting this development.
The Soviets have studied carefully the elements of national
interest which prevail in the underdeveloped countries and have
played, often successfully, on the following sentiments:
1.
The desire for economic development and the rise of
living standards.
2.
Dissatisfaction with tern of trade.
3.
Dissatisfaction with terns of Western aid.
(The Soviets
have characteristically reacted to this by providing "soft
7 estate apt. # 6632, o cx . P. 4.
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loans" at low interest rates with long-term repayment
provisions and repayment in goods rather than money).
The Soviets have chosen their targets carefully. Up to
1958, more than 85% of their economic and technical assistance
had been concentrated in five countries: Egypt, Syria, India,
Indonesia, and Afghanistan. `these are all countries in . n
either neutralism or nationalism are already strong internal
elements, and in which aid programs are geographically and econom-
ically feasible for the U.S.S.R. These are also areas which seen
to offer the beat results in terms of increased dependence upon
Soviet support.
The economic efforts of the Soviet bloc in the underdeveloped
countries up to June 1959 have totaled $2.6 billion. Of this, the
U.S.S.R. has contributed $1.8 billion. There is every evidence
that the Soviets accelerated the pace of this activity in 1958,
as 40% of the total amount spent over the period 1954?1958 was
spent during that year. On an annual basis, the amounts the
Soviets have spent have increased from less than $50 million in
1955 to an estimated 400 million in 1959.8
THE BACKGROUND IN SOUTH ASIA AND AI HANISTAN
American power interests in South Asia are to a considerable
extent an inheritance of the British power and influence in this
area prior to World War Ii. The position of Afghanistan in the
8. Draper Committee Report-Vol I-August 17, 1959, pp. 71-73.
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area has been securely established since the agreement betwwc:s
Britain and Czarist Russia in 1907, which provided for a British
Vsphere of influence' in Western Persia and a Russian 'sphere of
influence c in Eastern Persia. Afghanistan immediately became a
!buffer states between the Eastern and Western interests and has
remained in this position ever since. The Afghanistan situation
r mst therefore be viewed as part of a larger Asian problem, inso-
far as it concerns American power interests.
Ur. Lewis Weber Jones, then President of Rutgers Univer-
raity,, in reviewing the American interests in South Asia for- the
Senate Foreign. Relations Committee in 1957 concluded that aid to
South Asia is justified by the strategic importance of tbt region?
its potential strength as part of the free world and its v,!es s_.
bility to internal and external Communist threats; becaneo of its
present economic underdevelopmenta9 He states the case for U. S6
aid hi the area in the fo7f l.o dng argumentation:
1. The wide discrepancy in living standards between advanced
industrial countries a underdeveloped areas is a basic cause for
world instability.
2. The United States gains in influence and prestige by k: he
existence of strong healthy economies in other parts of the ucsrlda
3. The United States cannot afford to lose South Asia to the
Soviet-Comunist China bloc,
4. American aid in South Asia is equivalent to an. investment
in democracy and peace.10
9. U.S. Serrate, Coanyilan ? St.L A Suey,s - Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program - Sm"re: on South-
Asia, by Lewis W. Jones,, pp. 1471.147 4.
.10. Jones, L. W. op.cit.
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seeping in mind these overall conclusions as to th, nerd
for es;onomic support of the South Asia countries, we turn :.o the
particular situation in Afghanistan.
In the fall of 1955, Messrs. Bulganin & Khrushchev vi3ited
Afghanistan at the invitation of Prime Minister DAOUD, and in
their wake left a $1,00 million loan or tline of credit' for a
multiplicity of projects. This loan amounted to about five times
-';he total revonue of that country during the 1954-55 fiscal ? a:-~
The United States responded in several ways. It reopened
;:negotiations for assistance in the development of the K D.Aa M t
'a;nte jai, o :irports which had been shelved a year before.
June of 1956v the amount esslpended in the Technical Assistance
Progra n alone had risen to $3 million dollars and $15 million i a
additional special assistance grants had been allocated. Since
that time the economic aid program in Afghanistan has been subject
to considerable criticism,., which came to a head in 1958 when the
I.C.A. conducted a special evaluation of the program.
THE SOVIET POWER INTERESTS IN AI GHAN ISTAN
Using this sequence of events as a point of departure, let
first analyze to some extent the Soviet interests, aspirations,t
and programs in the area in terms of certain appropriate elements
of national power as outlined by Morganthan.
ll. r a nthauo Hans J. politics Amon .N bonne N.Y. Alfd es H.
Approc, pj Rg a 6.11316 : 23-4
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A.
Northern Afghanistan borders on three s ;para s republ c
of the 13,S,S,R. -- Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tadzik. The geographic ad-
-vantages of control. or eventual anne .tion of Afghanistan are
readily evident. Besides providing a possible invacioa route
through Paki tan. to India, it would also permit additional. control.
along the Iranian border, allowing further pressures to be placed
upon that country. Peter Schmid reports a conversation bst -3ea a
German engineer and a Soviet observer along a newly co wstruc - e
highway in Northern Afghanistan., in which the Russian inquired as
to whether the roaaa would be able to support heavy tanks! 12
Geographically, then, it must be admitted that Afghanistan is
in a position, where, under Soviet domination, it could provide a
vital. element of Soviet power in the area.
B. Natural Resources.
It is difficult to concede that Afghanistan could i a its
present stage of development provide much of value in the .y of
natural resources for the Soviet Union. large expenditures of
capital would help,; but there is no indx cation that the Soviets
are willing to provide this on the mammoth scale which would be
necessary. Afghanistan's position in regard to resources is well
sum .rised by Jonest "The prospects of rapid development are remote.
Most of the people are engaged in agriculture, but there is a large
12. Schmid, Peter, "Coexisting in # abul," The Re t gr, Feb, 5,,_
1959, P. 24.
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t. r:~ad c population. Terrain and climate nake road rn=;,:
di.:rY_i.e a .t arid-costly burden. So far as is kno
1;ources are insufficient to support the development ust . Coal is not plentiful. The hydroelectric pow::- po'-ent.i.al
U3 enormous, but its development requires very large c:a)? out`
Fa.ys ?I3
Cti Induatria , _C .pct,Z,.
The present state of industry in Afghanistan i;:s .~ '..i th enta ?
he Soviets have shown considerable interest in helping .he Afghan.-3
ri e,ti elop their industrial potential, and over the past fu.. 'ears
;-nave poured hundreds of technical specialists and ad r sar:?. into
the country. The Soviets undoubtedly hope that the t gh.:.-: WILL
become dependent upon them for the basic resources r equi?: n _d for
industrial production, such as fuel, and that they will come more
Prone to utilize Soviet transportation routes.
The major factor here, of course, is the gc o/;r?a.;~s. cal
location of Afghanistan, already discussed, with is accr~ s routes
to Pakistan, India and Iran. Although H. F. Armstrong c< ,wscludes
that outright acquisition of Afghanistan would not uapre~ t the
P
`soviets' operational position markedly,l~` this writer fear'; s that the
3ubstanti.al military aid which has been given to since
1956, including the use of Soviet officers as military f', 'i5er 3 wou3 :::
13. L. W. Jones, Cit p. 1493.
14. Armstrong, H. F. "North of the Khyber," Forei A