IMPLICATIONS IN GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ'S RESIGNATION AS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE RUMANIA COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 20, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/07/11: CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340012-8
CONFIDENTIAL
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50X1
COUNTRY Rumania 50X1 DATE DISTR. 30 April 1954
SUBJECT Implications in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-DEJ '8 NO. OF PAGES :2..
Resignation as General Secretary of the
Rumanian Communist Part
DATE OF INFORMATION REFERENCES:
PLACE ACQUIRED
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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ff000rding to an Associated Press dispatch of 20 April from Vienna,
50X1 Rumanian Premier Gheorghe Gheorghiu-DEJ made public his resignation as
General Secretary of the Communist Party, in a speech before the Dartsr
500 Central Committee on 19 April 1954?
.
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the Rumanian Communist Party has been planning
and preparing the means fOr the annexation of Rumania by the USSR.
This move would, of course, be beneficial from the Soviet point of
view for the following reasons:
a.? It would give the Soviets the assurance of ownership of Rumanian
terrain, and primarily the plains between the Danube and the
Carpathian mountains, which represent to USSR strategy a gateway
for both offensive and defensive purposes.
CONFIDENTMI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/07/11: CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340012-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/07/11: CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340012-8
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CONFIDENTIAL
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b. It would also mean the dissolution of a center of population of _
latin origin which can never be fully assimilated into the Soviet
bloc and which, through its national origin, is opposed and has
been unsympathetic toward the Slavic countries surrounding
Rumania. The Soviets will surely neutralize this situation by
deporting Rumanians to the USSR.
2. This political theme (viz., the annexation of Rumania by the USSR)
has dominated the thoughts of the Rumanian Communist Party for the
past three years. This theme may now become fact.
the Party thought it most judicial that DEJ renounce his position as
General Secretary of the Party and retain the Premiership rather
than the converse. As head of the Rumanian government, DEJ can move
for a plebiscite for the annexation without directly implicating the
Party and in case of failure without, of course, directly compromis-
ing the Party.
The new change in the Rumanian Communist Party and government may
also be interpreted as a maneuver on DEJ's part to obtain greater
freedom of action and greater authority, by not being directly
linked with the Party. It is most possible that he is thinking of
a coup dJetat, which idea he had originally discussed with TITO in
1947. At that time TITO had returned from the conference in
Moscow and visited the Satellite leaders. TITO was warmly received
by DEJ, who, because of this meeting, was held in disgrace by the
Party for three or four years. DEJ is the only Satellite leader
who had friendly relations with TITO and who is still in a position
of power. I know that DEJ attempted to introduce his followers in
important positions of both government and industry. For example,
Xenoron CELENTE was appointed as the Rumanian associate General
Director of SOVROMTRANSPORT. CELENTE, a friend of DEJ,s, demon-
strated his antipathy toward the USSR. His chosen co-workers were
not Party members. CELENTE made statements that he would strive
and would be able to transform this joint Soviet-Rumanian shipping
agency into a purely Rumanian company. He said that he would be
able to eliminate USSR participation.
This change in Rumania to the new idea of "collective leadership"
coincides with Soviet dicta and with Moscow's maneuver last year,
when MALENKOV resigned as General Secretary of the Party. Super-
ficially, Rumania's maneuver seems identical to Moscow's. The
basic motivations, however, were different. In Moscow it was a
maneuver for supremacy of power in the battle between the army and
the Party. In Rumania this was a maneuver to facilitate the annex-
ation of Rumania by the USSR without compromising the Party and by
possibly using DEJ as the scapegoat. A possibility which must also
be considered is that DEJ may be planning defection from the Soviet
bloc.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/07/11: CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340012-8