STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol 4 No 2, Spring 1960]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RD1716E03t2fA000300300001-1
STUDIES
In
INTELLIGENCE
`JOB NO. 2a- iz'
BOX NO1 _3___------
FOLDER NO, 3_ -----
TOTAL "CCS HEREIN
25X1
APR,
GATE $ loan
GGC --/ g> V TYPE
GEIG CAMP _J _ GPI
GRIG CLASS PAGES XZ& NcV CLASS
NEXT 6EV _L~'- AUTHL HA 114
JUST ---
VOL. 4 NO. 2 SPRING 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
25X1
Approved For Release X2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921 A000390300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 25C~
Approved For Release 20
CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
The Intelligence Literature Award . . . . . . . . . faces 1
Unrecognized Potential in the Military Attaches
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 1
Personal recommendations for enhancing the value
of an intelligence asset. CONFIDENTIAL
Design for Jet-Age Reporting . . . . . William Earling 7
New look in speed and guidance for routine informa-
tion reports from overseas. SECRET
Notes on the CRITIC System . . . . William A. Tidwell 19
Informal progress report on the procedure for urgent
intelligence flashes. SECRET
Anti-Soviet Operations of Kwantung Army Intelligence,
1931-39 . . . . . . . . . . . Richard G. Brown 25
Critique of Japanese methods and results in Man-
churia. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The U.S. Hunt for Axis Agent Radios
George E. Sterling 35
Story of the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division dur-
ing World War II. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
25)(1
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030p300001-1
 Approved For Relerase 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-g3921A000300300001-1
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Operation Portrex . . . . . . . . . Edwin L. Sibert
Page
Al
Intelligence and unconventional warfare in a
combat exercise.
The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner
Robert E. Matteson
All
Capture and trial of the chief of the Nazi RSHA.
The Lohmann Affair . . . . . . . . James H. Belote
A31
Clandestine German operations in the twenties.
Communication to the Editors . . . . . . . . . . .
A39
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Espionage and Counterespionage . . . . . . . .
A43
Resistance Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A48
Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services . . . . . . . .
A55
Psychological As
pects . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A59
Approved For Relealse 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921AO( 08 FID0AVAI
A former G-2 officer gives some
personal views on how to mul-
tiply the value of a military in-
telligence asset.
UNRECOGNIZED POTENTIAL IN THE MILITARY
ATTACHES
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
The system of U.S. military attaches, a worldwide liaison
service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five
behind the Iron Curtain, is one of the least well understood
of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of
this lack of understanding its great potentialities remain rela-
tively untapped.
The military attaches have produced and are producing
large amounts of intelligence information, and certain at-
tache reports have been of significant strategic value. The
Army attache in Tel Aviv correctly interpreted the Israeli
mobilization of October 1956 as a war measure and determined
the direction of the attack against Egypt. His prompt re-
port, a key item in the intelligence which enabled the Watch
Committee to alert the President to the impending Suez War,
could be counted by itself a sufficient justification for the at-
tache system's entire budget for the year. Service reporting
from behind the Iron Curtain has also been of incalculable
value, and that from many other areas has provided informa-
tion of importance.
As the attache systems become recurrently the target of
economy drives in the Department of Defense, however, the
lack of knowledge in the proper places as to what the attaches
produce for the intelligence community grows apparent. At-
tache reports are not often singled out for distribution to
high departmental policy levels. Most of them are incon-
spicuous elements of the routine reporting which keeps each
military service up to date on the corresponding services of
other countries. They contribute to the "finished intelli-
gence" of the encyclopaedic National Intelligence Surveys; but
officers at the policy level are unlikely ever to look at an NIS
10I.4 IDENTI~I~
Approvedor a ease 04/12/17 :CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
MORI/HRP
from pg.01-06
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
CONFIDENTIAL The Military Attaches
until, when a crisis hits, they have an immediate need for
data on the Lebanese army or the Indonesian navy, and even
then they do not necessarily remain conscious of the fact that
it was the attaches who supplied these data. Nor is it always
obvious at the policy level that there is a significant contri-
bution from the military attache system in nearly every Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate.
It seems clear that the social rather than intelligence as-
pect of the military attaches' work is weighed too heavily at
certain levels in the Pentagon. Hence the attaches are criti-
cized as "cookie-pushers" assigned to duty on the cocktail cir-
cuit. It is true that the nature of the job in many capitals
requires considerable social activity. In Washington itself,
the papers abound with accounts of parties for or attended
by the service attaches of the various foreign embassies. It
may also be true that the attache staffs occasionally include
some too socially conscious or ambitious officers who devote
themselves too assiduously to the kind of intelligence collec-
tion that is done over a glass. But that sort of thing can
happen in any organization; it is something that can be reme-
died quite quickly and easily by command action.
It is important that a new dignity be given to the attache
system and a deserved respect accorded it. It is important
that the still untapped reservoirs of information needed by
the Government which are available to military attaches be
recognized and exploited. There are new areas that need to
be covered, and old ones that should be covered better. There
are new horizons of opportunity, and new approaches that
can be used to obtain intelligence of utmost value.
Coverage and Cross Accreditation
Today there are 761 U.S. staff personnel serving in the at-
tache systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force overseas.
The Army has 429 (143 officers, 212 enlisted men, and 74
civilians), the Navy 161 (157 officers), the Air Force 171 (145
officers, 22 enlisted men, and 4 civilians). There are army at-
taches accredited to 73 countries, air attaches to 69, and
naval attaches to 58. Army attaches are actually stationed
in 69 countries, air attaches in 53, and naval attaches in 45.
2Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP7g- W b0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Military Attaches CONFIDENTIAL
It has been the policy to accredit one attache to more.than
one country in order to economize in manpower, because the
activities of some countries in some military fields are limited.
For example, there are army attaches in Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Honduras and Nicaragua; but Air Force interests in
these four countries are handled by the air attache in Guate-
mala, and naval matters in all five republics plus British Hon-
duras are the responsibility of the naval attache in Mexico
City. There are other variations in service practices around
the Caribbean. A naval attache is stationed in the Dominican
Republic, but the air attache accredited to Ciudad Trujillo is
stationed in Venezuela, and the army attache comes over from
Cuba. Haiti, on the other hand, has an army attache in Port
au Prince but is covered by the air attache from Caracas and
the naval attache from Havana.
While there is certainly not enough work under present
conditions in many of these places to keep separate attaches
fully occupied, the system of cross accreditation does create
some peculiarities. Thus in Havana, where the Air Force rep-
resentative covers only Cuba, the Navy's covers Haiti in ad-
dition, and the Army's the Dominican Republic. Our military
expertise on the Dominican Republic is partitioned among
Ciudad Trujillio, Havana, and Caracas; a regional conference
would have to be called to get the consensus of our on-the-
spot representatives about the over-all strength of the Trujillo
regime.
Sometimes the changing currents of international relations
create some curious situations in this representation from
outside, and changes have to be made in accreditation. At one
point the United States had no service attaches in the Sudan,
the representatives of all three services in Egypt being ac-
credited also to Khartoum. With the Sudanese more than a
little suspicious of Nasr's designs on their struggling young
nation, this doubling raised obvious problems. Today there
is an army attache in Khartoum-a most important assign-
ment with a military junta running the Sudan-and air affairs
there are covered by the air attache in Ethiopia.
Cross accreditation is of course economical, and it can be
satisfactory in certain instances. But we should be aware
that in this era of rising nationalism the armed services of
Approved For Release 004/12/17 :CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
CONFIDENTIAL The Military Attaches
those countries not accorded resident attaches may consider
themselves slighted and so feel more kindly-and coopera-
tive-toward the major powers that do keep attaches in resi-
dence. It would be wasteful, to be sure, to assign naval at-
taches to the Sudan or Switzerland, but the most powerful
and influential nation on earth should be able to afford at
least one appropriate service attache in every country that
has a military force, however embryonic. That there will be
more than enough to keep such officers actively and profitably
employed I hope the following paragraphs will demonstrate.
New Horizons
One need only look at the number of countries where the
military are today in full control, hold a dominant position,
or at least exercise considerable political influence, in order to
see the ascending potential of the role of the service attache.
Taking the world region by region and noting only the more
important examples of this situation, we find in Europe Gen-
eral de Gaulle master of France, General Franco running
Spain, and Marshal Tito ruling Yugoslavia, all of them de-
pendent in one degree or another on support from the army;
in the Middle East Egypt's Nasr and Iraq's Kasem, army of-
ficers brought to power by military coups; in Africa Haile Se-
lassie of Ethiopia relying on the loyalty of his imperial body-
guard and the Sudan run by a military junta; in Asia the
governments of Laos, Pakistan, and Burma subject to the will
of the military and Indonesia pivoting on the key position of
the army; in Latin America the army not the dominant fac-
tor in domestic politics only by exception from the rule.
In such countries, and in countries where the military may
in future emerge as a powerful political force, the officers of
the military services become a prime intelligence source and
target. The U.S. service attache has as his first obligation,
of course, the development of contact with officers on the
chief-of-staff level of the service to which he is accredited.
But the circumstances of the coup in Iraq point up the need
for getting to know also the ambitious and rising young of-
ficers who through ability or good fortune may achieve promi-
nence at some future time. The attaches could by this means
insure, not an advance warning of all future coups, but that
there would be fewer surprises.
~pproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78 bPA'W6 0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Military Attaches CONFIDENTIAL
It is acknowledged that in many countries a too obvious or
aggressive cultivating of friendships with military personnel
by U.S. attaches would be viewed with disfavor-and prob-
ably recognized for the surreptitious probing that it was.
Some ingenuity and long-range planning would be required
here. Initially the attache might be able only to spot up-
coming young officers who should be approached later, per-
haps by others, particularly since in many countries those
that carry a political thrust are kept in provincial garrisons
away from the capital. Sometimes the embassy, using the
country-team system, could have people outside the attache's
immediate office make the initial contact, develop the neces-
sary rapport, or maintain a relationship which had been es-
tablished.
But a main avenue of long-term approach to future wielders
of power starts in the United States. Every year hundreds
of foreign military officers attend U.S. service schools. Per-
haps not all of these will reach chief-of-staff level, but the
expectation that they will achieve senior rank is implicit in
their selection for the expensive visit to the United States.
Consider, for example, that Admiral Larrazabal, who headed
the junta that governed Venezuela between the overthrow of
the Perez Jimenez regime and the election of Betancourt, had
attended the U.S. Naval War College at Newport.
We have thus an ideal opportunity to establish personal
relationships that could in the future keep us informed on
affairs of critical intelligence interest. I am not talking about
recruitment of these officers as agents; it is a matter of de-
veloping the conviction in a foreign officer that his, your, his
country's, and the United States' interests are all identical,
or so very close that it would be to his country's advantage,
or at least not to its detriment, for him to confide in you.
First, there should be a thorough, methodical system at
the school for developing biographical data on each individual
officer-not just the usual personal history statement or bio-
graphical sketch, but knowledge of the likes and dislikes of
the man and what makes him tick. Did his father fight with
the Khalifa against Kitchener at Omdurman? Does he drink
heavily, have occasional sprees or amatory adventures? Is he
ashamed he can't afford a better home, feel he can't enter-
Approved i0orase 2b04/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-15
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
CONFIDENTIAL The Military Attaches
tain Americans? What are his cultural interests-music,
Goethe, chess? Has he been discriminated against because of
his race? Where does he want to end his career-as chief of
staff? as constitutionally elected president? as dictator? or
as a professional officer who has served his country well?
And how does he see the future development of his own coun-
try? Which great powers does he think can best help it?
Much of this information can be assembled by the faculty
of the school in question. But intimate insight into a man's
character, and especially the establishment of a rapport that
would yield continuing intelligence dividends, would require
that as often as feasible and practical the U.S. officer destined
to be assigned to a country become a classmate of its poten-
tially influential students at a U.S. service school. The iden-
tity of interest among classmates creates a strong bond.
If a foreign officer attends a U.S. school it can be assumed
that his English is passable. But this should not lead to any
relaxing of the attache's effort to acquire fluency in the lan-
guage of the country to which he is assigned. The psycho-
logical advantage of knowing the language is tremendous. An
intelligence officer's objectives are much easier to reach if his
foreign contact senses in him not a superficial, self-seeking
interest but a true and deep understanding based upon knowl-
edge of the country's language, history, and customs and an
appreciation of its people. Such specialization, it is true, im-
plies a relatively long assignment at the post in question.
The full implications of this long-range approach for the
personal career of a military attache may appear rather for-
midable in terms of present-day concepts. A year or two spent
learning language, area, and customs, a year or more at a
service school to cultivate the friendship of a foreign officer,
and at least a double tour of duty in one country-these may
add up to a third or a half of the U.S. officer's entire active
military career. But if we are serious about our intelligence
effort, this is a way to give new significance and worth to the
attache system, and the long-term benefits should certainly
be high.
6Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP7F%'0Y,&Wlll'?~b0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET
A radical proposal for control-
ling the substance of routine in-
formation reports from over-
seas and getting them promptly
to consumers.
DESIGN FOR JET-AGE REPORTING
William Earling
Transmitting information from its variegated and far-flung
collectors to users in the complex intelligence community is
necessarily a tremendously complicated business. In our pres-
ent situation the natural complexity is compounded by our
having been content to handle nonpriority materials by
means evolved with little change from communication systems
of the archaic past in separate departments and agencies.
In 1900 the few copies of dispatches from abroad required in
Washington could be supplied by carbon copies typed in an em-
bassy and forwarded by ship pouch. The only improvements
we have introduced for routine reports since then are to use
mats or stencils instead of carbon paper and to forward them
by air instead of by sea.
Given the vastly increased volume of reporting, this speed-up
in means of transportation has not been able to prevent a
net slow-down in the flow of information. Dispatches are
still directed back to parent departments in Washington
through many separate channels. There are departmental
reviews, revisions, retypings, reproduction. Mail rooms and
secretariats distribute them to other interested departments
and agencies, which in turn route them by messenger to sub-
ordinate components. At every stage they queue up in front
of logs and registers. The average transmission time for
routine reports has come to be measured in months, and some
stray documents take more than a year to make their way
through the maze.
It is true that the community is not suffering critically
from delay in receipt of priority information transmitted by
radio and cable. Although much of our rapid communica-
tions system is also archaic, radical improvements have been
MORI/HRP
from pg. 07-17
dE
Approveorr Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-'1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET Design For Reporting
made in some segments. Others are needed and possible, but
this article will limit its concern to routine dispatches and
information reports. For them we need a new, much faster
system, though not necessarily so fast or so expensive as for
cables.
The model intelligence reporting system would connect all
components of the community through one integrated com-
munications network. This network would have the capac-
ity to move all intelligence from reporter to consumer within,
say, 24 hours. It would have standard, streamlined, auto-
matic procedures for handling information at both ends of the
line, with no room for backlogs, personal procrastination, or
processing delay.
This model is something we can aim at, but we must begin at
some modest and practical beginning. Let us then examine
the design of a not too expensive system to speed the sluggish
flow of information reports from overseas perhaps not fifty-
fold but ten. Most analysts would find it not bad to be sure
of getting all routine information, down to the lowest priority,
within a week of its dispatch.
Triplicate Problem
The time required for the many processing steps that inter-
vene between reporter and consumer, a time exponentially
increased with volume as each report waits its turn at each
processing station, is central to our problem, but it is not the
whole problem. If we concentrate on the mechanics of getting
pieces of paper from point to point as fast as possible without
considering their substantive purport we are ignoring one side
of the coin. That the current volume of reporting is outgrow-
ing our ability to handle and use it effectively is manifest not
only in unacceptable delays but in consumer complaints that
they receive too many reports they do not need while failing
to receive information they do need. Collecting components
retort that consumers fail to let them know through standard
evaluation procedures which of their reports are useless and
to keep them informed through the standard placing of re-
quirements precisely what is needed. A lack of communica-
tion between the two elements is evident.
8Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921AV6M0300001-1
 Approve For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Design For Reporting SECRET
It is clear that better guidance would improve the quality
and reduce the volume of reporting; and this smaller volume
of better material could in turn be handled more speedily.
Formal collection requirements alone cannot do the job: the
hungry analyst writes his requirements loosely in order to
be sure of getting everything that bears on his subject, and
the avid reporter in the field will find some bearing on some
requirement in almost everything. Nor is the present con-
sumer evaluation procedure sufficient to the purpose : in all of
FY 1958 CIA, for example, received only 25 spontaneous eval-
uations of its CS reports, and of those rendered on particu-
lar request most were too slow coming-from an average six
months up to almost two years in instances-to be useful as
a basis for corrective action. What is needed is some new sys-
tem for rapid and frequent user criticism of individual reports
in order to point up good material and weed out at the source
any information below the level of significance for the intelli-
gence community.'
A third facet of our problem, bearing both on the delay of
information and on the analyst's dissatisfaction with what
does show up in his in-box, is the practice of successive dis-
semination through organizational channels, through office
or division and branch or section to the individual user. A
central mechanized dissemination direct to individuals would
save time, but Air Intelligence experiments with such an
automatic system 2 indicate that a great deal of excess paper
is pumped into the mill by a straight-faced, undiscriminating
machine presented with imprecisely defined user require-
ments. If we can find some way to pinpoint in machine lan-
guage exactly what each individual analyst requires, we can
give him more nearly what he wants and give it to him faster.
1For earlier treatments of this problem see William P. Bundy, "The
Guiding of Intelligence Collection," Studies III 1, p. 37, and Lowell
M. Dunleigh, "Spy at Your Service, Sir," Studies III 2, p. 81.
a Described by Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intelligence Informa-
tion," Studies III 1, p. 32. For other aspects of mechanized Air In-
telligence information handling see two articles in the series on
"Developments in Air Targeting," Outten J. Clinard's "Data Han-
dling Techniques," Studies III 2, p. 95, and Kenneth T. Johnson's
"Progress and Future Prospects," Studies 111 3, p. 53.
d
Approve ForERelease 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000191
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET Design For Reporting
The problem is then a three-fold one-to speed transmission
and processing of reports, to improve by guidance the quality
of reporting, and to make dissemination faster and more re=
sponsive to precise individual wants. These needs are inter-
related in something of a vicious circle: delayed and indis-
criminate distribution of reports to users breeds delay in get-
ting evaluations of them back to the originators; user disin-
terest in outdated information extends to disinterest in com-
menting on it; lack of evaluative comment means more in-
discriminate reporting and dissemination; a greater volume
of reports produces still more delay. If we can significantly
cut the transmission and processing time and better tailor
our dissemination, users will better recognize their own in-
terest in feeding back substantive appreciations to the collec-
tor; and the collector will be enabled by prompt user com-
ment to stop wasting his precious manpower on marginal and
submarginal operations and spurred to concentrate it on pro-
ductive enterprises.
Design for Speed
The design here exhibited of a new system to cope with
this triple problem was developed for experimentation on the
CS reports of CIA. One of its central features is a roll of per-
forated paper tape. In its most familiar form it is the tape
produced by the perforator unit of a standard M-19 teletype
machine, with its rows of up to five holes in different position
combinations, each representing a letter or function punched
on the keyboard of the machine. When this tape is fed into
the M-19 transmitter-distributor each perforation produces
an electrical impulse in a channel corresponding to its posi-
tion, and these impulses are used to key a page printer, or if
desired produce an identical tape, at the other end of a tele-
phone line or radio circuit.
A postwar development, the fiexowriter, has adapted the
tape communicator principle to the electric typewriter with
its richer keyboard and smaller print. An increase in the
number of impulse channels and corresponding perforation
positions on the tape permits enough additional combinations
to carry both capital and lower-case letters and some char-
acters and functions, such as semicolons and tabulation, that
the teletype machine cannot perform. Experimentally we
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A 5996300001-1
 ApprovedrFeir a sR , nV/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030QQQj
can use either the M-19 or a modified flexowriter in our design,
but the M-19 is a bit crude for finished reports and the ad-
vantages of the flexowriter are largely vitiated by our need
to stick to five channels in order to keep the tape compatible
with other communications equipment. Both machines are
too noisy. New tape-producing typewriters are being devel-
oped which will suit us better than either of these.
It is not that we are proposing electric transmission of all
routine information reports, not yet at any rate. But we
are borrowing many features from cable procedure, and our
system will if necessary be immediately convertible, in whole
or in part, to one using electric means.
The prepared tape can be automatically scrambled into a
quite meaningless pattern of perforations. Thus encrypted,
it is secure for radio transmission or, in our design, for air-
mailing by whatever means is fastest. In practice, this means
will probably be the unaccompanied State Department pouch
if arrangements are made to get it on the first available plane
without waiting for other material to accumulate: the State
pouch cannot be bumped by the air lines and is not held up
in customs. The tape should take sometimes as little as one
day to reach its consignee, rarely more than three.
In the experimental procedure, then, a routine CS report
is typed in the field, beginning with its operational cover sheet,
on a tape-producing typewriter. The report will be in the
form, a compromise between cable and dispatch format, in
which the analyst will in a few days, we hope, find it on his
desk; the first manual typing will be the only one in all but
exceptional instances. Form headings and other repetitive
material need not be so typed even here: a standard tape
carrying them can simply be run through. Carbons or a
mat in the printer will take care of local dissemination and
record copies.
Encrypted and pouched, the tape bypasses in effect all
registries in the field and in Washington-a carbon by the
usual accompanied pouch will satisfy their needs-and is de-
livered with only a pause for automatic decryption to the CIA
Cable Secretariat. The Secretariat operates day and night
with its own courier service and whatever staff is necessary
SECRET 11
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Aeoved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Design For Reporting
to get cables to their users within an hour or two of receipt.
It has developed exceedingly effective procedures, and this
bit of borrowing on our part from cable usage will be impor-
tant both materially and psychologically. In the Secretariat
the unscrambled tape is run through a printer, typing original
and carbons of the operational cover sheet, mat and carbons
of the report.
Responsibility for releasing the report, however, still rests
with the controlling area desk, and that for indicating its dis-
semination belongs jointly to the desk and to CIA Central
Reference. A Central Reference expert will be on duty in the
Secretariat, and as soon as the mat is typed he will read it
against user requirements and note on its face the proper
recipients, as far as possible individual analysts. In the mean-
time carbons of the report, along with the original and carbons
of its cover sheet, have gone to the area desk. If it can be
released without further ado, it goes back immediately, as-
signed a number and showing the addressees prescribed by
the desk, to be added to Central Reference's designations. If
it requires consultation, comment, or correction, it is held up,
possibly a day or so, for these. There will be check-up and
inquiry about overdue releases.
Back in the Secretariat, the report number, dissemination
instructions, desk comments, and minor corrections can
easily be added either on the mat or to the tape, and the
tape can either type a new mat or be fed by teletype to the
consumer. At some future date the whole community may
be sufficiently linked in a secure teletype network that most
of the distribution can be accomplished by feeding the cor-
rected tape into it. Considering the usual need for a courier
at the receiving end of the teletype line, however, courier
service from the Secretariat direct to individuals like that in
present use for cables might be at least as fast for many ad-
dressees. When there are a large number of recipients at one
location, as at the Pentagon, the tape and teletype might be
used to print a mat at a central cable center there, say the
Army Staff Communications Office, which could then make
distribution to Army, ASA, Air Force, Joint Chiefs, and Secre-
tary of Defense offices.
12 gECR~~
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-0392TiJQDD300300001-1
 Approved F9r R Iea a 20 4/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003003QPe%~T1
Design I-or epor mg
Field preparation of the tape may have taken a day, trans-
portation as much as three, Secretariat processing possibly
another, desk release and distribution perhaps a couple more.
When the user analyst gets his information it will probably
be no more than a week old. He could get it faster only with
a large-scale and costly introduction of new radio and cable
circuits with advanced terminal equipment. Field offices and
their controlling headquarters desks will find not only their
reporting but also their considerably greater volume of opera-
tional correspondence all moving at this speed.
Design for Guidance and Coordination
This speed alone will help feed back to the source an opinion
on the usefulness of his information, but as we have shown,
a new medium is needed for communication from user analysts
to the originators of reports. We propose a new evaluation
procedure, centered on a form bearing a deadline for return.
It will call for a quick appraisal by the analyst of the value,
credibility, and adequacy of each report in meeting his require-
ments, with ideas on how it could have been made more useful.
We should like eventually also to get here the analyst's com-
ments on its subject-coding, information which should in time
build up to yield greater precision in stating requirements,
making dissemination, and retrieving documents from stor-
age.
Comments on subject-coding would not be possible under
present procedures: information reports as now disseminated
have not yet been coded. But in our system the Central
Reference expert on duty in the Cable Secretariat who reads
a report to determine its proper recipients could also assign
it ISC and area codes. If the interposition of this step before
dissemination seems an added complication when we are try-
ing to get a report to its users as fast as possible, it would not
really take extra time, and the pay-off in getting analysts to
think in terms of the codes and in making Central Reference
aware of analysts' criteria for coding should be enormous.
The evaluation form will accompany reports sent to those
analysts whose feedback is worth exploiting, the specialists
concerned with the subject matter reported, those responsible
for writing collection requirements on it, those whose work
SECRET 13
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 m d For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921 A000300300001-1
S1E Design For Reporting
will suffer if information is not adequately retrievable because
of imprecise coding. It stands to reason that their coopera-
tion will be quickly rewarded by receipt of fewer reports
which are of no interest to them, by retrieval of filed mate-
rials they need in research, and by the more direct and effec-
tive contact with collectors made possible by their responses.
The form will be designed for simple answers and multiple-
choice checks both for the convenience of the analyst and to
facilitate later processing. In past experience, more than
half of the elaborate old evaluation forms are returned with
check marks only, no substantive comments whatever. For
the most part, therefore, punched-card processing of the new
forms will eliminate carbon or reproduced copies and obviate
manual sortings and distribution. One operator can punch
six to eight hundred forms onto cards in a day. All derived
products, except those including lengthy analyst comment.
will be tailor-made machine tabulations.
Feedback for Coders
Every theoretical discussion of retrieval problems brings
out the inevitable human limitations in the coding process.3
Central Reference document analysts are not omniscient uni-
versal geniuses; in assigning the apparently pertinent codes
they are bound to overlook or not to be aware of angles under
which retrieval might in the future become necessary. This
is the primary criticism leveled at the present library system
by personnel using it. The Intelligence Subject Code, espe-
cially with the refinement of its current revision, will be a
splendid instrument, useful exactly to the point to which
coders properly foresee the headings under which material
may need to be recovered, but no further.
The better and more widely known the ISC, the more it is
directly used and contributed to by experts in their various
fields, the better the retrieval system. If when its revision is
complete we could provide a space on the evaluation form for
analysts to suggest coding in other categories than those as-
signed by Central Reference, analysts would become more fa-
'See for example George W. Wright, "Toward a Federal Intelligence
Memory," Studies 11 3, p. 7, and Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intel-
ligence Information," Studies III 1, p. 25.
14
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921) ~~8?60300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Design For Reporting SECRET
miliar with the coding systems, and any analyst who received
a report could take care of his own interests by thus nomi-
nating the appropriate codes.
Mechanically, the additional entries could be referred to
Central Reference coders in weekly tabulations. These could
show report numbers, the additional codes proposed for each,
and the names of the contributing analysts. They could be
arranged by document or ISC number or in whatever order
would be most conducive to integrating them into the system
after any necessary discussion with the proponents.
Once this feedback process had been under way for some
time and analysts had become used to it, it is hoped they
would develop such confidence in the ability of the library-
particularly as mechanization provides increasingly reliable
and rapid service-to retrieve what they need that they would
be willing to dispense with the bulk of their own holdings of
indexed documents. Without participation in the coding
process we believe this confidence could not be established.
Feedback for Disseminators
If we are to achieve the speed and efficiency of mechanical
dissemination from a central point direct to individual
analysts, their individual requirements, as we have noted, will
have to be stated with precision and kept up to date by a
feedback system suitable for mechanization. Under such a
system, dissemination can take place by ISC subject codes,
and the assignment of codes to a report would automatically
indicate its dissemination. But coded requirements as well
as coded reports are a prerequisite for such a mechanized
process.
The analyst will be properly skeptical that his subtle needs
can ever be fully stated in machine language, and certainly
some unusual spot requirements will have to be handled out-
side any mechanical system. But most requirements can be
sufficiently codified to take care of the great routine bulk of
dissemination. A codified statement of an analyst's require-
ments may be derived in the first instance by tabulating his
response over a period of some months to key questions on
the evaluation form for all the reports he received, along with
their assigned subject codes. Document analysts could trans-
Approver VOWTelease 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A0003003000011'f
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET Design For Reporting
late this tabulation into a tentative Statement of Require-
ments, to be refined in discussion with the analyst concerned.
The resultant agreed Statement of Requirements would be
used as the basis for current dissemination to him, and it
could be kept up to date by the continuing feedback of his
evaluations.
This feedback system, properly used, will tend to give the
analyst and his supervisor direct control over the volume
of information delivered to his in-basket. The supervisor is an
interested party because of his responsibility for an equitable
distribution of workload to his subordinates, in practice a most
difficult task. Most supervisors carry their own workloads
and do not inspect their subordinates' in-baskets at regular
intervals. Tabulations of the evaluation form by name could
provide them every week or at any convenient interval with
a list of the reports their subordinates took in and their re-
actions to them. This tool might be a considerable aid to
proper workload distribution.
Feedback for Collectors
Most of the questions on the form will be designed to guide
the collector. Headquarters can use the answers, incorpo-
rated into punched card systems covering operational data,
sources, project numbers, and lists of requirements, to fur-
nish the field, in tabulations by station or base and source
cryptonym, the evaluations placed on all of their reports,
matched up against requirements levied on the station. Head-
quarters desks and staffs will be able, in their planning and
control functions, to use not only these but other tabulations,
for example listings by project and source of reports and
their evaluations, lists by requirement numbers of evaluated
reports responsive - to requirements, and a variety of statisti-
cal. compilations. If evaluations run consistently high on a
low-cost source, there will be little question about the renewal
of his operation. Adverse reactions will provide an indication
to the desk and staff that a situation needs to be looked into.
User rejections will not be drowned in the stack of paper sur-
faced once a year in the project renewal process, but will lead
to an examination of all pertinent facts and the prompt clos-
ing of marginal operations. Desk and staff personnel will be
16-
proved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-039210300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Design For Reporting SECRET
freed from the routine bookkeeping chores now required to
keep track of field reporting.
From Prototype to Production Model
This design for speed and guidance has undergone limited
tests on the reporting of a major field station, and it has been
found to produce at least the short-term benefits antic-
ipated. It is still in the prototype stage, however, subject
to modification in more extensive testing planned as equip-
ment becomes available. It may be that new technological
developments, for example photographic or magnetic tape en-
cryption processes now being investigated, will make major
changes desirable. In any case it will require adaptation to
varying local needs in the field before it can be generally ap-
plied to the reporting of even this Agency.
There will be many obstacles to the integration of the re-
porting of the whole community in a single system. They
will have to be tackled slowly, and piecemeal. The easiest be-
ginning will probably be on the receiving end, with the ex-
tension of rapid dissemination and the application of some
better evaluation system in those agencies, notably Air In-
telligence, that employ the Intelligence Subject Code. Ef-
forts are now under way to standardize the format of all com-
munity reporting. For all its tentative and limited nature,
our design does provide a basic concept and may embody some
specific features that can lead to an ultimate integrated re-
porting system.
Approved'BCPRdlease 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001 17
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET
Significant advance and recal-
citrant bugs in the procedure
for urgent intelligence flashes.
NOTES ON THE CRITIC SYSTEM
William A. Tidwell
"A true critick ought to . . . communicate to the world
such things as are worth their observation."
Joseph Addison's job description in 1712 could also be the
motto for a special CRITIC set up by the intelligence com-
munity in mid-1958, the reporting system responsive to a di-
rective that critical intelligence be communicated from the
field to the "highest authorities" in "speeds approaching ten
minutes." CRITIC does communicate rapidly to this high
executive world things that are worthy of their urgent at-
tention, specifically indications of international crisis or im-
pending military hostilities. If, in its present state of develop-
ment and with the communications hardware now in use,
there are relatively few occasions on which a CRITIC message
actually moves from reporter to intelligence user in ten min-
utes' time, the establishment of the system has nevertheless
made radical changes in the flow of critical intelligence to
Washington, and messages handled under it take only a frac-
tion of the average time required for similar messages before
its inauguration.
Establishment and Performance
The intelligence community has always been concerned
with the rapid reporting of urgent items, but a systematic
community-wide assault on the problem did not get under
way until the autumn of 1957. At that time a study of the
reporting related to the Turkish-Syrian crisis and certain
selected indicators of Soviet military activity demonstrated
that many critically important items were being handled in
a routine manner and that they frequently required more
than 24 hours to reach the White House. In terms of aver-
ages, a message containing information such as is now han-
dled in the CRITIC system would take nine hours and a half
MORI/HRP
from pg.
19-23
Ap p rovedSOPKe lease 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003003000011-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET The CRITIC System
to move from the field reporter to the intelligence user in
Washington.
The results of this study were given to the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,
which, with the concurrence of the IAC, recommended to the
President that the problem be attacked with the utmost vigor
by the intelligence community. This recommendation was
approved by the President, and the community initiated ac-
tion on two fronts, that of facilities and that of procedures.
The first resulted in the promulgation of NSCID No. 7, desig-
nating the Department of Defense as executive agent for
creating and managing a world-wide communications system
for the transmission of critical intelligence. The second led
to the establishment of the CRITIC system of procedures for
rapid reporting over this world-wide communications net.
From the beginning it was obvious that the initial decision
as to whether an item of information is of critical nature
would have to be made by the field reporters. At the same
time it was clear that field reporting personnel, not always
apprised of all the related information available in Washing-
ton, might err in their judgments. It was necessary, there-
fore, while giving as much guidance as possible to the field,
to reserve to intelligence headquarters in Washington the
opportunity for final evaluation of CRITIC items before pass-
ing them to the White House.
Critical intelligence was therefore defined as "information
indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which af-
fects the security or interests of the United States to such
an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the
President," and in DCID No. 1/8 specific categories of infor-
mation considered to fall under this definition were listed.
Field reporting personnel of all intelligence agencies were di-
rected to prefix the indicator CRITIC to all messages con-
taining information under these headings and to forward
them under high precedence by the most rapid communica-
tions means available. It was arranged that in Washington
messages carrying this indicator would receive simultaneous
electrical dissemination to all the main USIB agencies and to
the Strategic and the Tactical Air Commands. The system
was put into effect on 21 July 1958.
2A, fAW
For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-039210300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The CRITIC System SECRET
Like most new undertakings, the CRITIC system operated
with a certain amount of creaking and groaning during the
first few months, but its effect on the speed of reporting
was immediately apparent. CRITIC messages already moved
from field reporters to intelligence users in Washington in an
average of about an hour and a half, as against the 91/2-hour
average during the Turkish-Syrian crisis. The Critical Com-
munications Committee, monitoring the system on behalf of
the USIB, spent a great deal of time refining the interpreta-
tion of various categories in the CRITIC list and unsnarling
procedural problems as they were identified. By the end of
the first year of operations the average transmission times
had dropped to an hour or less, an accomplishment made
possible by improvements in the hardware and operating pro-
cedures of the supporting communications services along with
better handling of the traffic in the intelligence agencies.
Persistent Problems
The progress achieved by the CRITIC system has thus been
excellent, but a number of problems remain to be overcome
before it can reach full efficiency. For one thing, it can func-
tion perfectly only if the messages are kept short, but field
reporting personnel have not all learned yet to be as concise
as possible. It is still not unusual for a message to contain
hundreds of groups, and one even reached the 3,000 mark. It
is obvious that these messages cannot be put through in ten-
minute service by present communications equipment, operat-
ing at 60 or 100 words per minute. Long messages to de-
scribe a complex situation could often be obviated by a series
of short messages sent as the situation develops.
Some headquarters personnel have been misled by the defi-
nition of critical intelligence as matter for "the immediate at-
tention of the President" into thinking that each CRITIC
message should in itself be something of an earth-shaker.
But there are a number of categories of CRITIC items, indi-
cators of Soviet hostile intent, which become critical only as
they form a critical pattern. The pattern, however, can be
discerned only in Washington, by the combination of its sev-
eral elements; and field reporters without access to the rest
of the pattern must therefore give CRITIC handling to in-
Approved br~elease 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1~
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SECRET The CRITIC System
dividual elements, items which may prove in Washington to
be isolated events of relatively little significance.
Some reporting personnel have not understood that the
handling of CRITIC messages in Washington is organized on
a community-wide basis, that the CRITIC designator is less a
communications precedence indicator than an addressee
group which automatically ensures immediate distribution
by electrical means to all appropriate addressees in the Wash-
ington area. Their consequent designation of multiple ad-
dressees has increased handling and processing time and de-
layed delivery to intended recipients. One reporter even ad-
dressed a CRITIC message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, causing General Twining to be awakened in the
middle of the night and blocking delivery of the message to its
proper recipients until he could authorize its release.
Such shortcomings as these, however, are probably inevi-
table when a large number of widely dispersed people are called
upon to learn a new system of operation; experience and fur-
ther training of both intelligence and communications per-
sonnel should greatly improve performance in these respects.
More recalcitrant is a problem arising from a communica-
tions fact of life: in a number of highly important countries
of the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, the
U.S. Government cannot maintain its own communications
facilities and is dependent upon commercial facilities or the
monopolies of the governments concerned, which of course
do not recognize the comparative precedence assigned a mes-
sage within the U.S. Government systems. Some of these
governments might be willing on a reciprocal basis to grant
us the right to operate our own communications, but the
granting of such rights in the United States is contrary to
U.S. policy. Communications from these forbidden areas are
generally the responsibility of CIA and the Department of
State. Both organizations are hard at work on the problem,
and there is some hope that improvements can be effected.
In the communications systems operated by the U.S. Gov-
ernment, considerable additional improvements are planned
or under way. We have good reason to believe that CRITIC
messages handled by these facilities can achieve average
23pproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921$0l3b0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The CRITIC System SECRET
speeds of 10 minutes or less within the very near future. Nu-
merous test messages transmitted in substantially less than
ten minutes prove that the goal of "speeds approaching ten
minutes" is attainable under the right conditions. The
CRITIC system will become a "true critick," however, only by
virtue of alert and efficient support from a great number of
intelligence and communications personnel in many agen-
cies of the Government. Great strides have been made, but
there is still work to do.
R
Approved Forr Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A critical review of prewar Jap-
anese military intelligence op-
erations in Manchuria.
ANTI-SOVIET OPERATIONS OF KWANTUNG ARMY
INTELLIGENCE, 1931-391
Richard G. Brown
Japanese military intelligence operations against the Soviet
Union in the Far East became of prime importance after
Japan took over Manchuria in 1932. Before that she had no
great need for intelligence on the Soviet forces in the Far
East, inasmuch as she had no common international bound-
ary with the U.S.S.R. on the continent, the Chinese being in
control of most of Manchuria. At the time of the Man-
churian incident the Japanese nevertheless had potentially
strong operational intelligence assets in numerous inhabit-
ants of the Korean and Chinese border areas who were able to
cross into Soviet territory with relative ease so long as So-
viet security remained generally lax. In addition, there were
numerous anti-Communist White Russians in northern Man-
churia willing and able to engage in intelligence activities
for the Japanese.
The intelligence operations of the principal Japanese
agency in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, included propa-
ganda, sabotage, counterintelligence, and what was to be-
come a major collection effort on the Soviet army and the
geography of the area. The means it employed included the
dispatch of secret agents into Soviet territory, the intercep-
tion of radio communications, the interrogation of Soviet de-
serters and defectors, and the establishment of border ob-
servation units.
This article is based on historical data compiled, with the assistance
of personnel of the Japanese Kwantung Army, by the Military His-
tory Section of Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, and distributed
by the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. The MORI/HRP
principal source is Volume X of the Series Japanese Special Studies from pg.
on Manchuria, issued in June 1955 under the title "Japanese Intel-
ligence Planning Against the USSR." 25-34
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 25
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence
From the first the Kwantung Army and the Army General
Staff in Tokyo were alert for indications of Soviet reaction to
the Manchurian incident, and after Kwantung Army ele-
ments moved into the Soviet sphere of influence the surveil-
lance of Soviet actions in the Far East, particularly any mili-
tary movements, was intensified. Yet Japanese military
headquarters felt that the Soviet Union had no intention of
intervening in the situation, and so devoted its attention not
to immediate countermeasures but to consolidating the Japa-
nese position in Manchuria and developing an extensive in-
telligence network as Kwantung Army units advanced toward
the Soviet border. This intelligence effort was intensified as
Soviet border defenses improved: aerial photography during
the summer of 1933 revealed extensive fortifications designed
to check Japanese military operations against Soviet terri-
tory.
Agent Infiltration
The principal field intelligence units under the Intelligence
Section of the Kwantung Army staff were eight Army Special
Services Agencies. Of these it was the unit in Harbin which
played the major role in the Manchurian operations. The
Harbin ASSA used White Russians for espionage missions,
and these were the best of the agents available. The border
area ASSA's occasionally used White Russians, but relied
mainly on local Chinese and Koreans. These agents were in-
filtrated into Soviet territory to carry out espionage. Occa-
sional deserters from the Soviet army were also exploited for
information.
The Soviets commenced to bolster border security during
1935. They increased the number of border garrison units,
ordered the evacuation of border area inhabitants, and insti-
tuted constant patrolling. A Soviet counterespionage network
in Manchurian territory, especially in the border area, regu-
larly observed and reported on the movements of Japanese
agents. The White Russians, while more reliable and compe-
tent than other agents, being most of them ardent anti-Com-
munists, were more easily detected. Many were shot in at-
tempting to cross the border, and the majority did not re-
turn, thanks to effective Soviet security. A deadlock in trans-
border operations resulted.
ArQL- For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-ROR~~ J2 J UO~OY300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kwantung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The standstill in intelligence operations was quite embar-
rassing to the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence
Section, which therefore came increasingly to take over the
active direction of the intelligence services in Manchuria, par-
ticularly of the ASSA units. Efforts were made to improve
techniques of agent infiltration, to take more pains in forging
credentials, to pay more attention to dress, baggage, and lan-
guage, to give better training for missions and reporting. At-
tention was also given to other means of intelligence collec-
tion-communications, publications, and telescopic observa-
tion.
Communications Intercepts
Soviet communications in the Far East relied mainly on
wireless; the wire network had failed to keep pace with the
mushrooming military and industrial expansion. A very con-
siderable number of Soviet message circuits were thus vul-
nerable to interception. In order to learn the techniques for
breaking codes, the General Staff in Tokyo had sent several
technical officers to Poland in 1933 and 1934: the Polish Army
General Staff's cryptanalytic work was considered by the Jap-
anese to be among the best in the world. When the first con-
tingent of these officers returned from Poland in 1935, a small
unit for studies on radio interception and the breaking of So-
viet codes was formed and assigned to the Kwantung Army.
Eventually this unit was expanded and became known as the
Communication Intelligence Group, operating directly under
the supervision of the Kwantung Army intelligence service.
The interception and analysis of Soviet plain-text messages
was not undertaken until 1936, when the Soviet Union began
to construct the Baikal-Amur Magistral to supplement the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. The BAM line was a matter of grave
concern to the Japanese General Staff, but the Kwantung
Army Intelligence Section had no means of observing the prog-
ress of construction on it. The Operations Section there-
fore took the initiative and asked the Japanese-controlled
South Manchurian Railway Company to establish a branch
of its Communications Research Department in Harbin. This
branch was charged with intercepting plain-text wireless mes-
sages concerning construction on the BAM line and with
E ?7
20/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000 1
Approve d For Release
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence
d
a
y
y
A
az
?
~o >(9
r
-
.
\yt E
k-
`
-
m v
1 (
0
?1
r
L
, s
t
4
1
;~
1 - !2 ti..y
~L(
/ C
U
p j
c
d}
m
(proved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-R1Bff719j6900b&00001-1
 Approved IA-RDP78-03 I3V3
Kwantuneg Army20 Inte 04/1llig/1e7nce OFF118 00P 08NJY
analysis of the intercepted data with respect to selected sub-
jects. Although this installation supplied data to the intel-
ligence network through the very active Harbin ASSA, the
fact that it was conceived and supervised by the Operations
Section became an irritant in this Section's relations with the
Intelligence Section. The success of the Railway Company's
unit led the intelligence service to supplement its code inter-
ceptions with clear text intercepts, which were thereafter
forwarded on ticker tape to the Harbin ASSA for analysis by
its Document Intelligence Division.
Document Analysis
The importance of available Soviet publications, primarily
newspapers published in the Far East, had somewhat belatedly
become apparent to the Japanese, and the few publication
analysts originally assigned to the Harbin ASSA had been aug-
mented and formed into the Document Intelligence Division.
Its staff included a large number of White Russian intellec-
tuals, as well as Japanese competent to interpret and analyze
Soviet documents, publications and messages. Periodicals,
handbills, newspapers, magazines, books, booklets, pamphlets,
and even personal notebooks collected by the various intelli-
gence agencies were sent to the Harbin ASSA for scrutiny.
Later, when it became difficult to obtain documents, greater
importance was attached to Soviet radio broadcasts, along
with the intercepted clear-text wireless messages. But there
were still documents obtained by agents, papers carried by
the occasional defectors from Soviet territory, and in one
instance a windfall of postal communications from a Soviet
mail plane which made a forced landing in Manchuria in 1938.
Border Observation
In the early thirties the military units of the Kwantung
Army manned posts for visual observation of Soviet terri-
tory; each front-line unit had a few lookout posts equipped
with 24-power battery telescopes. After the difficulties in
intelligence collection became acute in 1934, the intelligence
service undertook to improve and expand this system as an
intelligence activity. The observation posts were organized
as "Soviet Territory Observation Teams" who were to keep
the Soviet side of the border under surveillance day and night,
ri,& 29
Approve orlfefease'2Q04~12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence
recording in detail the movement of even a single soldier,
horse, or vehicle. The posts were each manned by approxi-
mately one squad. They used telescopes of various types,
ranging up to one of 150 power obtained from the Navy for
night use. The front-line Army commands were ordered
to make use of any suitable points in their respective sectors
for this purpose, and to train and supervise the personnel
to make the observations. Nevertheless, up until 1938 these
teams were often composed of inferior personnel and occa-
sionally even lacked telescopes. Some of their more impor-
tant reports were on the arrival and departure of ships in
Vladivostok harbor, as observed from posts at Wangchaoshan
and Tumentzu, and on the arrival and departure of aircraft
at Voroshilov, as seen by posts at Suifenho and Tungning.
Achievements and Failures
By mid-1939 the Kwantung Army's intelligence agencies had
scored considerable progress in improving their operations.
In 1935 the communications intelligence Research Unit had
succeeded in breaking the simple codes used by the Soviet
border forces, and constant study brought later successes
against Soviet army codes of three and four letters. Although
these codes were not commonly used for important messages,
the Research Unit was nevertheless able to learn the organi-
zation and disposition of some border garrisons and the loca-
tion and movements of some air units. It also did traffic
analysis, compiling statistics on the origin and volume of So-
viet radio messages.
The interception and study of plain-text messages by the
South Manchurian Railway's Communications Research De-
partment yielded considerable information about the progress
of construction on the BAM line. The Kwantung Army's Re-
search Unit was also able to obtain from plain-text intercepts
some valuable indications about particular military situations
in Asiatic Russia. Analyzing this data, the Document Intel-
ligence Branch of Kwantung Army intelligence was able to
reach conclusions about the disposition of units, changes in
units, their commanders, their numerical designations, the
arrival of new personnel, and their places of origin, as indi-
cated by messages of safe arrival sent home. Messages in the
3Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA- F F fA 9I4?A3W0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kwantung Army Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
clear also supplied many fragmentary details about industrial
and economic conditions in Asiatic Russia, and these often
contributed to important findings.
The piecemeal data compiled by the Harbin Document In-
telligence Division was on many occasions helpful to higher
echelons in making estimates of the enemy's strength and
disposition. A compilation of file cards on approximately
4,000 Soviet officers in the Far East, for example, contributed
significantly to ascertaining the order of battle for Soviet
army forces in eastern Asia. An unusual operation under-
taken by the Division was the examination of postal matter
in the Soviet mail plane which made a forced landing in Man-
churia in 1938. The mail had to be secretly opened, sorted,
copied, and resealed while diplomatic negotiations for the
return of the airplane and its crew were being carried on.
The analysis of the material was completed within a month.
The observation teams engaged in telescopic surveillance of
Soviet territory produced some information but on the whole
were not notably successful. They provided details on Soviet
fortification improvements in parts of the border zone and
on new military roads, barracks, and warehouses behind the
fortifications, and they compiled statistical data on vehicle
operations supporting the fortified zone. Efforts of the
ASSA's to penetrate Soviet territory with spies were nearly
all failures, but their interrogation of fugitives from Soviet
territory often uncovered important information.
A test of the Kwantung Army's intelligence services was
afforded in 1939 by the development of the Nomonhan inci-
dent, which began in May as a series of clashes between Soviet
and Japanese forces guarding the border between Outer Mon-
golia and Manchuria. By June it had become a major engage-
ment of divisional magnitude and in August a failure for the
Japanese. This operation disclosed several serious defects of
organization and technique in Kwantung Army intelligence,
in spite of its significant improvement since 1931. In gen-
eral, it showed itself still not sufficiently modernized and sys-
tematized to be effective. It also showed marked differences
of system and procedure among its several components.
Approved For ReFease 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-i
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwanfung Army Intelligence
Deficiencies at Nomonhan
The chief defects of the Kwantung Army's headquarters
Intelligence Section arose from its having assumed over a
period of years complete control of all the ASSA's. Its own
functioning had consequently become extremely complex and
its real aims were often lost from sight. Properly a policy
planning staff, the Section had been transformed. into an op-
erating agency, and the detail arising from its domination of
the ASSA's constantly obstructed it. As the discharge of its
normal responsibilities became careless under these stresses,
the headquarters Operations Section lost confidence in it and
tended to make its own estimates, arbitrary and independent,
drawn from scanty information and often from untested
sources. The Intelligence Section was unable to halt this
trend, and it became more pronounced with the passage of
time.
This headquarters involvement with the ASSA's was aggra-
vated by an organizational weakness in the coordination of
these units which prevented them from being utilized sys-
tematically. The ASSA's had failed to systematize liaison
and cooperation among themselves. The Harbin ASSA, which
had the greatest experience and capacity in Soviet intelligence
and a staff more comprehensive and diversified than any of
the others, was kept on an equal footing with the other seven,
so that the benefit of its knowledge and expert guidance was
not imparted to them. With all eight operating independ-
ently under the direct control of the Intelligence Section, the
administrative burden became too great during the Nomon-
han incident.
A serious procedural defect in the handling of information
was illustrated by an incident which produced a minor crisis
in relations between the Intelligence and Operations Sec-
tions. The Harbin ASSA had obtained through a contact in
the office of the Soviet consul general there a file purporting
to be extracts from message traffic between Moscow and
Khabarovsk. Initially this correspondence seemed authen-
tic and important, but developments after the outbreak of
the Nomonhan incident convinced the Intelligence Section
that it was false and deceptive. The Operations Section, how-
ever, which had obtained a copy of it from the Harbin ASSA,
Wpproved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA- 81,6S9VfA0 0300001-1
 Approved For Release 20p4//17 : CIA-RDP78-03g' ffl43 0(9Ajy
Kwantung Army me Iigence
assumed that it had been acquired by interception and deci-
pherment, and reproduced it under highest security classifica-
tion. The Intelligence Section failed to report the deceptive
nature of this correspondence to the Operations Section,
which therefore tended to be misled by it in some phases of
the Nomonhan operations.
It was not until the last stages of this engagement, as the
Kwantung Army was concentrating its strength for an
attack, that the communications intelligence Research Unit
achieved some moderate success in learning the disposition
of Soviet and Mongolian troops in the Far East; and even
this limited accomplishment was made from the vantage point
of Changchun-almost 500 miles from the scene of battle.
The Kwantung Army's inadequacies in the communications
intelligence field were strikingly apparent in its failure to
have a signal detail in the front-line areas for the collection
of battlefield information transmitted by wireless in either
code or plain text, for the Soviet army often transmitted in
clear text in situations demanding speed, and the increase in
the number of coded communications for combat purposes
would have facilitated the solution of the Soviet code. Com-
munications facilities in the vastness of Outer Mongolia, the
locale of this conflict, were so patently poor that a significant
increase in radio traffic was to have been expected at the
outbreak of hostilities. Japanese interception equipment was
not developed sufficiently, however, nor were operators ade-
quately trained to tap this source of intelligence. Another
communications deficiency was the lack of a network for the
exclusive use of the intelligence services; the secret missions
that did get into Soviet territory were often therefore
isolated.
A committee of officers from Kwantung Army headquar-
ters and the General Staff in Tokyo later reviewed the Kwan-
tung Army's performance during the Nomonhan incident
and found a number of weaknesses. Chief among these was
the fact that the operations staff officer had insufficient con-
fidence in the estimates of the enemy situation made by the
intelligence staff officer, and as result was inclined to form
his own estimates on an inadequate intelligence foundation,
sometimes even basing his decisions exclusively on the peace-
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 33
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 A roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kwantung Army Intelligence
time situation. Another was the preoccupation of intelligence
officers with peacetime intelligence problems to such an ex-
tent that they failed to develop a war mobilization plan and
thus were unable to exploit enemy activity during the No-
monhan hostilities. A third was the fact that improvements
in techniques were insufficiently taken advantage of, and that
there was a great need for systematizing operations and pro-
cedures. The committee recommended that major improve-
ments be made in the peacetime operation of the intelligence
services and in preparing them for wartime activity, so that
intelligence estimates, as well as other intelligence products,
would enjoy the full confidence of operations officers and be
accorded full weight.
3Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-F~P~ Q39Z'IAOD03II0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03 fA 089R0M1+
How FCC's routine policing of
the ether became in World War
II a multi-purpose defense serv-
ice and a far-flung counter-
espionage operation.
THE U.S. HUNT FOR AXIS AGENT RADIOS
George E. Sterling
I hope that this country, particularly its intelligence agen-
cies, has become better organized to handle a national emer-
gency than it was in 1941. When the war, after slowly creep-
ing for two years from Europe toward U.S. shores, suddenly
exploded upon us at Pearl Harbor, thousands of new kinds
of things had to be undertaken in desperate haste and with
at times disorderly improvisation. Many agencies were given
emergency duties for no better reason than that they were
using equipment approximating what was needed for the war-
time work. That they by and large discharged these extraordi-
nary responsibilities well, at the same time helping coopera-
tively toward the gradual readjustment of temporarily as-
signed functions, is something in which all those who partici-
pated can take pride.
The Federal Communications Commission, because it had
a network of radio monitoring and direction-finding stations
to police the domestic airwaves, was given its full share of
duties not called for in its job description. It ran a rescue
service for planes lost in the black-out or bad weather,
locating them by their radio signals and furnishing them their
bearings; more than 600 planes, many of which would other-
wise have been really lost, were given FCC emergency fixes
before Army Air Force personnel were trained, with our help,
to take over the job. It monitored enemy commercial radio
circuits and furnished the Board of Economic Warfare with
hundreds of leads useful in the preclusive buying program.
To meet requirements of the Eastern, Gulf, and Western de-
fense commands, the Commission's legal responsibility for ap-
prehending unlicensed radio stations was extended to sur-
veillance of the coast by radio patrols for signs of surrepti-
MORI/HRP
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 35 from pg.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1 35-54
 roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
MIICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
tious communication with enemy submarines. The network
intercepted foreign weather traffic for our air forces. It mon-
itored foreign radio broadcasts, setting up the organization
which now has become the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, and published texts and analyses of broadcast news
and propaganda for a variety of government consumers. It
trained OSS personnel in radio methods and procedures and
built equipment for their use.
For a year and a quarter the FCC's Radio Intelligence
Division, as the monitoring network was known, carried the
full, load of military radio intelligence in Alaska, where the
Army was not able to station a radio intelligence company
until late in 1942 and got a monitoring station in operation
only in the spring of 1943. It radio-patrolled the Alaskan coast
by sea. It also participated at Army request in military in-
telligence elsewhere, most notably in Hawaii and on the west
coast. In San Francisco it set up an Intelligence Center
where officers of the military services were on duty around
the clock. It identified and tracked the radio-equipped bal-
loons which the Japanese launched against our west coast.
It discovered and established the location of a Nazi weather
station on Greenland, which the Coast Guard was then able
to destroy. It trained the military personnel who eventually
took over most of these duties, prepared instructional book-
lets and monitoring aids for them, and supervised their work
until they became competent enough to operate without help.
The RID even participated from afar in the guerrilla move-
ments in the Philippines. This activity began when one of
our monitors picked up a signal using the call, PK1JC, of an
amateur in the Dutch East Indies, where no amateurs could
operate. We fixed its origin in northern Luzon. PK1JC sent
a message coded, we determined, with a prewar Signal Corps
cipher disk, giving the name and serial number of an unsur-
rendered American soldier trying to establish contact with
MacArthur's headquarters. He requested acknowledgement
by a signal from General Electric's powerful KGEI transmit-
ter near San Francisco. The Signal Corps arranged for this
acknowledgement and asked us to continue copying all his
messages. Later, when the landing of transmitters by sub-
marine created quite heavy traffic from the Philippine guer-
36
Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RD'78-039Z'fA0003D0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
rillas, a primary monitoring station at San Leandro, Cali-
fornia, was exclusively devoted, at Signal Corps request, to
copying it and expediting it by private teletype circuit to
Washington.
Policing the Domestic Ether
Although these spirited improvisations requested and sup-
ported by the military services lay far outside the Commis-
sion's proper charter, the Communications Act of 1934, they
were undertaken eagerly when required and relinquished later
gracefully but with reluctance by our radio men and women
anxious to contribute to the war effort in any way they could.
Our people had enough of their own proper work to do, for
after Pearl Harbor the regular job of the Radio Intelligence
Division took on a new and grimmer aspect. It was now not
just a question of tracking down maladjusted transmitters,
unshielded diathermy apparatus, or even the illegal communi-
cations of pranksters, smugglers, and racetrack tipsters, but
of sealing the country's leaky ether against loss of war
secrets over the radio circuits of enemy agents. Hitherto,
with commercial communications to foreign countries free of
surveillance, spies in this country had had no need to risk
secret transmitters; now these commercial facilities were
closed or censored and the whole spectrum had to be patrolled
for furtive whisperings in Morse cipher. The RID was under
challenge to live up to its initials.
The Division's equipment, personnel, and physical deploy-
ment were adequate to the task. During the state of national
emergency that preceded Pearl Harbor the FCC had been au-
thorized to begin an expansion of its radio detection facili-
ties, which were ultimately stabilized in twelve primary moni-
toring stations, about sixty subordinate monitoring posts, and
about ninety mobile units distributed through the United
States, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. The fixed stations
and many of the mobile units were linked by instantaneous
communications. They were organized into three major net-
works based on radio intelligence centers respectively in
Washington, near San Francisco, and in Honolulu; but in fix-
ing the location of a source of radio signals the three net-
works were fused into one and directed from Washington.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 37
Approved or elease 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
Each primary station, in addition to its complex of rhombic
and other antennae and its receiving and recording equip-
ment, had at least one Adcock direction finder, a large rotat-
ing antenna sensitive to the direction of shortwave signals
bounced off the ionosphere; this device had been invented in
England, but was refined and improved by RID engineers. At
short range, say within a few miles, a simple loop antenna
can pick up the ground-wave component of a signal and deter-
mine its direction; our disguised mobile units included these
in their equipment. And finally, for locating transmitters at
really close quarters, we developed what we called a "snifter,"
a signal-strength meter that a man could carry in the palm
of his hand while inspecting a building to determine which
room a signal came from.
In the routine day-and-night operation of a monitoring sta-
tion, the patrolman of the ether would cruise his beat, passing
up and down the frequencies of the usable radio spectrum,
noting the landmarks of the regular fixed transmissions,
recognizing the peculiar modulation of a known transmitter
or the characteristic fist of a familiar operator, observing an
irregularity in operating procedure and pausing long enough
to verify the call letters, or finding a strange signal and re-
cording the traffic for close examination, and then sometimes
alerting the nation-wide net to obtain a fix on the location of
its source. More than 800 such fixes would be made in an
average month, requiring the taking of some 6,000 individual
bearings. For although mathematically the intersection of
two bearings provides a fix, the 1% error that must in prac-
tice be allowed in the angle of a bearing, even when it is cor-
rected for variations in propagation and site conditions, be-
comes considerable at distances that may run to thousands
of miles; and at least four bearings are needed for a reason-
ably reliable long-range fix.
Radio Spies in the United States
With respect to Axis agents in the United States and its
territories this close vigilance was almost purely prophylactic,
and. effective in its prophylaxis: out of respect for it enemy
agents, as far as we ourselves were able to discover, made
only two attempts during the entire war to establish radio
communications across our ethereal frontiers, and in both cases
38
Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-R~P7$-II3YRAW90300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
failed to get a single message through. The stories of these
two, although they have been told from other viewpoints else-
where,2 are worth summarizing here.
The first took place in the spring of 1940, long before Pearl
Harbor had roused us to hunt for radio spies here in earnest.
Our routine monitoring turned up an unidentified transmit-
ter carrying on coded traffic with a distant station which used
the call AOR. We asked the Army and the Navy if it might
be one of theirs. They had no knowledge of it; the Navy
thought it might be a St. John, New Brunswick, station. But
our direction finders showed it to be on Long Island, and its
correspondent AOR near Hamburg, Germany. We reported
to the FBI.
The Bureau told us in confidence that it was indeed a Ger-
man agent radio, but under their control. A German-Ameri-
can, William Sebold, had revealed that he was recruited by
the Nazis and instructed to set it up. The FBI built and now
were manning the station for him, feeding Hamburg false or
innocuous information and identifying its agent sources. The
deception continued for more than a year under our joint
surveillance, until at the end of June, 1941, 33 German agents
to whom the traffic had furnished leads were arrested. At
their trial that fall, when the defense tried to maintain that
AOR was not a German station but an FBI entrapment device
in the United States, RID engineer Albert McIntosh produced
charts showing the fix on Hamburg. His public testimony
must have been one factor in the German decision not to risk
agent transmitters in the United States.
They did try it once more, though, right after Pearl Har-
bor, apparently on local initiative, impromptu. In the general
alert which followed that shocking Sunday morning we had
put several mobile monitoring units out cruising the Wash-
ington streets. These were equipped not only with loop di-
rection finders but with a device we called the watch-dog, an
1 Wilhelm Hoettl, one of the German foreign intelligence area chiefs,
affirmed during his interrogation by 3rd Army in June 1945 that the
Sicherheitsdienst had not been able to establish a single wireless
connection either in the United States or in England.
2 Notably in Don Whitehead's The FBI Story.
Approved Forl ReleaseE20O4r1Y2/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001 1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
Ipproved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-I AR*4 IA6 0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
aperiodic receiver we had developed which would sound an
alarm when it received a strong signal on any of a wide range
of frequencies. (It was patented by two RID engineers and
later used by OSS and the Navy.) In the wee hours of Tues-
day, December 9, one of these watch-dogs was triggered by
signals on a transatlantic frequency. At the same moment
three thousand miles away our monitors in Portland, Oregon,
heard them too-station UA briefly and vainly calling a dis-
tant control center. Five other direction-finding stations were
set to watch the frequency; and when a few hours later UA
tried it again, they reported the bearings projected on the
chart in Figure 1. This fix confirmed the uncertain supposi-
tion of the watch-dog that the transmitter was in Wash-
ington.
Now three mobile units were given the scent, and they
quickly narrowed down the location to the German Embassy,
as shown in Figure 2. It was a problem to pin-point the
transmitter without entering the Embassy because the an-
tenna was stretched between two buildings, with equal signal
strength at each end and apparently lead-in wires to both
buildings. This problem was solved in a pre-dawn conference
with the FBI, who arranged, in cooperation with the Potomac
Electric Power Co., that we could go down into a manhole in
the street and cut the power to each building separately in
turn when UA began to call. In the end, however, because
the State Department was afraid for our own diplomatic mis-
sion still in Germany, we did not seize UA but simply set up
two jammers to drown him out if he should try once more.
He never did.
This beginning was the end for Axis radio agents within
our borders; any German agents picked up by the FBI there-
after were found to have been using secret ink or some other
communications than radio to get information out of the
country. And we learned that some Japanese agents who re-
quested their headquarters' permission to set up a transmitter
here were turned down on the grounds that the FCC would
nab them as soon as they got on the air. Outside our own
states and territories it was a different story, one in which
also the RID became intimately concerned.
Approved ForlRefease-20D4/'12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001 11
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
The Portuguese Net
One day in September 1941, monitors at the secondary RID
post in Miami heard a station using irregular procedures and
signing the call UU2, one not in conformity with those used
on commercial and other authorized circuits. It was there-
fore made a case for investigation. Bearings fixed its loca-
tion near Lisbon, Portugal; and as it continued to call almost
nightly without receiving a reply, RID units were instructed
to be on the lookout for the answering station. After more
than a month monitors at the secondary posts in Pittsburg
and Albuquerque simultaneously picked up the answer from
a station signing CNA; bearings were taken which located this
transmitter in South Africa.
A few days later another station using the UU2 procedure
was intercepted, this time with the call BX7. It was also in
Lisbon, and the characteristics of its signal showed that with-
out question BX7 was the same station which had previously
signed UU2, apparently the control stationof a network. After
a week an answer with the call letters NPD was picked up by
our Rhode Island monitoring post. This station proved to
be in Portuguese West Africa.
The messages exchanged between the Lisbon control UU2/
BX7 and the two out-stations in Africa were of course en-
ciphered. RID did not maintain a cryptanalysis laboratory,
decipherment being the responsibility of the FBI, of the
Army's Signal Intelligence Service, and, on behalf of the Navy,
of the Coast Guard; but in order to facilitate the identifica-
tion of intercepted traffic we had interested a couple of our
staff in cryptanalytic work. These men attained a consider-
able skill and in some cases were able to furnish leads for the
FBI decipherment. The Lisbon cipher was one of these cases.
It was an up-and-down transposition whose key length varied
from day to day.
The texts of the messages showed this network to be one
channel by which German agents in the neutral countries
and colonies of Africa reported on the movements of ships,
troops, and materiel and on political events. On March 26,
1942, for example, the South Africa station reported ship sail-
4Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-R6Pf4'-?t}3MA6ffi0300001-1
 Approved For Release 3004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03 ' QIOAg3 06Ajy
Axis Agenf Radios
ings and the concentration of Allied troops which later took
Madagascar. As translated from the Portuguese:
TWENTYSIXTH. AMERICANS "NISHNAHA" AND "SOLONTU-
SHAW" SAILED WITH ORE FOR NEW ORLEANS, ALSO ENGLISH
"CITY OF N. CASTLE"; "ANGOLA" AND ENGLISH "ISIPIEGO"
FROM DURBAN ARRIVED WITH PASSENGERS. TROOPS STILL
CONCENTRATED; TRYING TO LEARN DETAILS.
From Portuguese West Africa an agent with the code-name
Armando sent similar information intermingled freely with
operational reports. On December 4, 1941:
ARMANDO REPORTS ENGLISH CONSUL RECEIVED LONG EN-
CIPHERED TELEGRAM RELATIVE ENFORCING STRICT VIGI-
LANCE AGAINST ESPIONAGE. OFFICIALS CLAIMED ENGLISH
STILL COMMAND CAPE VERDE SUBMARINE CABLE. MANY
MEN GO TO FREETOWN OWING APPROACH TEN CONVOY
SHIPS, LARGE TROOPS, AMMUNITION AND TANKS. HOW-
EVER INFORMER DOES NOT KNOW IF THEY REMAIN LAGOS
OR FREETOWN AND BATHURST.
On January 7, 1942:
WEST INDIA ARRIVED BATHURST FOURTEEN WITH PILOTS
AIRCRAFT MECHANICS DISASSEMBLED TANKS ANTIAIRCRAFT
MACHINE GUNS MUNITIONS LARGE QUANTITY GASOLINE
CAMPAIGN TENTS. NEXT MONTH WE WILL HAVE REGULAR
CONNECTION DAKAR THROUGH INTELLIGENT NATIVE GOLD-
SMITH AUTHORIZED TO ENTER COLONIAL SERVICE UNDER
GOVERNOR TO HELP MY WORK. ARMANDO
On February 5:
CHIEF OF POLICE LIEUTENANT UNDERCOVER IMPRUDENTLY
WORKS FOR ENGLISH. CONVENIENT TO OBTAIN HIS RE-
TURN LISBON. HE CAN DAMAGE US. ARMANDO
But the Germans were growing dissatisfied with Armando's
work. The Lisbon station radioed him on February 11:
SAID THERE IS TO BE DISEMBARKMENT ENGLISH AMERICAN
TROOPS DAKAR NEXT FIFTEEN DAYS. WHY NO REPORTS
MOST URGENT.
On February 12:
DISEMBARKATION TROOPS FREETOWN NOT DAKAR. I OR-
DER YOU INVESTIGATE. NOT SATISFIED REPORTS WHICH I
CALL FOR. HAVE RECEIVED BETTER REPORTS FROM OTHER
PERSONS.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 43
Approved For a ease 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 A roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OVFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
And most indiscreetly, on 27 March:
SECURE EXPEDITIOUSLY RECENT REPORTS DAKAR FREE-
TOWN RELIEVE CAROLINA OF HIS DUTIES. USE NEW INK.
BEARER SHOULD DELIVER LETTERS PERSONALLY TO POR-
TER HOTEL DUAS HACOES VICTORIA STREET FOR MR.
MERCKEL. WE ARE EXPERIMENTING CONTINUATION OR-
GANIZATION TWO MORE MONTHS. USE YOUR BEST REPORTS
FOR MY VINDICATION.
The organization did not in fact last much longer than
two more months, but it was not the Germans who termi-
nated it. Revelations like this one enabled Allied intelligence
officers to clean out the Portuguese group in the summer of
1942.
Nazi Agent Training and Procedures
Having thus demonstrated its capability in the European
theater, the RID was approached early in 1942 by its British
counterpart, the Radio Security Service, with a request for
the establishment of regular liaison and exchange of informa-
tion. From then on to the end of the war we maintained
a most harmonious and fruitful relationship which served to
build up a pretty complete picture of the German diplomatic
and espionage networks and their activities. The characteris-
tics of individual transmitters and individual operators were
recorded and catalogued so that they could be recognized
when they were used on a different circuit. Nearly all the
codes and ciphers were broken, and the great bulk of the clan-
destine traffic could be promptly read. During the most criti-
cal. period of the war in Europe the RID was monitoring 222
frequencies used in clandestine intra-European circuits.
After the Lisbon net was closed down the Germans had five
major networks, with control centers in Berlin, Hamburg,
Bordeaux, Madrid, and Paris. The out-stations were located
in practically every European country, in Africa and the At-
lantic, and in the western hemisphere. The operators of these
out-stations were in general not skilled radiomen, we learned
from captured spies, but agents who had been trained in radio
and codes and ciphers along with other tradecraft-for ex-
ample photography and microfilm, secret writing, explosives
and demolition-at a school near Hamburg. Their radio
44 Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP7S=039Z'IAVV03D0300001-1
 ApprovedAF
xis prAg n?sl~adio 4/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03 WP 3 0C8~'~y
training embraced the use of International Morse and the
construction and operation of transmitters and receivers.
Student operators were required to achieve the modest
transmitting speed of twelve words a minute (as compared,
for example, with our Merchant Marine requirement of 20-25
words a minute). Then they would make a five-minute sample
transmission on a device which recorded graphically their
speed, touch, and characteristic fist. On the basis of this
graph they were assigned a permanent transmitting speed
and given another week's training at this speed. Then a sec-
ond graph was made as each operator graduated, this one to
be filed as a specimen signature against which his later mes-
sages would be verified as genuine and not the deception of
enemy counterespionage. This procedure was apparently
adopted after the Germans learned that the FBI had fooled
them with the Sebold station on Long Island.
The agents were furnished portable transmitters and re-
ceivers, usually of the type built into a suitcase, complete with
antenna wire, tools, and all the accessories necessary for going
into immediate operation. They were given precise instruc-
tions for constructing a directional antenna which would af-
ford a maximum signal to their control center and a mini-
mum to eavesdroppers. Then they were dispatched to their
posts by neutral ship, by submarine, by parachute, or over
clandestine land routes.
The first sign of their safe arrival would be their call let-
ters on the air; and this would signify their presence to us,
too, for it is difficult to disguise an agent radio's call. At one
time, when the control of one of the German nets passed
from the Abwehr to the Gestapo, its transmitters adopted
the call letters and frequencies of commercial stations in
South America; but other characteristic procedures of clan-
destine traffic still betrayed them, and this device was later
abandoned.
Not being able to disguise their calls, the agent networks
made a practice of changing call letters, usually every day,
in an effort to spoil continuity for their pursuers. But very
few had a rota which remained nonrepetitive for a year, say,
and we were able to work out in advance the call letters
which many espionage transmitters would be using on any
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 45
Approved or Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 pr(? V Uff F l a e 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDA 8-039 n~f 00300300001-1
particular future day; sometimes we even caught the out-
stations making mistakes in their own system. Some worked
with a list of 31 different calls which repeated itself every
month. Some had two such lists, one for odd and one for
even months. One system was worked out with such little
forethought that a spy once had to call with the international
distress signal, SOS. This was one of the systems that deter-
mined call letters in connection with the cipher key for the
day, a connection that sometimes led our part-time crypt-
analysts into the decipherment of messages.
One group, we learned from one of its indiscreet first mes-
sages sent blind, based its calls and transposition cipher on
the Albatross edition of Axel Munthe's The Story of San
Michele, a book excluded by copyright arrangements from the
British Empire and the United States, using a different page
each day. The page to be used was determined by adding to
a constant number assigned each agent the number of the
month and that of the day in question. The last line on
this page contained the calls to be used-the first three let-
ters, reversed, for the control center and the last three, re-
versed, for the out-station. An example of this procedure
may be of interest.
Shortly before midnight, eastern standard time, on March
12, 1942, one of our monitors at Laredo, Texas, copies the fol-
lowing slow hand-keyed message on 11,220 kilocycles.
VVVV EVI EVI EVI
IWEOF WONUG IUVBJ DLVCP NABRS CARTM IELHX YEERX
DEXUE VCCXP EXEEM OEUNM CMIRL XRTFO CXQYX EXISV
NXMAH GRSML ZPEMS NQXXX ETNIX AAEXV UXURA FOEAH
XUEUT AFXEH EHTEN NMFXA XNZOR ECSEI OAINE MRCFX
SENSD PELXA HPRE
We know from our analysis of previous messages that the
call EVI is due to be used by an operator of the San Michele
group whose assigned constant number is 56. Checking, we
add the month and day-this would be March 13 by Green-
wich Mean Time-and turn to page 72 of the novel. The last
word on the page is "give," so EVI is right. The first word on
the last line is "like"; the control center will sign KIL.
The message sent in the early hours of March 13 was prob-
ably enciphered on March 12, so we go back to page 71, shown
here opposite, for the key. Here the first line reads, "I would
4Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDPf8~~139~~FA~ 0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I would have known how to master his fear, and would have
been the stronger of the two as I have been in later years
more than once, when I have stayed a hand clutching a
revolver in fear of life.
When will the anti-vivisectionists realize that when they
are asking for total prohibition of experiments on living
animals they are asking for what it is impossible to grant
them? Pasteur's vaccination against rabies has reduced the
mortality in this terrible disease to a minimum and Behring's
anti-diphtheric serum saves the lives of over a hundred
thousand children every year. Are not these two facts alone
sufficient to make these well-meaning lovers of animals
understand that discoverers of new worlds like Pasteur, of
new remedies against hitherto incurable diseases like Koch,
Ehrlich and Behring must be left to pursue their researches
unhampered by restrictions and undisturbed by interference
from outsiders. Those to be left a free hand are besides so
few that they can be counted on one's fingers. For the rest
no doubt most severe restrictions should be insisted upon,
perhaps even total prohibition. But I go further. One of
the most weighty arguments against several of these ex-
periments on living animals is that their practical value is
much reduced, owing to the fundamental difference from
a pathological and physiological point of view between the
bodies of men and the bodies of animals. But why should
these experiments be limited to the bodies of animals, why
should they not be carried out on the living body of man
as well? Why should not the born criminals, the chronic
evil-doers, condemned to waste their remaining life in
prison, useless and often dangerous to others and to them-
selves, why should not these inveterate offenders against our
laws be offered a reduction of their penal servitude if they
were willing to submit under anaesthetics to certain experi-
ments on their living bodies for the benefit of mankind? If
the judge, before putting on the black cap, had in his power
to offer the murderer the alternative between the gallows
and penal servitude for so and so many years, I have little
doubt there would be no lack of candidates. Why should
not Doctor Woronoff, the practical value of his invention be
have known how to master his fear" etc. We take the first
nine letters and number them in sequence:
IW O U L D H A V
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Approved FoFr ReleaseE2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921 A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
Substituting these figures in the first four groups, with nulls
for any missing letters, we get
I W E O F W O N U G I U V B J D L V C P
1 2 x 3 x 2 3 x 4 x 1 4 9 x x 6 5 9 x x
or "12 March, 2304 hours, 149 letters in 659th message fol-
lowing." There are actually 154 letters following, but the
first group of five is simply a special indicator identifying the
agent.
This is as far as the RID needed to go for its own purposes
before turning the message over to the FBI. But the text
could be worked out from the same page of the novel. Lay
out a blank message in lines of twenty letters each, keep-
ing the columns straight. 149 letters in rows of 20 make nine
columns of eight letters each followed by eleven columns of
seven each. Write across the top the first twenty initial let-
ters of the lines on page 71, skipping indented lines. Number
these in alphabetical sequence, and then go down the columns
in the indicated order with the encrypted text. This arrange-
ment gives the clear German text:
i
b m
r
a
a t m
a
t
s
u
8
4 9
14
1
2 16
10
3
17
15
19
S
P R
U
C
H x
S
E
C
H
S
V
E S
T
A
x A
N
x
S
T
E
N
x M
A
R
Y x
Q
U
E
E
N
x E L
F
T
E N
x
E
I
N
S
M E Z
x M
E Z
x
V
0
N
D
A M P
E
I
R O
x
C
A
M
P
H O E
H
E
x R
E
C
I
F
E
G IPM
E
L
D E
T
x
n e
11 5
N U
I N
x M
A C
A M
E I
x R
u
f
f
n
p t
20 6
7
12
13 18
L L
x
V
O N
x
x
Q
U
E E
A
R
Y
x
A M
H
T
x
U
H R
P
F
E
R
x C
R
O
x
A
U F
E
C
I
F
E x
In English :
TEXT SIXTY FROM VESTA TO STEIN. QUEEN MARY RE-
PORTED OFF RECIFE BY STEAMSHIP CAMPEIRO ON ELEV-
ENTH AT EIGHTEEN O'CLOCK MIDDLE EUROPEAN TIME.
The Latin American Infestation
The Queen Mary message, from an agent in Rio de Janeiro,
came at a moment of climax in RID's most active and critical
theater of counterespionage operations, Latin America.
There were in March of 1942 six agent transmitters in Rio
4pproved For Release 2004/12/17 :CIA-RUP-0 9u'I~ OD0300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2 04/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Axis Agent Radios OFFICIAL USE ONLY
alone, and three of them reported the Queen Mary's arrival
on the twelfth. The espionage messages were full of news
about her until after she sailed on March 20, but these were
the last messages most of the agents sent. By the time she
was again in mid-Atlantic on a safely altered course, the Bra-
zilian authorities had arrested some 200 of the German spies.
The story behind this roundup is first of all an RID story.
Signs of the Nazi effort to create an espionage base in
Latin America began to be apparent as early as the fall of
1940. On October 27 our primary station at Allegan, Michi-
gan, picked up a strange maritime signal using the unregis-
tered call BCNL. Other monitoring posts were alerted, and
quite a number of similar calls were traced to ships in the
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The FCC's Tampa office
succeeded in identifying these vessels as small ones operated
by a firm called Gough Bros. and controlled by a coastal sta-
tion near Belize in British Honduras. The U.S. Caribbean
Defense Command, after developing evidence that this fleet
was being used to refuel German submarines and pass infor-
mation, arrested a Canal Zone employee who was a member
of the ring and was able to arrange a trap for nineteen others,
including the ringleader, prominent British shipping execu-
tive George Gough, in Belize.
Meanwhile in Mexico a German spy was sending out intelli-
gence reports in private code over Chapultepec Radio, the
same transmitter used for clandestine communication with
Berlin during the first world war.3 After Pearl Harbor, when
the use of code on commercial facilities was prohibited in
Mexico, this man, a properly registered amateur, resorted to
his own clandestine radio, but made the mistake of communi-
cating first with the FBI's deception station on Long Island.
The concerted German drive to establish radio agent nets
in this hemisphere, however, and our struggle against them,
began in the spring of 1941. One of our monitors at Millis,
Massachusetts, detected the faint signals of a station that
was trying to hide its transmission in a transatlantic radio-
telephone circuit operating on the same frequency. It was
repeating the call letters REW, but the signal sounded quite
like that of AOR, the FBI-operated Sebold transmitter's re-
Approved or eTease 2Q04TT2/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000141
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
spondent. Other monitoring stations, asked to help identify
the suspicious and noise-shrouded signal, discovered that
when REW paused to listen a station on a different frequency
would start sending the call letters PYL. The two transmit-
ters put on the same performance at the same hour the next
day, and for several days; they were apparently trying with-
out; success to communicate with each other. One of our
monitors became so engrossed that he wanted to go on the
air and help them out. Our fixes showed that R:EW was in-
deed in Hamburg, and PYL in Valparaiso, Chile, an espionage
station discovered before it could make contact with its base.
For the present, however, there was nothing that could be
done about agent radios outside U.S. jurisdiction except to
listen in, and more and more of them began to appear, setting
up in a half dozen of the Latin American republics. Chile
and Brazil held the principal concentrations at this time.
There were three main agent networks in Brazil, centered
on transmitters that we designated LIR, CEL, and CIT, from
the call signs they were using when first heard; the EVI of
our decipherment example was LIR. Evidence of the damage
they could do began to mount.
The German control stations, for example, sent exhaustive
lists of requirements for naval information, asked PYL in
Chile if it could "place a suitable man for us among students
going to the United States for air training," complimented
agents as "exceptionally correct" in their reports on tech-
nical details of English and American cruisers' equipment,
and assigned agents to investigate "USA parade and air bases
Colombia and Venezuela" and "air units Trinidad and Lesser
Antilles and flights via those places to West Africa; airplane
types, movement, dates." The agent radios sent back reports
like these:
5 JULY. NINE BOEINGS FLEW WITH MIXED CREW ENGLISH
AND AMERICANS. IN NEXT FEW WEEKS 20 MORE TO BE
FLOWN ACROSS. DETAILS FOLLOW.
19 JULY. LM REPORTS 15 LOCKHEED HUDSONS FLEW
ACROSS. ENGLISH REGISTRY AND CANADIAN-AUSTRALIAN
CREW. BOEING CLIPPER LEFT NATAL ON SEVENTH ALLEG-
EDLY FOR BOLANO WITH 19 LOCKHEED MECHANICS AND 11
CREW.
5AOpproved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-F P '~39 AQW0300001-1
 ApprovedAFor Releask 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03
uF1AHR2 85E0841
7 AUGUST. USA STEAMER URUGUAY ON LAST VOYAGE TO
UNITED STATES LEFT RIO 25 JUNE. WAS CONVOYED BY
BRITISH AUXILIARY CRUISER CARNARVON CASTLE TO TRIN-
IDAD. TRIP TAKES 7 DAYS. CRUISER TRAVELED SOME-
TIMES AHEAD SOMETIMES ASTERN OF SS URUGUAY.
8 OCTOBER. BMM REPORTS SEVERAL HUNDRED US AIR-
CRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES AND 8000 SPECIAL TROOPS AL-
LEGEDLY LANDING CORPS BEING ASSEMBLED PORT OF
SPAIN.
In November PYL identified a network courier as "daughter
of Clarke, secretary in USA embassy Quito since 1 November."
And ten days after Pearl Harbor an agent offered details on
the torpedo safety nets with which ships were being equipped
and also. "absolutely safe men . . . who will send to bottom
two or three large armed English ships ... without any sus-
picion falling on us. If we are interested payment only after
sinking, nothing in advance." The control station in Germany
of course approved: "Proposal for destruction of ships very
interesting." Reports on plane production also now began
in earnest:
1 JANUARY. CURTISS COLUMBUS FACTORY WILL BEGIN
MASS PRODUCTION SERIES SB2C SINGLE SEATER STUKA FOR
NAVY. ARMAMENT ONE CANNON FIVE MACHINE GUNS, MO-
TOR 1700 HP WRIGHT. BUILT FOR 2000 HP WRIGHT IN EX-
PERIMENTAL STAGE. PRODUCTION SO3C BEGUN IN COLUM-
BUS FACTORY AT BEGINNING DECEMBER. EMPLOYEES ALL
CURTISS AIRCRAFT FACTORIES DECEMBER TOTAL 27000.
PROPELLER PRODUCTION NOVEMBER 1042.
Our Government finally took action. On January 15, 1942,
the Rio conference of foreign ministers of the American re-
publics recommended immediate measures to eliminate the
clandestine stations. An Emergency Advisory Committee for
Political Defense was established with headquarters in Uru-
guay, and under its auspices we dispatched some of the best
RID monitoring officers to the six countries where we knew
agent radios to be operating (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Cuba,
Martinique, Paraguay). They had a two-fold mission-to lo-
cate the hide-outs of known agent transmitters with mobile
direction-finding equipment they took along, and to help the
governments of these countries establish monitoring net-
works which could keep them free of radio spies in the future.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
51
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :
CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
For this second purpose we sent men also to six other coun-
tries (Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay).
Forty men from eighteen Latin American republics were at
the same time brought here for training at our school in
Laurel, Maryland.
The man we sent to Brazil was Robert D. Linx. He helped
lay the groundwork for that arrest of 200-odd spies after the
Queen Mary left her dock in March. This roundup appar-
ently cleaned out the LIR and CIT organizations, the latter
led by a man named Christiansen; they were never heard
again. Some members of the CEL net escaped to the in-
terior, but two series of arrests after they ventured twice at
intervals to reactivate their transmitter put an end to them
too. By mid-year Brazil was permanently cured of its agent
radio infestation. Linx stayed on to direct the establish-
ment of the monitoring service, and became known as "the
father of Brazilian monitoring."
Although our men in Latin America worked quietly by them-
selves as much as possible, the German agents were not al-
ways unaware of what was going on. We heard one of them
telling his control that he knew at least six Yankee direction
finders were beamed on him and he was going to cool off in
the woods for a while. (He cooled off in a Central American
jail.) In Chile, the PYL organization took the precaution of
establishing a stand-by transmitter to assure continuity of
communication if one should be seized. On March 9 PYL
sent a message informing Hamburg that "Pedro," whom they
had employed to operate the new transmitter, would be ready
to get on the air the following day. On March 10, although
RID had not yet received the decrypted text of this message,
our monitors picked up Pedro's test transmission with the
? call GES and fixed his location in Antofagasta.
The arrival of our man, John de Bardeleben, in Valparaiso
on March 19 was the signal for the main PYL transmitter
to go mobile. De Bardeleben spent weeks tracking its chang-
ing locations in the area within a ten-mile radius of Valpa-
raiso. It developed that every second week, however, a trans-
mission would be made from the house at Avenida Alemana
5508, Cerro Alegre. This house belonged to one Guillermo
Zeller, a radio technician and licensed amateur who was often
5I pproved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-F 'P .!'O3 ~OW0300001-1
 Approved
AXIS or Rgeejs~a29o4/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03981AHVO R0?NL~
seen in the company of Hans Blume, manager of the Valpa-
raiso branch of the German company Transradio. In April
1941, shortly before PYL was first heard trying to contact
REW, Blume had bought from the radio supply store Casa
Widow a complete set of transmitter parts and two Halli-
crafter receivers. A tap was now placed on the Zeller tele-
phone.
The Chilean authorities were persuaded to raid the Zeller
house on June 25. Their perfunctory search discovered no
transmitter, but Zeller was indiscreet enough to telephone
afterwards to one of his agent colleagues and report his nar-
row escape : "Lucky they didn't search very good, especially
in the basement." With some trouble and delay another
search warrant was obtained, again to no avail; the officers
didn't bother to open a box they noticed in the basement
purporting to contain a sewing machine. PYL went off the
air after this, and nothing could be done until after many
weeks De Bardeleben found the transmitter in its sewing-ma-
chine box stored in a grocery on Cerro Alegre. Finally, on
October 23, most of the agents of the PYL organization were
arrested; but the man who actually operated the main trans-
mitter and operator Pedro at Antofagasta had disappeared.
Neutralist Argentina, which did not participate in the
Emergency Advisory Committee, posed a delicate diplomatic
problem with respect to the elimination of clandestine enemy
transmitters, and one of critical importance as the clean-up
in Brazil and Chile made the Argentine the main base for
espionage activity in this hemisphere. Not only agent radios
but the powerful Argentine commercial transmitters were
carrying quantities of compromising information to Italy, Ja-
pan, and Germany, and we could only copy their transmis-
sions, hundreds of messages daily. Many of these were at
speeds too high for manual copy; we recorded them on tape
and trained selected typists to put them into page form. A
strong memorandum from the U.S. Government on January
4, 1943, enabled us to send two men to Argentina to try to
do what we had done in Brazil and Chile, but our earlier suc-
cesses were not repeated here. The agent operations had be-
come much more sophisticated. While our men were taking
bearings on a signal the transmission would be cut off at
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 53
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Axis Agent Radios
that location and picked up by another transmitter several
miles away. And the cooperation of Argentine officials under
the Castillo and Ramirez-Peron regimes was less than eager.
They finally became so resentful of U.S. Government pres-
sures that we had to withdraw our men.
One spy who escaped in Chile, however, did not get as far
as Argentina. Almost a year after the incomplete catch of
the PYL ring in Chile, monitors at three different RID posts
heard a new station with the call PQZ, and all three were sure
they recognized the fist of operator Pedro of the GES sta-
tion at Antofagasta. Bearings placed the transmitter at
Santiago, Chile.
De Bardeleben's successor in Chile, William Fellows, was
notified, and he picked up the signal the next time it came on
the air. Working alone, he had to move around and take bear-
ings from different locations in order to get a fix; but after
two more PQZ transmissions he had the house located. To
my considerable personal satisfaction the operator Pedro, a
graduate of the Hamburg spy school, who had the effron-
tery to use my own initials as his clandestine call, was arrested
and his equipment seized. With this postlude there ended,
except for the Argentine hold-out, the story of radio spies in
the Americas.
SApproved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-
RDP~ Q39 'IA0D03II0300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Intelligence, deception, and un-
orthodox stay-behind opera-
tions in a combined and all but
real-war combat exercise.
OPERATION PORTREX
Edwin L. Sibert
There used to be some truth in the gibe that a war's first
battles are fought with the weapons and techniques (includ-
ing intelligence techniques) of the final engagements of the
last previous war. Now, however, the practice of conducting
large-scale and realistic maneuvers in time of peace, incor-
porating new developments not only in weapons and tactics
but also in intelligence, psychological, and paramilitary de-
vices, provides assurance that the first battles of the next war
will at least be fought with the methods of the last maneuvers.
One such war game in which I participated during the mili-
tary doldrums between World War II and the Korean War
was a particularly stimulating illustration of how realistic an
exercise can be made, of some practical limitations on realism,
and of the extent to which deception and unconventional
operations can be worked in.
Operation Portrex wasn't so very big, as modern maneuvers
go, but all elements of the armed forces-Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marines-took part, and there were paratroopers, frog-
men, undercover agents, and guerrillas. It was staged in the
first quarter of 1950 on the island of Vieques, a twenty-mile
stretch of land some ten miles east of Puerto Rico. It em-
braced a period of more than two months devoted to prepara-
tions for a three-day assault action.
The problem of the exercise was the recapture of a hypo-
thetical major Caribbean island which the enemy had occu-
pied. U.S. forces were to make a combined airborne and am-
phibious assault on its southern beaches, represented by those
of Vieques, and clean out the ten-square-mile maneuver area
on this island in the initial action. The cards were stacked
against the enemy defenders, who had available in the beach
area only a regimental combat team reinforced by a provi-
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :
Al
CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
MORI/HRP
from pg.
Al-A9
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Porfrex
Y PORT LIGHTHOUSE
MOSQUITO
DETAIL FROM
Isla de
VIEQUES
PUERTO RICO
0 1 2 Miles
A2
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
sional armored reconnaissance unit, an engineer company, and
a mixed battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, with light avia-
tion and the support of a weak fighter wing. The invading
task force consisted of the 3d Infantry Division reinforced by
a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division and a Marine Corps
reconnaissance company. It had the support of a strong
fighter wing based on Puerto Rico, air lift for the parachute
battalion, adequate sea lift for the ground forces, and naval
units for shore bombardment.
I commanded the land forces of the enemy defense, Puerto
Rican regulars. In mid-December 1949 I was permitted to
take them to Vieques. First we had to construct a tent camp
for ourselves and the numerous visitors expected, both VIP's
and run-of-the-mine; but by New Year's we were able to turn
our attention to defensive works-obstacles, strongpoints,
camouflage, protection against shell fire and air bombard-
ment, deception, counterespionage, and unorthodox measures.
Defenses and Deception
The beaches called Red and Blue on the accompanying map
were the major ones, the only ones big enough to accommo-
date a regimental combat team. But since an envelopment
of our east flank was indicated by the geography of the ma-
neuver area, we had to construct obstacles and defenses not
only on these but also, less thoroughly, on the small and
shallow Yellow and Green beaches. Materials and supplies
might have been a problem. Vieques Island has a population
of only about two thousand, mostly small farmers and poultry
and cattle raisers, concentrated in a restricted central area.
Its east and west ends are uninhabited training grounds. Its
only town is Isabela Segunda, with one street, unpaved.
Therefore all our ordinary supplies and all materials for de-
fensive works had to come from the San Juan area in Puerto
Rico by tug and barge.
Fortunately we had a sizable salvage yard at Fort
Buchanan, Puerto Rico, with a wide assortment of war sur-
plus items such as steel landing mats, I-beams and other odds
and ends of structural steel, old cable, etc. These, inter-
spersed with felled cocoanut palm trunks and thoroughly laced
with barbed wire, made formidable abatis-type obstacles. We
also bulldozed out anti-tank ditches at strategic locations;
A3
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
and we supplemented our limited allotment of barbed wire and
screw-type steel posts for apron fences by stuffing in among
them a lot of the heavy, thorny, tough brush that was prevalent
in the area. I'm sure our post-maneuver popularity with the
invading troops was of a low order.
Back from the beaches we burrowed as no one had since
World War I, and we found that in that tropical, rain-
drenched country you had to drain a ditch or dugout before it
could be used. In one of the necessary departures from com-
plete realism, we were ordered to clear all the stumps, stakes,
stones, etc., from a large flat area around the airstrip behind
Red beach, an obvious tip-off that this would be the drop zone
for the parachute troops. I saw to it that this work was done
most conscientiously: my son commanded a company in the
airborne infantry battalion attached to the 3rd Division.
As we were building the defenses during January and Feb-
ruary, the invaders were regularly taking air photographs on
which to base their assault plans. In order to throw them
off, we used not only camouflage but an elaborate system of
dummy defenses ostensibly disposed against an expected main
thrust of the invading forces north from Blue beach. These
were strongpoints of ground scraped up by the bulldozers,
protected by piled thorny brush, and equipped with inflated
tanks and dummy guns, trucks, and communications equip-
ment. The so-called Aggressor Cadre from Fort Riley fur-
nished this dummy equipment and helped greatly in the de-
ception work.
Trying to find some way to misguide the leading assault
waves of landing craft, we conceived the plan of camouflaging
the principal small-scale landmark in the area, an old two-
story Spanish lighthouse west of the beaches, and erecting
a false facsimile about a mile away. I knew our engineer,
Jim Goodwin, could do it, because he could make anything;
but I was forethoughtful enough about my eventual retire-
ment pension to ask the Naval District Commandant's advice
in the matter. Seldom have I seen a man so shocked; his
voice shook with emotion as he dwelt on the sacredness of
aids to navigation. So we had to call that off. I finally got per-
mission to use a smoke-screen, under the proviso that it be
Mproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
lifted ten minutes before the landing craft were to touch
down.
A particular tricky detail in our defenses was our use of
the small island that the map shows about 600 yards off Blue
beach, a low and rocky one accessible by rowboat but not by
landing craft. We were careful that air photographs should
show us ignoring its potential as a defensive strongpoint, but
we dug at its north end and heavily camouflaged a deep shelter
for .50-caliber machine guns sited to fire on the beach. They
were to wait until the landing craft had touched down and
then open fire on the invaders from the rear; in the noise
and confusion of the landing it would be some time before
their fire would be identified and located, not to say sup-
pressed.
CI, PP, and PM Preparations
Our attention was by no means all on hardware. We took
advantage of the Puerto Rican troops' capability in Spanish
to have them use it exclusively whenever there was a possi-
bility that the American enemy would intercept their com-
munications. We elaborated their natural difference in ap-
pearance from the U.S. forces by giving them a distinctive
helmet and fatigue clothes dyed green, items provided by the
Aggressor Cadre. We issued them identity folders, printed
by the Aggressor Cadre, which served us as a counterespio-
nage device and which the invaders later used as a basis for
PW interrogations.
For the benefit of the enemy we put up a lot of posters with
warnings about non-existent dangerous snakes and insects, as
well as some existing poisonous tropical plants like the man-
zanillo. Our psywar effort may have been a bit on the light
side though; the "1984" motif was strung through all our prop-
aganda, and some wag even put a huge "Big Brother Is Watch-
ing You" sign up in the latrine we erected for female VIP
visitors, correspondents and the WAC and WAF brass.
But the most important thing I did with respect to uncon-
ventional measures was to persuade Waller Booth, a former
OSS officer living in San Juan, to come on active duty for the
exercises. It was he who organized and directed an under-
cover net of counterespionage agents among the native resi-
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000Vi
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
dents of Vieques and who prepared a group of stay-behind
guerrillas to operate within the invaders' beachhead.
About half a mile inland between Red and Blue beaches lay
a heavily wooded swamp perhaps a mile in diameter, where
the ground stood generally under two or three feet of water.
Booth picked this place as his homey hideout for a motley
crew of about sixty stay-behinds carefully selected for a va-
riety of virtues, some of them dubious. He built a wooden
walkway about six inches under water into the center of the
swamp, marking its location with cryptic blazings on the trees.
Here he erected above water a shelter with crude sleeping and
eating facilities, storage space for supplies, and a communica-
tions center connected by hidden telephone lines to our main
switchboard. The hideout was invulnerable to air photogra-
phy and not a likely target for naval gunfire. Booth stocked
it with rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and demolition
material sufficient for the entire period of the maneuver. His
men wore enemy uniforms.
Booth's other enterprise, the counterespionage net, showed
its effectiveness as D day approached. Our security vigilantes
picked up two enemy agents in Isabela Segunda, CIC men in
civilian clothes posing as commercial travelers from San
Juan, before they had been able to get into the defense area
or send out any message. No agent ever penetrated the ma-
neuver area.
On the two nights before D day at least a hundred enemy
frogmen swarmed in to reconnoiter the beaches, but they
failed to detect the machine gun nest we had hidden on the
island off Blue beach. Our defenses looked from the air so
formidable, however, that on D minus 1 we were ordered to
detonate 100-lb. static charges of TNT among the obstacles
to simulate the effects of naval bombardment. Jim Good-
win had a long and eloquent discussion with the umpires
about the number and position of these detonations, and in the
end they did surprisingly little damage.
The Action
On D day, the attack made a fine show coming in. But it
was stopped cold by our smoke-screen, borne on a steady trade
wind blowing ideally from just north of east, until we were
proved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
forced to lift it at the stipulated time. Then it was hard, slow
work for the invaders to carve a foothold on the main beaches,
and our machine gunners on the island off Blue beach wreaked
great theoretical slaughter before their ammunition was ex-
hausted.
Shortly after the amphibious touch-down the airborne
troops were dropped in the expected area. I'll never forget
the awesome beauty of those thousand parachutes opening
white against the clear blue tropical sky, accented by the bril-
liant colors of the cargo chutes. But the airborne assault,
which was supposed to link up rapidly with the other forces
and proceed to wipe out the shattered defenders, was a failure.
The twenty-mile-an-hour trade wind was rough on the
jumpers; although there were no fatalities, some ninety men
were hospitalized. The seaborne forces were so delayed by
our obstacles that they couldn't come to the aid of the para-
troopers, and we captured most of them. I was relieved to
see my son walking around in the PW enclosure, and proud
that he refused to accept a can of beer from me unless all the
prisoners in the enclosure were similarly favored.
We also took prisoner the Marine Corps reconnaissance
company, which had been assigned the job of protecting the
invaders' east flank where our defenses were weak. We offered
the Marines no opposition until they got so far inland that
they were out of touch with the main forces and had exhausted
their fuel and ammunition. Their capture left the enemy
flank wide open to anti-tank fire and counterattack from our
anti-aircraft and reserve infantry battalion operating out-
side the envelopment.
Along about noon of D day, at the expense of many hun-
dreds of theoretical casualties, the main invading forces had
fought their way inland past the swamp hideout of Booth's
guerrillas, who now began to trickle out and mingle in their
American uniforms with the enemy on the beachhead, where
all of course was confusion. For the next three days, operat-
ing mostly at night, they performed all the functions of a real
fifth column, with which the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma-
rine invaders were completely unprepared to cope. Their
most valuable contribution was a steady flow of intelligence
A7
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Operation Portrex
to our headquarters, but some of their paramilitary exploits
were more spectacular.
They put time-fused incendiary bombs in all manner of
dumps along the beaches and on board beached LST's. They
placed shaped charges against a cruiser lying off shore. They
captured and used an enemy tank. They theoretically killed
the enemy Corps and Division Commanders by simply knock-
ing on their tent poles, handing each a musette bag "from
Colonel so-and-so," saluting, and disappearing: the bags held
simulated bombs timed for something like thirty seconds.
They captured officers carrying communications instructions
for directing field artillery and naval gun fire, data which by
the end of the maneuver had almost got us, the defenders, ac-
cepted into the invaders' naval gun radio net, and had actually
enabled us to make the enemy field artillery fire in places of
our own choosing.'
In spite of his set-backs and losses, the invader succeeded,
using a clever night operation which had been rehearsed at
Fort Benning, in gaining a lodgment on VIP hill by about
midnight after D day.2 Having intelligence of his strength
That these small off-beat operations can sometimes yield dispro-
portionate results was brought home to me again later, in Korea
during the last Red push in the summer of 1953. In the Seoul-
Inchon area a couple of light enemy aircraft were making a series
of inconsequential night-time intrusions, flying low so they were
almost impossible to intercept. Since they did little or no damage,
however, they were shrugged off and left to the quadruple mounted
.50-caliber machine guns posted throughout the area. At Inchon
one of these gun posts, sandbagged on a knoll, guarded a great dump
of oil in 55-gallon drums, fuel which would be needed by our forces
in opposing the current large-scale enemy offensive. One night, as
one of the light intruder planes, flying low in the usual pattern, came
over toward this dump, enemy agents by sniping drove the gun crew
momentarily from their post. The plane dumped a sackful of
incendiary grenades into the acres of piled-up oil drums, and the
fat was in the fire. Only the depot commander's precaution of
having stacked the drums in well-separated small piles and his
prompt action in containing the fire saved us from a critical fuel
shortage at a critical time. A silly little operation, one that could
probably never be repeated, had come close to having very em-
barrassing results.
E The battalion commander in this action was Lt. Col. Joe Stillwell,
Jr., now a general officer.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved_Eor Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Opera ion or rex
and fearing that morning would find us in a precarious posi-
tion, I ordered at 0200 hours that an over-all withdrawal to
our second position be completed before daylight. This was
a large order, but it worked: dawn on D plus 1 found the en-
emy coming out of his corner punching wildly in the air, that
is deluging our now empty old positions with a heavy artillery
barrage. That day and the next we made two successful sur-
prise counterattacks, and when the problem was called off
at 0900 on D plus 3 we were still an organized force with a
small reserve at hand.
Wally Booth stayed on in the service after the maneuvers,
and in 1952 he was wounded while engaged in guerrilla ac-
tivities on an island off the eastern coast of North Korea. I
am told that one result from our efforts at Vieques was the
establishment of an Army school to teach the kind of opera-
tions Wally demonstrated there. If that is true, one of the
buildings at the school should be called Booth Hall.
A9
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Personal recollections of the
capture and show trial of an in-
telligence chief.
THE LAST DAYS OF ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
The list of the 22 once exalted Nazis on trial at Nuremberg
was led by the notorious names Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop,
and Keitel, in that order. The man who came fifth, after
Robert Ley's suicide, was not well known to the public, either
in Germany or abroad. The prosecution was distressed that
documents bearing his signature were few and far between.
His name had rarely appeared in public print. The official
Reich photographer, Heinrich Hoffman, had been unable to
find in his extensive collection a likeness of the man. The
press kept running some other Nazi official's photo to repre-
sent him and getting mixed up about what his position and
duties had been. This obscurity was fitting and proper from
the professional point of view, for Ernst Kaltenbrunner had
headed the at last unified Reich intelligence and security
services.
Succeeding after Reinhard Heydrich's assassination in June
1942 1 to the chieftainship of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt,
Kaltenbrunner inherited the RSHA's ascendancy over Ad-
miral Canaris' Abwehr which Heydrich had achieved, and
eventually, with the assistance of circumstance, he contrived
to have the Abwehr completely abolished and its main rem-
nants made the RSHA's Militaerisches Amt, to be directed
along with its foreign intelligence Amt VI by Walter Schel-
lenberg. Amt III, under Ohlendorf, was the internal Sicher-
heitsdienst, and Mueller's Amt IV the Gestapo. But Kalten-
brunner's main interest lay in foreign affairs: according to
Schellenberg he aspired to get hold of the foreign ministry in
place of Ribbentrop, whom he hated.2
He was a powerful man. Even Himmler, to whom he theo-
retically reported, feared him: asked in April 1945 to receive
some Swedish delegates from the Jewish World Congress,
1For the story behind Heydrich's death see Studies IV 1, p. I.
2 Folke Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls, p. 142.
MORI/HRP
from pg.
A11-A29
All
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
Himmler said to Schellenberg, "How am I going to do that with
Kaltenbrunner around? I should then be completely at his
mercy." 3 (Schellenberg considered Kaltenbrunner, his im-
mediate boss, to be one of his own "most active and dangerous
enemies" and therefore worked closely with Himmler.) Kal-
tenbrunner, not Himmler, was entrusted with the investiga-
tion of the July 1944 attempt on Hitler. He often by-passed
Himmler to report directly to Hitler, with whom he had had
personal ties since childhood, and toward the end spent sev-
eral hours with him daily.4
On the Scent of the Chief Werewolf
After the Siegfried Line was breached and Nazi Germany be-
gan to fall apart, it was said that the hard core of Party lead-
ers and their Waffen SS would hole up in a National Redoubt
which they had made ready in the Austrian Alps and from
there descend to prey like werewolves on the Allied occupa-
tion forces. This bad dream, of course, never came true, and
later there was a good deal of scoffing at the "myth." But
at the beginning of May in 1945 there was nothing mythical
about either the Werewolves or the National Redoubt. As
General Walter Bedell Smith said, "We had every reason to
believe the Nazis intended to make their last stand among the
crags." 5 All of our intelligence pointed to the Alpine area
east and south of Salzburg as the final fortress for the Goet-
terdaemmerung of the remaining Nazi fanatics. Reconnais-
sance photographs showed that they were installing bunkers
and ammunition and supply depots in this mountain region.
Interrogations of military and political prisoners indicated
that government officers, ranking Party leaders, and the SS
troops were moving to the Redoubt, leaving it to the Wehr-
macht to stem the allied advance.
Under these circumstances the 80th Infantry Division, Third
U.S. Army, was ordered back on May 3 from its meeting with
the Russian troops at Steyr on the Enns river to a position
'Deposition of Walter Schellenberg, Document No. 2990-PS, November
18, 1945, Office of Chief U.S. Counsel, Nuremberg.
' Bernadotte, op. cit., pp. 133, 139; Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth,
passim.
"'Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions," Saturday Evening Post, July 13,
1.946, p. 26.
A12
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 AuraIhkirchan _?j
))~~ hls-orl'
l*? Rltham t-thr
or
fa
rehha
9
- Y 2e ?]uNpt~ M+J TG
rev{s~kiaU C~ ? ~'R ~&N
H
~l ..? x tea. $ L--- \
1
l9 rsr ut.T t e s 0}
Ihiu
4 Brid{Uw imt ~`'4 ???Iil tY t
T 61984
11a3U
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kalfenbrunner's Last Days
about sixty kilometers north of the center of the National
Redoubt area. I was in charge of the CIC team covering the
area of the 80th Division's 319th Regiment. Interpreter Syd-
ney Bruskin of New Haven, Connecticut, worked closely with
me.
On May 5 we arrested and interrogated the Party leader of
the village of Vorchdorf. He revealed that two days earlier
August Eigruber, Gauleiter of Upper Austria, had passed
through Vorchdorf on his way to Gmunden on Traunsee, a
fashionable resort about sixty kilometers east of Salzburg in
the foothills of the mountain Redoubt. Gmunden was beyond
our prescribed area, but a Gauleiter was too tempting a
quarry; there were only four in Austria, 42 in all the Greater
Reich. So we took up the pursuit. But in Gmunden the Aus-
trian police told us that during the previous week not only
Eigruber but also Kaltenbrunner and Reichsleiter Ley of the
German Labor Front had passed through. Here was big game
indeed. They had been headed for the heart of the Redoubt
in the Salzkammergut, a mountain fastness dotted with salt
mines and extending from Attersee through St. Wolfgang
and Bad Ischl to Bad Aussee in the Steiermark.
Proceeding the same day up the long Traunsee shore into
the Redoubt area with a tank battalion, Sid and I were afforded
the opportunity to examine a concrete manifestation of Kal-
tenbrunner's work, the concentration camp at Ebensee. Part
of the Mauthaeusen extermination system built up by Kal-
tenbrunner when he had been the "Little Himmler" of Aus-
tria, it seemed more horrible even than Dachau or Ohrdruf.
Bodies that one would never have believed could exist alive
were walking around, covered with sores and lice. The filth
was indescribable. Adjacent to the crematorium were rooms
piled high with shrunken nude bodies, lye thrown over them
to combat the stench and vermin. The excess bodies that
couldn't be handled at the crematorium were hauled by the
wagonload to another part of the enclosure, where they were
dumped into open pits filled with a chemical solution. Worse
still was the hospital, where the dying and sick had been
herded for experimentation before being carted off to. the
crematorium. There were no beds in it; the inmates lay on
shelves covered with dirty rags, groups of two or three hud-
A13
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
died together like mice to keep warm. As we entered they
put out their hands and begged for food. When we told them
we had none, but that the American medics and military gov-
ernment personnel would be along immediately, they broke
down and sobbed, "We have waited for you four, five, six years.
Now you come empty-handed."
On the next day, May 6, we seemed about to close in on
Kaltenbrunner, the man who shared with Himmler and SS
General Poehl responsibility for the whole system of Nazi
concentration camps. We had pushed sixteen kilometers into
the Redoubt without encountering any sign of resistance and
reached Bad Ischl, home of Franz Lehar and formerly the sum-
mer residence of Emperor Franz Josef I. Here we were told "on
reliable authority" that at that moment Kaltenbrunner and
his wife were in Strobl, a town ten kilometers to the west.
Our informant, who wore the uniform of a Wehrmacht
lieutenant, was a local leader in the Austrian Freedom Move-
ment which had sprung up in opposition to the Nazis. This
Movement did in fact give invaluable aid to the CIC in track-
ing down the Nazi leaders: about 80% of our arrests of SS,
Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst, and Party leaders in Austria were
due directly to leads received from it.
The lieutenant offered to drive me to Strobl with his in-
terpreter, a German soldier, and to have a second car with
other members of the Freedom Movement follow us. Sup-
pressing my suspicions of this quick proposal I left Sid in Bad
Ischl to organize an informant net and set out with the volun-
teer escort. I was thankful for their Wehrmacht uniforms
when we found the road clogged with remnants of General Sepp
Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army retreating before the Rus-
sians. We were not bothered. The war was effectively at an
end, anyway, and the main bulk of the SS, like the Wehr-
macht, was glad to call a halt to the fighting; it was mostly
fanatics and the underground that worried us now.
In Strobl, the burgermeister admitted in a trembling voice
that the Kaltenbrunner party had been staying at an estate
on the outskirts of town. We drove to this estate, parked
the two cars at the entrance to the grounds, and walked from
there to the house. Several men in civilian clothes followed
but did not stop us. At the, house we were greeted by a large
M proved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
blond woman of about 38 years, who immediately acknowledged
that she was Mrs. Ernst Kaltenbrunner. With her were her
three young children but no husband. I informed her that
she was under arrest for purposes of interrogation and, to
impress the civilian bodyguard, mentioned the imminent ar-
rival of American soldiers. We then escorted her down to the
car, still followed by her silent bodyguard. At the car their
leader finally spoke, in perfect English: he and his men
had personally been instructed by General Kaltenbrunner to
safeguard Mrs. Kaltenbrunner and the children; only yester-
day, however, he had heard on the radio that General Eisen-
hower had ordered all civilians to turn their weapons in to
local burgermeisters, and he had told his men to comply; they
therefore had no means to carry out their assigned mission.
It was apparent that the will to resist was gone.
Back in Bad Ischl, our informants helped us pin-point the
center of the National Redoubt as being in the vicinity of the
mountain town of Alt Aussee, thirty kilometers to the south
and well up in the Totes Gebirge range. We took this in-
formation, and Mrs. Kaltenbrunner, back to the 80th Division
command post at Voecklabruck. Interrogated, Mrs. Kalten-
brunner acknowledged that her husband had been with her
at their Strobl estate as recently as May 3. He had presided
over a meeting attended by the following important Nazi of-
ficials: Neubacher, ambassador to Belgrade; General Glaise-
Horstenau, minister to Croatia; Gauleiter Rainer of Salzburg;
RSHA foreign intelligence area chiefs Wilhelm Waneck and
Wilhelm Hoettl; SS Oberfuehrer Muehlmann; Otto Skorzeny,
leader of the RSHA sabotage units. Kaltenbrunner, she said,
knew the Alt Aussee area well from summer visits he had
made when he was the "Little Himmler" of Austria. She de-
scribed him as 43 years old, six feet four inches tall, weighing
220 pounds, having a powerful build and dark features, with
deep scars on both sides of his face.
A task force of tanks and infantry under Major Ralph
Pearson was ordered to the Alt Aussee area, and I was in-
structed to join them there. It was now V-E day. Sid Bruskin
and I left Voecklabruck at four in the morning on May 9. As
we drove up over the Poetschen pass, it was difficult to keep
our minds on the mission, so beautiful was the scenery. The
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000I-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
road led up beside a rushing mountain stream that cascaded
merrily down the rocks in steep descent, its spray sparkling
in the early morning sun. Above and around us were snow-
capped peaks, and the green alms on either side were brightly
splashed with mountain flowers. We rested in Bad Aussee
and then climbed the last four kilometers into Alt Aussee, a
town of 4,000 at the end of a winding mountain road, the last
village in the ascent up the Totes Gebirge. Nestled on the
west shore of Alt Ausseersee, it looks across the deep, cold
lake to the Trissiwand Peak on the east and over the Loser
Alm on the north shore to the snowcapped summit of the Totes
Gebirge range.
Alt Aussee was for the Viennese what Lake Tahoe is for Cali-
fornians. Three Gauleiters-Henlein, Jury, and Eigruber-
had their summer homes there. Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-
Schillingsfurst, the largest landowner in the Salzkammergut,
was born and now lived there. Prince Hohenlohe, who had
lived for a decade in New York with an American wife, made
transparent attempts to ingratiate himself with us. He got
us living quarters in the Hotel Eibl and offices in one of his
villas down the street. He invited us to tea and apologized
for his poor hospitality, saying that the Nazis made him live
in his barn. (Later he was arrested for interrogation, after
Kaltenbrunner told 12th Army Group interrogators that he
had been Ribbentrop's observer in Spain and Portugal and had
produced a mine of information regarding the United States
and Latin America.?)
We established an informant net from our "white list" of
anti-Nazis and the most knowledgeable and trustworthy mem-
bers of the Freedom Movement. This latter group was headed
by Johann Brandauer, the assistant burgermeister. Rumors
were rife that Kaltenbrunner, Ley, Eigruber, Kreisleiter Stich-
not of Gmunden, and strong groups of SS troops and high
SS officers were hiding out in the recesses of the Totes Gebirge.
From May 9 to May 11 we worked sixteen or eighteen hours
a day trying to get some clue to Kaltenbrunner's where-
abouts.
HQ 12th Army Group Intermediate Interrogation Report, June 28,
1945.
kpiroved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
Our first important contact was with Albrecht Gaiswinkler,
a British agent who had been parachuted into the area on
April 20. A native of Bad Aussee, he had been drafted into
the Wehrmacht, had deserted in France, turning a Nazi sup-
ply train over to the French Maquis, and when the Third
Army liberated Alsace had given himself up to the Americans.
The Americans had turned him over to the British, to whom
the Aussee area was allocated for future occupation. Gais-
winkler had learned that Wilhelm Waneck, Chief of the RSHA
Intelligence Section for Southeastern Europe-and one of
Kaltenbrunner's May 3 conferees at Strobl-was now operat-
ing a wireless transmitting station in the Kerry Villa located
on a hill at the outskirts of Alt Aussee. Working with
Waneck were his deputy, Wilhelm Hoettl, (another of the con-
ferees), Werner Goettsch, who had earlier held Waneck's job
and now was a sort of chief ideologist for the RSHA, and a
number of other Nazi officials.
Thanks to Gaiswinkler's effective groundwork, Sid and I
were able to arrest this group, seal its headquarters at the
Kerry Villa, and stop the operation of its transmitter. We
did not know then that this was the central communications
center for the National Redoubt and Kaltenbrunner's only
connection with the outside world; its importance and the
feverish activities of the Goettsch-Waneck group during the
preceding month were revealed only later after detailed in-
terrogation of the principals. For the moment our attention
was all on locating Kaltenbrunner, and these people gave no
leads on his whereabouts except the information that he had
been at Alt Aussee on May 3.
We located and arrested many lesser Nazis who had fled to
Alt Aussee, seeking for the most part time to collect their
thoughts and prepare their anti-Nazi alibis-Gunther Alten-
burg, Minister Plenipotentiary to Greece; General Erich Alt
of the Luftwaffe; Joseph Heider, who had been detailed by
Eigruber to blow up the Alt Aussee salt mines wherein was
stored a fabulous collection of looted art treasures for the
projected Great Hitler Museum in Linz; Dr. Hjalmar Mae, head
of the puppet state in Esthonia; Walter Riedel, construction
chief for the V-2 weapons at Peenemuende; Ernst Szar-
garus, Foreign Office secretary in Rome; Spiros Hadji Kyriakos,
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
Under Governor of the National Bank of occupied Greece;
William Knothe, General Counsel of the Foreign Office; Dr.
Carlos Wetzell, head of the pharmaceutical industry; and Dr.
Bailent Homan, minister in the Hungarian puppet govern-
ment.
As we cast about during those three days for traces of
Kaltenbrunner's movements, we sorted out the diverse social
groups in Alt Aussee, each busy trying to establish its anti-
Nazi premise. There was the artist's group, with movie actors
Ernst von Klipstein and Lotte Koch, the Viennese theater star
Unterkirchner, the aged composer Wolf-Ferrari, the sensa-
tional pianist-composer-conductor Peter Kreuder, self-styled
"Cole Porter of Germany," the composer and conductor Nico
Dostal, the Austrian tenor and movie star Johannes Heesters,
and many members of the Vienna symphony orchestra. More
intriguing from the CIC viewpoint was the old German no-
bility group of Countess Platen and Herbert von Hindenburg,
nephew of the Field Marshal, because they had living with
them one Jean Schils, a Dutch intelligence man who claimed
to have been a member of the anti-Nazi underground, and a
certain Norman Bailey-Stewart. Schils gave us several false
leads on "V-3 weapons" supposed to be located nearby in a
Russian-occupied area, and seemed in general bent on provok-
ing incidents between the Russians and the Americans.
One day Schils came into the office to volunteer informa-
tion on the whereabouts of Gauleiter Eigruber and brought
Bailey-Stewart along as his interpreter. It soon became ap-
parent that Bailey-Stewart was deliberately misinterpreting
everything Schils said, and he was acting very abnormally.
About 35 and unusually good-looking, he showed his im-
patience with the dullness of the business at hand. I ques-
tioned him alone, and he turned out to be England's famous
"Officer in the Tower" of the thirties, eager to tell the world
the sequel to those early espionage activities-his work for
the Nazis in the war just ending.
In 1932, according to his account, returning as a second
lieutenant from duty in India, he was disillusioned with Eng-
land's imperial policy. He volunteered for the German secret
service and was sent back to London to collect order-of-battle
information. Discovered through the alertness of the Eng-
A18
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
lish censors, he was tried amid much publicity and sentenced
to five years in the Tower of London. When his family's in-
fluence obtained his release in 1936 he went to Vienna, watched
now not only by the English secret service but also by the
Gestapo and Schuschnigg's and Skubl's Austrian police. He
applied for Austrian citizenship. The English picked him up
in 1938 and accused him of smuggling arms into Austria to
help the then illegal Nazi Party. The charges were not
proved, however, and with the Anschluss he became a Ger-
man citizen. In the same year he was questioned by RSHA
agents about his criticism of Nazi propaganda beamed to
England, and his criticism was so good that he was flown to
Berlin and given a job in the Rundfunk, where in 1939 he
began what were to become later, under William Joyce, the
Lord Haw Haw programs. But about this time he was re-
ported to have made remarks detrimental to the Nazi State,
and he became involved in personal antagonisms. Through
a friend in the Foreign Ministry he was given a job in its
wireless department. In March 1944 he was sent to Vienna.
In December, having been called to service in the Volksturm,
he gave a false address and departed for Alt Aussee.
All this was very interesting, but it did not advance the
Kaltenbrunner chase. We arrested Bailey-Stewart on behalf
of the British and went back to our job. The most promising
set of people in Alt Aussee for our purposes was the one com-
prising Countess Gisela von Westarp, Iris Scheidler, and Dr.
Rudolf Praxmarar.
Gisela von Westarp was Kaltenbrunner's mistress. A pretty
blonde of twenty-two with blue eyes, vivacious and extremely
intelligent, she had been working at Himmler's Berlin head-
quarters when Kaltenbrunner came from Vienna in early
1943 to take over the RSHA. On March 12, 1945, she bore him
twins, Ursula and Wolfgang, in a cowshed in Alt Aussee. I
still have a letter she wrote to her mother describing the
event, declaring that she "almost deserved the Mother
Cross," and pointing out that Mrs. Kaltenbrunner had taken
twelve years to produce only three children. One of the
twins' godfathers, Gisela told me proudly, was Hitler's per-
sonal physician, Dr. Karl Brandt.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaftenbrunner's Last Days
Iris Scheidler was the wife of Arthur Scheidler, formerly
adjutant to Heydrich and now to Kaltenbrunner. She was
thirty years old, an attractive society brunette, seemingly in-
tent on having a good time. She and Gisela were good friends
with many of those in the Hitler inner circle, especially
Heinrich Hoffman, the Reich photographer who had intro-
duced Eva Braun to Hitler, Eva Braun herself, Baldur von
Schirach, Hitler Youth leader and later Gauleiter of Vienna,
and Herman Fegelein, the SS General who acted as liaison
officer between Hitler and Himmler.
Dr. Rudolph Praxmarar had once been Iris' husband, and
they still had great affection for each other. He had been a
classmate and friend of Kaltenbrunner's at the University of
Graz and then became a prominent physician in Vienna.
Now he was the SS Chief of Hospitals and military commander
of Alt Aussee. He was about 50 years old, with a genial person-
ality and the reputation of being a great sportsman. But
we received from Freedom Movement informants in the SS
hospitals an accusation against him signed by members of his
own staff. It read in part:
Until two days prior to the entry of the American Task Force Into
Alt Aussee, Praxmarar kept active association with the bloodhound
Kaltenbrunner. He has not been afraid to shelter him in the hos-
pital and provide him with medicines and food and weapons.
Arms were loaded into a car at night to help Kaltenbrunner escape
to the mountains. Praxmarar, prior to the arrival of the Ameri-
cans, tried to force several of the patients into the Kampgruppe
Kaltenbrunner for the purpose of staging a last stand in the moun-
tains. He also tried to get one hundred men from Georg [Gais-
winkler] for the same purpose. Under the pretext of angina pec-
toris he took into the safety of his hospital the Kaltenbrunner
Gestapo chief in Vienna, SS Brigadier General Huber.
We found Huber still in the hospital and arrested him.
Praxmarar we didn't arrest until several days later, when we
had received further proof of his complicity with Kaltenbrun-
ner.
The Quarry Taken
Finally, on the morning of May 11, we received our first
solid piece of information on the location of Kaltenbrunner's
hideout. Johann Brandauer reported that the Alt Aussee for-
est ranger-a member of the Freedom Movement-had seen
A20
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaftenbrunner's Last Days
General Kaltenbrunner, Scheidler, and two SS guards five days
before in a cabin called Wildensee Huette atop the Totes
Gebirge. Though the tip was five days old, it had the merit of
coming from a reliable source: Brandauer was one of our
closest and most trustworthy collaborators. I therefore asked
him to bring me immediately two reliable Austrians who knew
the mountain trails to serve as guides.
Brandauer. brought not two but four Austrian guides, all
former Wehrmacht soldiers. They said it would take us five
hours to reach the cabin. There would still be from twenty
to thirty feet of snow on the ground, and no cover for us ex-
cept drifts on the last four kilometers of the way up to the
cabin. We would have to leave before midnight to arrive
under cover of darkness and while the crust on the snow was
still hard. ~ I would dress in Austrian costume-lederhosen,
Alpine jacket and hat, and spiked shoes. I would approach
the cabin alone; the Austrians were not willing to come closer
than five hundred yards. I would go up unarmed so as not to
draw fire or arouse suspicion. I would pose as a passer-by
crossing the mountains on the way to Steyrling, in the next
valley: there were many Wehrmacht deserters and fleeing
Nazis whose safest and most expedient mode of travel was
by foot over the mountains. If Kaltenbrunner was not there
I would come out immediately.
This was a sensible plan. That it was executed stumblingly
was due to the fact that Major Pearson, the task force com-
mander, insisted on sending a squad of his boys along. I was
afraid their presence might bring on a pitched battle, leaving
either a dead or an escaped Kaltenbrunner, and my argu-
ments achieved at least the compromise agreement that I
would have authority to use the infantry squad in any man-
ner I saw fit. I ordered it to stay well to the rear and on
the approach to the cabin keep under cover out of sight.
After this matter had been arranged, on the afternoon of
the eleventh, I sent for Gisela. She was extremely anxious
to find out what information we had regarding Kaltenbrun-
ner. I told her we had some leads and asked her to write
a note to him urging him to accompany the bearer into safe
custody with the Americans rather than let himself be taken,
and probably killed, by the Russians. After a moment's
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030000 21
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
thought she complied. Later that afternoon we were visited
by several delegations from the Gisela-Iris group-first Hans
Unterkirchner, the Viennese actor, then Lotte Koch and
Ernst von Klipstein, then Praxmarar and Iris-all fishing for
information.
Iris was apparently most concerned about the safety of her
husband Arthur Scheidler. Although she was going to have
a baby in six weeks, she insisted that she be allowed to ac-
company any patrol that might go off into the mountains
after him, arguing that if she were in evidence there would
be no shooting on the part of the Kaltenbrunner group.
Thinking that she might indeed be useful in this way, I told
her she could come; but then she backed down. Never quite
sure what the maneuverings of these friends of Kaltenbrun-
ner might mean, I sent Sid to the Gisela-Iris house to keep an
eye on them for the next twelve hours.
That night at 11:30 p.m. the patrol assembled in the CIC
office for final briefing. The infantry boys, although they had
volunteered for this mission, were a little dubious about the
plan as outlined, and especially about being guided by former
German soldiers. They wanted it made clear that if they
made a single false step the guides would be dead ducks; after
coming through the war alive they didn't want to get killed
with peace and home in sight.
As we started off at midnight the squad of soldiers loaded
with their rifles, hand grenades, and ammunition seemed to
make as much noise as a company of tanks rolling through
the streets; it would be evident to the village people that a
patrol was leaving. We walked past the See Hotel, where one
of Praxmarar's SS hospitals was quartered, past Fischern-
dorf, along the Alt Ausseersee shore, and then began to climb.
There were unexpected obstacles: trees swept down by heavy
snowslides lay across the path, and the foot bridge over the
Stammern stream had been carried away in the spring floods.
Up through the timber, up past the timber line we wound our
way, snake-like over the hairpin trail. The infantry, weapon-
laden and without spiked shoes, slowed us down, and it was
soon clear that we could not keep to our schedule. Three of
the soldiers, injured by falls, were dropped along the way.
A ,roved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
At 5 a.m., as day began to touch the sky, we finally reached
a snow-covered pass from which through glasses we could see
the Wildensee Huette. It lay across a great expanse of ex-
posed down-slope and then up a long bare ridge, just below
the crest. We nevertheless decided to proceed directly, in full
view, rather than take a circuitous route to gain cover from
overhanging crags. It was getting late; everybody was thor-
oughly tired from breaking through the crust calf-deep at
every step; and the cabin appeared to be utterly deserted.
Behind a ridge of snow some 300 yards from the cabin I
left the four Austrian guides and what remained of the in-
fantry squad and worked my way around to the blind west
side of the cabin, taking advantage of any cover there was.
As I was laughing at myself for being so cautious in approach-
ing an evidently deserted cabin, I heard a bird-call signal off
to the right. No, it was a bird, apparently as lonesome as I
felt. The cabin, I could see, was a typical Alpine hut-two
rooms, a wood shelter, a porch that faced down the slope in
the direction we had come. The shutters were tight closed;
no smoke was coming from the chimney; no fresh foottracks
were visible in the snow.
I walked onto the porch and knocked at the door. There
was no response. I tried the door and found it locked. But
then a sleepy groan came from the left-hand room. I knocked
loudly on the window shutter. Someone got out of bed and
walked across the room. The shutter opened, revealing a
rough-looking man of about 35, not Kaltenbrunner. "Was
suchen?" he asked. I said in very American-sounding Ger-
man that I was cold and wanted to come in. But he clearly
wasn't going to ask me in, so I came straight to the point
and handed him Gisela's note to Kaltenbrunner.
He read it carefully, but then said he didn't know these
people, he was just a passer-by on his way down to Bad Ischl.
At that moment he looked over my shoulder down the slope,
and saw the four guides coming up with rifles slung over their
shoulders; observing that nothing had happened to me, they
had decided that there was no danger. He quickly crossed
the room and took a revolver from his trousers hanging be-
side the bed. I retreated to the protection of the cabin's west
side, and he slammed the shutter shut. The guides, alarmed,
A23
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
brought the eight infantry boys up in a half-circle around the
front of the cabin. While this maneuver was being executed,
the man in the cabin opened the door and came out on the
porch, perhaps to negotiate, but when he saw the rein-
forcements he quickly reentered, slamming and bolting
the door behind him.
With the men in position, we called out to the occupants to
come out with their hands over their heads. For ten min-
utes we kept repeating this call, with no results. Not wishing
to start shooting, we went onto the porch and began to knock
down the door. But immediately it opened and four men
walked out with their hands over their heads. They had de-
cided to come peacefully after all.
Inside the cabin we found four Wehrmacht rifles, four re-
volvers, a large quantity of ammunition, two machine pistols,
and a machine gun, the latter hidden in the recess of the
chimney. Also a case of empty champagne bottles, some
French bonbons, some American tax-free cigarettes, and a
large quantity of counterfeit American and British money.
In the ash pit at the base of the chimney was a picture of
Kaltenbrunner with his wife and children, a copy of his last
radio message to Fegelein for Himmier and Hitler, his identi-
fication card as Chief of the SIPO and SD, and his metal
identification discs as number two man (Himmler was num-
ber one) of the Gestapo and the Kriminalpolizei.
I interrogated each of the four men. Two of them admitted
they were SS guards, but claimed they had no connection with
Kaltenbrunner. And Kaltenbrunner and Scheidler, although
there was no mistaking at least the former, refused to admit
their identities. They had false papers, Kaltenbrunner those
of a doctor discharged from the Wehrmacht, and lie carried a
medical kit and all the usual accessories. (Later he took
pains to explain that these papers were not forged, but the
authentic identification of deceased persons. This rather fine
distinction was characteristic of his efforts to appear an Aus-
trian gentleman and a good Catholic.) He stood rigidly at at-
tention during the interrogation, trying to create a good in-
itial impression by being earnest and cooperative. Scheidler
was the antithesis. He made no attempt to hide his wrath.
AApproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approve~Ipfeoreeler 2~( /~~57 : CIA-RDP78-03921 A000300300001 -1
His eyes flashed furiously at me as we swung heavy packs onto
the four men for our trip down to the village.
At 11:30 in the morning we arrived back in Alt Aussee,
where word had apparently circulated that a mountain patrol
was returning: a crowd was gathered in the village street.
As we passed Prince Hohenlohe, he remarked, "I see you have
your man Kaltenbrunner," and at the same time Iris and
Gisela broke from the throng and ran up and embraced their
respective men. Kaltenbrunner and Scheidler now had to
drop their masks.
The Last Days
In time, through the interrogation and testimony of Kal-
tenbrunner and others,? it was possible to piece together the
story of his recent efforts to salvage something from the Ger-
man defeat. On April 18 Himmler had named him Commander
in Chief of all forces in southern Europe. He had reorganized
his intelligence services as a stay-behind underground net,
dividing the command up between Otto Skorzeny, head of the
sabotage units, and Wilhelm Waneck, whose radio station in
the Kerry Villa kept in contact not only with Kaltenbrunner
and other centers in the Redoubt and in Germany, but also
with stay-behind agents in the southern European capitals.
Waneck, however, with Werner Goettsch, Wilhelm Hoettl,
and others, concluding as early as 1943 that the Nazis would
lose the war, had been intriguing for a negotiated peace with
the western allies and a common front against Russia. The
plan was to set up an independent Austrian state in rebellion
against the Nazi Reich and supported by the Anglo-Ameri-
cans. Goettsch had valuable contacts among the Vienna So-
cialists, and one idea had been to send Karl Doppler to the
United States to broach the plan because he had the same
masonic degrees as President Roosevelt. Kaltenbrunner was
informed of this conspiracy and gave tacit assent, though he
could not actively participate. Later other Socialists were
brought in, including Karl Winkler, who had contacts with
Notably Wilhelm Hoettl (Third Army Preliminary Interrogation Re-
port No. 17, June 1945), Wilhelm Waneck (12th Army Group In-
termediate Interrogation Report, June 21, 1945), and Werner
Goettsch (USFET Final Interrogation Report No. 8, July 24, 1945).
A25
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CI --RDPb78 03e9?1Aa0003 yS00001-1
America and England through Draja Mihailovich, and Raffael
Spann and Professor Heinrich, who had an excellent contact
in England, their friend Major Christie at the Travellers Club,
London. Attempts in 1944 to contact Major Christie by letter
failed, however; and an opportunity provided by Mihailovich to
get in touch with the American Legation in Belgrade was lost
when Belgrade was occupied.
Finally, in March 1945, according to the interrogation re-
ports, Hoettl went to Switzerland with the Polish Count
Potocki, with whose help and that of Prince Alois Auersperg,
a former Abwehr officer implicated in the July 1944 attempt
on Hitler's life, he was able to get into touch with Mr.
Schultze-Gaevernitz, a member of the American Embassy,
and through him with Allen Dulles." Through Auersperg and
a Dr. Kurt Grimm, Austrian Freedom Movement representa-
tive, Hoettl also had contact with a Mr. Leslie of an Allied
Commission in Berne. The Americans, he was told, did not
want a strong Russian influence in Austria, and they were
particularly interested in Kaltenbrunner's attitude toward an
independent Austrian state.
With this information Hoettl, Waneck, and Goettsch were
able to urge Kaltenbrunner to set up a rival Austrian govern-
ment to the Russian-sponsored one in Vienna, which the west-
ern allies refused in April to recognize. Kaltenbrunner held
two meetings with members of this Free Austria group-Neu-
bacher, Glaise-Horstenau, Muehlmann, Hayler, Pschikril,
Hoettl, Goettsch, and Waneck-at which a provisional cabinet
was discussed and it was decided that Kaltenbrunner, in ac-
cordance with American wishes, should be an advisor. Hav-
ing now full powers in southern Europe, Kaltenbrunner was
in an excellent position to use his reorganized intelligence
services as a bargaining counter with the Allies.
On April 26, at Strobl, Hoettl reported to Kaltenbrunner,
Glaise-Horstenau, Neubacher, Muehlmann, Waneck, and
Goettsch on the results of a second visit to Switzerland. It
was agreed at this time to try to arrange a meeting between
Allen Dulles and Kaltenbrunner at Feldkirch, in Austria near
'This approach, if it was made, was carried out by the interme-
diaries: Hoettl did not in fact meet with Allen Dulles, and probably
not with Gaevernitz.
A26
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approveeddffi nrbR lea a ?Og4,12I17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
the Swiss border. During the next few days Kaltenbrunner
met with Field Marshall Kesselring and Lieutenant General
Winter at Koenigsee regarding the project. But the sands
were running out; the war was coming to an unexpectedly
rapid end. Kaltenbrunner could pursue the political way out
no longer. Facing capture as the Russian and American
troops closed in, he retired to Alt Aussee to bid Gisela farewell
and from there with his two SS guards and his adjutant
Scheidler made the ascent to the mountain hideout among
the snowy crags of the Totes Gebirge.
Interrogated now briefly by the 80th CIC at Alt Aussee
before being sent on to Third Army and 12th Army Group,
Kaltenbrunner said that he had intended to come down from
his retreat after things had quieted down and, on the basis of
the underground forces at his command, his Free Austria proj-
ect, and his knowledge of Bolshevism, come to terms with the
western allies: "If there is one man in Europe who knows
Bolshevism, it is I." We allowed Gisela and Iris a last tearful.
farewell before sending the two men on to higher headquar=
ters. There was a plan afoot which never materialized to
have Kaltenbrunner talk with General Eisenhower and then
issue a statement calling on the underground to end all re-
sistance.
During subsequent interrogations Kaltenbrunner remained
very cooperative, intent on establishing his alibi. At Third
Army he said that with Hitler's consent he "began in 1945
to use the foreign intelligence service to counteract Ribben-
trop's pernicious influence and to find a political way.. out."
He wrote a letter to his wife, Lisl, clearly designed for Am..exi-
can eyes:
My own destiny lies in the hands of God. I am glad that I never
separated from Him.... I cannot believe that I shall be held re-
sponsible for the mistakes of our leaders, for in the short time of
my activity I have striven hard for a reasonable attitude, both
internal and external.... They ought to have paid more attention
to my words.... We have no property worth mentioning. Pere
haps the only resource for you will be my small stamp collection.... .
Was it not my duty to open the door to socialism and freedom as
we imagined and desired them? ... I have not given up hope that
the truth will be found out and for a just legal decision.
A27
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
But he never disclaimed his positive relationship with Hit-
ler, one apparently bordering on adoration. His subordinate
WilhelmHoettl said of him that he "was fascinated by Hitler,
believed in him without reservation . . . . He believed he had
a mission to serve Hitler with his entire RSHA . . He
came to believe that Hitler was the man sent by God. This
developed into a mania."
In July Kaltenbrunner was sent to British Interrogation
Center 020 outside of London. Here, at a time when the hor-
rors of the concentration camps were being brought to light,
he was seized on as the first prisoner that had played a sig-
nificant and responsible part in the extermination program.
He was given third-degree treatment, I learned later from an
American intelligence officer working on the case. The result
was that henceforth he not only did not cooperate but re-
fused even to admit he had any responsibility at all in the
Nazi system. He refused to admit that he knew men who had
been his closest associates. He denied that he had ever been
near a concentration camp. He refused to admit that he
signed orders incarcerating persons in concentration camps.
In short, he denied from this time on any connection with
Nazi crimes or persons responsible for such crimes. He was
flown to Nuremberg for the trial in handcuffs-the only one
of the 21 major defendants treated in this manner.
In November, two weeks before the scheduled opening of
the trial, I was sent to Nuremberg to set up a security plan:
the American military commanders were becoming anxious
about "lone-wolf assassins," and Robert Ley had succeeded in
committing suicide despite supposedly elaborate precautions.
To test the Palace of Justice security system, another CIC
man and I tried penetrating without proper credentials to the
inner cell block which housed the 21 defendants. We suc-
ceeded, as anybody might have done, in passing through the
four interior guard posts without the required Red Pass. A
fifth post guarded the individual cells. I asked to see Kalten-
brunner and was readily admitted upon signing the registra-
tion book.
Kaltenbrunner looked gaunt and pale. He clearly showed
the effects of what he had been through since I saw him on
May 12. He gave no indication of wanting to remember
A28
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Kaltenbrunner's Last Days
me; it seemed as if he had mesmerized himself into a state of
complete forgetfulness. Only when I mentioned the name
Gisela he nodded and asked several questions about her and
the twins. But that was all.
On the opening day of the trial, to everyone's great disap-
pointment, Kaltenbrunner was not in the prisoners' dock; he
had been stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage the night be-
fore. It was three weeks before he was well enough to make
his plea, "I do not believe I have made myself guilty in the
sense of the indictment." On December 10 I was present at
the scene described in the press release of the International
Military Tribunal's public relations office:
Ernst Kaltenbrunner received a cool welcome from his co-
defendants when he made his initial appearance at the trial Mon-
day afternoon. Entering the prisoners' dock just before the after-
noon session began, no welcoming hands were proffered to greet
him. When he offered to shake hands with some of the defendants
there was a noticeable reluctance on their part. Taking his seat
in the dock between Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Rosenberg, he tried
to engage his neighbors in a conversation without much luck.
... When he was approached by his own defense council, Kalten-
brunner held out his hand. His lawyer had, however, with studied
casualness locked his hands behind his back.
I walked down beside Kaltenbrunner during the intermis-
sion that afternoon. He recognized me and motioned that
he wanted to speak with me. That was not permitted. I
had received that day through the mail a note from Gisela
for him, a girlish love-note telling him that his heart must
never grow cold, that she was thinking of him and would al-
ways love him. I handed it to Kaufman, Kaltenbrunner's de-
fense counsel. AP correspondent Daniel DeLuce, however,
who was talking with Kaufman at the time, appropriated it
and wrote a story on it. Kaltenbrunner presumably never
found out that Gisela was keeping the home fires burning.
Later that week Kaltenbrunner was stricken with a recur-
rence of the cerebral hemorrhage, and could not return to the
dock until January. But he survived through the entire trial,
to be hanged on October 15, 1946, with eleven of his co-de-
fendants.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Achievements, extravagances,
and exposure of a clandestine
German interbellum operation
in military research and devel-
opment.
THE LOHMANN AFFAIR
The Weimar Republic's attempts in the twenties to circum-
vent the Versailles restrictions on its armed forces produced
clandestine operations which in their financing, cover devices,
and hazards of exposure present a close parallel with intelli-
gence operations. One such series of undercover research and
development projects, carried out by a Captain Walther Loh-
mann of the German Naval Transportation Division, got out
of hand and became a source of acute embarrassment to the
Weimar Ministry of Defense. The affair was hushed up, and in
more recent times has been virtually overlooked by historians.
Sufficient material is now available, however, for a scrutiny of
Lohmann's work, its oddities and blunders, and for an account
of the way the German Cabinet successfully veiled its true
nature after some of the clandestine activities had been ex-
posed in the press.'
Walter Lohmann, the son of a one-time director of the
North German Lloyd shipping line, served inconspicuously as
a non-combat logistics specialist during the European war of
1914-1918. He won recognition in navy circles afterward, how-
The following materials were used in the preparation of this article:
captured documents of the German naval staff, in custody of the
Division of Naval History, U.S. Navy; the record of proceedings of
the German Cabinet and documents of the German Foreign Min-
istry, in custody of the U.S. Department of State at the National
Archives; records of the Berlin Embassy of the Department of State,
now available to the public at the National Archives; documents of
the German Reichstag and the files of several German newspapers,
including the Berliner Tageblatt, available at the Library of Con-
gress. In addition the writer has consulted the published memoirs
of former German Defense Minister Otto Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik
in der Weimarer Zeit (Stuttgart, 1958). Precise documentary cita-
tions are made in another version of this study being submitted to MORI/H RP
the Journal of Modern History. from pg.
A31 -A38
A31
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Lohmann Affair
ever, for his work on a subcommission which negotiated the
disposition of the German merchant fleet and for his direc-
tion of shipments of emergency food supplies to Germany.
He also managed the return from overseas of German war
prisoners. In 1920, while on the first of two trips to Leningrad
to negotiate with the Russians regarding the release of cap-
tured German merchant ships, he met the comely German-
born Frau Else Ektimov, destined later to play a role in his
downfall. He subsequently arranged for the return of the
lady to Germany and for her support.
In October 1920 he assumed command of the Naval Trans-
port Division of Navy headquarters in Berlin, a post concerned
primarily with logistical matters. For this reason, and also
because he enjoyed the complete trust of Admiral Paul
Behnke, then commander in chief of the Navy, he was given
full charge in early 1923 of the disbursement of the Navy's
"black" funds reserved for clandestine purposes.
Achievements
Initially, these funds included large sums-amounting in
dollars to at least 25 million-obtained from the sale of war-
ships and submarines scrapped in 1919 and 1920 at the order of
the Allied Powers. Later, some two and a half million were
added as the Navy's share of the so-called "Ruhr funds," mon-
ies voted by the Reichstag and used to strengthen the armed
services above Treaty limit at the time of the French occupa-
tion of the Ruhr. Subsequently, smaller sums totaling about
two and a quarter million were obtained or diverted from other
sources. Most of this money was transmitted to recipients
through a Lohmann-supported bank, the Berliner Bank-
verein, which acted as a middleman between the Naval Trans-
port Division and the various projects funded.
Only one inspector, a man of Lohmann's own choice, was
assigned to audit the funds, and he had no authority to ques-
tion the wisdom or validity of the captain's disbursements.
His presence afforded a partial check against improper book-
keeping and ordinary waste, but none to hinder Lohmann
from supporting whatever projects he chose. Admiral Behnke
and Minister of Defense Otto Gessler, trusting Lohmann to
use the money for worthwhile undertakings, seem to have
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Lohmann Affair
given him carte blanche, an opportunity which appealed to
his Hanseatic spirit.
Between 1923 and 1927 Lohmann financed nearly all of the
clandestine and semi-clandestine projects of the Navy. Most
of these were established with the initial concurrence of his
superiors, and many required the closest cooperation with sev-
eral divisions of the naval staff; but some were founded and
supported solely on the captain's initiative without the
knowledge of even the commander in chief of the Navy. This
independent activity was protected by the necessity for strict
secrecy in clandestine operations and by Lohmann's ex-
tremely broad powers.
The projects which dealt with aircraft and submarine de-
sign and development were for the most part soundly con-
ceived, well executed, and extremely important for the future
development of the Navy and the Luftwaffe. With subsidies
from Lohmann, three German shipyards operated a highly suc-
cessful submarine design bureau in The Netherlands which
maintained contact with Navy headquarters through a
dummy firm known as Mentor Bilanz. The "Dutch" bureau,
Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, designed a submarine
which Lohmann and Captain Wilhelm Canaris (later to be-
come the Abwehr chief of ambivalent loyalties) in 1926 ar-
ranged to have built at Cadiz in Spain. The purpose was to
train German technicians and to develop a prototype medium-
size submarine, which among other features had torpedo
tubes designed to eliminate the large bubble of air that nor-
mally betrayed a submarine's position when a torpedo was
fired.
Lohmann's work in aircraft development was equally sig-
nificant. The firms of Heinkel, Dornier, and Rohrbach en-
joyed his subsidies, and in 1926 he purchased outright the
Casper Aircraft Company to obtain facilities for the type-test-
ing of "commercial" aircraft which closely resembled the
fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance planes being built abroad
by such firms as Boeing, Vickers, and Douglass. By 1927 Ger-
many had several successful prototypes, and the Swiss sub-
sidiary of Dornier was about to embark on the design and
development of the "DO X" flying boat, a twelve-engine giant
larger even than the famous Boeing Clippers of Pan-Ameri-
A33
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Lohmann Affair
can, to meet the requirement for a patrol seaplane capable of
landing and refueling at sea. Only an unacceptably low serv-
ice ceiling made it necessary to abandon this design.
The training of airmen was at the same time not over-
looked. Battle-experienced pilots of the Lohmann-financed
Severa flying service based at Noordnay and Holtenau con-
ducted tactical exercises with the fleet and trained a dozen
young naval officers each year in the art of flying.
Extravagances
As Lohmann's list of projects grew-including also such
things as the secret construction of motor torpedo boats and
subsidies to various small-boat shipyards and yachtsmen's as-
sociations-his ambition increased proportionately. By about
1926 he seems to have become convinced that he could per-
fect a massive structure of clandestine projects financed by
profitable commercial ventures bolstering the rapidly dwin-
dling "black" funds. He then stepped into another world,
the world of commerce and business, where his successes were
lamentably few. He had become the victim of Masslosigkeit-
gross intemperance.
Two projects which attempted to combine money-making
with what might today be termed "defense-related research"
bordered on the fantastic. One company was founded to ex-
ploit an experimental method of raising sunken ships by sur-
rounding them with ice, and another sought to extract motor
fuel from potatoes. These accomplished nothing, and both
aroused much public ridicule when they were later exposed.
Another device, a coal-pulverizing machine, came to grief in
the course of experiments and the Lohmann-financed com-
pany which sponsored it went bankrupt.
But it was the Berliner Bacon Company which came to be
described by German Socialists as the most oderiferous of Loh-
mann's schemes. This project was initiated primarily as a
money-maker in the spring of 1926. Lohmann proposed to
wrest from the Danes the lucrative British bacon market by
offering a German product cured by a new process especially
for the Englishman's palate. He had incidentally in mind
that the fast refrigerator ships he hoped to acquire for the
bacon trade would be useful in wartime as troop transports.
A$proved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Lohmann Affair
His ambitions, however, exceeded his ability to analyze the
British market potential, and by mid-1927 his company
was bankrupt.
Lohmann's downfall stemmed from his relations with the
Phoebus Film Company, in 1927 the third largest producer of
motion pictures in Germany. Beginning in 1924 Lohmann
granted subsidies to this firm on condition that it produce
films of a "national" character designed to stimulate the
"fatherland consciousness" of the German people. He also
hoped to use its overseas offices to establish an intelligence
network in former enemy countries where Germany was not
allowed a naval attache.
The captain probably had personal reasons for supporting
Phoebus as well. Prior to his association with the company
he had become a close personal friend of one of the direc-
tors, and afterward a member of a hunting club organized by
him. Through this man Lohmann secured for his friend Frau
Ektimov a position with Phoebus at a salary of 1,000 marks a
month, enough to enable her to support her aged mother and
young son in comfort. Frau Ektimov, employed for "repre-
sentation," did no work, and she had apartments in a house
purchased by Lohmann. Lohmann's personal relations with
her are nevertheless officially said to have been above re-
proach, motivated solely by a desire to help her; and honi soit
qui mal y pense. He also seems not to have appropriated any
of the "black" funds for his own use.
Between 1924 and 1927 Lohmann provided Phoebus, a com-
pany capitalized at approximately $1,000,000, with a total of
over $2,500,000. He informed his superiors of only one of five
separate grants, a government-guaranteed loan from the Giro-
central Bank in Berlin in March 1926. In order to obtain
their signatures on this guarantee, Lohmann resorted to a
strategem, informing them that the Lignose Company, a pro-
ducer of raw film, had also guaranteed the loan and that in
the event of default it would stand the loss instead of the gov-
ernment. He neglected to add that he had in effect bribed one
of Lignose's officials with a $2,500 "negotiating fee," and that
he had given this man a written assurance that Lignose would
not have to pay. In the early half of 1927 he arranged two
more government-guaranteed loans which he kept secret from
Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300043T
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The Lohmann Affair
his superiors by affixing his own signature in the name of
the Reich.
Despite this massive aid, Phoebus continued to lose money.
In 1927 it was in such serious financial difficulties that it
failed to convene its regular annual stockholders' meeting or
issue a financial report. By August disaster was impending
for both Lohmann and Phoebus. The company was falling be-
hind in payments on its loans, and penalties were mounting
rapidly. None of Lohmann's various money-making projects
had paid off, and the "black" funds were near exhaustion.
Exposure
Kurd Wenkel, one of the financial writers of the Berliner
Tageblatt, a liberal daily of high quality, had been following
the declining fortunes of the German film industry with close
attention. He was well aware of the financial condition of
Phoebus, and by mid-July had begun to suspect that Phoebus
enjoyed official support. At about this time he became ac-
quainted with a former director of the company, Isenburg,
who had resigned in disgust in 1926 and knew of Lohmann's
dealings with Phoebus, of the several government-guaranteed
loans, and of Lohmann's relations with Frau Ektimov. Evi-
dently for reasons of spite he told all this to Wenkel, who took
care to check the story independently and then in articles on
8 and 9 August created a sensation by exposing the shameful
scandal.
Wenkel, however, was apparently not aware of Lohmann's
real clandestine mission. For him the Phoebus relationship
constituted an attempt by the Navy to strengthen right-wing
elements in Germany. His articles briefly mentioned some of
Lohmann's other activities, including subsidies to a boatbuild-
ing yard, but only as attempts to help industries that had
some war potential. One of his disclosures, however, had it
been pursued, could have exposed most of Lohmann's work-
his connections with the Berliner Bankverein.
Lohmann had bought a controlling interest in the Bank-
verein in March 1925 in order to use it as a covert financing
agency for his projects. But the private bankers who re-
mained shareholders were greatly displeased at the deprecia-
tion of its stock caused by failures such as that of the Ber-
liner Bacon Company, and their discontent made them seri-
roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 ApprovedrFeor Releas 7~ttair 2/17: CIA-RDP78-03921AO00300300001-1
ous security risks. If any of them emulated the vindictive
Isenburg and talked to the press, there was grave danger
that the Lohmann affair might become not only a scandal
but a revelation of serious German violations of the Versailles
Treaty.
Antidotes
The German Cabinet and Chancellor Marx were therefore
anxious to smooth the affair over as rapidly as possible. Loh-
mann was suspended from office, an official Cabinet inquiry was
begun, and a retired official of the Prussian State judiciary
was placed in charge of Lohmann's office for the purposes of
investigation and audit. Publicity was curtailed and Wenkel
silenced by pressure on the Berliner Tageblatt. Two radical
journals continued to carry articles through late August, Sep-
tember, and October, but neither had good enough contacts
in navy or industrial circles to make further damaging dis-
closures. Chancellor Marx consulted directly with various im-
portant party leaders to insure silence in political quarters.
In November the Cabinet began a series of meetings on the
affair. As prophylactic action against future extravagant in-
discretions by one individual or one component of the govern-
ment, it decided to establish a "Supervisory Commission for
the Secret Tasks of the Armed Forces" composed of the heads
of the Army and Navy, the Reich Finance Minister, and the
President of the General Accounting Office (Rechnungshof)
to supervise and approve all clandestine projects of the serv-
ices. Within the Navy a special "B" budget for funds diverted
from publicly budgeted items was placed in the charge of a
regular budget officer who had no authority to initiate or con-
trol projects. Although illegal operations were ultimately on
a considerably larger scale than during the Lohmann era,
rising from $1,700,000 in 1928 to $5,250,000 in 1933, there was
no further abuse of the powers conferred by secrecy.
Lohmann, much in disfavor, was nevertheless punished only
by forced retirement on a reduced pension. There seem to
have been two reasons for this clemency-first, that extensive
investigations showed he had not appropriated official funds
for himself; and second, that an elaborate court-martial would
have brought on the very thing the government wanted most
to avoid, publicity which might disclose violations of the Ver-
A37
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RQP L 039221A0QQ33Q0300001-1
The ohmann air
sailles Treaty. Lohmann was a broken man, however, and
he died only three years later of a heart attack. His widow
had so little money that she was unable to pay the necessary
inheritance taxes. Of Frau Ektimov's fate there is no word.
Before the Reichstag and the world public the Cabinet was
able to obscure the fact that violations of the Versailles Treaty
had occurred. The matter had to be brought to the Reich-
stag for approval of a special appropriation to pay off the gov-
ernment-guaranteed loans to Phoebus; but the Cabinet an-
nounced in advance the resignation of both Defense Minister
Gessler and Navy commander Zenker, who, as Lohmann's su-
periors, had to accept responsibility for the scandal. In the
Reichstag discussions the question of why Lohmann had en-
gaged in such unusual activities was never fairly asked. Vio-
lation of the Treaty was charged only once, by the young and
fanatical Communist deputy, Ernst Schneller, who declared
correctly that Lohmann had been involved in submarine pro-
duction in Spain. He ruined the effectiveness of an otherwise
good case, however, by continuing with wild allegations that
Germany's former enemies were assisting her in this work
preparatory to a combined capitalist assault on that bastion of
socialism, the U.S.S.R. This was such hackneyed tripe that
the responsible German press did not bother to print his
charges. The French news agency Havas carried them, but
only in routine fashion and without comment.
Abroad, the fact that Lohmann's work violated the Versail-
les Treaty was completely missed by the press. Furthermore,
the reports of the American Embassy in Berlin were brief and
incurious regarding Lohmann's motives. British and French
diplomatic reporting is not available, but an examination of
the German Foreign Office records fails to disclose even a
memorandum of conversation on the subject between these
embassies and the Wilhelmstrasse. The conclusion seems in-
escapable that either the vaunted British and French intelli-
gence services were caught napping, or, as seems more likely,
the policy-makers in Paris and London chose to ignore the af-
fair. To them the apparent collapse of the German Navy's
efforts to circumvent the Treaty was perhaps a matter for
quiet amusement rather than for alarm or indignation.
A38
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS
Dear Sirs:
I have come across copies of correspondence which may be
of interest in documenting Mr. Nabbie's article on "The Alamo
Scouts" that appeared in the Studies Vol. III No. 4. Spanning
a two-month interval from a fortnight before the Luzon land-
ings to a fortnight after the retaking of Manila, they illus-
trate the evolution of official policy toward the Filipino guer-
rillas. The first statement of policy from MacArthur's head-
quarters was made in response to a Sixth Army request:
20 December 1944
Headquarters Sixth Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 442
Subject: Official Recognition of Guerrillas
To : Commander-In-Chief, South West Pacific Area, APO 500
1. Request that a directive be published clarifying the policy to
be followed in extending official recognition to guerrilla units.
2. It is understood that to date no guerrilla forces on Luzon have
been officially recognized by this theater.
3. Guerrilla groups on Mindanao, Leyte and Panay have been
extended such recognition with consequent emolument in rank and
pay. It is believed that unless some similar recognition is extended
to a group or groups on Luzon, it may cause resentment and handi-
cap the unification of the guerrilla forces there.
For the Commanding General:
G. H. DECKER
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff
1st Ind.
General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area, APO 500,
27 December 1944
To: Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, APO 442
1. The formal recognition of guerrilla units operating in Luzon
present a very different problem than that prevailing on major
islands to the South. Such action in the South resulted from an
entirely different military situation than has existed under enemy
occupation in Luzon. The vast areas, never under the physical
occupation and control of the enemy in Mindanao, Panay and
Negros, for example, permitted the organization and arming of
MORI/HRP A39
Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-090 M90300300001-1
A39-A41
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP78-Q/.392AA0QQ300300001-1
o e rraditors
regularized military forces and their commitment to guerrilla war-
fare, military intelligence and other interior activity under the
direction of this Headquarters.
2. This was not possible in Luzon due to the widespread garrison-
ing of the area by vastly greater enemy occupying forces. As a
consequence the resistance movement in Luzon has been confined
to the classic type of underground operations in which an entire
population, with little exception, has participated with patriotic
fervor. These operations have extended into every center of
enemy activity and have resulted in providing information in most
precise and detailed form on enemy dispositions throughout the
island.
3. It is anticipated that this great patriotic movement among the
people of Luzon will reach its maximum strength and utility after
the battle for Luzon has been joined and it is the desire of the
Commander-in-Chief that it be utilized to maximum advantage.
4. The service, past and future, of unsurrendered, escaped or
released members of USAFFE [United States Army Forces, Far
East], will certainly ultimately be recognized on the merits of
each case, as will the service of civilian patriotic secret societies,
groups and individuals, but it is desired that for the purpose of the
campaign the movement insofar as practicable be treated and
directed as a spontaneous patriotic effort on the part of the whole
people.
By Command of General MacArthur:
B. F. FITCH
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Adjutant General
This position, although it was presumably the best that
could be taken at the time, was not a very practical one. "A
spontaneous patriotic effort on the part of the whole people"
did not differentiate between Filipinos who trafficked with the
Japanese and the guerrillas who had taken up arms, made
sacrifices, and were living in the hills away from their fami-
lies. It also gave no basis for defining the status of individual
guerrilla leaders, where claims to authority were rife and as-
sumed rank was the order of the day. (I personally met and
was badgered by 20-year-old full colonels.) The unsurrendered
Americans in the area (Volckmann,l O'Day, Barnett, Black-
burn,2 Calvert, and Murphy in north Luzon; Lapham, Anderson
McKenzie and Ramsey in the central part; Barros in the south-
1 See Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained (New York, 1954).
'See Philip Harkins, Blackburn's Headhunters (New York, 1955).
A40
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
To The Edifors
ern Bicol section) did do much to consolidate individual guer-
rilla units and define in some sort their areas of jurisdiction.
The subsequent regularizing of the guerrilla units as com-
ponents of the Philippine Army which Mr. Nabbie describes
from the Alamo Scout viewpoint was based on the following
cable of 17 February 1945 from the Commanding General, Ad-
vance detachment, USAFFE, to the Commanding General,
Sixth Army:
It is desired as rapidly as practicable to induct into the Philippine
Army those guerrilla elements who have been or are being employed
or whom you believe it is desirable to employ in support of our com-
bat operations on Luzon. They may be inducted into service as
groups or individually as you deem expedient. The mechanical
process of such incorporation into service will be accomplished by
you or your subordinate commander as you may direct, furnishing
rosters and necessary data to the USAFFE Headquarters to perfect
the official records. Officers and men not already in the Philippine
Army by virtue of previous enlistment, induction or appointment
will acquire the status of members of the Philippine Army as of the
date of entry upon duty with pay according to Philippine Army
scale commencing as of that date and without prejudice to prior
service or claims. You are authorized to equip and supply these
units as best you may.
The screening of guerrilla claims through personal inspec-
tion of the units by Alamo Scout officers behind the Japanese
lines was probably effective in eliminating most of the John-
nie-come-lately's and others whose recognition was not war-
ranted.
Henry G. Fishburn
A41
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
The editors welcome the contribution of book reviews
on subjects within the contributor's field of compe-
tence. Reviews, like manuscripts, should be typed
in double space, and they should be headed with the
bibliographical data in standard Studies format.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE
THE PANTHER'S FEAST. By Robert Asprey. (New York:
Putnam. 1959. Pp. 317. $5.00. Also London: Jonathan
Cape. 1959.)
Robert Asprey's fictionalized life of Colonel Alfred Redl,
Austrian counterintelligence genius and Russian agent within
the Imperial General Staff before the first world war, makes
little contribution to a professional understanding of this
famous espionage case long cited, without detailed or adequate
study, as a classic instance of the recruitment of a homo-
sexual under threat of exposure. Yet if the jacket of the book
(not an unbiased source) can be believed, Asprey has studied
the files that survived Austrian efforts to suppress the Redl
case as well as the inadequate and sensational literature that
has grown up around it. He claims to have talked to sur-
vivors, including Redl's paramour Stefan, who were familiar
with details. The end result should have been worthy of all
this work.
Possibly it was. Asprey's first draft, a serious biography of
Redl, was rewritten in its present form at the behest of his
publishing agent, and the original manuscript destroyed. The
result is neither sound biography nor good fiction, and it is
essentially dishonest : it misleads the reader by combining
fact and fantasy without discrimination. This deception is
heightened by the inclusion of occasional footnote references
to authorities (without citing specific pages) and a truly im-
posing bibliography. Unsuspecting readers may well accept as
verified fact such sequences as Redl's meeting with the Italian
military attache in Vienna, completely fictional although
Redl may indeed have sold information to both Italy and
France. The "interpretive" invention of live dialogue protects
the casual reader from boredom at the expense of the student
who needs to get at the truth. Since the book market, to be
sure, consists of many casual readers and relatively few stu-
dents, writers and publishers who conspire to inflict "inter-
pretive" biography on the public are not commercially at MORI/HRP
fault. from pg.
A43-A46
A43
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA
-RDP78-03921 A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Espionage
In common with earlier writers on the case, Asprey trips
over the hard fact that Redl, himself a Russian agent, con-
tinued to uncover and neutralize other Russian agents in
Austria-Hungary. Asprey solves this problem through an im-
aginary face-to-face bargaining session between Redl and
Batyushin, the Russian officer who is thought to have han-
dled him. At this invented meeting Redl and Batyushin are
shown arranging to sacrifice Russian agents in Austria as
part of the payment to Redl. Asprey here follows without
acknowledging his source a theory first developed by Tristan
Busch in his Secret Service Unmasked,' but goes beyond Busch
to suggest that more than one meeting was held. Only the
German edition of Busch's work is listed in Asprey's bibliogra-
phy. Busch, who claims a career in Austrian intelligence be-
fore and during the first world war, cites no authority for this
doubtful story.
The true reason for this seeming inconsistency in Redl's ac-
tions was probably more prosaic: what better cover could he
have than an active career as a catcher of Russian spies? Ar-
rangements to sacrifice occasional Russian agents, if they
were in fact made, could have been set up through whatever
normal channels Redl had for passing messages and photo-
graphs to the Russians. (We know virtually nothing of
these.) The Russian case officer, whatever his personal feel-
ings, undoubtedly reconciled himself to the loss of a few minor
agents if he could keep the big one securely hooked. Until
evidence becomes available-and we know nothing of the
Russian side of this case-the face-to-face meeting of Redl and
Batyushin must be regarded as a myth. Indeed, until Rus-
sian files are opened, we can only speculate about Redl's moti-
vation, the operational techniques he employed, and his true
relationship to his Russian case officer.
At this late date, two great wars and half a troubled cen-
tury later, why should overburdened American intelligence
officers interest themselves in the uncertain career of a dimly
remembered Austrian officer who was trapped into espionage
by his homosexuality and a passion for luxurious living? What
can the tragic story of Alfred Redl mean to us?
'Tristan Busch (pen name for Arthur Schuetz), Secret Service Un-
masked (London: Hutchinson -& Co., Ltd.), pages 35-36.
A44
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Espionage
We should remember, first of all, that the case of Alfred
Redl forms part of the intelligence tradition of our Soviet ad-
versary. The recruitment and direction of Redl shows a skill
and daring that modern intelligence officers in their igno-
rance rarely grant to the services of Imperial Russia. The
Soviets inherited no mean tradition in intelligence, and it is
our business to know this background thoroughly. If this
means a study of history-anathema among many American
intelligence ofcers-we must make the best of it. How can
we know the character of the enemy if we do not know his
background and tradition?
It is a common American practice, one that shows through
all our history, to judge events and activities primarily as suc-
cesses or failures. This narrow pragmatic view is applied to
our intelligence operations in an abnormal degree. If it suc-
ceeded, fine; if it failed, try something else. Almost no one
bothers to ask why it succeeded or failed. The result is con-
siderable groping in the murk. When the English indulge in
this same practice we laugh and say they "muddle through."
Success and failure, however, are really not so simple. In
every successful operation there are elements of failure, in
each failure some success. If the Redl case can teach us any-
thing, it teaches us the danger of brushing failures under
the rug. No evidence now available indicates that Austrian
counterintelligence ever tried to explore the ramifications of
the case. Its criminal failure to interrogate Redl thoroughly
before he was allowed to kill himself shows how eager it was
to bury the case along with Redl and forget it. No vested in-
terest should ever stand in the way of the investigation of op-
erational failures.
The story of Colonel Redl is a magnificent case history in
the seizure and manipulation of one human personality by
another. Human motivation and the manipulation of per-
sonality to achieve desired ends is our eternal study. It is
precisely here that Asprey fails us. When his book is finished
we know something of Redl's glittering facade, but little of the
man himself. Asprey was simply not up to this task. The
career of Redl, in truth, is the subject for a great novelist.
Any perceptive reader of Darkness at Noon is helped to fuller
comprehension of the great Soviet purge trials, though Koest-
A45
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Espionage
ler's book is frankly fiction. It is a pity that no novelist of
Koestler's stature has been attracted to Alfred Redl.
Redl's career illustrates for us once again the supreme irony
of espionage: it is the unsuccessful agent who gains lasting
fame. Nathan Hale and John Andre, both notoriously un-
successful, are the two best remembered operatives of our own
Revolutionary age. Alfred Redl has given his name to the
classic case in which Colonel Batyushin, his supposed case of-
ficer, the truly successful man, is hardly remembered. Indeed,
Colonel Batyushin was so successful that we cannot be cer-
tain he ever existed!
COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE: Information, Espionage, and
Decision Making. Research report prepared by nine stu-
dents at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration under the direction of Georges F. Doriot, Professor
of Industrial Management. (Watertown, Mass.: C. I. As-
sociates. 1959. Pp. 78. $10.)
For all its arresting title and respectable sponsorship this
brochure contributes little information not generally known
about commercial espionage, and it treats its interesting sub-
ject in a gauche and superficial manner. The authors assume
at the outset that the field of business intelligence systems is
largely unexplored, and they appear to accept businessmen's
own comments on their use of espionage at face value and
without serious challenge.
The report, which tends to present espionage as a phe-
nomenon peculiar to the postwar period of business in the
United States, is based on interviews with business executives
and responses to questionnaires sent U.S. industrial firms.
The corporate responses suggest that all competitive intelli-
gence systems were begot by the threat of penetration by
other commercial espionage organizations, and that self-de-
fense, being best served by a good offense, eventually required
the introduction of the demobilized OSS officer or FBI agent
as a professional commercial spy.
The brochure concludes with a recommended program of
action which embraces the preparation of requirements, the MORI/HRP
exploitation of collection opportunities, collation and evalua- from pg.
A A46-A47
_6
For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Espionage
tion, the dissemination of finished intelligence, and its use in
the decision-making process. The report contains no informa-
tion of significance to the professional intelligence officer.
A47
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
THE GERMAN RESISTANCE: Carl Goerdeler's Struggle
Against Tyranny. By Gerhard Ritter. (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1958. Pp. 330. 35/-.) Translated
and abridged by R. T. Clark from the German Carl Goerdeler
and die Wiederstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Ver-
lags-Anstalt, 1954). Published also in France as EEchec au
Dictateur (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956).
The intelligence officer who picks up this book expecting to
learn how Carl Goerdeler, the heroic Lord Mayor of Leipzig,
organized resistance against Hitler and the Nazis is doomed
to disappointment. Professor Ritter, himself one of those ar-
rested and imprisoned as holding anti-Nazi views, has devoted
his work primarily to the political philosophies of the anti-
Nazi elements, Goerdeler and other individuals and groups,
including those in the Wehrmacht. While the book contains
some pickings for the intelligence officer, the picking is not
made the easier by Ritter's exhaustively discursive treatment.
The author does trace the origins of the opposition and re-
sistance, describing in some detail the extensive travels
Goerdeler undertook in trying to secure support from abroad
as well as at home for the struggle against Hitler. He gives
considerable space to the opposition in the Wehrmacht,
which he shows to have been at its strongest under Beck's
leadership before the occupation of Czechoslovakia and then
to have waned in the face of Hitler's successful conquests, re-
viving only when it became apparent that Germany could not
win the war. The Communists, according to Ritter, were un-
skillfully led and ineffective in their underground activity;
their one large-scale venture, the Rote Kapelle espionage net,
was not a resistance organization but one to serve the Soviet
enemy. The Social Democrats went into exile. "It was in
fact," Ritter writes, "only the churches which created a gen-
uine popular movement against National Socialism." An im-
portant part was played by the Catholic labor movement.
Hans Oster, Admiral Canaris' deputy in the Abwehr, was
the soul of the military opposition. Protected in his activity
MORI/HRP
from pg.
A48-A49
A48
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
by Canaris and the successive chiefs of the General Staff,
Beck and Halder, he was able to keep the opposition alive from
1933 until 1943, when his removal left Goerdeler with only 01-
bricht, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Interior, as military
organizer. Graf Schenck Claus von Stauffenberg, the man
whose bomb came closest to eliminating Hitler, is acknowl-
edged to have been the one to act while the rest of the mili-
tary only plotted; but Stauffenberg obviously does not stand
high with Professor Ritter, who shows his sympathy with the
belief of Goerdeler and many of the military that assassina-
tion was not the way to handle the evil Fuehrer.
The book gives peripheral treatment to the Kreisau circle
or "Counts' Group" of Helmuth von Moltke and Peter Yorck
von Wartenburg, describing principally its plans for a future
Germany and comparing them with Goerdeler's. It also has
only a few sentences on the contacts between Peter Kleist of
Ribbentrop's staff and a Russian, identified only as Klauss, who
conveyed purported Russian proposals for a separate peace.'
Ritter throws doubt on the authenticity of these offers, but
shows that they influenced some of the resistance groups to
consider approaches to Stalin in 1944.
From the historical point of view, the reader of this book
can but be left with the net impression that the German op-
position-with the exception, to be sure, of a few high-prin-
cipled men-found that it was able to tolerate Hitler as long
as he was winning, and that by the time he was losing it was
too late for them to act effectively.
SHAI: The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence. By Ephraim
Dekel. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1959. Pp. 369.
$5.00.)
The SHAI was the intelligence arm of Hagana, the Zionist
paramilitary organization which flourished underground in
Palestine from the inauguration of the British Mandate Au-
thority in 1921 to its termination shortly before the outbreak
of the Arab-Jewish war in 1948. This account of its activities,
like most popular treatments of intelligence subjects, leaves
for the professional reader much to be desired. Although the
1 See Kleist's Zwischen Hitler and Stalin: 1939-45 (Bonn: Athenaeum-
Verlag, MORI/HRP
1950). from pg.
A49 A49-A51
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
author was an officer of the SHAI, and in spite of documentary
garnishment with reproductions of official British CID reports
and orders, the book fails to give any real insight into the or-
ganization, resources, and methods that lay behind the epi-
sodic series of exploits it narrates.
Much of this failing is apparently due to continuing secu-
rity restrictions : the present Israeli intelligence service is the
immediate lineal successor to the SHAI. Names of individuals
and organizations are disguised or omitted; the reader learns
only in a most general way in what headquarters these ex-
ploits were conceived and by what means successfully exe-
cuted; the Jewish Agency nets in Europe and America, which
furnished such active and important support for the under-
ground, are never mentioned.
But the stories also bear the imprint of the author's ex-
clusively Zionist perspective. His tone is strongly anti-Brit-
ish, less immoderately anti-Arab. He credits only the two or
three British officers who showed their sympathy for the
Jewish cause by turning informer. He projects sequences on
SHAI operations in arms smuggling, protecting arms factories
and caches, and introducing illegal immigrants in which the
British Army, the Mandate Police, the CID, and MI-5 are re-
peatedly penetrated, outwitted, deceived, and circumvented
until it is made to appear that the British either were imbe-
ciles or just didn't care.
The Jews of Palestine during the Mandate period were an
intelligent, homogeneous minority (several hundred thousand
in a population of approximately a million and a quarter)
with a passionate ideological motivation which can be com-
pared only to that of the early Christians. The British, con-
fronted with an extremely hostile Arab majority, were forced
to rely inordinately on Jewish officials in their civil adminis-
tration and in the police. The Jews, however, whether they
were trusted officials of the Mandate government or police
officers or just plain citizens, held their first loyalty to their
own people. They would always give advance warning of im-
pending British actions they learned about and would co-op-
erate in deception and diversion to protect the underground
activity. This situation, together with the low internal co-
hesion of the Mandate Authority and its doubtful morale,
A50
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
made it an easy penetration target for the small, secre-
tive, and beleaguered SHAI.
It was almost impossible, on the other hand, for the British
to penetrate even small segments of the Jewish underground
because of its tight loyalties and its rigorous internal security
measures-compartmentation, the screening and testing of
new members, physical protection for group assets, security
of meetings, speedy communications, discipline and control
of outside contacts, the threat of death to Jewish traitors
and informers in or outside the organization, and lavish use
of bribes and emoluments among Arabs and Gentiles. The
hard-core action group was solidly backed by the general Jew-
ish population, which looked to the SHAI and the Hagana for
security. All this the author takes for granted in displaying
the successes of the underground.
In spite of these weaknesses, SHAI does have specialized
value as background for an understanding of the present Is-
raeli intelligence service. It is also important reading for any-
one who may be confronted with the problem of what can be
done with-and what should not be attempted against-a
small, fanatical, and absolutely loyal group of people bound
together by ideology, religion, blood, and history, who know no
other cause but their own.
GRIVAS: Portrait of a Terrorist. By Dudley Barker. (Lon-
don: Cresset. 1959. Pp. 202. 21/-.)
GRIVAS AND THE STORY OF EOKA. By W. Byford-Jones.
(London: Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 192. 21/-.)
In the eyes of most Britishers George Grivas, dedicated
leader of the EOKA underground organization which held the
island of Cyprus in turmoil for four. years, terrorizing its
whole population of half a million, is a frustrated and ruth-
less murderer. These two British authors, not surprisingly,
share this view; but as factual accounts of the underground
campaign, its aims, objectives, and methods, their books are
most informative. Written soon after the demobilization of
EOKA, the two tell essentially the same story in more or less
the same way. Mr. Barker is more thorough in describing
the intricacies of organization, techniques, and operations of
the movement, whereas Mr. Byford-Jones' personal contacts
MORI/HRP from
pg. A51-A54
A51
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
with several key figures in the Cyprus campaign, including
Grivas himself, add the authenticity andinterest of first-hand
experience.
It is ironic that the outcome of the successful terrorist
campaign, prospective independence, was not its goal: Grivas
had devoted his whole effort to the union of Cyprus with
Greece. Cypriot-born professional soldier of the Royal Hel-
lenic Army and a guerrilla leader during the war, having lost
out in extreme right-wing postwar Greek politics and been
relegated to inactivity, he turned to drawing up a plan for a
private army to operate in the Cyprus mountains for the
enosis cause. In this he was encouraged and sponsored by
Archbishop Makarios III and the Cyprus Church. The Greek
Church has for centuries kept nationalism alive in areas
where Greeks are subject to foreign rule, and Cyprus had
been a major target of its efforts.
It is made clear in these books that Grivas' aim was pri-
marily to influence world opinion, to inflame a propaganda
battle. Neither he and Makarios nor the Greek government
imagined that the British could be driven from Cyprus by
force, but they calculated that an armed Cypriot insurrec-
tion would convince world opinion that Cyprus was oppressed.
That situation created, the Greek government could then ex-
ploit it in the United Nations.
For five years Grivas studied hard and carefully the organi-
zation and techniques of the Communist guerrilla forces in
Greece. He was especially impressed by their practice of work-
ing through youth organizations and their ruthless pressure
on the civil population. His plan for Cyprus was prepared in
great detail. It was organized in three stages-first, sabotage
plus rioting and insurrection by school children; second, as-
sault and murder of pro-British Greek Cypriots; third, attacks
on British soldiers and civilians. These steps were designed
to inflame the youth, frighten ordinary Cypriots into express-
ing fervor for the cause, transform into national heroes any
young EOKA gunmen that were caught, and lastly, provoke
disciplinary and repressive measures by the British.
How Grivas kept the terrorist campaign going four years,
eluding the 25,000-man British security forces, is thoroughly
and chronologically described by both authors. With very
A52
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Rele se 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
little real guerrilla fighting, the program was one of sabotage,
ambush, assassination, and execution, mostly carried out by
a small number of youths. Radio Athens poured out inflamma-
tory propaganda, and the Church used spiritual sanctions to
turn the faint-hearted into active supporters.
Both writers acknowledge that British ineptitude contrib-
uted to Grivas' success and the ease with which he evaded
capture. The troops, especially in the early stages, were gul-
lible and easily diverted. Cooperation between the troops and
the police was lacking. Not until Field Marshal Sir John
Harding took personal command were the anti-terrorist op-
erations effective; and then Harding's vigorous measures
brought precisely the reactions that best suited Grivas' pur-
pose. Although they badly crippled the EOKA they made it
easy for the resistance to present itself to world opinion as
a national effort to attain freedom from an oppressor.
When Grivas' strategy succeeded and the U.N. General As-
sembly heard in February 1957 the Greek plea for Cypriot
self-determination, Grivas seized upon the chance to reconsti-
tute his decimated organization, offering to suspend violence
as soon as the Archbishop was freed from exile. The British,
in the face of the U.N. resolution, had no choice but to accept
the truce. During the quiet which followed, Grivas recruited
new EOKA leaders, formed new terrorist groups, continued
smuggling arms, and taught his followers how to make home-
made weapons. At about this time Harding was replaced by
Sir Hugh Foot as Governor of Cyprus.
Foot was more competent in the propaganda field. He
moved freely about the island, mingling with the Cypriots.
He found the situation dangerous in two ways; conflict had
arisen between EOKA and the left wing, and tension was
mounting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A
Turkish resistance movement appeared and began intercom-
munal fighting to insure that Cyprus would not go wholly to
Greece. Violence was no longer logically controlled. Murders
and ambushes occurred without political objectives. In a last
wave of assassination and terrorism in the autumn of 1958,
EOKA attempted to regain the center of the stage through
a harassing program of killing British soldiers.
A53
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Resistance
When at the end of 1958 the Greek, Turkish, and British
foreign ministers reached agreement on the creation of an
independent Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, whom Grivas re-
vered, assumed full responsibility, and Grivas reluctantly
abandoned enosis. He left Cyprus for a briefly sustained
hero's welcome in Greece, and he sits now in Athens, where
Byford-Jones saw him as "the Lieutenant-General of the
Royal Hellenic Army he had always wanted to be, bemedalled
as any officer in the country, honored and yet feared. The
picture I carried away with me when I left Greece was of a
prematurely old, almost broken Grivas, a disappointment, a
shock to anyone who had seen only the heroic photographs
of him on his arrival. He was a man lost, spiritually alone.
What is to become of him? Is the cycle to take a full turn?
Is he again going to turn to politics as he did after his last
illegal guerrilla adventure?"
A54
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
IN THE NAME OF CONSCIENCE. By Nikolai Khokhlov.
(New York: David McKay. 1959. Pp. 365. $4.50.) Trans-
lated from the Russian Pravo na Sovest (Frankfurt: Possev
Verlag, 1957.)
In this skillful translation, Khokhlov's moving personal
memoirs-recounting his eager wartime enlistment into the
NKVD, his training for a stay-behind operation in Moscow,
his frustrations in deep-cover assignments, his partisan ac-
tivities, his gradual postwar disaffection, his resolve to use an
assassination assignment as a means of escape, and the tragic
disappointments of his reception in the West-are changed
only by the elimination of a few unessential passages and the
addition of a postscript describing what he believes to have
been a Soviet attempt in 1957 to poison him with radioactive
thallium. A convincing and informative book for the lay
reader, it slights details which would make it more valuable
for the student of Soviet intelligence.
In describing Soviet intelligence, Khokhlov concentrates
on personalities rather than structure. The reader cannot
reconstruct with any assurance the organization of Directo-
rate I (foreign intelligence) or the Partisan Directorate and
its successors, in which Khokhlov was employed. During
most of his intelligence career he was, to be sure, in staff
agent status and presumably not very familiar with organiza-
tional details, but his long service enabled him to acquire some
knowledge of his own component. This information is passed
on to the reader in no organized form: data on organization
is given only incidentally as required by the story. Personali-
ties do make a story, however, and Khokhlov is best in de-
scribing such men as General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov,
chief of the Partisan Directorate and its sucessor unit until
1953, and General Leonid Alexandrovich Eitingon, his deputy.
Their subordinate officials are equally well portrayed. Recon-
structed conversations, of which there are many in this book,
must always be regarded with suspicion; but Khokhlov uses
them well to acquaint the reader with the Soviet intelligence
bureaucrat, both male and female.
MORI/HRP
A55 from pg.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1 A55-A57
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Soviet Bloc
The story gives some data on agent training, unfortunately
without much detail. It may be revealing that in late 1941,
with the Germans in front of Moscow, time was taken to
teach the stay-behind agents table manners; and that Khokh-
lov could be expected after three weeks' training, without
knowledge of the language or country, to pass as a Pole in
Rumania, where there were many Poles at the time. Khokh-
lov apparently experienced the hurry-up-and-wait phenomenon
well known to soldiers and members of intelligence services:
he cooled his heels for long periods of time in several coun-
tries, beginning with Rumania.
The time spent abroad doing nothing was not all lost, of
course. Khokhlov seems to have had the misfortune to ap-
pear on the scene at just the time when Soviet intelligence
recognized its lack of Soviet citizen agents who could pass as
foreigners abroad, a lack with which the great purges of the
late thirties probably had something to do. Undoubtedly we
are seeing through Khokhlov's eyes the beginning of the shift
in policy toward the use of Soviet citizens in illegal capacities
abroad. Although some wartime successes with foreigners
had been achieved-witness the Rote Drei in Switzerland-
Soviet intelligence bureaucrats were probably conscious of the
failures that had occurred and wanted to take advantage of
the greater control that would result from the employment
of Soviet citizens in deep-cover assignments. Khokhlov's mis-
sion to assassinate the NTS leader Okolovich is the only one
thoroughly described, from planning to dispatch of the agents.
Although many operational details are omitted even here, the
reader gets an insight into Soviet planning, briefing, and
training procedures.
If Khokhlov's story is true, he-almost uniquely among de-
fectors-left the Soviet service for ideological, ethical, and pa-
triotic reasons, in order to work with the NTS emigre organi-
zation for a better Soviet regime. His version, of course, can-
not be fully checked; but it is notable also that while in the
United States he would never accept anymonetary compensa-
tion for his services. He made it a point to sign a receipt for
any cash advanced him, and he always repaid the advances,
being apparently reluctant to become indebted to the U.S.
Government in any way. The least plausible aspect of his ac-
count, his misjudgment of the operational potential of the
A56
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Soviet Bloc
NTS, which he was counting on to rescue his wife and child
from Moscow, seems to have had some real basis in Soviet in-
telligence files.
If the Russian edition of Khokhlov's book is clandestinely
circulating in the USSR, as he claims, his unfavorable de-
scription of American intelligence officers, their boorish con-
duct, rapacity, lack of depth and operational skill, and their
inability to help him in any way, will not encourage defections
to American intelligence. A poor impression of the State De-
partment is conveyed, too: a daring plan to save Khokhlov's
wife-by having our Moscow Embassy arrange that Ameri-
can correspondents go interview her at her apartment while
Khokhlov's press conference was under way in Bonn-was re-
jected by the Embassy, apparently too late to stop the rather
theatrically staged conference. Khokhlov's inability to achieve
his objective of saving his wife and child is not surprising.
His anger at the Americans may be considered a reflection
of his bitterness at his own failure to comprehend the situa-
tion in the West.
THE BRAIN-WASHING MACHINE. By Lajos Ruff. (London:
Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 176. 16/-.)
A STUDY IN INFAMY: The Operations of the Hungarian
Secret police. By George Mikes. (London: Andre Deutsch.
1959. Pp. 175. 15/-.)
The Brain-Washing Machine is the tale of a Hungarian
refugee who had spent three years in the hands of the secret
police. He emerged from this experience with a new theory
of the Communist show trial and the abject confessions which
are essential to it. These confessions are made possible, he
asserts, by a "magic room" so designed as to drive its inhab-
itant into a state of schizophrenia.
Ruff says he spent six weeks in such a room. He describes
in detail the lights which constantly revolved and threw ka-
leidoscopic patterns on the walls, the furniture so constructed the as to Make sleep or even comfort out of thhe fi u s t and the
constant showing of surrealistic pornog ap
injections of scopalamine and TO Om,
regularly administered ed to escape from the magic r
caline. Ruff himself manag
to trial. But he concludes that such a roo
and did not come
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
MORI/HRP
from pg.
A57-A58
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Soviet Bloc
must be the answer to the conundrum of the Communist con-
fession, from the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev to those of
Rajk and Mindszenty.
The difficulty with Ruff's hypothesis is that his magic room
explains altogether too much. It is not necessary to com-
bine drugs, rotating lights, the showing of films, etc., to create
illusory surroundings. Any one of these devices could usually
accomplish the desired result. In some cases, in fact, schizo-
phrenic reactions can be induced by simply reducing the level
of sound in the prisoner's cell from a normal 75 to, say, 5
decibels. And if the AVH did not need such an elaborate
magic room to induce schizophrenic reactions, we may doubt
that such a room in fact existed. The AVH, moreover, or
anyone charged with staging a show trial, would not find the
production of artifical schizophrenia in a prisoner a very prof-
itable technique. A schizophrenic prisoner is a prisoner out
of control. His actions, whether before a court or elsewhere,
would be unpredictable.
It thus seems likely that the magic room, far from serving
to explain the Communist confession, is only the consequence
of the experimental administration of mescaline to prisoner
Ruff by the physicians of the AVH. Mescaline is the drug
used by the Peruvian Indians to induce religious ecstacy, and
Ruff's magic room has all the earmarks of a mescaline dream.
This view of Ruff's room is all the more persuasive since so
much else in his book is both senational and difficult to docu-
ment, as for instance his suggestion that a homosexual re-
lationship existed between Matyas Rakosi and Janos Kadar.
Mikes' book is also disappointing. It is a summary of sev-
eral issues of the State Security Review, house organ of the
Hungarian secret police, together with a brief and not very
perceptive history of the AVH itself. The Review was classi-
fied top secret and circulated among ranking AVH officers in
only 210 copies. The issues which came into Mikes' posses-
sion discuss the recruitment of informers, particularly among
intellectuals, the problems faced by principal agents, the es-
tablishment of safehouses, and the techniques of infiltration,
surveillance, and censorship. But there is very little in all
this which is not generally known in the intelligence commu-
nity, and even to the reading public.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
THE WEAPON ON THE WALL: Rethinking Psychological War-
fare. By Murray Dyer. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
1959. Pp. 269. $6.00.)
Spurred on by an avid interest and manifold experience in
the communication of ideas in peace and war, Murray Dyer
has written a thought-provoking review of our methods and
policies in using the propaganda and psychological weapon.
Taking a broader and more elevated view of psychological war-
fare than the black-art connotations of this term evoke, he
prefers to speak of "political communication" and include in
it the whole gamut of actions, policies, and attitudes, as well
as words, which are used to influence the political behavior
of others. Most of his book is nevertheless concerned with
what we normally call propaganda.
Even without benefit of Mr. Dyer's broadened definition,
the intelligence specialist can count the psychological warrior
his most demanding customer. Planners and operators in the
political, economic, or military field have intelligence require-
ments of a more or less well-defined scope and normally in
sufficiently long term to give time for careful collation and
evaluation. Psywar needs, on the other hand, cover the water-
front, and "crash" requirements are the rule: the psywar
business is much like that of the newsman and public rela-
tions officer. Weapon on the Wall puts these needs into three
teeming categories-knowledge of the psychological, political
and economic climate; information on which the operator can
select his targets and the time and means to attack them;
and finally facts and estimates upon which to evaluate the
impact of operations.
The author observes, however, that "political communica-
tion, as yet, cannot specify with precision the kinds of intelli-
gence it needs and wants," and he calls for extensive research
on psywar doctrine, techniques, planning, and evaluation. As
an ex-psywarrior and intelligence officer, this reviewer sub-
mits that the inability to specify intelligence needs stems pre-
cisely from lack of doctrinal clarity among the political
A59 from pg.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1 A59-A60
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Psychological
municators as to their role. Operators who differ on what
their mission is will naturally differ as to the intelligence
they need. This is what makes trouble for the intelligence
supplier, adding confusion to what is at best a large and har-
assing order. Given consistent requirements, the flow of in-
telligence is likely to be troublesome chiefly in its abundance:
requirements in the psywar field seem to fascinate collectors.
During the war an Army G-2 who had been on,psywar duty
with the SHAEF was distressed to find that his conscientious
spelling out of psywar requirements in the EEI for his POW
interrogators produced the unhappy result that many of them
spent more effort on this material than on order of battle.
Mr. Dyer's book, intended primarily for the makers and ex-
ecutors of high psychological policy, will give the intelligence
officer a useful perspective on the needs of this customer of his
as it outlines the dimensions of the customer's policy problem.
THE EXECUTIVE OVERSEAS. Administrative Attitudes and
Relationships in a Foreign Culture. By John Fayerweather.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1959. Pp. 195.
$4.00.)
Although restricted to the special problems of business ex-
ecutives overseas and pertaining especially to the Mexican
scene, this study makes a contribution to the embryonic but
growing social science field devoted to the effectiveness of all
kinds of American efforts abroad, a field particularly relevant
to intelligence activities. The author, Associate Professor of
International Business at Columbia University, interviewed
45 U.S. and six Mexican businessmen and conducted observa-
tions on the relationships among six U.S. and ten Mexican
executives working with each other over a period of four
months. He analyzes the resultant data, augmented by com-
parable observations from European, Indian, and other socie-
ties, in a framework of behavioral and social science concepts.
Concentrating upon the achievement of understanding of the
foreign national as the key to effectiveness in a foreign so-
ciety, he makes his major contribution in presenting a meth-
odology for working toward this goal.
Professor Fayerweather distinguishes five main problem
areas-working relationships between men in a business or-
MORI/HRP
from pg.
A60-A62
A60
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Psychological
ganization; individual attitudes towards innovation, analysis
and action; basic motivations derived from the individual's ob-
jectives in life; difficulties in teaching foreign nationals Ameri-
can ways; and special problems arising from foreign nationals'
attitudes toward Americans and the United States. He rec-
ognizes that all members of a national group are not identical
in behavior, each being conditioned by his own unique com-
bination of inner personal qualities and environmental con-
ditions, but identifies different generic national approaches to
business relationships. The American way, he says, produces
a group-oriented personality disposed toward cooperation, con-
fidence, fellow-feeling, mutual trust, and other qualities ad-
vantageous in the operation of a business organization. Other
cultures produce an individualistic personality characterized
by distrust, hostility, local loyalties, sense of separation, and
authoritarianism, generally detrimental to organizational
welfare.
The U.S. executive, however much he deplores the foreign
deficiencies, is exhorted to handle them with enlightenment
based on an understanding of their causes and the peculiari-
ties of their manifestation in the particular society in ques-
tion. The pattern of action suggested as applicable especially
in Mexico is one of accommodation of American ways to those
of the local scene, including more reliance on indirect com-
munication in place of straight-to-the-point frankness, the
adoption of local virtues-to become for example simpdtico,
"making life pleasant with understanding," and sencillo,
"fitting into the local society in an unaffected way"-and an
emphasis on personal relationships in business dealings.
This book is welcomed as a serious attempt to sensitize the
American executive to many of the problems of interpersonal
relations abroad. Looked at from the standpoint of the con-
cepts and methods of the behavioral sciences, however, its
shortcomings are evident. Its theoretical approach is one of
rough and ready selection from currently popular concepts
eneTa% Shallow application of them. It points out
and a cultural interaction without
of
t the value premises that -ling behind
manifestatio
vale
ce eta for study
the sllr a t to g ewoTks
attem'A fTam Cora DuBois, MangaTet
any real roupbehavioT~ted b9
individualu h and as th?Se presen p,61
systems
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
Recent Books: Psychological
Mead, and others are needed. Its definition of culture as "sets
of customs" is essentially superficial, showing the lack of any
comprehensive view of the structure and function of society
and culture such as is given in the works of W. Lloyd Warner.
Professor Fayerweather uncritically assumes that Ameri-
can business methods are correct and good ways which should
be imposed on backward societies. The assumption may be
justified, but it would have less flavor of the "white man's
burden" if works of specialists on cultural evolution, such as
those of Robert Redfield on the urbanization of folk cultures,
were taken into account. The modus operandi suggested for
the U.S. executive, on the other hand, is presented too much
as a surrender to local tradition rather than as a strategy
of realistic maneuvering. The author's failure to make a
scholarly approach through the materials of the social and
behavioral sciences now available on his subject has resulted
in a conglomeration of case-study data mixed with haphazard
conceptual approaches and cultural analyses apt to be more
confusing than enlightening to the serious student.
The Executive Overseas is not, then, a definitive study of
overseas effectiveness even in the business field. But it is a
readable and highly interesting introduction to some of the
problems of working abroad, and it at least attempts to sug-
gest a frame of mind conducive to their solution. In this sense
it performs a valuable task in helping to open a critically im-
portant subject for investigation. It provides much thought-
provoking material for more penetrating studies which, we
hope, will follow.
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release ~
Articles and book reviews on the following pages are un-
classified and may for convenience be detached from the clas-
sified body of the Studies if their origin therein is protected.
The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents
preceding page 1.
The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelli-
gence Collection, in scanning current public literature for in-
telligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who
prepared book reviews for this issue of the Studies. Most
noteworthy in this respect are the following:
Asprey's The Panther's Feast ...........
Competitive Intelligence ...............
Dekel's SHAI .........................
Books on Grivas and the EOKA .............. Roger G. Seely
Books on the Hungarian AVH ......
Dyer's Weapon on the Wall....... .
Fayerweather's Executive Overseas. .
25X1
25X1
25XI
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921 A000300300001-1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030030~
pproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-)3921A000300300001-1