POST MORTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 8, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relea , 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000 060017-9
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 February 1954
t tANDUM FOR: I
Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA G-2
Coll Charles L. FRood, USN G31 )
11s USAF(AFOI1t-2B2)
Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG)
SUBJECT : Pbat Morterms
REFERENCE z ONE Me?orasda for the IAC dated 3 June 1952:
Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies
in National Intel).igenes Estimates
1. The attached paper is the first action taken by 01QE
on post aortems sines March 1953.
2. Past experience with the procedure outlined in the
reference indicates several flaws. Tying the post mortem to
3ndividitial estimates proved generally unsatisfactory. In many
cases the problem was to determine what conclusions to draw
from available facts rather than to collect more facts. In other
oases, appropriate collection action had already been taken as
the result of a prior estimate on the same area and axgrfurther
action would be duplioatosy. In maxgr instances, no specific
action was considered necessary other than for each agency to
take continuing action within the field of its responsibilities;
it was considered superfluous to initiate special procedures
to tell each agency to continue carrying out its assigned mission.
The net result was a series of post marten memos which concluded
that no action was necessary, and thereby implied that no intel-
ligence deficiencies existed,
3. It is obvious, however, that intelligence deficiencies
do exist and that the IAC bears ultimate responsibility for de-
tecting them and initiating action for remedying them. It is
believed that some of the deficiencies in the present procedure
could be remedied by a post mortem issued quarterly rather than
after each estimate. The post mortem could be issued simul.-
taneously with the quarterly revision of the estimates program.
Such a publication would provide further guidance to research
and collection agencies and would provide the basis for amore
comprehensive attack on intelligence deficiencies.
25X1
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SECRET
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4. Fbr the present, however, we want to review the 1953
woduoticn to identify aigntfioant gape. This will also give
us a chance to test out the ye riodie rather than estimate-by
estimate approach.
5. egg: would you therefore please review the attached
for eubatance and hens your representative meat with us at 10:00
Monday, 15 Tebruary, In Roan 3,46 South.
25X1
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
Distributidn erg"
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5 Febrtaary 1954
SMU=g POW - Cr 1953 PRODUC'1'IO?
The following is a review of intelli?saee deficiencies r* w,,LU,(I!
during preparation at Nstiotm1 Yactelltgenoe Esti tutee during 1993.
Tie principal estisrtes upon wbi.eh are findings are based acre l .atmi
in TAB "`A.w
1. T BLOC
The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the So iet BL-pa .,wj-t
tees widely aecog"sed. for a long tine. Mny of tbsec will prWmbl
erever be fined. During 1953 a need me expressed for mare etf wt
can the resistance potential in the Bloao Amordingly, the IAA
authorised creation of an Ad Boo Resistance Intelligence Camittes
can 8 Deeesher 1953. Rrperienee during 1953 also indicated a need
or ,geeatar eoileetian wed research efforts in the following kay ate..
a. Airoref Production. Strenuous efforts should be
continued to resolve existing differences in proved -r
for estiarating airy t production. With the g res .
of Soviet atowle power, accurate estimates of ..owlet
longvraeadp cad tighter aircraft production are of
critical Import"".
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SEMT TAB "
0/ER MenD to
7AC representatives
8 Tebruary 1954
PRINCIPAL NI8 PRC2JCTION BASE FQEt 1953 POST MONTRI( FMMB
1. 8uvtler BLOC
NEC.(* Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957
NIE.81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to Oerray through Mid-1954
1U-( Probable Developments within the &ropsan
Satellites through Mid-1955
NIN-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities tbsough Mid.1955
NIE-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses at Action
through Mid-1955
SZ-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
81.36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
56-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in Eeatroaagastie
Warfare
M39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin
and of the Elevation of Maleakov to
Leadership in the USSR
56-40 Coa^amist Reactions to US EstabIlsboact of
a "Volunteer Preedois Corp.'
89.42 Current Communist Tactics
82-46 Probable Long Tern Developeztt of the Soviet
Bloc and Western Per Positions
SE.47 Probable Effect of Recent Develop cants in
Eastern Oera%W on Soviet Policy with
Respect to Oera.
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i%ftw
am=
PAR ALA'
x-74 Probable nsrs],ojwits in Soma through 1953
MIS-77 Probable D~essl+arpr-nts in Indonesia
MM 40 00MAU ist drpabilitisa and Probable Courses
at Aatias~ in Korea
MM-91 Probable Dasslopoeats in Indoehitr throw. 1934
U-37 Probable Wfoots ce the Soviet Bloc at Certain
Courses at Action Directed at the Internal
and mcterrsal Casiwce at Car1nist Chloe,
M-43 Thailand"s Ability to Withstand ocown et
Pre wur a or Attacks tbrou* Kid-1934
M ,JA Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
or the llspublio or Soea with Respect to
the Aridstics in E,orsa
88-31 The Sidnitiezaaca of the Her IMoneslan Gown - 1,
M53 Probst" Cassentst Relations to Certain Possible
Dnsiapssnts in 10doehina
30 MAMOM NM=
NO-63
France's Probable Putttre Role in the Western
Security System
11.63/1
Probable Short Tenzer DeveloPernts in Pesch Policy
111-71
Probable Outlook for Italy
11143
Probable Deselopeesnte in T
os]svia
T!w Political. CutLlook in Italy
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RRlIIII
4. MR RABZMAFRICA
MM-73 Coi ditions send Trends in the budle
no" Afteoting US Security
KI -75/1 Mobsbls Dewlaposta in bin tbra 1953
AIR-76 Prabsbl. Dwe2 u .ruts in Rapt
1M-79 Probable Dowelupoats in South Asia
RIt-83 Conditions end Trends in Tropical Africa
25X1
AIR-1CA Probable D weloprents in Ilea through 1954
U-49 Tb. Current O ttlack in Iran
5. IATO AMR
IV-84 Probable Dseelo ments in O *tesals
NO-83 Probable Do elopnents in Chile
NIX-86 Probable Dssw1opeents in Brasil
Approved For Release 2005 CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060017-9