ASSUMPTIONS FOR PLANNING: THE WORLD SITUATION, 1969-73

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000040021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 11, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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11 October 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Consultants
SUBJECT: Assumptions for Planning: The World Situation, 1969.73
We would appreciate your reactions to the main judgments
herein concerning principal world trends in the period 1969-1973.
We have been asked to contribute a short assessment along these
lines for use by the Agency in long-term planning. The attached
is a first draft, and does not represent a firm ONE position.
Obviously, the time-frame is somewhat artificial, since the years
before and after the specified period can neither be ignored nor
crisply distinguished from 1969-73. Obviously too, the estimates
in a short paper of this sort must be very general and, since it
is done for planning purposes, must allow for variations, "other
possibilities," and some "worst cases."
25X1
Acting Deputy Director
National Estimates
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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11. October 1966
Planning Assumptions
1. Any forecast of the future world situation, particularly
for a period three to seven years ahead, must allow for great
uncertainties. Change and turmoil are more the rule than the
exception in an era of rapid technological progress, speedy and
widespread communication, close economic interdependence, rising
socio-economic aspirations, the great gap between rich and poor
nations, explosive population pressures, and the breakdown of
traditional societies and attitudes in many parts of the world.
Chance continues to play a large role in affairs, and to set
limits on what can be foreseen. Thus while certain lines of
development in some geographical or problem areas can be estimated
with reasonable confidence, in most instances it is necessary to
allow for varying alternatives. Moreover, we feel obliged to take
note of certain contingent possibilities, or "worst cases" --
which, though often not "probable," are nonetheless of sufficient
importance and likelihood as to deserve noting in any prudent
planning for the period.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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2. It is also important for planning purposes to distinguish
between situations which affect vital or important US security
interests, and those which do not. Change of almost any sort,
anywhere, affects US interests in some form and to some degree --
but in many cases the interests are not vital, nor closely related
to security. Communist involvement may constitute grounds for
counter-action by the US in situations which would not otherwise
warrant US action; but there will also be turbulent situations
in which Communist involvement is neither the main cause nor the
central issue. How and to what extent US interests are affected
in these situations will depend on cases, but the mere fact of
change, instability or disorder does not automatically establish
the existence of Communist responsibility and opportunity, nor
does it necessarily mean that important US security interests
are engaged.
II. Armed Conflict
3. Nuclear war involving the US will remain a possibility
during this period, but not necessarily more so than at present.
The chances of a large-scale US conflict with Communist China
will probably be greater than of one with the USSR, but the many
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variables involved in both cases -- including the course of the
Vietnam war and the uncertainties in China -- prohibit confident
assumptions on this question. Lesser conflicts -- wars between
smaller powers, limited wars involving one or more larger powers,
and insurrections will probably occur and will involve US interests,
directly or indirectly, and perhaps US forces.
III. Threats to US Interests: The Communists
4+. The Communist powers will constitute the chief political,
subversive, and military threat to the US during the period in
question, and the USSR in particular will be the chief rival power
center. We anticipate some continuing erosion of the USSR's
authority over other Communist states and parties, and a growing
assertion of nationalism among such states and parties generally.
The process will not, however, go so far as to end the USSR's
paramount influence in the Communist world. In terms of threats
to US interests, these trends may in time work to reduce Communist
militancy as against the West and the underdeveloped world, but
this cannot be assumed for any particular period.
5. The USSR and Eastern Europe: While it is only prudent to
assume the continued hostility of the USSR toward US interests, this
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will probably not again take the form of openly aggressive threats
as it did in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. The threat will
be less stark, and more selective. It is most likely to take the
form of political, economic, and subversive efforts to weaken US
and Western positions -- particularly around the Soviet periphery.
It cannot be assumed that the Soviets will avoid adventures in more
remote areas -, Latin America, Africa, the Far East -- indeed they
will continue efforts in all these areas and no doubt exploit
opportunities as they arise. However, these remoter areas are
likely to be lower in the Soviet scheme of priorities than those
on the Soviet periphery. The USSR will probably continue to avoid
the kind of overt military threat to Western Europe which tends to
galvanize NATO, but it will retain an active interest in Europe,
particularly on the German question. The Eastern European states
will not themselves pose a threat to US security, but will present
both problems and opportunities.
6. Communist China. The political scene in Communist China
is likely to be one of great uncertainty and turmoil, as the regime
seeks to arrange for the succession to Mao Tse-tung. This political
atmosphere will make Peking's policies -- both at home and abroad
more difficult to predict. Whatever the outcome of internal
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increase their efforts to expand their influence throughout the
area at US expense, though often in sharp competition with each
other. British presence and influence will diminish and Australia
and New Zealand will increasingly look to the US for assistance in
supporting their interests in the area.
8. The Middle East. It is likely that the Middle East will
present much the same sort of problems and prospects in 1968-1973
as it has in the past few years. There will be a rather small
number of fairly smoothly functioning countries -- e.g., Turkey
and Israel; a rather larger number wherein governmental continuity
will be critically dependent on one man; and the same area
quarrels -- Arab-Israel, revolutionary-conservative, etc. In a
world that is decreasingly bi-polar, most governments will be
less willing to cooperate with the US in matters relating to the
USSR. Moreover, radical nationalist regimes will be aligned in
many foreign policy positions with the "non-colonialist" Communist
countries. There are a number of places where political
instability, especially it accompanied by insurrectionary activity,
could develop so as to involve US military forces, and the one
remaining sizable military installation in the Arab world -- Wheelus
in Libya -- will have gone by the end of the period. Yet, the
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massive US commercial investment is likely to be increased rather
9. South Asia. Indo-Pakistani hostility and the Chinese
presence along the Himalayas will continue to share the top of
the list of worries with economic development problems of over half
a billion people. Governmental stability will be less a problem
than will a debilitating arms race. While Soviet support for India
25X6
it also introduces complications in overall US relations with India
and Pakistan. We foresee no developments, barring trouble between
India and China, which are likely to require major use of military
forces in the area.
10. Latin America. The governments of most Latin American
countries are inherently unstable and the causes of instability
will continue. Failure of the Latin American version of the
capitalist system to make rapid economic and social progress will
enhance the appeal of extremists of right and left. Anti-US
sentiment will increase further, and a variety of nationalist-
populist movements are likely to emerge, seeking to overturn the
established order and prepared to accept aid from all sources.
Cooperation with such a movement would probably give a Communist
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party its best opportunity to improve position and influence;
the possibility that Communists following this Bourse might then
go on to gain control of another Latin American country cannot be
discounted. This possibility is probably greater in the Caribbean
area than in the rest of Latin America. In any case, Cuban,
Communist Chinese and Soviet efforts to support the various and
competing Communist parties, and to foster subversion, will
continue.
11. Africa South of the Sahara. Most black African countries
will remain subject to acute internal instability, arising out of
tribal, racial, religious, and sectional differences, as well as
from political inexperience and social and economic tensions.
Border conflicts will probably increase in frequency. The
various "liberation" movements in white-dominated southern Africa
will become more active, and the efforts of the black African
states to force the US and other world powers to overthrow the
white-dominated regimes will become even more vocal. Although
Africa is an area of secondary importance to both the USSR and
China, they will continue to seek to increase their influence in
certain countries and to undermine the US position in countries
where it is strong (e.g., Ethiopia). China and, in some cases
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Cuba and the UUR, will encourage wars of national liberation and
other forms of internal strife in hopes of bringing to power
groups beholden to them.
12. From the increased turmoil in Africa, in one or another
of the above forms, incidents will arise that threaten US control
of the few installations we have on the continent or US influence
in countries where we have significant aid programs or private
investments. Various disorders may also give rise to anti-
American or pro-Communist regimes in countries where we now have
no significant interests. More remotely, African instability
could touch off an internal or international crisis that could
expand to involve the US and a Communist power as antagonists.
25X6
S-E-C-R-E-T
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