CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007100030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 June 1963
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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17 June 1963.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. India-USSR: India receives offer of arms from
USSR and Czechoslovakia. (Page 1)
25
3. Israel: Ben-Gurion's resignation may be intended
to pressure his opponents. (Page 3)
4. USSR-Satellites: Economic relations becoming
increasingly difficult. (Page 4)
5. Communist China - USSR: Peiping remains un-
compromising in its dispute with Moscow. (Page 5)
7. Brazil: New cabinet appointments may signal
further evolution of government to left. (Page 7)
8, USSR-Iraq- -Kurds: TASS attacks Iraqi govern-
ment; supports Kurdish demand for autonomy.
(Page 8)
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10. Notes: Japan; 'Korea;
(Page 10)
India.;
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India-ijSSR: Both the USSR and Czechoslovakia
have offered arms o India during the past two weeks.
17 June 1963
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According to an Indian Foreign Ministry offi-
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ammunition
cial-,both countries implied that a wide range of
military equipment could be made available. Mos-
cow specified among other items radars, surface-
to-air missiles;, and heavy mortars, and also indicated
willingness to discuss manufacture in India of rifle
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
New Delhi is "intrigued" by the offer--particu-
larly on the eve of talks between the Russians and
the Chinese in Moscow- -and intends to send a tech-
nical mission to Moscow and Prague in early July,
as suggested by the Russians.
The magnitude of this offer and the timing of
negotions reflect a Soviet belief that considerations
of relations with China are of less importance than
the necessity of preventing the West from becoming
the sole supplier of major military items to IndI
Indians will read in this Soviet bloc initiative a
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furtli `er vindication of New Delhi's continuing profes-
sions of nonalignment. The special effort New Delhi
has made. to keep Washington informed, despite Mos-
cow's injunction to inform no third parties, suggests
Indian concern that procurement of further Western
arms might just as easily be jeopardized as stimu-
lated by Indian acceptance of competing Soviet bloc
offers.
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*Israel: Ben-Gurion's resignation appears largely
the result of his displeasure with growing opposition
to his policy of rapprochement with West Germany.
As has happened before, he may have resigned
as a means of pressuring his opponents--particularly
those in his own party and the cabinet--to accept his
policy. The 76-year-old leader's health is considered
excellent and it seems unlikely that he is yet ready
to retire permanently from public office.
His action, which also involves his resignation
from parliament, could result in early elections.
However, before that stage is reached Finance Min-
ister Levi Eshkol, number two man in the govern-
ment and in Ben-Gurion's Mapai labor party, prob-
ably will be asked to try and form a new government.
The subject of Israel's relations with West Ger-
many, a highly emotional matter with many Israelis,
gained considerable prominence during the recent
private visit to Israel of former West German Defense
Minister Strauss. Strauss came in response to an
invitation from the Israeli defense ministry, a port-
folio which Ben-Gurion held in addition to being prime
minister. Other members of the cabinet, notably
Foreign Minister Meir, reportedly objected to the
invitation.
Ben-Gurion's advocacy of close relations with
Bonn--at present the relationship does not involve
formal diplomatic ties- -apparently is predicated on
the hope that Israel will be able to obtain military
and additional financial aid from West Germany. Ben-
Ckirion curtailed the recent Israeli campaign against
it might antagonize Bonn.
German scientists employed by Egypt for fear that
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* USSR- Satellites. Economic relations between the
USSR and the European satellites are apparently be-
coming increasingly difficult.
In a wide-ranging interview with Krupp represent-
ative Beitz on 14 June, Khrushchev stated that popu-
lar demand in the satellites for an improved standard
of living must be accommodated to some extent. Dis-
cussing economic problems,with the satellites, Khru-
shchev admitted that his ambassadors could no longer
rule in those countries as they used to. He compared
his difficulties with the satellites to those of a father
whose sons had grown "too big to spank:'
trade relations between the USSR
and the satellites are growing worse.
Rumania has objected to imposition of Soviet com-
mercial advantages in Rumanian-Soviet trade, and
that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with "Soviet foreign trade
practices,
some subordination of national interests. However,
recent press commentary in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland has been highly laudatory of economic in-
tegration goals, and recent Soviet trade practices with
the satellites have not been obviously discriminatory.
Satisfaction of the satellites' desires for major
immediate improvements in their standard of living
would require a far more significant change in Soviet
Satellite objections probably result in part from
difficulties in working out details of Soviet plans to
increase significantly the integration of satellite eco-
nomic activities, a process which inherently entails 25X1
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trade and in integration plans.
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Communist China - USSR! The Chinese Commu-
nists have again forcefully demonstrated that they are
not planning to come to the 5. July meeting with the
Soviet Union in a spirit of compromise.
Their belated reply of 14 June to the Soviet Union's
30 March letter is a long, intransigent position paper
intended more for the international Communist move-
ment than for Moscow. Published in People's Daily
on 17 June, Peiping's letter is being broadcast around
the world in installments. The Chinese probably ex-
pect that by delaying their reply they have made dif-
ficult any Soviet response and thus will have the last
public word before the meeting.
The summary of the letter notes that the Chinese
have set forth 25 questions of "principle" which they
feel should be discussed at the meeting. The partial
text now available indicates that the Chinese are main-
taining their anti-Soviet positions on the issues in dis-
pute, emphasizing the need for continuous revolutionary
pressure, opposing the Soviet interpretation of peace-
ful coexistence, and refusing to accept Yugoslavia as
a socialist nation while insisting that Albania is still
a member of the socialist camp in good standing.
The letter, by implication, accuses the Soviet
Union of following Yugoslavia's revisionist policies,
and condemns the USSR for aiding India in its "attack
on a fraternal socialist country!' The Chinese warn
that anybody who follows and defends the "erroneous
obstinate line" pursued by Moscow is also failing into
revisionist error and will be attacked by Peiping.
Although the Chinese claim in the letter to be in-
terested in maintaining the "unity" of the Communist
world, they more honestly stated their position in a
People's Daily attack on Tito on 14 June when they
baldly said that, the dispute between themselves and
the revisionists was "irreconcilable.'
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Brazil: The new cabinet appointments made by
President Goulart on 14 June are probably the begin-
ning of a general cabinet reorganization to continue
the leftward evolution of the government.
The President's selection of pro-Goulart General
Jair Ribeiro to replace anti-Communist Amaury Kruel
in the key post of war minister may intensify revolu-
tionary plotting among the military. It seems unlikely,
however, that a centrist-rightist military coup attempt
will be made unless Kruel agrees to lend his supgort
to the effort.
It is likely that a second stage of Goulart's cabi-
net shuffle will result in the dropping of Finance Min-
. inter Dantas and Commerce Minister Balbine, both of
whom have been severely attacked by Leonel Brizola,
leftist federal deputy and Goulart's hrothPr-in-taw_
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USSR-Iraq- -Kurds: The 15 June TASS statement
supporting the "just demands" of the Kurds for auton-
omy, within the. Iraqi state is by far the most vicious
attack on the Baath government that Moscow has issued.
Ostensibly a defense of Kurdish rights, this dec-
laration is in fact an effort to warn the Iraqi Baath
of Moscow's serious concern at the policies it has
followed since the overthrow of Qasim. Despite this
concern,. however, there is no evidence yet of any
Soviet decision to reduce the USSR's economic or
military aid programs in Iraq.
Charging the Iraqi Government with "Hitlerite"
treachery, the use of "fascist SS detachments," and
genocide, the TASS statement asserts that Baghdad's
Kurdish policy is a violation of the UN charter and a
matter of concern to all nations. Demonstrating
,where the USSR's concern lies, the statement asserts
that the policies of the Baath government could lead
to a return of Western predominance in Iraq, which
could then be used as a springboard "against the
security of the Soviet state"
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NOTES
queries regarding the safety of nuclear submarines.
has been embarrassed by the parliamentary attack
.and its inability to provide detailed answers to all
Japan: Proposed visits to Japanese ports by nu-
clear-powered submarines of the Nautilus type are
proving a more difficult political issue than Prime
Minister Ikeda had anticipated. Sharp questioning
of the foreign minister by the left-wing opposition in
the Diet has been backed up by protest rallies in To-
kyo and several key seaports. The Ikeda. government
South Korea: A very poor South Korean barley
crop--possibl50 percent below average- -has raised
the possibility of food riots in the coming. weeks.
Such disturbances. would further aggravate the un-
stable political situation and reduce the prospects
for a peaceful transition to representative govern-
ment later this year. The military regime was
counting. on a bumper barley crop to help compen-
sate for last year's poor rice harvest.
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India: The resignation of Oil Minister Malaviya,
following several investigations of corruption charges
against him, reduces still further leftist influence with-
in. the Indian cabinet. A long-time colleague of Nehru's
and a leading advocate. of Soviet bloc economic assist-
ance, Malaviya was Krishna Menon's last strong. sup-
porter in the cabinet. jNehru had strongly resisted
demands for Malaviya s ouster, mainly because he
saw in them a continuation of the pressures from
right-wing elements which forced him to. drop Krishna
Menon last fall and which continue to snipe at his. own
leadership.
17 June 63 DAILY BRIEF
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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