POLICY AND DECISIONMAKING IN A CRISIS: LESSONS FROM THIRTEEN DAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000200090005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 26, 1979
• Content Type: MF

SENSITIVE
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26 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
7
The Director of~Central Intelligence
Policy and Decisionmaking in a Crisis: Lessons
from Thirteen Days
1. In light of the meetings you will be attending over the next
days and weeks, I took a look at Robert. Kennedy's Memoir of the>Cuban
Missile Crisis Two lessons struck me as relevant to Loday:
-Debate-(such as proposed by Mr. Cutler) was essential
-Participants in the "ExCom" spent more time discussing
the issues than they anticipated
-This apene& u~ mare ppiJ.ons than previously on the
table
-The President limited his involvement and this tended
to permit people to speak more freely (creatively?)
-Only in the middle of the process (and after first
meeting with the President did the group agree on
a procedure to develop recommendations. See Tab A
for highlights)
25X1
Attachment C is RFK's chapter on "Some of The Things We Learned."
2. With respect to the issue of you and others being pressured (by
the media blitz) into moving more quickly than is warranted:
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 SENSITIVE
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-This administration/President has shown itself willing to
back off until it had its act together (e.g. energy speech)
-Deliberations over US options in the '62 crisis lasted five
full days and it took the "ExCom" three full days to discover
new options (e.g. the blockade)
25X1
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Thirteen Days
our deliberations. Because any other step would arouse
suspicion, he returned to his regular schedule and his
campaign speaking engagements.
The next morning, at our meeting at the State
Department, there were sharp disagreements again.
The strain and the hours without sleep were beginnLnz
to take their toll. However, even many years later, those
human weaknesses-impatience, fits of anger-are ui,-
derstandable. Each one of us was being asked to make a
recommendation which would affect the future of al
mankind, a recommendation which, if wrong and if ac-
cepted, could mean the destruction of the human race.
That kind of pressure does strange things to a human
being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experi-
enced men. For some it brings out characteristics and
strengths that perhaps even they never knew they had,
and for others the pressure is too overwhelming.
Our situation was made more difficult by the fact
that there was no obvious or simple solution. A dogma-
tism, a certainty of viewpoint, was simply not possible.
For every position there were inherent weaknesses; and
those opposed would point them out, often with 3evas-
tating effects.
Finally, we agreed on a procedure by which we
felt we could give some intelligent recommendations to
 "A majority opinion . . . for a blockade . .
'e.
~.d
the President. We knew that time was running out and
that delay was not possible. We split into groups to write
up our respective recommendations, beginning with an
outline of the President's speech to the nation and the
whole course of action thereafter, trying to anticipate all
possible contingencies and setting forth recommenda-
tions as to how to react to them.
In the early afternoon, we exchanged papers,
each group dissected and criticized the other, and then
the papers were returned to the original group to de-
velop further answers. Gradually from all this came the
outline of definitive plans. For the group that advocated
the blockade, it was an outline of the legal basis for our
action, an agenda for a meeting of the Organization of
American States, recommendations for the role of the
United Nations, the military procedures for stopping
ships, and, finally, the circumstances under which mili-
tary force might be used. For the group that advocated
immediate military action, it was an outline of the areas
to be attacked, a defense of our position in the United
Nations, suggestions as to how to obtain support from
Latin American countries, and a proposed communica-
tion to Khrushchev to convince him of the inadvisability
of moving militarily against us in the Caribbean, Berlin,
or elsewhere in the world.
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Thirteen Days
During all these deliberations, we all spoke as
equals. There was no rank, and, in fact, we did not even
have a chairman. Dean Rusk-who, as Secretary of
State, might have assumed that position-had other
duties during this period of time and frequently could
not attend our meetings. As a result, with the encour-
agement of McNamara, Bundy, and Ball, the conversa-
tions were completely uninhibited and unrestricted.
Everyone had an equal opportunity to express himself
and to be heard directly. It was a tremendously advan-
tageous procedure that does not frequently occur within
the executive branch of the government, where rank is
often so important.
Th(
Staff
till]
us 1
brc
inn
ste
Me
foa
fru
at
p(
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 'hirte art Days
effect the greatest possible safety measures to protect
our own aircraft carriers and other vessels.
After the meeting, the President, Ted Sorensen,
Kenny O'Donnell, and I sat in his office and talked. "The
great danger and risk in all of this," he said, "is a miscal-
culation-a mistake in judgment." A short time before,
he had read Barbara Tuchman's book The Guns of Au-
gust, and he talked about the miscalculations of the
Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, the French, and
the British. They somehow seemed to tumble into war,
he said, through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies,
misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferior-
ity and grandeur. We talked about the miscalculation of
the Germans in 1.939 and the still unfulfilled commit-
ments and guarantees that the British had given to
Poland.
Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed,
but it was possible that either side could take a step that
-for reasons of "security" or "pride" or "face"-would
require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for
the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring
about a counterresponse and eventually an escalation
into armed conflict. That was what he wanted to avoid.
He did not want anyone to be able to say that the U.S.
had not done all it could to preserve the peace. We were
not going ti
other side -
saries into
anticipated
Afte
while along
Dobrynin
plications c
had create
within Cub
 not going to misjudge, or miscalculate, or challenge the
other side needlessly, or precipitously push our adver-
saries into a course of action that was not intended or
anticipated.
Afterward, the President and I talked for a little
while alone. He suggested I might visit Ambassador
Dobrynin and personally relate to him the serious im-
plications of the Russians' duplicity and the crisis they
had created through the presence of their missiles
within Cuba.
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 OFTEN THOUGHT afterward of some of the
things we learned from this confrontation. The time that
was available to the President and his advisers to work
secretly, quietly, privately, developing a course of ac-
tion and recommendations for the President, was essen-
tial. If our deliberations had been publicized, if we had
had to make a decision in twenty-four hours, I believe
the course that we ultimately would have taken woaald
have been quite different and filled 'with far greater
risks. The fact that we were able to talk, debate, -argue,
disagree, and then debate some more was essential in
choosing our ultimate course. Such time is not always
present, although, perhaps surprisingly, on most occa-
sions of great crisis it is; but when it is, it should be uti-
lized.
But more than time is necessar4 I believe our de-
liberations proved conclusively how important it is that
the President have the recommendations and opinions
of more than one individual, of more than one depart-
ment, and of more than one point of view' Opinion, even
 Thirteen Days
fact itself, can best be judged- by conflict, by debate.
There is an important element missing when there is
unanimity of viewpoint. Yet that not only can happen; it
frequently does when the recommendations are beirs
given to the President of the United States. Hhs office
creates such respect and awe that it has almost a cower-
ing effect on men. Frequently I saw advisers adapt their
opinions to what they believed President Kennedy and,
later, President Johnson wished to hear.
I once attended a preliminary meeting; witl a
Cabinet officer, where we agreed on a recommendation
to be made to the President. It came as a slight surprise
to me when, a few minutes later, in the meeting with the
President himself, the Cabinet officer vigorously and
fervently expressed the opposite point of view, which,
from the discussion, he quite accurately learned would
be more sympathetically received by the President.
We had virtual unanimity at the time of the Bay
of Pigs. At least, if any officials in the highest ranks of
they did not speak out.
government were opposed,
Thereafter, I suggested there be a devil's advocate to
give an opposite opinion if none was pressed. At the
time of the Cuban missile crisis, this was obviously not
needed.
It is also important that different dep -rtrnent~ of
(Tov e
\i as
his c
Pert
lea as
Ow
vol''
ver
felt
An
esa
1.
Si
ad
di
 "Some of the things we learned . . .
e.
is
it
r3.
ce
id,
on
rise
he
and
ch,
yuld
Bav
CS of
out.
te to
the
not
government be represented. Thirty years ago, the world
was a far, far different place. The Secretary of State and
his department could handle all international problems.
Perhaps they were not always handled correctly, but at
least this handling by one department was manageable.
Our commitments were few-we were not as widely ir--
volved as we are today-but we were nevertheless a
very powerful nation. We could and did, in places we
felt our national interests were involved (such as Latin
America), impose our will by force if we believed it nec-
essary. The Secretary of State dealt with all the respon-
sibilities without great difficulty, giving foreign-policy
advice to the President, administering the department,
directing our relationships with that handful of coun-
tries which were considered significant, and protecting
the financial interests of our citizens around the world.
But that position has very little relationship with
that of the Secretary of State today. The title is the same;
it still deals with foreign affairs; but there the similarity
'virtually disappears. Today, the Secretary of State's po-
sition is at least five jobs, five different areas of responsi-
bility, all of which could properly require his full time.
The Secretary of State must deal with more than
one hundred twenty countries, attend to the affairs of
the United Nations, and travel to numerous countries.
 Thirteen Days
He must receive ambassadors, attend dinners, and han-
dle other protocol and social affairs (and lest anyonc be-
lieve this to be unimportant, we might remember that
Secretary Rusk missed President Kennedy's extremely
important meeting with Prime: Minister Macmillan in
Nassau because of a diplomatic dinner he felt he should
attend). The Secretary of State must deal with a dozen
crises of various significance that arise every week all
over the globe, in the Congo, Nigeria, Indonesia, Aden,
or elsewhere. He must deal with the one or two major
crises that seem to be always with us, such as Berlin in
ig6i, Cuba in 1[x62, and now ''Vietnam. Finally, he must
administer one of the largest and most complicated of all
departments.
Beyond the time and energy that are requred in
administering the office, there is another major differ-
ence in foreign affairs. Thirty years ago, only the State
Department was involved in international matters. But
that is no longer true. A number of other agencies and
departments have primary responsibilities and power in
the foreign-relations field, including the Pentagon, the
CIA, the Agency for International Development., and, to
a lesser degree, the USIA and other independent or semi-
independent departments.
In some countries of the world, the most power-
fill si
Amli
i
Del,
I
the!
littlil
n an'
sex,(
of o
tan
the
bus
tric,
St
op
wl
pl
 in
!r-
ite
-ut
-ad
in
the
to
fill single voice is that of the AID administrator, with the
Ambassador-even though he is representing the State
Department and is ostensibly the chief spokesman for
the United States and its President-having relatively
little power. In some countries that I visited, the domi-
nant U.S. figure was the representative of the CIA; in
several of the Latin American countries, it was the head
of our military mission. In all these countries, an impor-
tant role was played by the USIA and, to a lesser degree,
the Peace Corps, the Export-Import Bank, the American
business community in general, and, in certain coun-
tries, particular businessmen.
Individual representatives of at least the Penta-
gon, the CIA, and AID must be heard and listened to by
the President of the United States in addition to the
State Department. They have information, intelligence,
opinions, and judgments which may be invaluable and
which may be quite different from those of the State De-
partment.
It is also true that because of the heavy responsi-
bility of the Secretary of State, he cannot possibly keep
himself advised on the details of every crisis with which
his department has to deal. There is also the risk that as
information is sifted through a number of different
hands up to him or to the President, vital facts may be
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Thirteen Days
eliminated or distorted through an error of judgment.
Thus it is essential for a President to have personal ac
cess to those within the department who have expertise
and knowledge. He can in this way have available un-
filtered information to as great a degree as is practical
and possible.
11, During the Cuban missile crisis, the President
not only received information from all the significant
departments, but went to considerable lengths to ensure
that he was not insulated from individuals or points of
view because of rank or position. He wanted the advice
of his Cabinet officers, but he also wanted the opinion of
those who were connected with the situation itself.'; lie
wanted to hear from Secretary Rusk, but he also wished
to hear from Tommy Thompson, former (and now again)
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, whose advice on the
Russians and predictions as to what they would do were
uncannily accurate and whose advice and recommenda-
tions were surpassed by none; from Ed Martin, Assistant
Secretary for Latin America, who organized our effort to
secure the backing of the Latin American countries; also
from George Ball, the Under Secretary of State, whose
advice and judgment were invaluable. He wanted to
hear from Secretary McNamara, but he wanted to hear
also from Under Secretary Gilpatric, whose ability,
part
the%-
woul
ings
fere
ned
th
WO
 "Some of the things we learned . .
knowledge, and judgment he sought in every serious
crisis.
On other occasions, I had frequently observed ef-
forts being made to exclude certain individuals from
participating in a meeting with the President because
they held a different point of view'. Often, the President
would become aware of this fact and enlarge the meet-
ings to include other opinions. At the missile-crisis con-
ferences he made certain there were experts and repre-
sentatives of different points of view. President Ken-
nedy wanted people who raised questions, who criti-
cized, on whose judgment he could rely, who presented
an intelligent point of view, regardless of their rank or
viewpoint.
He wanted to hear presented and challenged all
the possible consequences of a particular course of ac-
tion. The first step might appear sensible, but what
would be the reaction of our adversaries and would we
actually stand to gain? I remember an earlier meeting
on Laos, in 1961, when the military unanimously recom-
mended sending in substantial numbers of U.S. troops to
stabilize the country. They were to be brought in
through two airports with limited capability. Someone
y uestioned what we would do if only a limited number
lauded and then the Communist Pathet Lao knocked
 Thirteen Days
out the airports and proceeded to attack our troops, lim-
ited in number and not completely equipped. The repre-
sentatives of the military said we would then have to
destroy Hanoi and possibly use nuclear weapons. Presi-
dent Kennedy did not send in the troops and concen-
trated on diplomatic steps to protect our interests.
It was to obtain an unfettered and objective
analysis that he frequently, and in critical times, invited
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, for whose
wisdom he had such respect; Kenny O'Donnell, his ap-
pointment secretary; Ted Sorensen; and, at times, for-
mer Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former Secret ary
of Defense Robert Lovett, former High Commissioner of
Germany John McCloy, and others. They asked the
difficult questions; they made others defend their posi-
tion; they presented a different point of view; and ?hey
were skeptical.
I think this was more necessary in the military
field than any other. President Kennedy was impressed
with the effort and dedicated manner in which the ?nili-
tary responded-the Navy deploying its vessels into the
Caribbean; the Air Force going on continuous alert; the
Army and the Marines moving their soldiers and equip-
ment into the southeastern part of the U.S.; and all of
them alert and ready for combat.
with
oral I
impli
i
'you1
natia
said
Sovii
Reiss
sites,
~~ea
itv
talk
the)
the!
the
 ap-
for-
r of
the
the
11 of
"Some of the things we learned . .
But he was distressed that the representatives
with whom he met, with the notable exception of Gen-
eral Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the
implications of steps they suggested. They seemed al-
ways to assume that if the Russians and the Cubans
would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our
national interest. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once
said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the
Soviet Union. On that fateful Sunday morning when the
Russians answered they were withdrawing their mis-
siles, it was suggested by one high military adviser that
we attack Monday in any case. Another felt that we had
in some way been betrayed.
President Kennedy was disturbed by this inabil-
ity to look beyond the limited military field. When we
talked about this later, he said we had to remember that
they were trained to fight and to wage war-that was
their life. Perhaps we would feel even more concerned if
they were always opposed to using arms or military
means-for if they would not be willing, who would
be? But this experience pointed out for us all the impor-
tance of civilian direction and control and the im-
portance of raising probing questions to military recom-
mendations.
It was for these reasons, and many more, that
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Thirteen Days
President Kennedy regarded Secretary McNamara ,is
the most valuable public servant in his Administration
and in the government.
From all this probing and examination-of the
military, State Department, and their recommendations
-President Kennedy hoped that he would at least he
prepared for the foreseeable contingencies and know
that-although no course of action is ever completely
satisfactory-he had made his decision based on the
best possible information. His conduct of the missile
crisis showed how important this kind of skeptical prob-
ing and questioning could be.
It also showed how important it was to he re-
spected around the world, how vital it was to have allies
and friends. Now, five years later, I discern a feeling of
isolationism in Congress and through the country, ,,
feeling that we are too involved with other nations-, are
sentment of the fact that we do not have greater support
in Vietnam, an impression that our AID program is use-
less and our alliances dangerous. I think it would be well
to think back to those days in October 1962.
We have not always had the support of Latin
American countries in everything we have done. Fre-
quently, our patience has been sorely tried by the oppo-
sition of some of the larger South American countries to
States
willing
a majo
sians
acting
acting
ing th
rapid p
Gaulle,
accepte
and pu
tion. H
not bees
about yr
and har'
NATO c
 rnt;'asures we felt to be in our common interest and
worthy of their support. During the Cuban missile crisis,
however, when it was an issue of the greatest impor-
tance, when the United States was being sorely tried,
those countries came un imously to our support, and
that support was essential.
It was the vote of the Organization of American
States that gave a legal basis for the quarantine. Their
...........,,.
willingness to follow the leadership of the United States
was a heavy and unexpected blow to Khrushchev. It had
a major psychological and practical effect on the Rus-
sians and changed our position from that of an outlaw
.acting in violation of international law into a country
acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protect-
ing their position.
Similarly, the s pport..of our-NATO allies-the
rapid public acceptance of our position by Adenauer, de
Gaulle, and Macmillan-was of great importance. They
accepted our recitation of the facts without question,
and publicly supported our position without reserva-
tion. Had our relationship of trust and mutual respect
not been present, had our NATO allies been skeptical
about what we were doing and its implications for them,
and had Khrushchev thus been able to split off the
NATO countries or even one of our chief allies, our posi-
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Thirteen Days
tion would have been seriously undermined.
Even in Africa, support from a number of coun-
tries that had been considered antagonistic toward the
United States was of great significance. With a naval
quarantine around Cuba, our military reported, Soviet
planes could still fly atomic warheads into Cuba. To do
so they had to refuel in West Africa, and the critical
countries with sufficiently large airports and the neces-
sary refueling facilities were Guinea and Senegal. Presi-
dent Kennedy sent our two Ambassadors to see the Pres-
idents of those two countries.
Sekou Toure of Guinea had been the subject of
great criticism in the United States because of his
friendship with the Communist nations; but he also ad-
mired President Kennedy. When our Ambassador vis-
ited him, he immediately accepted as true President
Kennedy's description of what was happening in Cuba;
said Guinea was not going to assist any country in con-
structing a military base on foreign soil; and announced
that Russian planes would not be permitted to refuel in
Conakry.
In Dakar, Ambassador Philip M. Kaiser had a
close personal relationship with President Leopold
Senghor, who a short time before had had a very suc-
cessful visit to Washington. He, too, quickly perceived
the dar
land or
J effersi
all vita
wishel
the rt:
shoull
other
doub
to bt
own
 the danger and agreed not to permit Russian planes to
land or refuel in Dakar.
In short, our friends, our allies, and, as Thomas
Jefferson said, a respect for the opinions of mankind, are
all vitally important. We cannot be an island even if we
wished; nor can we successfully separate ourselves from
the rest of the world.
Exasperation over our struggle in Vietnam
should not close our eyes to the fact that we could have
other missile crises in the future-different kinds. no
doubt, and under different circumstances. But if we are
to be successful then, if we are going to preserve our
own national security, we will need friends, we will
need supporters, we will need countries that believe and
respect us and will follow our leadership.
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 HEARINGS
("U.i11T1'11'1:1+; ON INTE'H-AMEANCAN AFFAIRS
(_ O.11 NI ITT E I~; O N FO Ita~; I (11 N A F I I RS
HO1'SE OF H EI)RESEN'I'ATIVES
NlNH,TY-FII)-,S'L' CON( IiESti
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U.S. GOVI:RNMb;N'1' PRINTING Oh'11('I;
WASIIING'1'ON : 1970
FOR RELEASE TIIIJRSI)AY A.M., AUGUST 20, 1970
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN
For ~ilc la} the tiuperlntendrnt of leech 1L ntu U. GOVCrunu'nl Printing Ufllee,
1lnshin,^ton 1)t`. :u111_ rire $I
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Printed for the use pf the Committee ou Foreign Afl;iii
 102
intc)rested in, r,entlemen. We are anxious to hear from you in that
context.
Mr. Secretary. (A biographical sketch of Sveret:i ry Nutter follows:)
IIoN. (.', WARRIrEN NUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF I)EFENSE (INTrIINAT1ONAL
SWURITY AFIAIRS)
U. Warren, Nutlcr took office as ASSIStnit Sceretar' of Defense (Aiternatlonal
Security Affairs) on March 4, 1969. Horn In Topeka, Kansas in 1923, he was edu-
euted at the University of Chicago, where he received his A.IT. degree in 194.1,
an A.M. in li)I,s and it I'll .ll. In lil`t9. Ile nerved In the European Theater during
World War It as an enlisted ntan and later was eonunissioned as it b`irst. Lieu.
tenlurt in the Array Iteserve. Ills
Infa decorations Include the Bronze Star, the Colobat
utryinan's Badge and three battle stars. Prior to coming to the Def,nse I)e.
purtment Mr. Nutter was Paul Goc t1ioe Mc?Iniire Professor of .Economics, Chair-
man of the Department of Ecomm~icr., 'it](] Director of the Thomas Jefferson Cc?n-
ter at blue lniversity of Virginia. Before going to the University in 1957, he was
on the faculties of Lawrence College and Yale University. During the Korean
War. Mr. Nut: ter served with the Ceni gal Intelligence Agency. I rorn 1954 through
1967 he was n rn'iu r of the research start of the National Bureau of I,cone.n ie
Research anti director of jts Iengiby Study of Soviet. Economic Growth, ill the
latter capacity fie sulxrvised preparuttori of several scholarly monographs in-
cluding his own Growth of Industrial Production in the Sovtct Union (1i512), Par-
ing four years prior to his present appolntmeut he was active in a nnalber of
international eonJenee bringflig togelher econornis s from the West and Eastern
Europe, 'hogethcr Willi The Philaclclpirin Inquirer lie received the Gavel Award
for (1istingnished journalism from the Ann'rican Bar AGSOChrtion fit 196,6, for
Itl series of articles ('out rusting the legal, political and social Institutions of the
United States and the Soviet ITilton , v pnblishcd as The Strange World of
Ivan hranou. ill, Is also the author of four ta'o trrhona' e is i of hoolcs and
Ville, Va, rnaL~? is huu is fu Cluarlotles-
STATEMENT gdN, G. WARREN NUTTER, ASS TANT SECRETARY
OF DE SE FOR TXTmsn?A..,~.,__._
Mr. Nnrrr:R. Thank
o
y
n verb' ranch, 11f r. thairnian.
My statement will be a s
s specific issue but I
little broacher than thions and I will have
will be very plea us on thi ]titer in (m ost i
something to say:,aebd out to focus
it.
Mr. Chairman and (listinguislied rnenibers of the committee, I arrr
pleased to bo with you this lnor?ning to disrnrss oar security post lire in
the Caribbean. The Caribbean basin has always been of special interest.
to U.S. security. It; is, in effect, our "third border." Although the pub-
lie foots has been mostly on other :Trews of the world in recent.. yea is.
l want; to assitro the committee, that wto h:n-e been keeping a very 1`8 TV-
fill watch on the situation in the. C:1 t ihbe:111.
'I'ho security threat in the. ('a.ribi,eall can be divided into three ele-
ments--tlio internal threat to the security of the (`aribbean govern-
ments, the threat from Cuba, and the, threat sternrning front Soviet
military activities in the area. I will discuss each of these briefly in
till-it.
INTERNAL, SEcnrn',Y
Active insurgency in the Caribbean area is, in general, ender control
by the secnrif.y forces of the local governnu'ut5, Ilioiigh some countries
still require nuxlast U.S. inilit.al,y assistaneet primarily trainin<
Velop and maintain adegnato security capahilities, [Security deletion,
 Cuba's hel& ," ()astro also continues to encourage local guerrilla lead-
ers to acquit ands and aims Iltroug;ll robbery. kidnapping and other
violent means.
Castro has moderated his former propaganda cau-paig?n against, iris
Latin American neighbors hut. has intensified Ow Volume and virulence
of anti-U.S. prolr.tganda.. I1avana. Radio 1rro:tdea4s hrogran-s in eight,
1anguagis and t.w(. Indian dia.lect,s. "1'alllhee in-perialism," the Alli-
ance for Progress, the Nixon adiministratioll, and the Central intel-
ligence Agency arc, >rime targets of these abusive attacks. Havana,
Radio Internatiotral iroadcasts anti-1T.S. speeches anti interviews by
disgruntled U.S. citizens. It, reiterates the I lremre that there is only one
approach to the solution of Latin America`.-; llrohlen-s: "the patlr of
gennnie revolution capable of destroying I he present Structure and
putting an end to iinperilllist, exploit:d ion.,, 'l'ho official Cuban Coni-
-nuriist Party newspaper, L,'rnlllnn,, lu:timtaiilS a steady anti-I'.5. 1 nur-
paign doilouneing racisn- in the i'riited Stntcs and "the brutal :rrr-
gresston of U.S. nnperiaiisrn" ill V1011:1111. Castro :tl-o supports 11w
Afro-Asian Latin American Solirlaril.v Oiganiralion, its propagarlIla
organ, 7'ricon.linr'..irlnl; amd the Continental ( )rgganizat ion of -.at nr
American Students.
In sum, Castro has shown through his arl ions and words I ltat lie will
coutitllte to support. subversion and revolution thronghnut the
Americas.
activities in the Caribbean consist of military assis-
Q- iet itiilita r
y
tance, to Culba, atul Soviet all and naval ol,erat lulls tl-at Snluc Bales in-
clude visits to Cuba.
L-=4Sec-trity 1)elet.ion.1
Soviet assistance has given Cuba the hest equipped loves in Latin
America, but these forces not have the ;tit or sealift to tnouut
operations outside of Cuba. 'Ii ere:ae a substantial number of military
advisers, technicians, and instructors in ('ttba who oversee and protest
the Soviet inveslnuent and sustain and enhance Castro's defensive
posture. There are also advisers in the civil sector where, for example,
the Soviets are assisting the Cubans at their expel-r11 tal nuclear
reactor. This reactor bas no :tppareirt military applirat ion,
The exchange. of extended visits by Defense Mill ir . (,I' the 1-wo
countries wit.hni the past 8 months and ('astro's speech of April 23
are indications of continued n-ilitary cooperation between the two
countries. Iii his speech, Castro explicitly Stated that "Cuba would
never sever its political and military relations with the U.S.S.R. On
the contrary, we shall always be ready to have clo-er military l ies with
the Soviet Union."
In the last. li. luonths, we have ob:avrved rlcw foal s of Soviet -mili-
tary activity ill (110 ('aiibbeitn HIM nray challenge our security in-
terests. In July of last/ year, Soviet n:uV:tl (allbat:ttlls eirtered the
Caribiwall and visit?etl Cuba for the lust I init. I Security (Islet iorr.
'I'ho purpose of this first, Soviet natal li:,it rua,y well have included
fa.niihiarizat.ion with (;at'ihbeai- waters. In Nlay of this year, it tuorc
sigmificttltt Soviet naval force, m-arle tilt of three saabn-:uines (two con-
ventionally powered, the other nuclear powered), a sufimarine tender
and guided inissile cruiser, a missile e(luipl-ed destroyer, and all oil
 CUBA AN I) '1'1-11 CARIBBEAN
J08 ," I -RDP8'1 B00401 R06020009000 -9
MONDAY, JULY 27, 1970
Ilot-tie; or' l E1'u sENTAI'Ivi s,
(' 4 I UIT l EE ON FOREIGN A (''FAIRS,
u1 Ia'IJIMFITEE ON 1N'I'tai-AMERICAN AFU`AIRS,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee on Ilit er-Aulel?ic)ln Affairs nu0t, i)ursu:ull to no-
ice, at In o'rlovk in room `!?;)O I1ay'hurn House Ofiive lttiillling, iron.
)note }t. II ('ll,rhnirau11I of Ille5nlx?olnlullIee, I)r'Sldulr.
The lii'ouu)iittee will I)lea5ec'oule. ioorder.
4c?t:ll
\I I
1'v
..
,
.
We nu'a't (Ills nlorllilh Io hear tesliutony from the I)rIto 15e'tc)r in.
onu'rtion with the Cuban refilg;ee. In'o(''r? c Is5 Iiug to
Iill:l :111(1 I Alt' l :1t'll)Ueall.
It i~ our Itleasllre to lame' its, it witneMI. M tuolo Reyes, ((tistin-
vl-? idil)_'' in I hat 'ollllalllllil \?, ll'llivaled 1)) I111' C'nllse of :I ire.e t'iiha
d t ho h.15 2?aiu'd .a ,p'r'at de:d of I)lo11)inerlev a5 a broadcaster n11d
err( for OI? l.ai ill Atneric nil u'w..at ;1t,I( ion \1" I'V'.I iil 11in1ai. 111.
C'cr~, I n)i~Ilt ,tdd, has for years [wen the voice of wnriliug, and has
11