RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS TO FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS (FCRCS)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100013-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
July 11, 2005
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 20, 1974
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 171.51 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100013-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs,, ~, Walsh
The Tanham/FCRC problem has returned (as
Colby says in his note). He wants to discuss
this further. Do you need additional in-puts
from Harry (attached i
s
the original memo on
FCRCs) . 1
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100013-4
Approved For Release 2005/07/Y2(? CTAIR&%W66+495RO OOC001000
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Release of Intelligence Documents to
Federal Contract Research Centers
(FCRCs)
1. This memorandum responds to the question George
Tanham of RAND raised with you earlier this month. The
question related to the possibility of disseminating classified
documents to "Federal Contract Research Centers".
2. There are two elements to this question--what are
Federal Contract Research Centers and what are the present
rules with respect to disseminating classified information to
them ?
3. The term "Federal Contract Research Centers" is
defined in a National Science Foundation (NSF) publication of
1967 as:
R&D organizations exclusively or substantially
financed by the Federal Government, which
were established by the Federal Government
either to meet a particular research and
development need or, in some instances, to
provide major facilities at universities for
research and associated training purposes.
Basically, the term and variations of it form a category of
organizations used by the NSF in its various reports on how the
Federal Government spends its R&D funds. It does not describe
25X1
Approved For Release 2005(qM,:IfA9B01495R000600100013-4
Approved For Release 2005/OEFtb6i1495R000100013-4
a fixed list of organizations with a homogeneous set of relationships
with the US Government. Over time the definition has changed
thereby adding or deleting various sub-groups of organizations.
During the period 1957 to 1967 over 90 different organizations were
included in the various listings although at any one time about half
that number were listed.
4. The listing for fiscal years 1971-1973 (headed "Federally
Funded Research and Developments Centers") contains 67 entries.
This list includes a variety of organizations under contract to US
departments and agencies ranging from Defense, Air Force, Navy,
Army, AEC to NASA, IIEW, and NSF. Some of the contracts are
administered by universities and other non-profit institutions and
others are administered by industrial firms. Some do classified
work; others do not. My view is that it would not be useful to use
the organizations listed in the NSF publications on the subject as
a class for a decision on access to classified intelligence. It
would be better to treat each organization on its own merits when
deciding whether it should receive classified information.
5. The standing USIB rules covering contractor access to
classified information are quite clear and restrictive. The rules
require that any classified intelligence passed to a contractor be
directly pertinent to the tasks involved in a specific contract (need
to know) and that the individuals and facilities involved have the
necessary clearances. The contracting agency must review each
document to be passed in order to certify the need to know. In
addition, there are several document controls (e.g., EXDIS,
Controlled Dissem) which prohibit dissemination to contractors
without explicit approval of the originating agency. These rules
do not distinguish between contractors on NSF's list of FFRDC
and other private firms like GE/TEMPO.
6. These USIB rules were developed after much debate
and reflect some unfortunate experiences various intelligence
agencies have had with contractors including those on the NSF list
of FFRDCs. At one time ORR disseminated much of its finished
intelligence on the Soviet economy to RAND under a general research
-2-
Approved For Release 2005/Q r,01 495R000600100013-4
Approved For Release 2005/@ Q tJ fM 01495R0OQ 00100013-4
contract we had. There is at least one instance where a RAND
person published a classified ORR report as an unclassified
RAND report. The whole Pentagon Papers episode also generated
a hard review and tightening of the dissemination of classified
reports to contractors. Furthermore, organizations on the FFRDC
list are taking on contracts with foreign governments (e. g., MITRE
for Japan and Stanford Research Institute for a number of foreign
countries and firms). This should make us look very hard at any
blanket arrangements we might make.
7. On the basis of these factors, I recommend against any
general arrangements to disseminate classified intelligence on a
routine basis to the FFRDCs as a group. If you wish to pursue
this matter further with Tanham concerning RAND, I recommend
that we have some very specific discussions with him to see what
might be done on the matter.
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
EWProctor:fbr
Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - Acting Director
1 - Director/CRS
1 - DDI Chrono
r 1-:4 DDI CR.S file
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100013-4
Cn_\ I r_~~:_ TIAI_.
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100013-4
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100013-4