COMMENTS ON THE IC STAFF MEMORANDUM ON 'INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM DECEMBER 1974 - MARCH 1975'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 7, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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7 April 1975
SUBJECT s Comments on the IC Staff Memorandum on.
"Intelligence Coverage of the War in
Vietnam December 1974 - March 1975"
1. On balance, we believe this is a fair appraisal.
2. It is not quite accurate in the summary and the
introduction to describe President Thieu's action in mid-
March as a decision to withdraw from major parts of the
country "without a fight." Thieu did intend to abandon
the'central highlands, but rte clearly did not foresee'
that his-withdrawal of' the airborne division- from' Mil-
itary Region 1 would lead to the rapid abandonment of
Da Nang and the entire central coast "without a fight."
The main point here is that President Thieu, even more
than the US intelligence community, was not alert to
the RVNAF's extreme vulnerability to a total command
and control collapse.
3. The IC Staff memorandum refers only to interagency
assessments. We believe that a review of the total cov-
erage in national intelligence publications would show
that a more comprehensive treatment was available to
senior consumers. For example, several NID feature
articles since the beginning of 1975 made the judgment
that Saigon would be prepared to write off much of the
highlands without a fight. On the question of South
Vietnamese morale and will to resist, an OCI assessment
published on November 18 as a DDI Memorandum pointed
to a "growing sense of pessimism regarding the Thieu
government's ability to cope with the country's economic
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problems or to hold the military line against the com-
munists." This assessment warned that if the government
suffered further territorial losses or heavy casualties.
in next year's dry season, "a defeatist psychology
could begin to take hold and sentiment for change could
begin to snowball."
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
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3 - DOCI Chrono w/basic
4 - EAPD file
Apr 75
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3 April 1975
SUBJECT: Intelligence Coverage of the War in Vietnam
December 1974 - March 1975
INTRODUCTION
In mid-March, President Thieu made a decision to abandon
South Vietnam's central highlands and to withdraw the elite Airborne
Division from Military Region 1. His intention was to concentrate
his units in the southern half of the country and around the large
population centers along the north-central coast.
The rationale underlying this decision was Thieu's apparent
conclusion that his forces were over-extended and under-supplied
and faced an enemy possessing a formidable inventory of armor
and artillery and a large, combat-ready strategic reserve. And
certainly Thieu's assessment also included his judgment that the
future of US aid was uncertain at best.
President Thieu consulted no one while making his strategic
decision--not the RVN's Joint General Staff, the regional commanders,
or any US officials. Without the benefit of careful military planning,
Thieu's actions have precipitated South Vietnam's worst defeat in
the long history of this war. Saigon's armed forces and, indeed,
the government itself, are now tottering on the brink of collapse.
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These events raise some obvious questions
--Was there a failure on the part of the intelligence
community to accurately forecast the course of events
in South Vietnam? And, if so, what was the precise
nature of the failure?
To answer these questions, two major specifics must be
addressed: the Intelligence Community's estimates of Communist
military intentions in South Vietnam, and its assessments of the
capabilities of South Vietnam's armed forces. We take these in
turn.
1. Communist Military Intentions in South Vietnam
The intelligence community's. principal forecast of Communist
intentions in South Vietnam through mid-1975 is contained in NIE
53/14. 3-2-74: "Short-Term Prospects for Vietnam," published
on 23 December 1974. The principal conclusions of this paper
were these:
". . . the evidence points toward a marked increase
in military action between now and mid-1975.... " (p. 1)
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"We expect at a minimum a sharp escalation in
fighting this dry season with the Communists making
greater use of their in-country firepower than in 1974.
They clearly have the flexibility to commit a portion
of their strategic reserve, and we believe that they are
likely to base their decisions on how the fighting evolves
during the dry season. We believe that they will make
such a commitment to exploit major vulnerabilities in
the South Vietnamese position or to maintain the
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momentum of their military effort... we estimate
that an all-out offensive is unlikely this dry season,
although there is a risk that Hanoi might move in
this direction if it perceived an opportunity where
it could score a decisive victory. " (p. 9)
The course of events since the publication of this estimate
(until Thieu's withdrawal scheme backfired) suggests that this
estimate accurately forecast North Vietnamese intentions. The
first three months of 1975 were characterized by an "escalation
in fighting" and the North Vietnamese commitment of "a portion
of their strategic reserve. " And the North Vietnamese have
obviously moved "to exploit major vulnerabilities in the South
Vietnamese position. " In other words, the character and
intensity of the fighting, the posture and deployment of North
Vietnam's divisions in RVN, and the limited commitment of
the NVA's strategic reserve division all indicate that the NIE
was accurate in its principal conclusions.
We believe that the actions of the NVA in the week after
Thieu implemented his pull-back plan also support the NIE's
judgments. Clearly confused, Hanoi initially was not quick
to press its tremendous opportunity.
additional units to the fight in the South occurred after, not
before, Thieu's decision.
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II. The Performance of the Armed Forces of South Vietnam
ti
The question here- -Did the intelligence community misassess
the capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces?--
requires a complex answer. The December 1974 NIE characterized
those armed forces in this manner:
"The military performance of the RVNAF has been
reasonably effective... /Land it is/ capable of providing
security sufficient to protect the bulk of the populace,
despite ammunition, fuel, and equipment stringencies. "
(p.5)
Clearly, this does not portend the events which unfolded in
March and April 1975. However, in fleshing out the details, the
NIE goes on to state:
"Nevertheless, the quality of many RVNAF commanders
is still marginal, especially at company and field grade
levels. " (p. 5 )
"The RVNAF is plagued by the perennial problems
of reduced manning levels. " (p. 5)
"South Vietnamese military shortcomings are most
apparent within the territorial forces... /many of them/
have performed poorly as a result of inadequate leadership
discipline and unit manning. " (p. 5)
"The most unsettling development affecting the RVNAF,
however, derives from the decline in US military aid
available to the GVN. " (p. 6)
"Even at the 1974 level of combat, we would thus
expect the RVNAF to be in a significantly weaker logistical
position by the end of the dry season." (p. 6)
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Taken together, these amplifications of the RVNAF's condition
provide the reader of the NIE with the description of an armed
force which has distinct problems- -problems which are not getting
better. The Estimate summarizes in this way:
"RVNAF combat capabilities appear in retrospect to
have peaked in the year or so following the cease fire.
There has been some decline in RVNAF effectiveness,
but the decline has not yet reached significant proportions. "
(p. 6)
And most prescient of *all is this key judgment of the NIE:
"As important as the current level of US assistance is
the GVN's faith in a continuing US commitment to provide
military assistance in the future when it is needed. A loss
of confidence in the US commitment to South Vietnam would
seriously affect the GVN's morale and will to continue the
struggle regardless of the actual level of stocks on hand.
/underlining added/
The NIE thus suggests the danger of a psychological unravelling
of the RVNAF--the possibility that its will to fight might significantly
decline.
But, in the light of subsequent events, the NIE's appraisal of
the capabilities of the RVNAF appears to have overlooked its vulnerability
to a command and control breakdown and to have underemphasized the
possibility of a breakdown of its will to fight in the face of strong
pressure. The NIE also failed to foresee the envelopment of the
retreating fighting units in a vast tide of refugees and military
dependents. Still, since the Estimate
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was highly qualified, and since it did not and, we think, could
not foresee Thieu's hasty and unplanned withdrawals, these
failures were certainly not complete ones. And the likely
performance under stress of many of the South Vietnamese
units which performed so badly after Thieu's decision to withdraw
was to some extent predicted. The question was addressed, for
example, in the December 19, 1974 joint CIA/DIA study entitled
"Status of the South Vietnamese Combat Forces. " It characterized
these units in this way:
"ARVN units in MR 1 are generally in poor condition
following the extended period of heavy combat. All three
regular ARVN infantry divisions--the 1st, 2d, and 3d--are
understrength and most of the regiments are only marginally
combat effective. " (p. 1) /-All three broke without being
seriously challenged by the NVA7.
"The 23d division is still at full strength, and is
rested and combat effective, but would have difficulty
defending Pleiku and reinforcing Kontum with the supporting
forces now present in the highlands if heavy Communist
attacks broke out. " (p. 7) /A combination of the fight for
Ban Me Thuot, which involved two new NVA divisions, and
the manner in which the withdrawal order was implemented
resulted in this division's disintegration/.
"The 22d division. . . can be expected to continue
performing well against Communist forces in Binh Dinh
Province. " (p. 7) /Apparently it did, until it, too, became
aware of the general unravelling which had taken place
elsewhere/.
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Only the analysis of the Marine Division may have been far
off the mark:
"The Marine Division, long considered one of South
Vietnam's finest combat units... is rated highly effective
and the most combat-ready ARVN unit in MR 1. " (p. 3)
//While all the events surrounding its withdrawal from
northern MR 1 are still unknown, it apparently maintained
its unit integrity until it reached Danang. After its
arrival there and during the period of the withdrawal
of the Marines from Danang, there was an apparent
major breakdown in its discipline/.
From all the above, it can be fairly established that the
community did not wear rose-colored glasses when looking at
the South Vietnamese armed forces. It can also be said, however,
that it did not anticipate the degree and extent of the strain those
forces would be subjected to by their own Commander-in-Chief.
Nevertheless, Thieu's unfortunate behavior was of a character,
and his decision was made in such a way, as to virtually preclude
our ability to foresee either. His moves were also of a character--
e. g. , his extraordinary vacillation concerning whether or not Hue
would be defended--which adversely affected the ability of his
commanders and troops to function.
The increasing remoteness of GVN officials with their US
counterparts- -well noted during the past year as American resolve
vis-a-vis South Vietnam waned--severely hampered US efforts to
assess trends in South Vietnamese politics and policies. But, in
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the last analysis, it was the peculiar inner working of Thieu's
mind which was decisive. It was not the plan to withdraw in
itself, but, rather, the manner of its implementation, which
produced the psychological shock waves.
III. More Recent Estimating
The most recent estimate is SNIE 53/14. 3-75: "Assessment
of the Situation in South Vietnam, " 27 March 1975. Written in the
midst of the chaotic situation which obtained to the northern half
of South Vietnam, its key judgment was:
"Communist momentum, however, will be hard to
stop, and the North Vietnamese may be tempted to
commit the remaining portion of their strategic reserve
to exploit the situation. Even if they do so, we believe
that the GVN's military strength in the southern part of
the country will enable it to survive the current dry
season, although additional losses are certain....
Even so, ... the result likely [will] be defeat by early
1976."
Since the SNIE's publication, all of MRs 1 and 2 have been
lost. While there has been a momentary pause in the Communist's
forward movement, there is no sign that the North Vietnamese
offensive has ended. The community's view now is that the SNIE
was too sanguine. A new interagency assessment, published on
4 April, concluded that, because of the impact of military reverses
and political uncertainty, and because Hanoi will bring yet
additional forces into the struggle,"the question over the defeat
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of the Republic of Vietnam is timing--whether it will collapse or
be militarily overwhelmed in a period of weeks or months."
Y
This assessment sees two courses of action open to the
Communists:
"The application of massive force to inflict
final defeat... /-or/ envelop Saigon, cut off its
supplies and thereby bring the Government of
Vietnam to its knees. "
The interagency assessment concludes that the Communists
most likely will pursue the latter course of action:
~~ .. that Hanoi will opt for a less costly and cul politically more expedient
c llapserfromewitl~in isating
that South Vietnamese
near at hand. "
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Distribution:
1-DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - PRD Subject
5 - PRD Chron
6 - PRD/OC
7 - IC/Registry
8 - IC
9-D/
10 - D/DIA
11 - DDI
12 - D/OCI
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