CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300230001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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 14 April 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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USSR-Berlin. Moscow indicates that new access guaran-
tees could be negotiated without difficulty if West agreed
to change in Berlin status. (Page t)
USSR: Khrushchev denounces US-British statement on nu-
clear testing. (Page M)
USSR- Morocco-Alge ria: Five Soviet helicopters being
shipped to Algeria via Morocco. (Page iv)
Communist China - India. Peiping comments on Sino-Indian
border controversy at National People's Congress. (Page v)
Burma-. Rangoon terminates aid from private US foundations.
(Pag e v)
Cambodia- Sihanouk may propose international. conference
on South Vietnam. (Page vt)
Turkey, political tensions mount between opposition parties
and military. (Page vi)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 April 1962
DAILY BRIEF
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USSR-Berlin-, On the eve of the resumption of US-Soviet
talks on Berlin, Izvestia has published..an article by its.author-
itative commentator on Berlin and German affairs which un-
derscores. Moscow's position that new access guarantees could
be negotiated without difficulty if the West agreed to a change
in the status of West Berlin which would. terminate the "occu-
pation regime:' The Izvestia article sought to convey the
USSR's readiness to enter serious bargaining on the question
of an international access authority by reaffirming the proposal
made. last month by East German party chief Ulbricht that an
arbitration body composed of the guarantor countries be estab-
lished in connection with a new Berlin agreement. This scheme
is designed to provide a facade of continuing Soviet responsi-
bility for Allied access by stipulating that the USSR would act
as the arbitration body's. agent in settling any access dispute
which may arise between East Germany and the West.
Although both Izvestia and the Ulbricht speech called for
the replacement of Western "occupation troops" by UN or. neu-
tral contingents,. an East German deputy foreign. minister hinted,
in a recent interview with an Indian correspondent that token
mi ht remain in West Berlin-,
,-Western forces
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*USSR--Nuclear Testing. Khrushchev's harsh and offen-
sive letter to Prime Minister acmillan delivered yesterday
was intended to counter what the Soviet leaders regard as a
Western move to place responsibility on the USSR for the im-
pending US test series in the Pacific. The letter, a reply to
Macmillan's cover letter to the US-British statement on nu-
clear. testing, denounced the joint statement as an attempt to
"divert popular wrathil; it charged that the US and Britain did
not expect the Soviet Union to accept their terms for a nuclear
test-ban agreement and had already decided beforehand to pro-
ceed with the tests
e Soviet premier revived old allegations that the West-
ern powers have aggressive intentions against the USSR,.. that
they want to retain West Berlin as a "beachhead for. the strug-
gle against Communism," and that they are seeking to conduct
espionage in the USSR under the guise of a test-ban inspection
system. Khrushchev reiterated that Western tests will oblige
the Soviet Union to resume testing. He attempted to contrast
Soviet and Western attitudes by declaring that the USSR will
renounce testing "forever" if the West will do the same, and
by offering to go anywhere at any time. to sign a general disar-
mament treaty
harassments of Western access to the city
tiations with the US on Berlin or any shay intensification of
he letter to Macmillan probably is the opening salvo in
a vig rous campaign to exploit US tests to place the West on
.the defensive on the whole range of East-West issues. Pravda
has joined.the attack by castigating the US and Britain for re-
jecting the Soviet proposal at Geneva for a moratorium on all
tests for the duration of the disarmament talks. It is unlikely
that the Khrushchev letter and accompanying propaganda. fore-
shadow any immediate hardening of the Soviet position in nego-
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14 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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USSR-Morocco-Algeria: 25X1
F icop ers were
included in the recent Soviet shipment of arms delivered at
Casablanca these helicopters are intended for the Al-
gerian National Army (ALN). Moroccan officials have re-
peatedly assured US representatives that Morocco will receive
no helicopters or additional airplanes from the USSR. Rabat
in this way is seeking to avoid jeopardizing current negotia-
tions for the supply of military air transport equipment from
the US.
Since late 1960 the USSR has on several occasions used
Morocco as a transshipment point in supplying arms to the.
ALN. If the Soviet Union is shipping helicopters to the Algeri-
ans, it is doing so in order to maintain its position as a supplier
of arms to the Algerians, to assist Algeria from the outset in
its efforts to create a modern army, and to forestall French
efforts to induce the future Algerian Government to rely solely
on France for arms. Now that the cease-fire is in effect, Mos-
cow may feel that limited, indirect arms shipments to the Al-
gerians would not provoke French political retaliation beyond
that which followed the. USSR's de jure recognition of the PAG
last month.
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However, if the materiel actually is destined for Algeria,
De Gaulle will react sharply and may even break diplomatic re-
lations with the.Soviet Union..
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*Communist China - India: In a briefing on Sino-Indian re-
lations to the delegates o t R National People's Congress now
meeting in Peiping, the Chinese Communist regime charged
that India has "pushed forward step by step into Chinese terri-
tory" during the past year, set up new military outposts, and
made repeated overflights across Chinese territory. Peiping
insisted that it would be "dangerous" for India to attempt to
alter. the status quo along the boundary by unilateral action and
said that it was holding the door open for negotiations. New
Delhi's position has been that formal negotiations cannot begin
until Chinese forces have withdrawn from the disputed terri-
tory.
The congress delegates were also told of India's refusal
to renew the 1954 treaty governing trade with Tibet, . which
lapses this June. The treaty embodied China's first formal
commitment to the so-called "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence"; Peiping seems especially concerned over the ef-
fect on Asian neutrals of India's im utation that the Chinese
have dishonored these principles.]
Burma. The Burmese Foreign Office has informed the
Rangoon representatives of the Asia Foundation and the Ford
Foundation that the government has decided it can no longer
accept aid from private organizations and has instructed them
to wind up their projects requiring foreign advisers within six
rA
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 months. The Fulbright Board was requested to withhold as-
signment of all persons to Burma during 1962. These moves
arose.from Ne Win's nationalism and distrust of all non-Bur-
mans, even including the minorities of Burma, and are a
continuation of Ne Win's efforts, launched during his 1958-60
caretaker rnment- to isolatp hir-, emintry frnm alien in-
f luences. 25X1
(Backup, ra-ge 3)
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cochairmen, avoided an all for a conference.
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nam, while perhaps stabilizing the situation temporarily, will
Cambodia;/ ]PIrince Sihanouk has become increasingly con-
cerne3 over I ituation in South Vietnam and now is consid-
ering the advisability of proposing an international conference.
He fears. that the increasing'US military presence in South Viet-
personal press organ advocated international guarantees of the
17th parallel, liquidation of the Diem regime, and demilitariza-
tion of South Vietnam.
eventually threaten Cambodia's securiW I Sihanouk attempted
to take a leading role last year in solving the Laotian crisis,
and he apparently considers the time ripe for similar efforts
to neutralize South Vietnam. A recent editorial in Sihanouk's
Both Peiping and Hanoi have indicated their interest in
"joint consultations" among the 1954 Geneva Conference pow-
ers, presumably on the assumption that the US, if engaged in
a.conference, would not further enlarge its commitment in
South Vietnam. The USSR, however, in a 17 March Foreign
'Ministry statement issued as one of the two Geneva Conference
. Turkey: Political tensions are again building up in Turkey
over tFe -question of pardons for. the military officers involved
in the coup attempt on 22 February 1962 and amnesty for members
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of the former Menderes regime. Prime Minister Inonu has
promised, as a part of the settlement between the rebels and
the government, that the officers involved in the abortive Feb-
ruary revolt would not be prosecuted. He is expected to intro-
duce a.draft law to this effect next week.
Extremist members of the Justice.. party, which partici-
pates with Inonu's Republican People's party in the coalition
government, are opposed to such legislation unless it is tied
to an amnesty for many of the imprisoned civilian leaders of
the Menderes government. Military leaders are unanimously
opposed to such an amnesty and have told US officials in Ankara
that linking of the two issues by the Grand National Assembly
would lead to another military take-over. Observers in Tur-
key believe that failure to gain passage of the bill granting par-
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tion and immediate military intervention-
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Burma Moves Toward Authoritarianism and Isolationism
General Ne Win, who participated in the nationalist rev-
olutionary movement which forced the British out of Burma in
1948, has little formal education and far less fore. n travel
and experience than most Burmese leaders.
Burmese and aliens alike have found Ne Win a difficult man
with whom to negotiate.
A senior Foreign Office official has informed the American
ambassador that the decision to terminate Ford and Asia. Founda-
tion activities was not aimed at American or Western.institutions
in particular, but at all private assistance programs. On the
basis of Ne Win's previous record, it may be expected that Chi-
nese Communist and Soviet. economic aid programs as well as
the private programs will face increased difficulties. During
his 1958-60 regime, Ne Win.fired all alien advisers paid by the
Burmese Government and canceled a number of Soviet "gift" as-
sistance projects- -repayable in Burmese rice. The only peo-
ples.who have thus far escaped his suspicions have been the Is-
raelis and the Yugoslavs, representatives of small independent
countries for which the Burmese have developed a liking and
respect.
Ne Win has acted in a similar fashion in the military field.
To remove British influence from the post-independence -
Bur-mese Army,,he convinced the government in 1953 to abrogate the
military training agreement with the United Kingdom. He wel-
comed the signing in 1958 of the US-Burmese military equipment
sales agreement--a program he continues to support--but by
late 1959 he had become concerned by an "excessive" American
influence in. his army. He shelved indefinitely the establishment
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of a National Defense College, which would have required some
American staffing, . and sharply reduced the number--never
more than 40--of US military advisers.
The special problems of the Asia and Ford Foundations. in
Burma may stem from two additional factors. Both organiza-
tions received their authorization from former Prime Minister
Nu, and many of their projects have been those especially fa-
vored by him. The present military regime, like Nu's last
administration, may be attempting to eliminate programs of
the preceding government. More serious, however,
both foundations - -always with
Burmese Government approval--have been active with projects
among the minority peoples of the Shan and Isachin states, whose
loyalties to Burma.Ne Win doubts.
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Cambodian Chief Considers Conference on South Vietnam
ihanouk has long envisaged a neutral zone in Southeast
Asia extending from South Vietnam through India, as a means
of eliminating military rivalry in the area between the two
world bloc In a recent speech Sihanouk expressed his. pleas-
ure that ommunist China had proposed a conference.
Hanoi and Peiping, charging that US aid to Diem threat-
ened their own security, have tried to raise war fear in neu-
tral Asia. Between veiled warnings, however, the suggestion
has been planted that the "peace of Indochina can be safeguard-
ed" if the 1954 Geneva powers take appropriate action.to termi-
nate US military assistance to South Vietnam o
The Communists probably reason.that a conference on
Vietnam would offer them the advantages of putting interna-
tional pressure on the US not to enlarge its military commit-
ment during the talks and of providing a platform from which
the North Vietnamese could press for their own solution--re-
unification elections. If the West turns down a conference pro-
posal, the bloc will attempt to convert this to its advanta e b
alleging that the West has rejected a "peaceful solution:' r -1
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Warning Center
The Director
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