JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 12, 2004
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 12, 1970
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6.pdf364.06 KB
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Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2 Friday - 12 June 1970 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 C 25X1A 25X1A 6. Met with Mr. John Reddan, Counsel, My Lai Special Investigation Subcommittee, Ho ~,G~ Armed Services Committee. who told me that General Cushman's appearance had gone quite well and had included some difficult areas of questioning. 7. Met with Charles Johnson, Staff Director, House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and reviewed the current status 'of S. 782 with him. In brief, he feels it would be well if we were to touch base with each of the Subcommittee members before the Subcommittee meets on the bill. I thanked him for his advice. 8. Met with Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, Hou P Armed Services Committee, and briefed him on the Vietnamese infiltration rate for June, Soviet intercept squadron defense mission in Egypt, Cambodian political situation, and the Soyuz 9 mission. Mr. Slatinshek gave me a copy of correspondence between the Air Force and Representative Lucien Nedzi (D. , Mich.) concerning press reports that Soviet long-range aircraft flying into Cuba are not tracked. At least in one instance after these aircraft left the vicinity of Iceland they were not located again until they were later photographed on the ground in Cuba. He asked whether we could shed any additional light on U. S. inability to track long-range Soviet aircraft headed in our direction, which the Committee feels should be a matter of interest to the Agency as the leader in the intelligence community. 0 USAF review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 ~?-?,AZiiJ! Mi C." T,,.: P,;R I=:.:;,-CE P. cnn 1t) .Ir. Nedzi: ^Cently, a r,~mbe.:c of your staf' , Nr. Samuel H. Black, rC.~,-es'.ed our comments on an article which appeared in the News on May 3_3, 1970, regarding the flight of Russian C,:: t from the Soviet Union to Cuba. The incident referred to was off ;_cially reported to the Washington press corps on April 30, by Mr. Jerry Friedheim, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of De ense (Public Af- and 1 a ^c , omas H. Mooror, of Naval Oporati_on s,- in a .si ~cch to the r.merican Ord-- nc.u-o As.sociation.. The inforita!::;_on was repeated to membo . s of A oci.~ e'1 in Las Vegas, Aviation/Space Writers ss - ti Nevada, b'' L r. Daniel Z. Ilenkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Pub- 15c A~~airs). ?s the- article by Mr. Edwin G. Pip, staff writer for the t. News, correctly infers, the Air Force has no capabil- t :;'o, tracking aircraft out of rz ngc of our shore-based We have no radar coverage of the Atlantic region in- , can only t.r_ack flicght:s which enter the coastal Air Identification Zone. `l.'}l^. I'.u 7 ]_~ n J oncj--rancjo naval '"O;nnai sanco plane in question da.c'. no' penetrate this zone C?'`_.. our avast Coast. Those :i.ntercept:ed near Iceland were not c,-=--ying air-to-stir:-ace missiles , although some Soviet long- ~" .a e ;Manes have :his capabi._li_ty. Tn theory, such missiles could be launched from outside our radar coverage . Further- .ooril,, low-flyinq aircraft could, penetrate Well into our pres- c::Ii: sear cJefoAi;;r_:~ befoxo boin ~' ;ico;c_-c'ci. It is hoped' the above infcr~:r anon Will be helpful to you. lf_we can be of any further c sni.n-'c ncn, please let us know. '.C".hment 'C -' -'b 1C Luci.en N. Ncdzi of Represcni:.ativcs Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 By EDWLN. G.. PIPP.. LAS VEGAS = Four big__Russian bombers last month, it was learned .here.today. And they did it without being disccvered:o._-- U.S. radar, although their flight prilz--would- 600 -iii1'es-from the U.S. East?.Cow, Vt ?f~j!.L Actually, they were .intercepted near Ices the flight they flew in secrecy and isolation, 1tt? Aviation-Space Writers Association: meeting Had the Russians wished, it would have been a simple matter to, launch missiles at - American cities-if they had flown as low as 100 to 500 feet above the Atlantic and fFtus. escaped-detection by- coastal radar= Air Force officials admit they lost trac- t were sighted near Iceland until they were:' There- were two -bombers in each of two- flights. The filghts marked the first time since the Cuban crisis that the. Communists have ?-- It is not known if the. bombers carried.::: .nuclear weapons.- Coast and several hundred miles inland was open to attack with no measures taken to protect them.. - -Dean Der.-Photovia tPI ?elevhoto 5. F-102 interceptor tracks a Russian bomber like one- flown to..Cuba :-- pp-o'vec{-'For.--Re1e`asa2Q04/11/01-_: CIA-RDP72-003' Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 Was open to attucK with no- Measures taken to protect them. This is the sequence of events as described here. During the recent worldwide Russian mili- tary maneuvers, two of the bombers were spotted as they approached Iceland. Two American F-102 jet interceptors were sent aloft from Keflavik, Iceland, to identify the planes. The identification was made, but no shots fired because the bombers did not penetrate the defense area surrounding Ice- land. The interceptor pilots flew so close to the bombers that they were able to copy the numbers on the tails of the planes. When the interceptors left, the Russian planes were flying south over-the Atlantic. Pour days later two more of we Russian Bears were intercepted near Iceland and their tail numbers copied before they con- tinued south L . During the next few.. days. two flights of.' the bombers again were intercepted near Iceland, This time they were northbound, heading toward Russia. The planes' tail numbers correspond with those-copied by the interceptor pilots when"ihe` In the meantime, Air Force rmcotmeissanca.. . planes, which routinely photograph Cuba, re- turned with photographs showing Russian Bear bombers parked at the Cuban airport. This is the first time this type 'of: Russian `vvith the bombers. The Russian Bear bomber has four turbo''. prop engines. Its range is 8,000 miles. Each plane can carry two 500-mile-range air-to-surface nuclear missiles. Also the planes are c.'a p a b I c of carrying 25,000 pounds of bombs. Defense officials said it is not-unusual for the bombers to go from Russia to Iceland,;'. They said that.froni the time the bombers were identified near Iceland until photographs, showed them in Cuba there was no contact ently return to Russian bases. However, last month was the first time the Russians have made nonstop flights to Cuba. The Russians are known to have 150 to 2007 Bear. 'bombers.. In odditian they have,several (Concluded on. Page SA) Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6 r ----., it. b~rub'rs 1,203, hide 93o F01010T 07D Luloan triorMS Continued from Page One hundred medium-range bombers, some. super- sonic and capable of in-flight refueling. The bear can be used both as a bomber and as an aerial tanker plane for the shorter-range bombers. U.S. defense officials have known of the capabilities of these aircraft for several years. They know there is nothing to prevent the Communism from sending a number of these planes to Cuban bases, where they c o a I d threaten the Eastern and Gulf coasts of the United States. Radar in the Southern United States has proved to be extremely weak. A Russian MIG piloted by a Cuban defector recently flew from Cuba and was not detected until it was over Homestead Air Fbrce Base, near Miami, and ready to land. To further complicate the problem, U.S. austerity moves in recent years have reduced the n u in b e r of interceptor jets capable of downing manned bombers when they are de- tected by radar. Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000100190011-6