G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

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.G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
4. PLEASE PROVIDE SPECIFIC INSTANCES IN WHICH THE
AGENCY'S INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AFFECTED U.S. POLICY OR,
TOGETHER WITH THE PRODUCT OF OTHER AGENCIES, CONTRIBUTED
TO IT.
Early in July DIA started reporting increased Soviet
activities in Cuba and emphasized the increased shipping of
military materiel and personnel and efforts to expand. Soviet
civil air activities. On 18 August, DIA reported that the
USSR appeared to be equipping Cuba with electronic countermeasures
equipment. In commenting on the increased numbers of Soviet
personnel arriving, it was noted that Cuba had no need for Bloc
troop units since Havana could control internal security, but
that the increased delivery of Soviet materiel would require
greatly increased numbers of Soviet personnel to train Cubans
in its use. On 8 September, DIA published the view that "the
scope of Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests strongly that basic
Soviet objectives do go beyond support of Castro. The Soviets
probably see their actions as a means not only of extending
their influence into a predominantly U.S. sphere, but of
compounding Washington's international. problems."
In collaboration with CIA the confirmed presence of
MIG 21s was reported by DIA on 8 September; and reports of
references to "volunteers" for Cuba in Soviet military
traffic was first reported on 21 September. DIA on the basis
of its analysis reported on 24 September that there were
indications of Cuban pilot training in IL-29s in the USSR.
In the meantime, the continued arrival of Bloc specialists
and technicians and additional military materiel including tanks,
artillery, and guided missile patrol boats, was reported as
information became available. Increased and more sophisticated
Cuban military training and the participation of Soviet or other
Bloc personnel in such training was also reported. DIA emphasized
on several occasions that the Cubans would not be able to take
over the SA-2 sites for some 9 to 12 months and thus these would
continue to be controlled by Soviet personnel. DIA did not
detect the presence of any tank battalions, although a careful
re-reading of numerous low-level reports gives clues to such a
development, as well as to the probable presence of some
specialized Soviet units.
On 5 September DIA presented the following evaluation for
inclusion in a Joint Chiefs of Staff principal plan titled "The
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan."
"The Communist Bloc stronghold in Cuba increasingly poses a
serious threat to the US. The Soviets continue to build up
Communist Premier Castro's military forces at an unprecedented
crash rate: strengthening the Cuban ground forces with additional
and substantial quantities of modern weapons, including amphibious
DIA review(s) completed.
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carriers, tanks and self-propelled guns; establishing a
comprehensive surface-to-air missile defense network (SA-2's);
providing missile-firing KOMAR-class naval patrol craft; and
expanding Cuban Air Force capabilities (60 MIG's) with the
addition of MIG-21's. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's step-by-step
development of a military beachhead in Latin America has
reached a critical-decision threshold: under the cover of this
augmented military potential, depending on US reaction to the
crash buildup, the Bloc may now be willing to consider the
deployment to Cuba of advanced offensive weapons systems (SSM's)
under Soviet control and the establishment of an advanced sub-
marine-base counterpart to our base at Holy Loch, Scotland.
Regardless, the Soviet Union will continue to strengthen its
showplace stronghold in Cuba-and to exploit it to promote
Communist revolution throughout Latin America, employing the
spectrum of tactics to suit the varied situations of instability
in the different countries. At the same time, the Soviets will
seek to avoid provoking US intervention in Cuba or a US-USSR
military confrontation. Underlying the Soviet threat in Latin
America is a well-organized subversive movement, centered in
Castro's Cuba, to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched
oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social
reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in
Latin America is that, while others have talked of fulfilling
the aspirations of the masses, Bloc-backed Castro has actually
accomplished a radical, militarily secure social, revolution in
Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the US with the support of
an apparently more powerful patron."
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H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION
1. OTHER THAN AS STATED UNDER G, ABOVE, IV WHAT COMMUNITY
PUBLICATION PANELS OR CQ01ITTEES DOES THE AGENCY PARTICIPATE?
For DIA response to this question, see reply to questions
G 2, and Section F.
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