SOVIET BUILT FISHING PORT IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 25, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010005-4
GUNFIRENT
25 September 1962
SOVIET BUILT FISHING PORT IN CUBA
1. Is this story likely?
The presence of the Soviet Fisheries Minister in Havana, the
well publicized Soviet fishing activity in the Atlantic and reg-
ular passage of Soviet whaling fleets through Caribbean waters
all make the story credible in the eyes of the general public
and world opinion, but much is left in doubt in the mind of any-
one familiar with the Soviet fishing industry and its collateral
pursuits. The story is a slick one with ample believability for
propaganda purposes. It is the first announcement of actual
establishment of a Soviet controlled and operated. facility with-
in Cuba, and is calculated to appear innocuous by presenting a
facade of commercial enterprise of mutual advantage. It is not
likely that the prime purpose for establishment of the port is
the one announced by the Cuban Government.
2. If the story is not likely, what would be the purpose of the
base?
Soviet establishment of a fishing port in Cuba is a clear
indication of Soviet intentions to carry out at a steady pace a
step by step increased presence in Cuba. Establishment of a
commercial port makes it more likely that Soviet Naval ships
might make 'good will" visits to Cuba to set further precedents,
always making their presence appear to be normal and 'non-offen-
sive." A further step could be the gift of a short range sub-
marine --- proclaimed as "defensive" in purpose -- followed by
a submarine repair facility, which could ultimately lead to the
establishment of a full-fledged advance submarine base for the
Soviet Fleet such as we have in Holy Loch --- and with particu-
lar propaganda reference to our base at Guantanamo. Each prob-
able step would lay the groundwork for thenext, and each further
step would depend on the force and nature of U.S. reaction.
3. What would be our ability to find out the real story?
It CIAI advises we can eventually find out by an
all-sourm- , requirements for which are being levied by
the Washington intelligence community.
4. When could we find out?
CIA further advises that there is no immediate way. Barring
a lucky break, it will take some time, mostly depending on the
rate of development of the port.
DIA review(s) completed.
Approved For Release P68B002~k%*WUb1105-4
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Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010005-4
SECRET
5 September 1962
JSCP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF THREAT
The Communist Bloc stronghold in Cuba increasingly
poses a serious threat to the US. The Soviets continue
to build up Communist Premier Castro's military forces
at an unprecedented crash rate: strengthening the Cuban
ground forces with additional and substantial quantities
of modern weapons, including amphibious carriers, tanks
and self-propelled guns; establishing a comprehensive
surface-to-air missile defense network (SA-21s); providing
missile-firing Komar-class patrol craft; and expanding
Cuban Air Force capabilities. (60 MIG's) with the addition
of MIG-2l's. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's step-by-step develop-
ment of a military beachhead in Latin America has reached
a critical-decision threshold: Under the cover of this
augmented military potential, depending on ITS reaction to
the crash buildup, the Bloc may now be willing to consider
the deployment in Cuba of advanced offensive weapons sys-
tems (SSM's) under Soviet control and the establishment
of an advanced submarine-base counterpart to our base at
Holy Loch, Scotland. Regardless, the Soviet; Union will
continue to strengthen its showplace stronghold in Cuba
and to exploit it to promote Communist revolution through-
out Latin America, employing the spectrum of tactics to
suit the varied situations of instability in the different
countries. At the same time, the Soviets will seek to
avoid provoking US intervention in Cuba or a US-USSR mili-
tary confrontation. Underlying the Soviet threat in Latin
America is a well-organized subversive movement, centered
in Castro's Cuba, to exploit the natural tendency of en-
trenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for
radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolution-
ary elements in Latin America is that, while others have
talked of fulfilling the aspirations of the masses, Bloc-
backed Castro has actually accomplished a radical, mili-
tarily secure social revolution in,Cuba, and has done so
in defiance of the US with the support of an apparently
more powerful patron.
Attachment F4
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