RULES OF WARFARE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0004000510001 2
' A1392 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX march, 10, 1966
3. Certified by the. profession.
Certified' police specialists: Juvenile offi-
cers, investigators in morals, homicide, pro-
bation, parole, burglary, special services, and
others.
1. Five years of police science education in
the officer's specialty.
2. Patrolman, or other police experience,
as the profession would require.
3. Certified by the profession.
Certified patrolman: Foot patrol, officers,
cruiser car officers, and others who deal with
citizens on a face-to-face relationship.
1. Four-year B.S. degree in police science.
2. Certified by the profession.
Noncertified police personnel: Parking me-
ter maids and others, guards in jails, etc.,
where the officer is not required to arrest
persons on a face-to-face relationship.
1. Two years of police education in the
specialty.
2. Certification by the profession.
Insofar as police administrators are con-
cerned, the profession may decide to break
down cities and counties according to pop-
ulation and classify them as class A, B, or
C, whereas a certified patrolman might serve
as an administrator in a small class C com-
munity, but it is suggested that one not be
allowed to enforce laws on a face-to-face
relationship if he is not at least a certified
patrolman. Even these standards will prob-
ably have to be raised in the future, but this
seems to be at least a starting point.
With the above academic standards, Soon
will come police State licensing, as is true
with other professions, where competent of-
ficers will be able to move from one State
to another if they so desire. Eventually the
politically elected and appointed officers will
either become professionally trained, or the
public will demand that these positions be
staffed with certified personnel by examina-
tion or other similar means.
It is suggested that while professional
status is necessary, and in fact imperative,
that local law enforcement officers never be-
come unionized. The police officer owes his
allegiance to his local, State, and Federal
Government, and to the citizens he repre-
sents, and no professional or other organiza-
tion should have control over his duties,
responsibilities, or loyalties. We must guard
against police strikes and walkouts, and
against personal political use of police agen-
cies. This is one of the basic reasons some
social scientists refuse to do research in
police standards. They fear a national police
organization. This certainly is blind rea-
soning. We cannot close our eyes to the
plight of the local enforcement in dread of
It becoming overly organized and too power-
ful. While we are marking time and debat-
ing what nbt to do, local enforcement is
falling further and further behind the rising
crime rate. While it is true that even the
most qualified and competent police in the
world could not completely erase the fright-
ening crime problem in this society, a much
better job of law enforcement can be done
by trained police officers than is being done
today by nonprofessional officers.
As soon a.s certification of police is dis-
cussed, immediately one hears that this is
impossible due to the fact that over 95 per-
cent of present-day officers could not certify.
How, they ask, can we solve this crucial prob-
lem? This problem is probably not as knotty
as some, especially presently employed offi-
cers, would have us believe. Those who hold
tenure in law enforcement agencies when
certification becomes a reality, should be
required to attend police science schools, in-
service training programs, and the various
FBI seminars periodically to remain em-
ployed, and thusly would receive blanket
certification. To ascertain that police science
programs Would be available to those young
men and Women who seek a career in law
enforcement, and those who must attend to
retain employment, police science eurricu-
lums should be instituted in every tax-
supported junior college, college and univer-
sity in the land. The expense of these schools
would be greatly offset by each State receiv-
ing far better law enforcement, and the birth
of a profession called law enforcement.
While the above general description of a
police certification system may not be all?
Inclusive, it may encourage the readers to
suggest others. Other systems may be more
effective and practical, but to deny that some
type of certification is not necessary to at-
tempt to bring local enforcement up to a
professional status is naive indeed in the face
of evidence that this forgotten and neglected
discipline is quite out of step with the mod-
ern times. It simply cannot compete if it
must depend on nonprofessional Manpower
assigned to professional duties and respon-
sibilities.
The extremists on the political right main-
tain that social scientists who investigate
police competence intend to destroy the
agencies of law so thai enemy governments
may take over this Nation. The ultralib-
erals on the left blatantly attack criminolo-
gists concerned with police efficiency, and the
police, as being Gestapo instruments of a
totalitarian government. They serve to
frighten away dedicated social science in-
vestigators, and further, serve to confuse the
public. As a result, local enforcement slips
further and further behind the accepted
professions, lost in a sea of misunderstand-
ing and confusion, while crime continues to
rise and the citizen continues to lose more
confidence in the police system.
To sum up: The time most certainly has
come for this society to face up to the prob-
lem of an inadequately educated and trained
local law enforcement system. California's
emphasis on police science education should
become a national emphasis, and some sys-
tem of police certification and licensing is
almost imperative. Safeguards against police
unionization should be instituted, and city,
county, and State citizens in every city and
hamlet in this Nation should become inter-
ested in assisting local law enforcement to
reach a high level of professional status.
Local enforcement is helpless to reach this
hoped for height itself without the aid of
every public-minded citizen in .the land.
Certainly the road to police professionaliza-
tion is a long journey, but we must begin
this journey a step at a time whether we
care to or not, or certainly social chaos will
result in this society in the next few decades.
Rules of Warfare in Vietna
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN R. HANSEN
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 10, 1966
Mr. HANSEN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker,
firepower and mobility are the chief ad-
vantages over the enemy in . Vietnam.
Business Week magazine said recently:
Backed by great firepower U.S. military
officials believe the strategy they have de-
vised eventually will cause the Vietcong and
North Vietnam to give up the fight. Admin-
istration officials proclaim the tide has
turned in our favor, and statistics?kill ra-
tios, offensive actions initiated, enemy de-
fections, and other back their claims.
This informative article will interest
my colleagues who May have missed see-
ing it and, with permission given, I place
It in its entirety in the RECORD at this
point:
VIETNAM: CHANGING THE RULES OF GUERRILLA
WAR
(NOTE.?Using massive firepower, total
control of the air, and instant mobility of
ground forces, Americans are confounding
Communist theories?and conserving United
States and allied lives.)
Substituting materiel for manpower wher-
ever possible the United States is fighting
the Vietcong?with massive firepower?on the
ground and from the air. For example:
U.S. forces are using up small arms am-
munition at an annual rate of 1 billion
rounds, bombs at a rate of 1.8 million, and
2.75-inch rockets, fired mostly by helicopters,
at the rate of 4.8 million.
Helicopter sorties are being flown at
the rate of 125,000 a month?up from 60,000
in the middle of 1965 and 19,000 in 1961.
Tactical aircraft attacks in South Vietnam
jumped to a monthly average of almost 13,-
000 last December, from 1,200 in 1964.
B-52 bombers have been dropping about
6,000 tons of bombs a month on enemy tar-
gets since last July.
This use of firepower has raised the cost
of killing an enemy soldier to unprecedented
heights. But it is saving American and
South Vietnamese lives.
GETTING AROUND
Coupled with firepower, the other chief
American advantage over the enemy is
mobility. The United States has 1,600 heli-
copters in Vietnam, many armed with ma-
chine guns, rockets, and grenade launchers.
In the rice-rich Mekong Delta, you can see
how this added mobility?as well as addi-
tional men?has changed the war in the last
year. General Qua.ng, who has been putting
his IV Corps on the offensive for the past 2
months, says: "I have no more men now, four
battalions per regiment. I have the chop-
pers. Now I can lift a division from Vinh
Binh to An Xuyen to trap a Vietcong force
and still be sure that I can get back to de-
fend Vinh Binh if it's attacked."
Since the battles of Pleime and the lad-
rang Valley in November, the enemy has
tended to avoid large-scale offensives. By
contrast, United States and South Viet-
namese troops have been moving with in-
creasingly boldness into enemy strongholds
never before attacked from the ground.
Yet the size of the Vietcong force contin-
ues to grow, and infiltration from the north
has stepped up, North Vietnamese regulars
have employed a 120-mm. mortar, indicating
a buildup of heavier weapons.
I. GUERRILLA PLAN
The enemy still appears to be holding to
phase 2 of the classical guerrilla-warfare
scenario laid down by Chinese leader Mao
Tse-tung: fighting in widely scattered areas
in an attempt to force the opponent to di-
vide Up his forces and thus create a stale-
mate. Thus, at the old city of Hue in the
north, a Vietcong company attacked on Jan-
uary 20 for the first time in 10 years. Eight
houses were knocked out, two children
killed, and eight civilians Wounded. The
number of Vietcong main force battalions
in the Province has doubled since last Sep-
tember?and there's now a North Vietna-
mese regiment.
Meanwhile, the Communists are regaining
the capability of testing for phase 3 oper-
ations?a general offensive. In Saigon,
there's some expectation enemy forces might
concentrate their forces in an attempt to
overrun a major city near the 17th parallel,
or try again to cut the country in two and
then sue for peace in hopes of moving their
frontier one jump closer to the coveted delta
region and Saigon.
The odds lengthen
But successful guerrilla forces of the past
never had to cope with the firepower, mobil-
ity, and mechanical killing power made pos-
sible by modern technology introduced by
the United States.
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ie _public-police public rein- then fear and respect the local officer as he
tlens114 Stat.% _or Ineal level to
Plilon.s.0-fs the. aliti4VP-1 431:48 and
ns ip_lifgarAs to the lax,itncLratzst
e.s.a?,10.94?..antorCenlelt.t nation-
as a so fallen inte-the enallOW reason-.
4 laW en.foreementi a Sem iSk tllecl
atton,instoad, Of a Dr(Ifes$101.1, In _add',
bq rang police administrative ()facials
4...tosthe WornbUt ?theory that_ "ex-
elLes Es_the best teaPheri" and that police
Mucalion and training is not nearly
&tank as ?police experience. True,
notably California and Oregon,
police science degree pro-
. Junto_ c_911eges and colleges,
are in.ralporily _in regards to the
e? FsQls_rtenCe eal1.11.0t leach
-. the' .atatei local, and Federal
r?estiniratt,tqjqw strisL enforce.
eliCe cannants Aeac,,b.?him. , entirely_ the_
?Eli9YatIgra. lu?cztuiluallsties _(ini.-
4:1114ppc.stRzraphig evidence, finger-
nwrjtzg, fn_Vfir1118 etc.) which
_ F ,P4Le .0.q.tectimi. and ,the
,Vicder.d....criminals _who,
..1141b4tei.,,shoW. every indication of
...6,944)-KPlisients if net_nlore so, in their
sVP.A.V.tions than local officer in
le al,profsssion,he represents. And most
, ezperience cannot teach the officer
e,gy, psychology, and sociology which
important in the understanding of
an liteshaV.COr.... 4 person with a BS degree
OgliPled with a few years
?o1ice9zpeipe, can replace two or more
and llintrained _officers, and in
?, Wollid dna_ far more effective
1,1114...gsYi Law enforcement is so corn-
ated tht,f We-in_siet Onataffing it with
,Ilfle4applicants, much criminal be-
Ves.-1? ..reinain Undetected, and the civil
s of,stil unprotected, by policemen
pt eXen.tulderstand many of these
tamjeve s s 4 4
title distinguished FBI, and its
e.aljtkveVitsor,Jo,z ,. Hoover, local law
Appeal haa improved considerably over
, it knew during the
oayr. of_the ,gangsterism of the 1920's and
4 %any _periodic police seminars
-andthe _FBI Academy (at no
haye )ke,Pt_10Ciil Officers abreast of
, PYiltibibsLinigrillae detection and
+3. 1.
sAVIPs-Htastie.and local police nation-
art Well qualified, they are in the ex-
.?e 44,9X4y. Less than2_percent of the
encles_ rtatienally require a college
?pelic_e scienCe, and in. fact the vast
brity ave,,h no _educational or training
PatS...T.1118 is quite apparent when
hborna maw of those who hold local
q W444.A.onqo 45ome retain their positions
,pleasure of the mayor or sheriff
dileto.,scane enrt.of examination.
loWel'esr..,_if_the typical police
does .any screening at all when
_ ves_reany_mediocre officers who pass
, itilant wixt, even receive high evalu-
1114. 41
,-4
'
to note that the Mafia and
siLeirsintinft,,,le_are. afraid of the
--CPAVIction? abilities of
",liteer clear" of Federal
?koWever, they have no qualms in
ti State laws: even murder. Some-
ice-,pick their, victims to death,
Aey_ encase them in cement and
itpiers. on. occasions they
eln..411..public places or even in the
Jki9.17zhis 111;1410,
and on nther occasions
djnamite thgw ..to _death _in cars, but
Isheae .1411ers even apprehended,
ideteci, .underworld Is so
? iii.cielacy,of Federal officers that
,14fiAla1y_with its,members who
01?laswa_fOr ?personal benefit.
er,..in?Pwat, casec1s_a4State law viola-,
waldrsoemeiat becomes a
profetisionsi,,,crinsinal.
-
7.1
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4-44'
now does the Federal, and the whole Nation
will benefit as a fesult. Furthermore, the
frightening rise in delinquency, which is in-
creasing about 8 percent per capita faster
than the population growth, will be more
controlled than it is today. Of course, we
know that even if local officers were as well
qualified as the FBI, we would still have
much. calminality until those social prob-
lems which create criminality are solved.
Recent State and Federal court rulings,
which have turned loose proven guilty mur-
derers, etc., indicate that local officers must
become proficient and trained, and this
training must come soon. In almost all of
these cases, the accused person's individual
rights were violated by the officer, either
because these rights were disregarded, or even
unkown to him. In either case, the courts
will not allow policemen to obtain their evi-
dence in illegal manners in the future.
Rather than weakening law enforcement by
these decisions, the author sincerely believes
that instead these rulings demand that local
enforcement become a profession, staffed by
highly skilled technicians who know more
about the laws they enforce than do the
citizens they arrest. This is not necessarily
true today.
While this society has seen fit that law-
yers be thoroughly trained and educated
in the law, it has naively believed that any-
one was competent enough to enforce the
law without extensive professional training
or education. Whereas, the district attorney
(who is always a lawyer) may have hours,
days, weeks, or even months to ponder over
his interpretation of a given law violation,
the typical policeman is many times forced
to make his decision on a split second at
the scene of a crime. How many innocent
persons have had their reputations ruined
by a false charge, and how many petty viola-
tore have been charged with more serious
violations than they deserved, can never be
determined, but they must have been legion
since the average officer of the law in the
Nation is not professionally competent. Due
to, again, a negative sterotype we hold to-
ward law enforcement, qualified young men
do not seek enforcement careers, however,
those who seek psychological enhancement
do not have these same qualms. Too many
pogge,apphcants (many of whom fortunately
are denied police positions) seek the power
and prestige of the badge. To some un-
stable personalities the badge makes up for
all their real or imagined shortcomings.
They may have been denied normal associa-
tions with others, but with the badge they
know they will become the center of attrac-
tion. They may have had a mediocre edu-
cation, but the badge will make them as im-
portant and respected as those who have
graduated from the prestige university.
While we may have some officers in enforce-
ment today who sought police work as a
personality crutch, they are in minority na-
tionally among our dedicated local officers.
Law; eiforkeeVaStit..14,..t00 ilriPOrtant in a de-
'inociacy for It to become a "catchall" for
social misfits who seek self-realization
through police authority.
It is interesting to note that it is not only
the typical citizen who thinks that law en-
forcement exists only for the punishment
of criminals, but this is also believed by the
average local police officer. Law enforce-
ment is designed not only for the detection
and repression of criminal behavior, but for
the protection, of the individual rights of
citizens as well. This is another reason why
It is so extremely important for the officer
to receive education as well as training.
Civil liberties are so important in a demo-
cratic social order that we cannot allow
this crucial profession to further wallow
in a maze of community indifference. The
lawyer is thoroughly trained and educated
.before liens to? graati e 1,4wt , ergo% i
tegi
" 1 7B004
ea*,e-2t) 5/07/1'
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it stands to reason that the police officer
should be trained and educated before he
enforces the law. Since the officer is ex-
pected to be a first aid expert, father con-
fessor, social scientists, and even a judge, it
appears to this author that we are expect-
ing "boys to perform men's jobs" if we
further disregard local law enforcement,
and the plight of the local law officer.
Some theorists maintain that we cannot
afford to pay attractive salaries which will
attract educated, interested, and otherwise
qualified applicants. This certainly is shal-
low reasoning. Since the enforcement of
laws exists for the repression of crime and
the protection of the innocent, as well as
the maintenance of law and order, we are
qutie ambiguous when we guarantee in-
dividual rights in this democracy, and then
employ nonqualified persons in law enforce-
ment to assure the citizenry that these
rights will be safeguarded. Since over 90
percent of all the scientists the world has
ever known are living today, and they have
discovered more new scientific innovations
in 20 years than have been invented in the
previous 2,000 years, we can expect a highly
educated and technically advanced social
order in the next few decades.
Can nonprofessional persons enforce laws
in a highly complex, technical social order?
A qualified police officer will deter, more
crime, detect more criminals, better under-
stand civil liberties, and better protect in-
nocent citizens than the present untrained
officer, and he will pay his own way in many
ways. When we are in need of the services
of a lawyer, we seek a lawyer who is known
for his skill and abilities in the complex area
of laws and their interpretations. It is
odd that we do not place as much em-
phasis on law enforcement which is every
bit as complex, and certainly just as impor-
tant as law interpretation. Comment was
earlier made concerning the American belief
that physical size was the most important
qualification for law officers. In fact, the
ability to defeat others in physical combat,
or extreme athletic ability, for too long have
been the only standards of measurement for
police applicants in far too many local and
State police agencies. Certain height and
weight requirements may be desirable in
some police positions, but complete depend-
ence upon huge physical size certainly is a
poor manner of determining the competency
of law officers. One sometimes wonders how
many brilliant and otherwise qualified young
men were denied law enforcement careers
because they were 1 inch or thereabout
too short. True, physical standards are im-
portant, especially sound physical health,
but there are other qualifications which are
just as important if one is to enforce laws
adequately and fairly.
Some critics maintain that academic
standards will not assure that local enforce-
ment will reach professional status, and that,
again, police work is practical in nature and
must be learned through "practice." We do
not allow lawyers to practice on the public
until after they receive their professional
education, and we should not allow law offi-
cers to receive all their training in this man-
ner. Too many individual rights are tram-
pled upon by police officers who have been
employed for many years and who have re-
ceived all their "education" through "police
experience."
For several years the author has written
national articles for police and criminology
journals setting down what he thought were
minimum standards if local enforcement was
to become a profession. He briefly presents
them in this article, hoping for comment and
action from SR readers.
Certified police administrators: State po-
lice heads, chiefs of police, sheriffs, and
others.
1. Five years of police science education.
2. Police experience as the profession
744,41991:14.414refIsCalr'
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March 10, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
Air power?once ridiculed as unsuited to
guerrilla-type Warfare?has had a major im-
pact on the war. A cardinal tenet of guer-
rillas is not to fight at unfavorable odds;
air power stacks the odds against them. It
also Increases the difficulty for guerrilla
units, which hide out in dispersed groups,
to concentrate for a major attack.
From all indications the B-52 raids, which
rain enormous tonnages of bombs down in
pattern strikes on jungle redoubts day and
night, deprive guerrillas of sanctuary and
have severely damaged their morale. Each
B-52 carries more than 50 750-pound bombs.
55, TESTING GROUND
In terms of weaponry, Vietnam is putting
to test a broad range of jet-age equipment
, never before used in a shooting war?but
not all of it Is working as well as hoped.
Defoliating agents are being used to kill
vegetation and expose jungle trails, and to
destroy rice crops in enemy territory. But
they have been found to have only limited
capability against the double-canopied
jungle growth common in Vietnam.
A number of supersonic jets?including
the McDonnell F-4, the Grumman A-6, and
the Douglas A-4?are getting their first work-
outs under fire. American planes have come
up against Russian-built surface-to-air mis-
siles in North Vietnam and only 11 have
been knocked down since the air strikes
began a year ago. U.S. pilots have found
they can avdid them by flying in low to
escape radar detection.
Out of mothballs
At the same time, the war has shown that
conventional antiaircraft fire can be effec-
tive against high-speed jets, particularly if
the guns are radar directed. U.S. jets carry
little armor plating and are so crammed with
electronic gear that even a partial hit can be
severely damaging. The U.S. has lost 275
tactical planes to conventional enemy ground
fire?a low rate considering the large number
of sorties,
But the Irhpact has been great enough to
cause the U.S. Army, which had ditched the
antiaircraft gun in favor of air defense mis-
siles, to decide to bring guns back. It is
breaking out old 40-mm. guns from stock-
piles and cOnverting the General Electric
20-mm. Vulcan rotating barrel gun used on
attack planes to an antiaircraft role.
Helicopter losses have been phenomenally
low?one for every 13,000 flights. But of the
177 choppera lost last year only 76 were from
hostile action, indicating a high rate of ac-
cidents and mechanical failures. And the
low loss to ' enemy action must be weighed
against the fact that the enemy has no air
power to challenge the helicopter fleet.
New and old
Heavy jungle cover also has lessened the
impact of napalm and explosive bombs in
killing enenay troops. Now the Air Force is
shifting to the "Hays Bomblet," which does
not arm itself until after it penetrates upper
levels of jungle growth and then spreads
shrapnel.
In some ases, the military has turned the
clock backWard to get effective weapons. A
fleet of C-47s, some of the oldest planes still
flying, has been armed with machine guns
that spew out 7.62-millimeter rounds at the
rate of 18,000 a minute to provide an aerial
firing platform that can remain airborne
far longer than any fighter to support ground
troops. '
The Navy, suddenly faced with the neces-
sity of fighting on rivers and in swampy
areas, Is buying and arming small plastic
boats originally designed for, pleasure use.
It is considering purchasing air boats similar
to those Used in the Florida Everglades.
Winners and losers
Two deVelopments have proved highly suc-
cessful in Vietnam. They are helicopter-
borne grenade launchers that can hurl 200
fragmentation grenades a minute? at the
enemy, and Interlocking aluminum blocks
that can be laid quickly to provide an "in-
stant airfield" capable of accommodating jet
attack planes.
But there have been some other disap-
pointments. The Bullpup air-to-ground mis-
sile has not been as effective as hoped In
blasting bridges in North Vietnam, although
the B model now in use is an improvement.
Backed by great firepower, U.S. military
officials believe the strategy they have de-
vised eventually will cause the Vietcong and
North Vietnam to give up the flight. Admin-
istration officials proclaim "the tide has
turned in our favor," and statistics?kill
ratios, offensive notions initiated, enemy
defections, and other?back their claims.
The Face of War
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DONALD RUMSFELD
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 10, 1966
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, the
ambiguities and confusing aspects Of the
war in Vietnam have made it difficult for
the American people to form sound
judgments as to the U.S. goals and
policies in southeast Asia. The confu-
sion which accompanies the war has
been lessened to some extent, however,
by the high degree of reporting, of some-
times unpleasant facts, by the U.S.
broadcast media, as well as the print
media.
The following remarks published in
the March 1966, edition of the Quill,
published by the professional journalistic
society, Sigma Delta Chi, and written by
Columbia Broadcasting System President
Frank Stanton, outline the role that the
broadcast media is playing in Vietnam
and some of the difficulties it faces.
THE FACE OF WAR
(By Frank Stanton, president, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.)
(Nors.?Abridged from remarks made by
the CBS president at a meeting in the Wal-
dorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, Jan.
28, 1966.)
The past four decades have seen broad-
cast journalism grow in competence and
thoroughness until today the majority of
Americans look first to radio and television
for their information. Those same four de-
cades have seen the Nation's bleakest depres-
sion, the world's most devastating war, and
mankind's most dramatic scientific progress.
All these put a tough challenge, first to
radio and then to television, to report and'
interpret them accurately, vividly, and in
such a way that the American people were
significantly aided in carrying out effectively
their dectsionmaking duties as citizens. As
dramatic a part of history now as the events
themselves are the role that radio played
in the political life of the thirties, the sober-
ing and yet reassuring effect of Ed Murrow's
"This Is London" during the darkest days
of World War II, and the soaring sight on
50 million television sets of our first man-
shoots in 1962,
But the responsibility of broadcasting in
gathering and reporting the news has never
been more pressing and more difficult than
it is now. The overriding fact of our na-
tional life today is the war in Vietnam. It is
our duty in broadcasting to bring the face of
A1393
this war?the human face on the battlefield
and the issues behind it?to all the people
so that they can witness it and understand
it. This is turning out to be a rough job,
full of perplexing and persistent problems.
The forthright reporting of unpleasant facts
has inspired adverse reactions both from
the public and from Washington. Unjust
and senseless charges of unpatriotic conduct
have been made against correspondents for
doing their jobs under the most difficult
conditions imaginable.
I am not talking here about censorship
or matters Involving military security. I
am not talking even about "managed news."
I am talking about facts and issues that
our people have to know in order to carry
out their decisionmaking responsibilities as
citizens.
Much of this ambiguity about the proper
role of reporting in this war is due, with-
out doubt, to the frustrating character of
the Vietnamese war. Vietnam is like no
other war in our history and against an
enemy like no other we have fought. Prog-
ress toward a resolution is sporadic and
defies measurement in terms easily deter-
mined or simply reported or readily under-
stood.
Besides its baffling intrinsic nature, the
Vietnam war has also been a baffling one
for our newsmen, our reporters, and our
cameramen. Operating on their own in a
war of no fixed positions, they have had to
use ingenuity, persistence, and sheer guts
to bring the harsh reality of this agonizing
war home to us here In the United States.
They have to provide for themselves and
work in isolation from their colleagues. For
their pains?and I use the word literally?
they have been attacked more often than
they have been praised. "
There is an ancient proverb about the low
regard in which the bearer of ill-tidings is
held. "None love ,the messenger who brings
bads news," wrote Sophocles. Unhappily,
much of the news in any war is bad news,
and this one is far from an exception. As
a result, the men who risk their lives to get
the sounds and sights of the embattled, and
the men who stay up all night to get the
material ready for the air, are treated in
many cases as if they invented the events
and conditions they are reporting.
There are those, too, including some in our
Government, who would like only the good
news reported. Threats of reprisal, of making
a difficult job all but impossible, have not
been unknown. But failures and mistakes
are an essential part of the story. If they
are to be avoided or corrected, It Will not be
by hiding them but only by bringing them
fully out into the open where the people
have a chance to examine them and then to
make their opinion felt. For as Sophocles
also wrote, "Truth is always the strongest
argument,"
,On the other hand, in the absence of for-
mal censorship, we scrupulously follow the
three general principles put to the news
media by the Pentagon for voluntary adop-
tion; We will report casualty statistics on a
daily basis only in general terms, we will re-
port troop movements only when the enemy
already know them, and we will refrain from
giving the names and numbers of specific
units engaged in individual battles. We also
do everything we can to avoid revealing the
identities of individual casualties before next
of kin have been notified. All these are sen-
sible restrictions with the sole purpose of
limiting information reaching the enemy.
But in other respects?in common with all
conscientious journalists?we are not sub-
scribing to any theory of news by handout,
telling the American people only what some-
body arbitrarily decides that they should
know and concealing the rest.
The policy does not make for unanimous
popularity, although we are convinced that
in the long run it is the only sound one.
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5/0711 7B00441k000
NGRES*9N441/4 APPKINTDIX
24944P,11,ppz Igtterkhare fan_letters, We
every vigorous letters protesting
njoringing_ the _horrors_ of war too
-,.."Tigliggli.helliaS that we are re-
-fact_ too linnleaeatit for the public
Nge -arg-Allowilig too much of the
g W.e.gre ,nOteliowing enough of
end t0,0 13111ch..of the draft-card
cge propagandists for the
ctpAgaridlsts against it.
AllIzPose,..is understandable.
41...Nar..1s_ never pleasant to
is far more
room on Elm
tne liattleg,round. But
_JA,..111a.t Elm Street is
jhlanOnflict because of
ri4tr?41. 14e, ,C9fahat area and be-
ng 1; gated. to a eampa,rative
young. DeeisheaS ria.able in Wash-
& steaming.. tor,
sola _10.000 Mile& away begin in
_ ki-14 ed .there.. To ignore
olikr bir....thright and our respon-
au, free people.
etojzielzighly fortunate that this,
-1.6?1? wors to-report_ and
1 tie alsQ_Which. we
forepart with the immediacy,
Atka tre-111?41031g1111esa of modern-
eetropleiontilitliSill, _The reality of the
Wajj'a)4?rought home forcefully to
a by the ,eachg and Ubiquitous
c.44PARt.t.Ws pietines _were
itaakca4.1.a.ilo2ltIls tatLeven
ages,pictured. The choppy
.3ligte,1nute _and_frag-
in,lirlef unrelated se,
of the time.
iaropitone and the dogged
_.ieturg ceznere etI,W-arld-Wax IL for
t .ep.t,en1,1KULantjl. Sight apart.
Pe...t143 tprg J w raore_imr
reeponsitality of broadcasting today
rt these ev,entaiallY, accurately,
and to,analyze their mean-
? ecielve
E .,?B*ENTAT,IVE4p
14.F0Age.194,
E05 dPf Arizona. Mr.
ZebrUary 1, 1966, in Phoe-
13,,ePublin Published an
6,VC Oh of _Car National
OPS-A,C,t. the. Taft-Hartley
AitsA11461C61.01 this controversial
Ms. William D.
PC42110Tois(...1,tonsider the
worthy of being read by my
-
? z T-217,11, YoT..c_ItzsHr?
b 14s-CVssErk .gconnzuc-
9st. 4-
/PAR -,IXAgzaligge,)
Xight to vinrship, it is a
14-1?tosotD, and it isa natural right
411?W.Ou .01-Alte right to life in the
? 1101e4atetlpil at independence is an
tailes.torteig th.e_long historical
grO thege thSee natural rights of
Ak =
UMW sometimes are con-
? glitiCaLineOuities
We 414424 11(b) of the old
gat?,? eg.,4gt,i/24 of Mir Present National
tieills Act. This Federal law legal-
izes the right of industry to sign labor con-
tracts permitting the hiring of nonunion
workers in those States that expressly allow
it.
God without an entrance fee or particular
street address, the vote without a payment,
and a job without a continuing commission
fee are the basic natural rights of all men.
Now, it follows that retention of the poll
tax is a twin sister to repeal of the States'
right-to-work laws. The one charges a fee
to vote, and the other charges a fee to work.
Think et over.
Congress is churning to repeal section 14(b)
so that big labor may charge a fee of anybody
who wants to work for a living. The reason
for wanting this, of course, is a mixture of
political power and institutional ego.
Nineteen States have these right-to-work
laws that make it unlawful to charge a labor
poll tax against industry's will as a fee to get
a worker off the dole.
What manner of man says you can vote
for free but cannot work for free? What
kind of person can wave the flag but not the
pork chop? A crafty politician can walk this
tightrope, and a greedy labor leader can
scheme for more and more organized power.
The national union shop or the closed
shop is political ownership of an economic
activity?znan's own labor.
Big labor and big business are steadily
bumbling their ways into the functional
economy or corporate economic state.
Utopian declarations of big government
are followed by expedient measures, and both
are followed by inflation. And the func-
tional economy can and will pick up the
pieces.
The corporate state cannot operate with-
out national labor unification of all indus-
trial workers. One tragedy of the American
labor movement is that it does not see that
repeal of 14(b) is another step toward the
gallows for free enterprise business and for
right-to-strike labor.
There's one for you; how about a law
lishing.thvightto,strilrea LE.cme makes
oigLtile-otnen. _Even the simple
t cif this,logical parallelism makes big
livid with anger.
Apologists point tp the 'Union Starch &
Reing .90,14.rt.?,cfeeitien._ Where one. problem
ts It'Vateleof -by dues payment without union
participation. They overlook the fact that
*A:4,g till a lenor _poll tax without a formal
union label.
ilAieggyntea....say the Union Starch
6g1.1,1 12.4?nreeervea the individuals freedom
of organfzational likes and, dislikes. But
the economic worker is still forced to help
firlena,politicakAR,tion movement,
' '.11-zid we all know big labor is big politics.
The Starch argument confuses the real
issue, which is that an industrial worker in
the free market has to pay a fee to a private
agency in order to earn a living.
There can be no closed doors in an open
economy, but there must be closed doors in
a functional economy. Does big labor see
this far into the boomerang consequences of
its own power ambitions? No, it doesn't.
The much harsher question is: Does either
business or labor see the differences between
initial Government expediencies and subse-
quent Government policies? Again no.
tatley politically expedient for Gov-
ernment to placate labor by repealing sec-
tion 14(b), thus making the union or closed
shop the law of the entire land.
T1-11..s....gigarlY Amounts to enacting a na-
tional labor tax, just as much a tax as the
poll tax.
At the same time, it is politically expedient
for Government to placate civil rights minor-
- by abolishing some States' voting poll
tax.
A real national policy would support or
reject both the voting and working fees bY
leaving both up to the various States or pro-
hibiting both to all States.
Colnpuisory uniofl zinere..lp p ,with or
11
-#
March 10, 196t
out the enforced payment of dues is in flat
opposition to American individual freedom.
And national enforcement of big labor's
agency fees with or without union member-
ship is no different than a poll tax to vote
in a free election.
Artificial mapping of the movement of la-
bor and goods, wages and prices?or votes--
constricts the natural expansion of any
healthy economy or, remember, any democ-
racy.
Thomas M. Mulry
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN
OE NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 10, 1966
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, March
10 marks the 50th anniversary of the
death of Thomas M. Mulry, and I think
it appropriate that recognition be made
of this anniversary since Mr. Mulry was
one of the outstanding citizens of our
country.
Born in New York City of a mother
whose forebears went back to the earliest
colonial days and a father who had come
from Ireland as a boy, Thomas Mulry
grew to eminence in his chosen field of
business?banking, but he also became
one of the foremost figures in the field
of American charity?and this at a time
when government had not assumed the
all-encompassing position in support and
guidance which it fills today.
Although he rose to the position of
president of the Emigrant Savings
Bank?one of the great savings institu-
tions of New York City, Mr. Mulry's last-
ing devotion was to organizations serving
the poor and afflicted. Much of his ef-
fort was devoted to the fostering and
nurturing of Catholic charitable units
and so great was his contribution that
he was described by one eminent au-
thority as "generally acknowledged to
have been the greatest single person in
the history of American Catholic chari-
ties."
He worked all his life for the Society
of St. Vincent de Paul and in his later
years served as president of its superior
council.
So great was the knowledge of his tire-
less and energetic labors that President
Theodore Roosevelt appointed him in
1909 as Vice Chairman of the White
House Conference on Children which he
did much to stimulate and which con-
tinues its work to this day.
It was his work in sponsoring and ef-
fecting increased cooperation between
charitable organizations that was Mr.
Mulry's most valuable contribution to the
social development of our country and
in these ecumenical times his pioneering
efforts take on new significance.
In the 1880's when he began his work,
private charities were either entirely
Protestant or militantly Catholic. Pros-
elytizing was carried on without any
great subtlety. The idea of cooperation
was unconsidered. In the face of this
unpromising situation Mr. Mulry began
his efforts to poin the activities of groups
of (=crept faiths since he realiz.ed that
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE March 10, 1966
THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PARTICI-
PATION IN THE DEFENSE OF WET-
NAM
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
rise for the purpose of calling to the at-
tention of Senators the very comprehen-
sive and convincing paper which has
just been released by the Department of
State entitled "The Legality of U.S. Par-
ticipation in the Defense of Vietnam."
I do so because the legality of our po-
sition has been challenged repeatedly on
the floor of the Senate and in part
throughout the country. I think it has
been answered by some of the most
Prominent and expert lawyers in the
country.
The House of Delegates of the Amer-
ican Bar Ass6ciation meeting in Chicago
recently unanimously supported the le-
gality of our position in Vietnam. A
number of professors and other legal ex-
perts have gone on record and their opin-
ion has been placed in the record.
I feel that because we are a country
which believes in the legal process and a
world of law, as well as a nation of law,
it is important that we be precisely cer-
tain as to what justification in law there
Is for our prestige in Vietnam.
For this reason I call atteiation to this
document which sets forth m detail the
legal case for the following propositions:
I. The Hnited States and South Vietnam
have the right under 'international law to
participate in the collective defense of South
Vietnam against armed attack.
II. The United States has undertaken
commitments to assist South Vietnam in
defending itself against Communist aggres-
sion from the north.
III. Actions by the United States and
South Vietnam are justified under the
Geneva accords of 1954.
IV. The President has full authority to
commit U.S. forces in the collective defense
of South Vietnam.
Finally, I wish to call to the attention
of the Senate a brief and concise sum-
mary conclusion which in a few hundred
words summarizes our position simply
and clearly.
I thank the distinguished Senator from
Alabama.
Mr, President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the document entitled "The
Legality of U.S. Participation in the De-
fense of Vietnam" be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the docu-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the Department of State, office of the
Legal Adviser, Mar. 4, 19661
THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
DEFENSE OF VIETNAM
I. THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAM
HAVE THE RIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
OF SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST ARMED ATTACK
In response to requests from the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, the United States
has been assisting that country in defending
itself against armed attack from the Com-
munist north. This attack has taken the
forms of externally supported subversion,
clandestine supply of arms, infiltration of
armed personnel, and most recently the send-
ing of regular units of the North Vietnamese
Army into the south.
International law has long recognized the
right of individual and collective self-defense
against armed attack. South Vietnam and
the United States are engaging in such col-
lective defense consistently with interna-
tional law and with U.S. obligations under
the United Nations Charter.
A. South, Vietnam is being subjected to
armed attack by Communist North. Vietnam
The Geneva accords of 1951 established a
demarcation line between North Vietnam and
South Vietnam. They provided for with-
drawals of military forces into the respective
zones north and south of this line. The
accords prohibited the use of either zone
for the resumption of hostilities or to "fur-
ther an aggressive policy."
During the 5 years following the Geneva
Conference of 1954, the Hanoi regime devel-
oped a covert political-military organization
in South Vietnam based on Communist
cadres it had ordered to stay in the south,
contrary to the provisions of the Geneva
accords. The activities of this covert or-
ganization were directed toward the kid-
naping and assassination of civilian offi-
cials?acts of terrorism that were perpetrated
in increasing numbers.
In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the
North Vietnam regime infiltrated an esti-
mated 10,000 men into the south. It is esti-
mated that 13,000 additional personnel were
infiltrated in 1962, and, by the end of 1964,
North Vietnam may well have moved over
40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas Into
South Vietnam.
The International Control Commission re-
ported in 1962 the findings of its Legal
Committee:
?There is evidence to show that arms,
armed and unarmed personnel, munitions
and other supplies have been sent from the
zone in the north to the zone in the south
with the objective of supporting, organizing
and carrying out hostile activities, includ-
ing armed attacks, directed against the
armed forces and administration of the zone
In the south.
"There is evidence that the PAVN [Peo-
ple's Army of Vietnam] has allowed the
zone in the north to be ? used for inciting,
encouraging and supporting hostile ac-
tivities in the zone in the south, aimed at
the overthrow of the administration in the
south."
Beginning in 1964, the Communists ap-
parently exhausted their reservoir of south-
erners who had gone north. Since then the
greater number of men infiltrated into the
South have been native-born North Viet-
namese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun
to infiltrate elements of the North Viet-
namese army in increasingly larger numbers.
Today, there Is evidence that nine regiments
of regular North Vietnamese forces are fight-
ing in organized units in the South.
In the guerrilla war in Vietnam, the ex-
ternal aggression from the north is the crit-
ical military element of the insurgency,
although it is unacknowledged by North
Vietnam. In these circumstances, an armed
attack is not as easily fixed by date and
hour as in the case of traditional warfare.
However, the infiltration of thousands of
armed men clearly constitutes an armed at-
tack under any reasonable definition. There
may be some question as to the exact date
at which North Vietnam's aggression grew
into an armed attack, but there can be no
doubt that it had occurred before February
1965.
B. International law recognizes the right bf
individual and collective self-defense
against armed attack
International law had traditionally recog-
nized the right of self-defense against armed
attack. This proposition has been asserted
by writers on international law through the
several centuries in which the modern law of
nations has developed. The proposition has
been acted on numerous times by govern-
ments throughout modern history. Today
the principle of self-defense against armed
attack is universally recognized and ac-
cepted?
The Charter of the United Nations, con-
cluded at the end of World War II, imposed
an important limitation on the use of force
by United Nations members. Article 2, para-
graph 4, provides: "All members shall refrain
in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."
In addition, the charter embodied a sys-
tem of international peacekeeping through
the organs of the United Nations. Article 24
summarizes these structural arrangements in
stating that the United Nations members
"confer on the Security Council primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, and agree that
in carrying out its duties under this respon-
sibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf."
However, the charter expressly states in
article 51 that the remaining provisions of
the charter?including the limitation of arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, and the creation of United
Nations machinery to keep the peace?in no
way diminish the inherent right of self-
defense against armed attack. Article 51
provides: "Nothing in the present charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Measures taken
by members in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present char-
ter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or re-
store international peace and security."
Thus, article 51 restates and preserves, for
member states in the situations covered by
the article, a long-recognized principle of in-
ternational law. The article is a "saving
clause" designed to make clear that no other
provision in the charter shall be interpreted
to impair the inherent right of self-defense
referred to in article 51.
Three principal objections have been
raised against the availability of the right
of individual and collective self-defense in
the case of Vietnam: (1) That this right ap-
plies only in the case of an armed attack on
a United Nations member; (2) that it does
not apply in the case of South Vietnam be-
cause the latter is not an independent sov-
ereign state; and (3) that collective self-
defense May be undertaken only by a re-
gional organization operating under chapter
VIII of the United Nations Charter. These
objections will now be considered in turn.
C. The right of individual and collective
self-defense applies in the case of South
.Vietnam whether or not that country is
a member of the United Nations
1. South Vietnam Enjoys the Right of
Self-Defense
The argument that the right of self-de-
fense is available only to members of the
United Nations mistakes the nature of the
right of self-defense and the relationship of
the United Nations Charter to international
law in this respect. As already shown, the
right of self-defense against armed attack
is an inherent right under international law.
The right is not conferred by the charter,
and, indeed, article 51 expressly recognizes
that the right is inherent.
1 See, e.g., Jessup, "A Modern Law of Na-
tions," 163 if, (1948); Oppenheim, "Interna-
tional Law," 297 if. (8th ed., Lauterpacht,
1955). And see, generally, Bowett, "Self-
Defense in International Law" (1958).
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arch 10, 1966 CQNGIESSIC)1,44L RECQR1? ? SENATE
73
reconunr1 :that" hill-1'4 actilail 41.= the. &ire& _Of bachelor of arts and years and Mr. Justice Frankfurter would
eonnec on to be to regegniz.e that then from Georgetown University Law often ask me why I did not argue before
Director, of, tbg Tiouston,J4qe,
effia.Pickett, needs te, be?replaced 1)7,
Oree't*Ipetent ,achignistrator, and k
istiggett - That this ,action _)?e, _taken,
prOri tit
?
4110:14sel.11rthit, Actrats,
Coin,ptroller, genera's _iwort,
reject dafekrebruary 23 1966
ao abjection, the excerpts
o?,-beprinted.in the EORP,
. ,
144 ,Y?ft.rir193M.;
waueoi9ja toe
_pjp.ciisg to FHA's'
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nsoykig oyzalnzation,
wl espee-( to niortiaKe
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Rercent of project co-sig appear
9. gi44.41v zsulnu19,44..t.0 hits-9Xe
41;c9?,..isigtved,
faatcrs.,
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roteituiee were uoCfpilesIted,
APX t1j?vAtiantsot
wanae.ol.mortg, ages_has
Tring#C114 atie. Ponamissinaser..
ess the. hvalar_tance_to, all agency era-
?approvi-pg mortgage in.sur-
CI* n.Vcrloy ,stiigtcompfianee with
exItpins;. pyno9.4ures,.. We yec-
4 the Conapeissioner in;Arcss
has the.,41N-a'Aq znagd against
on unpece_ssary risks tnv,olvec1
relartiests for 1.igaisjpg projects
when Sikh projects are not
92.7s Ic.pl, 4x, spc.n.scrsIvving a proper
dclitWajkic Ijagscet providing
for the elotcyjy an4
sulssjaocp, apdability
lyeKoaSpqje,,,a4suypip.4_91,the,
Coaiet1on, and continuity of the
414
.
SOW._
He .re.sigileil ...konuais _Buie& position
ill-May.st Wit). beeome FLA Assistant
Co,obralkien?Gennaellor the District of_
gPlUmb,i01-ivlagre_.lie tried a number of
Wir,41 ,g4ae-B Zaad, ...sat_ as. a member of
several _cleeisimunalibag boards. After
5 years_ he left the District and went
With the National Capital Planning
ConainiViOn aa-ita General Counsel and
Secretary, wherehe remained for 4 years.
aenaie 9 years,
tyPligrg,e44.4.-A,Ar.O4 ggivsLaa ram.
omit a number of Jegal.,..do,ciunents,
These included proposed legislation on
hallsekeei ling matters and the first motor
vehicle and traffic regulations for the
Capitol Grounds. The Capitol Police
Board had been required to promulgate
these regulations under a new provision
of statute transferring Jurisdiction from
Distriet ta the Capitol authorities
and making the comparable District
regulations inapplicable to many miles
of streets and drives on the Hill.
Early in January 1956 the then
Sergeant at Arms, _JoseplA C. Duke,re-
eilidtred11111 Cheatham to return to the
Senate and assist with the greatly ex-
panded volume of problems.
On his return 10 years ago, in addition
to his varied day-to-day duties, Bill pre-
sented all the Sergeant, at Arms' budget
and appiepriationas requests to the Sen-
ata Committee on Appropriations and
worked on various matters with the
C3mmittecs on Rules and Administra-
tion and Public Works; he closely co-
operated with the U.S. attorney in
defending suits arising out of Senate ac-
tivities; and performed endless duties
QS the Sergeant at Arms' repre-
sentative under the chairman, of the
_. the Court. Mr. Sobeloff invited me to sit
by him as he presented his argument to
the Court and afterward Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said to me, `Now you are
getting close.'?
When he was asked if he would write
a book like everyone else is doing, Bill
replied that he did not have any cur-
rent intentions of writing one. How-
ever, he explained that he already had
appeared in print in the Saturday Eve-
ning Post of March 20, 1926, as excerpts
from_his diary as a page boy were quoted
in_ a story by Mary Roberts Rinehart en-
titled "Willie Cheatham Looks at the
Senate."
I just want to add that in my book
Bill Cheatham was one of the finest and
one of the most courteous attendants of
the Senate I ever encountered. I think
he so richly merits the tributes we pay
him today.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
wish to take advantage of this opportu-
nity to say a word about Bill Cheatham.
I have known Bill Cheatham for the
nearly 20 years that I have been a Mem-.
ber of the Senate. He has certainly been
one of the most faithful and efficient per-
sons we have had in the Senate. I had a
good bit of contact with him in reference
to the program the Foreign Relations
Committee carries on when ministers and
parliamentarians from other countries
come here. We nearly always have them
up to talk with us, or have lunch, or have
coffee, or a get-together of some kind,
and we usually follow that by bringing
them to the Senate floor.
We always relied on Bill Cheatham to
handle things for us and he has done it
in such a magnificent and efficient way
that I shall always remember that.
'Tlibre-is bile other thing that cones
o rify mind when I think of Bill Cheath-
- ttrfrlififfthitis his dear old mother. For
many, mafiy years One could -see her al-
most any day when the Senate was in
session sitting up in the gallery. She is
a sweet, kind, gentle woman.
I hate very much to see Bill Cheatham
retire from the Senate. I wish for him
and his mother many long years of hap-
piness.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad that the
distinguished Senator from Alabama
mentioned Bill Cheatham's mother. It
was my privilege to learn of her a good
many years ago when she was, frequent-
ly in the corridors. I never see her but
what I give her a little hug. She is sweet
and gracious and interested in public
affairs as if she were a youngster. I do
not know her age. One never tells a
lady's age anyway. Let us say that she
lived in good health to a ripe age and
still has never lost interest in public
affairs.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I wish to mention
two other things that come to mind. My
birthday is the 20th of December. Every
year when I am here I get a telephone
call from her and she sings "Happy
Birthday" over the telephone.
4741--,c UPT44,11. cwrigultar,
1,..rgpeliis jQ...u?orer,than., 2_ months
,T4AKahead of each presidential inauguration,
J41-7,441v rfe hr.sd played a iiialOr role in planning
- 1 t
arranging
Aors
lwno
ip Z2. C4P11 Etrad in office and in escorting the official
Congressional Funeral Committee to the
services usually held in the home town
of the deceased.
Bill's 4-year period at the Planning
Commission was perhaps the stormiest in
the Commission's history. It included
suits by citizens attempting to pre-
ed Pik Ma 12th, birtndaY as a serve upper Rock Creek Park from being
e Ansi after_ ?,yeus served substantially covered with a highway by
it e'er.% to the. ?,ecketaxy to the _ the Maryland Reads Commission and
riTy?then the ,p_cruperatic Side, battles concerning the problems involved
Ftsp_Alteitnerkein: tAt ANDAS,j1411011g4 with the Maryland Planning Commis-
w4sIt_POOICOAkt. LIPPainted sion. The local Urban Redevelopment
Illfl)111.5-gae al only _secretary on the Act caused many arguments between the
es en 0PY.gr,Wa.ts- inanglirated, Commission and the Redevelopment
, Land Agency. The landmark case -
MaaJak4.1a:Saars_ne. der_tlIe rede.velopment law was original-
Sezuwitg. Anna,. ly handled by Bill. When the Supreme
t Demograts, ex- Court decided to hear the case, Bill said
for ee_kexvasi .the .. he was very thrilled over the fact that
Cops during World War I. Solicitor General_ Simon E. Sobeloff
'hersWftS ,AQ?P4ge sch991. So_he asked Bill to assist in preparing the
1.* rammar JakooLin ampullae, Supreme_ Court argument. Bill said
?c 01 ,SY,P? te.M, .04tained ighwistfully_ that this made the late Mr.
k
oin by_ attending_ private Justice F_eax Frankfurter happy too be-
Jitter gra?iitated_, cause "*Zeu see. my wife was secretary
v r ?tx to Mr 4
, Justice roILLIL avrtpla for 14
.-Rsle1$
MiS,PrgSident... Wil-
ilagan 1seaxaer
-4=5 Yews- ago,
..celOate let.:kgZratict! at.
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March 10, 1966
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 5275
The charter nowhere contains any provi-
sion designed to deprive nonmembers of the
right of self-defense against armed attack.,
Article 2, paragraph 6, does charge the United
Nations with responsibility for insuring that
nonmeniber states act in accordance with
United Nations "principles so far as may be
necessary for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security." Protection
against aggression and self-defense against
armed attack are important elements in the
whole charter scheme for the maintenance
of international peace and security. To de-
prive nonmembers of their inherent right of
self-defense would not accord with the prin-
ciples of the Organization, but would in-
stead be prejudicial to the maintenance of
peace. Thus article 2, paragraph 6?arid,
indeed, the rest of the charter?should cer-
tainly not be construed to nullify or di-
minish the inherent defensive rights of non-
members.
2. The United States Has the Right To Assist
in the Defense of.p.outh Vietnam Although
the Latter Is Not a United Nations Member
- The cooperation of two or more interna-
tional entities in the defense of one or both
against armed attack is generally referred to
as collective self-defense. U.S. participation
in the defense of South Vietnam at the
latter's request is an example of collective
self-defense.
The United State is entitled to exercise
the right of individual or collective self-
defense against armed attack, as that right
exists in international law, subject only to
treaty limitations and obligations under,
taken by this country.
It has been urged that the United States
has no right to participate in the collective
defense of South Vietnam because article 51
of the United Natinns Charter speaks only
of the situation "if an armed attack occurs
against a mem.ber of the United Nation."
This argument is without substance.
In the first. place', article 51 does not im-
pose restrictions or cut down the otherwise
available rights of 'United Nations members.
By its own terms, the article preserves an
inherent right. It is, therefore, necessary
to look elsewhere in the charter for any
obligation of members restricting their par-
ticipation in collective defense of an entity
that is not a United. Nations member.
Article 2, paragraph 4, is the principal pro-
vision of the charter imposing limitations
on the use of forcc by members. It states
that they "shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations."
Action taken in defense against armed at-
tack cannot be characterized as falling with-
in this proscription. The record of the San
Francisco Conference makes clear that arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, was not intended to re-
strict the right of self-defense against armed
attack.,
2 While nonmemhers, such as South Viet-
nam, have not formally undertaken the obli-
gations of the United Nations Charter as
their own treaty obligations, it should be
recognized that much of the substantive law
of the charter has become part of the gen-
eral law of nations through a very wide ac-
ceptance by nations the world over. This
is particularly true of the charter provisions
bearing on the use of force. Moreover, in
the case of South Vietnam, the South Viet-
namese Government has expressed its ability
and willingness to abide by the charter, in
applying for United Nations membership.
Thus it seems entirely appropriate to ap-
praise the actions of South Vietman in rela-
tion to the legal standards set forth in the
United Nations Charter,
5'. See, e.g., 6 UNCIO documents 459.
One will search in vain for any other pro-
vision in the charter that would preclude
U'S. participation in the collective defense of
a nonmember. The fact that article 51 refers
to armed attack "against a member of the
United Nations" implies no intention to pre-
clude members from participating in the de-
fense of nonmembers. Any such result
would have seriously detrimental con-
sequences for international peace and se-
curity and would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations as they are
ret forth in article 1 of the charter.4 The
right of members to participate in the de-
fense of nonmembers is upheld by leading au-
thorities on international law.5
D. The right of individual and collective
self-defense applies whether or not South
Vietnam is regarded as an independent
sovereign state
1. South Vietnam Enjoys the Right of Self-
Defense
It has been asserted that the conflict in
Vietnam is "civil strife" in which foreign in-
tervention is forbidden. Those who make
this assertion have gone so far as to compare
Ho Chi Minh's action in Vietnam with the
efforts of President Lincoln to preserve the
Union during the American Civil War. Any
such characterization is an entire fiction dis-
regarding the actual situation in Vietnam.
The Hanoi regime is anything but the legiti-
mate government of a unified country in
which the South is rebelling against lawful
national authority.
The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a
division of Vietnam into two zones at the
17th parallel. Although this line of demarca-
tion was intended to be temporary, it was
established by international agreement,
which specifically forbade aggression by one
zone against the other.
The Republic of Vietnam in the south has
been recognized as a separate international
entity by approximately 60 governments the
world over. It has been admitted as a mem-
ber of a number of the specialized agencies
of the United Nations. The United Nations
General Assembly in 1957 voted to recom-
mend South Vietnam for membership in
the Organization, and its admission was
frustrated only by the veto of the Soviet
Union in the Security Council.
In any event there is no warrant for the
suggestion that one zone of a temporarily
divided state?whether it be Germany,
Korea, or Vietnam?can be legally overrun
by armed forces from the other zone, cross-
ing the internationally recognized line of
demarcation between the two. Any such
doctrine would subvert the international
agreement establishing the line of demarca-
tion, and would pose grave dangers to inter-
national peace.
The action of the United Nations in the
Korean conflict of 1950 clearly established
the principle that there is no greater license
In particular, the statement of the first
purpose:
"To maintain international peace and se-
curity, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;".
6 Bowett, "Self-Defense in International
Law," 193-195 (1958); Goodhart, "The North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949," 79 "Recueil Des
Cours," 183, 202-204 (1951, vol. II), quoted in
5 "Whiterria,n's Digest of International Law,"
1067-1068 (1965); Kelsen, "The Law of the
United Nations," 793 (1950); see Stone, "Ag-
gression and World. Order," 41 (1958).
for one zone of a temporarily divided state
to attack the other zone than there is for
one state to attack another state. South
Vietnam has the same right that South Korea
had to defend itself and to organize collec-
tive defense against an armed attack from
the north. A resolution of the Security
Council dated June 25, 1950, noted "with
grave concern the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North
Korea" and determined "that this action
constitutes a breach of the peace."
2. The United States Is Entitled To Partici-
pate in the Collective Defense of South
Vietnam Whether or Not the Latter Is
Regarded as an Independent Sovereign
State
As stated earlier South Vietnam has been
recognized as a ceparate international entity
by approximately 60 governments. It has
been admitted to membership in a number
of the United Nations specialized agencies,
and has been excluded from the United Na-
tions Organization only by the Soviet veto.
There is nothing in the charter to suggest
that United Nations members are precluded
from participating in the defense of a recog-
nized international entity against armed
attack merely because the entity may lack
some of the attributes of an independent
sovereign state. Any such result would have
a destructive effect on the stability of inter-
national engagements such as the Geneva
accords of 1954 and on internationally agreed
lines of demarcation. Such a result, far
from being in accord with the charter and
the purpoces of the United Nations, would
undermine them and would create new
dangers to international peace and security.
E. The United Nations Charter does not
limit the right of self-defense to regional
organizations
Some have argued that collective self-
defense may be undertaken only by a re-
gional arrangement or agency operating
under chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter. Such an assertion ignores the
structure of the charter and the practice
followed in the more than 20 years since the
founding of the United Nations.
The basic proposition that rights of self-
defense are not impaired by the charter?
as expressly stated in article 51?is not con-
ditioned by any charter provision limiting
the application of this proposition to collec-
tive defense by a regional arrangement or
agency. The structure of the charter rein-
forces this conclusion. Article 51 appears
in chapter VII of the charter, entitled "Ac-
tion With Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggres-
sion," whereas chapter VIII, entitled "Re-
gional Arrangements," begins with article 52
and embraces the two following articles.
The records of the San Francisco Conference
show that article 51 was deliberately placed
In chapter VII rather than chapter VIII,
"where it would only have a bearing on the
regional system." 6
Under article 51, the right of self-defense
is available against any armed attack,
whether or not the country attacked is a
member of a regional arrangement and re-
gardless of the source of the attack. Chap-
ter VIII, on the other hand, deals with rela-
tions among members of a regional arrange-
ment or agency, and authorizes regional ac-
tion as appropriate for dealing with "local
disputes." This distinction has been recog-
nized ever since the founding of the United
Nations in 1945.
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty
has operated as a collective security arrange-
ment, designed to take common measures in
preparation against the eventuality of an
armed attack for which collective defense
under article 51 would be required. Simi-
6 17 UNCIO documents 288.
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7000446R0004000500O
, 4 -.....]
tz.9.apatz...p.,tion .At....u. WU h. Ake_ Cfillncll_ taken an
.,.____g_eng vaitr_. lis_. ,...,___77141911.tcackigie peace andiecinity in south-
, RAPA.L., ....P.4_1. ..0111-_,e _Sag .4faiii?--.1316.-gaillIgi3-11116 MA, =Pressed
PATiPalgilY..S.-1e-, ....PritiPIAM.C41745,--ilPtianie, aindeeiLesiace the
10p3 Cjavatz_T __"(14,...11,1k0;1441141.-il.t 1.4121113XY_ /960, members
..........ALtiae ..CoUlaall lave ..neen-InitablY reluctant
trair'iArar i 'Tiviv'thar r _01 ?t?oilroceed with _any consideration of the
estaNtriiiIiig_Ke:Og7-ariliation- - yisillamcinestion..
alk-res711-ac ages:- tTat-i-T..1?te. ,QUilsinsiQ11..ia .clear_that the United
are:hilk,4i_el,c-Lwithin .1
- :?tg..tel tine.11111Q.,..Way_acted_to interfere with
claPter....Vig..-.1.1411Ziatinns.CMISICierat10.21 of the nn 61
142.1,..44,..,3Clettlaln...._ Qn_the_ contrary, the eUniter.t
United
ae,92114t_. e_j_nicatio_ning _Zgtigz. ,120?a_ requested, United Nations con-
0,rau....-; 4.1h,..x.nrisi .7.raiugaa,guand ,tha _CounciLhas not seen fit
_
.--tat.t
nernational law does not require a
e ense against armeer-ittack '
declaration of war as a condition prece-
,eg,1:1C4e...k-iii ' a I4161-14 - -
(tent to taking measures of self-defense
ft ...1against armed attack .
"T..E.16. 9?"0" n'he existence or absence of a formal dec-
Y Ail i,gis-,ATIlazattoll..Q.L.War is. hat &factor in _determining
pait.M....Whether. arilatetuationaLusc of force is law-
matter. nf ..haternational law. The
4,9.W13
.,, ,..-_,,,,,a,n,._ d Iliteit
nil Iifttis'.uis_ Qhar.ter_'.a_zestriction focus
_ .... .. '1A-u_21':1.'41-- ..,..an...the zaanner_azul.,ptirpose of its use and
vver_ ro_act__ae nst aggression. ?nolong;ny_ forinalities_ of announcement.
eljiMs-raiii e ora-,rtl-Cie7i-Ca: 1.- It should also be noted that a formal
,,,-- .,,,,,?.?,
.? 4Pi,oprelvS1.--.-declaraticn of war would not place any ob-
le !or 0 ,n iv duaziror
. gations on either side in the conflict by
CAr7...plarTL -- _liwhich that side would not be bound in any
qn ?e PP!",1.7.- -.event. The rules of international law con-
pp,r '4a-measures. _-eerning the conduct of hostilities in an in-
51 eTearl---StaTee tat --ternational armed conflict apply regardless
- exPtaclig- .of any declaration of war.
7/.--Su-ininary _
n inTe_rngioThall
I'lie. aital.Las iier rith-a-.Love' shO,Ws_thkt?,,
? 7a iti CR 1 I " 1Z niCiiti?..24,11:17Anitrio isii.pkit keii i.:4i4pasteipiirt_riti:
an-getthenibam ster._'talitia9,-8,1-im-4-ci- --7.tra,-A -65iiillelioliii76:iiia,010111?..e. a...9917_
ana OE '11:or'44.m arnt c e 7 a--nct -1-ec-tlFe kirde-firs'e-Wrch.-the participation of
tag it-iiiirOVISIOns "ii-i-arirp..p_f4r1ts7te ' -6theii. - Ili fispiinee to reqlests from South,
e for fliel:c:olidii-cl-q nn-e i
bers n a Gail' ''ViEtn-ani,- the-V.111*r "States has been ?,par--
if - r ii piall corikli _.i......: UM_ '-ticTio-a-tin It: lir 414 'defense both through_
fn _ cr Ith this rriffrfarT actron iVitliiii South Viethain_and
ales --ai "a-----,;30?Ter--,,ia Me' --ddri-Ofis -ten dIFeetly_a,gainst the aggressor
TAV;sp,Qicipat1nn by the
?reliaiiVis _ atrIleasure.7tairii '-triltreZ":Stat is fii? confospity With inter-
eu in_th: agpipl-:0 .tg. ' fj,9?, -hal-tonal IS;iii-ari 4: consistent with our oh-
" " 41.Y.L9.1k1rt 6 -11g-elOn!: ithiTer Ifie 0_harta Of the LT_Alted.
opt. _ ' - -Naloii 6 - '
ea - he aurity anQ rons1biliy_ ..1-1?.X,ArZ mar= BYT.,r5....ndin ILDIDERTAKEN _COM-
- C7.6117131. , _11-1"riTV .t,,....a e 3,;-?e*at. ,..., ZATIATAina-TO. 00/ar_Ssaillti vIrTN1031._ thr__DE-
x tinie:Su.p.n_ ae_tip_n Ss_ Est?TratICOZESN.F.AQATtisT oQUDIV,NIST AGUES..
order to mainTain or act/ Flaw, juz. Awgzia. .
P4C--0,41-4---?e--,_MIX1t-Y.:7,.... The United States has made commitments
iq r.skQteuo4eauu give:n assurances, in various forms and
nres ...,-,..-,In ,.,at different times, to assist in the defense of
a ress on, ill _South Vietnam.
115K4 e n ter gt6:"Ei'S
. '...'''''''' -s4-. -The United States gave undertaking at the
VA,/ 9,...c0,2....... ...m-
ss of on,: .,.... the Geneva Conference 4 y in 1954 r e ss ion
-414e1 ;;;;..1 At the tInil of the "iianiiig oLple Geneva
-Tun- 'residentIEisenhower warned
tai:211"- -'rtfiat an' refieWal ,C4?
. ?ni
?
dTTIT & fiwNdliL 1 48 -I- iving assurance
7:11. 6 bfrt _ it u .7.0m,84,11Zraxe,,Pga a_1179xavcee
TOW,'-iit-the -name- time
,,,giving
-7.1ifft-the- Trriffed_p_t.i,e5 wo
e -c7...';''tes Ttfitifil51-117 sett-lenient?r-And the formal_
Lklee d:: "41117177.::b-nisiftlarzhis-ri 'A-ro7n--4.--oet:c3rit:ttii_elidee.0 ii:Ots4'elaeeGvsveae:_,crweo Conferencellpnrc,earnetiefiew.
-,,'"'-it,--- -statml that the _ _
erreSil if II-I:violation of t e _
sclAsiaa:_liscIr "yrs oindli"iiTements with gr and
4" asa Ifirdafelifitg international peace
IgM3'ellISn'-'211'-t'S 'rim security:' - - - - -
Tg .19_6 fl
iti
danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes. Measures taken under this para-
graph shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations."
Annexed to the treaty was a protocol stat-
ing that: "The parties to the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty unanimously des-
ignate for the purpose of article IV of the
treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and
the free territory under the jurisdiction of
the State of Vietnam."
Thus, the obligations of article IV, para-
graph 1, dealing with the eventuality of
armed attack, have from the outset covered
the territory of South Vietnam. The facts
as to the North Vietnamese armed attack
against the south have been summarized
earlier, in the discussion of the right of self-
defense under international law and the
Charter of the United Nations. The term
"armed attack" has the same meaning in
the SEATO Treaty as in the United Nations
Charter.
Article IV, paragraph 1, places an obliga-
tion on each party to the SEATO Treaty to
"act to meet the common danger in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes"
in the event of an armed attack. The treaty
does not require a collective determination
than an armed attack has occurred in order
that the obligation of article IV, paragraph 1,
become operative. Nor does the provision
require collective decision on actions to be
taken to meet the common danger. As Sec-
retary Dulles pointed out when transmitting
the treat to the President? the commitment
in article IV,paragraph 1, _"leaves to the
judgment of each country the type of action
to be taken in the event an armed attack
The treaty was intended to deter armed
aggression in southeast Asia. To that end
it created_not_only a multilateral alliance but
also a series of bilateral relationships. The
__obligations are placed squarely on "each
_party" in the event of armed attack in the
treaty area-not upon "the parties," a word-
jag that might have implied a necessity for
collective decision. The treaty was intended
to, give the assurance of U.S. assistance to any
_party or protocol state that might suffer a
Communist armed attack, regardless of the
views or actions of other parties. The fact
that the obligations are individual, and may
AYArt_to zuule,extent differ among the parties
to the treaty, is demonstrated by the U.S.
understanding, expressed at the time of
signature, that its obligations under article
IV, paragraph 1, apply only in the event of
Communist aggression, whereas the other
parties to the treaty were unwilling so to
limit their obligations to each other.
?-Th the United States has a commit-
ment under article IV, paragraph 1, in the
event of armed attack, independent of the
_decision or action of other treaty parties.
A joint communique issued by Secretary
Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
--of Thailand on March 6, 1962, reflected this
understanding: "The Secretary of State as-
sured the Foreign Minister that in the event
of such aggression, the United States intends
to give full effect to its obligations under
the treaty to act to meet the common danger
In accordance with its constitutional proc-
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that
this_obligation of the United States does not
depend on the prior agreement of all other
parties to the treaty, since this treaty obliga-
tion Is Individual as well as collective."
Most o e countries ave stated
that they agreed with this interpretation.
None has registered objection to it.
When the ipenate Committee on Foreign
Relations reported on the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, it noted that the
treaty area was further defined so that the
"free territory of Vietnam" was an area
"which, if attacked, would fall under the
protection of the instrument." In its con-
clusion, c ttee s : "The com-
S?1411, ?
!Pt,
74?,4m,ivi, ? , -
? , -
-
?'4. iti -11' T-.;11`lito.iititt-arigenfiogethm VietnamiThterna
ir Ili 'r.,,,? 4*.., LI,
hyt some that ,,.., un,..
rir the SEITO Treatde
, has 177T-blat-d- riaer in 4, t159 V.:4t4.4.91taitea.,/legotiated
men o _gat n.n. (if_ ars -. wit % a num er of tither cowl, r ea and signed
V.L.-,..ThiLikIELunerit over: it..-re 4S.T.8::631-1:ect.17.1.?Defe'nee Tret.
tiii that i?iciiiii-"Th'e t?
la Pitt* ullid l'c'; sa....,:-' -iiiiti,ZYDE-Fiti;1144- thei'ust paragraph of
q_cfrais ?.??,,, ,:rec,2:nizei tuket'azgresslorheY_biternne;04s grlaEnin.e tcYI
... : _....ea,.. ,c2.Ation ,Nxi.ta IUD, .atiaci:i4ralle..tickty aLea goinst any of the
. V' ql...14 ta42.Atel..1111111.7.- -LaLtaSi ..ci -MAUL any Mate or _territory
. .
n effectly clear that the which the Parties ly_unAMmous agreement
*..! . , a ,..2 _944-efepLig is iMP4.494-12,Y may here after desioiate, would end,anger its
4" 1- r4,c-,P.I.S.-?,?e...er PaR.r.ter,:inslwilia_g, _own peapp_ad_safe_ty, and agrees that it
rov, iC1113 Ca tArt2.9# 3.3,,,_ t 0 t tb.! elawon
7B0o446R0604Ct0(45):)0
?
se,
.?
March. 10, 1960
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 5277
mittee is not Impervious to the risks Which
this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that
acceptance of these additional obligations
commits the United States to a course of
action over a vast expanse of the Pacific.
Yet these risks are consistent With our own
highest interests."
The Senate gave its advice and consent to
the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1.
C. The United States has given additional
assurances to the Government of South
Vietnam
The United States has also given a series
of additional assurances to the Government
of South Vietnam. As early as October 1954
President Eisenhower undertook to provide
direct assistance to help make South Viet-
nam "capable of resisting attempted sub-
version or aggresaion through military
means." On May 11, 1957 President Eisen-
hower and President Ngo Dinh Diem of the
Republic of Vietnam issued a joint statement
which called attention to "the large build-
up of Vietnamese Communist military forces
in North Vietnam" and stated: "Noting that
the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article
IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, President Eisenhower and President
Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or
subversion threatening the political inde-
pendence of the Republic of Vietnam would
be considered as endangering peace and
stability."
On August 2, 1961 President Kennedy de-
clared that "the United States is determined
that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be
lost to the Communists for lack of any sup-
port which the United States can render."
On December 7 of that year President Diem
appealed for additional support. In his
reply of December 14, 1961, President Ken-
nedy recalled the U.S. declaration made at
the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954,
and reaffirmed that the United States was
"prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to
protect its people and to preserve its inde-
pendence." This assurance has been reaf-
firmed many times Since.
III. ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
VIETNAM ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE GENEVA
ACCORDS OF 1954
A. Description of the accords
The Geneva accords of 1954 established
the date and hour for a ceasefire in Vietnam,
drew a "provisional military demarcation
line" with a demilitarized zone on both sides,
and required an exchange of prisoners and
the phased regroupment of Viet Minh Forces
from the south to the north and of French
Union Forces from the north to the south.
The introduction into Vietnam of troops
reinforcements and new military equipment
(except for replaceinent and repair) was pro-
hibited. The armed forces of each party
were required to respect the demilitarized
zone and the territory of the other zone. The
adherence of either zone to any military alli-
ance, and the use of either zone for the re-
sumption of hostilities or to "further an
aggressive policy," were prohibited. The In..
ternational Control Commission was estab-
" These accords were composed of a bi-
lateral cease-fire agreement between the Com-
mander in chief of the People's Army of
Vietnam and the commander in chief of the
French 'Union Forces in Indochina, together
with a final declaration of the conference,
to which France adhered. However, it is to
be noted that the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment was not a signatory of the cease-
fire agreement and did not adhere to the
final declaration. South Vietnam entered
a series of reservations in a statement to
the conference. This statement was noted
by the conference, but by decision of the
conference chairman it was not included
or referred to in the final declaration.
Relied, composed of India, Canada and Po-
land, with India as Chairman. The task of
the Commissien was to supervise the proper
execution of the provisions of the Ceasefire
agreement. General elections that would re-
sult in reunification were required to be held
in July 1956 under the supervision of the
ICC.
B. North Vietnam violated the accords from
the beginning
From the very beginning, the North Viet-
namese violated the 1954 Geneva accords.
Communist military forces and supplies were
left in the south in violation of the accords.
Other Communist guerrillas were moved
north for further training and then were
infiltrated into the south in violation of the
accords.
C. The introduction of U.S. military person-
nel and equipment was justified
The accords prohibited the reinforcement
of foreign military forces in Vietnam and the
introduction of new military equipment, but
they allowed replacement of existing mili-
tary personnel and equipment. Prior to late
1961, South Vietnam had received consider-
able military equipment and supplies from
the United States, and the United States had
gradually, enlarged its military assistance ad-
visory group to slightly less than 900 men.
These actions were reported to the ICC and
were justified as replacements for equipment
in Vietnam in 1954 and for French training
and advisory personnel who had been with-
drawn after 1954.
As the Communist aggression intensified
during 1961, with increased infiltration and
a marked stepping up of Communist terror-
ism in the south, the United States found it
necessary in late 1961 to increase substan-
tially the numbers of our military personnel
and the amounts and types of equipment
introduced by this country into South Viet-
nam. These increases were justified by the
international law principle that a material
breach of an agreement by one party en-
titles the other at least to withhold com-
pliance with an equivalent, corresponding, or
related provision until the defaulting party
is prepared to honor its obligations.'
In accordance with this principle, the sys-
tematic violation of the Geneva accords by
North Vietnam justified South Vietnam in
suspending compliance with the provision
controlling entry of foreign military person-
nel and military equipment.
9 This principle of law and the circum-
stances in which it may be invoked are most
fully discussed in the Fourth Report on the
Law of Treaties by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
articles 18, 20 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/120 (1959) )
"II Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission 37" (UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1959/
Add. 1) and in the later report by Sir Hum-
phrey Waldock, article 20 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/
156 and Add. 1-3 (1963) ) "II Yearbook of
the International Law Commission 36" (UN
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add. 1) . Among
the authorities cited by the fourth report
for this proposition are: II Oppenheim, "In-
ternational Law" 136, 137 (7th ed. Lauter-
pacht 1955); I Rousseau, "Principes gene-
raux du droit international public" 365
(1944); II Hyde, "International Law" 1660
et. seq. (2d ed. 1047); II Guggenheim, "TraitO
de droit international public" 84, 85 (1935);
Spiropoulos, "Traite theorique et pratique
de droit international public" 289 (1933);
Verdross, "VOlkerrecht," 328 (1950;y Hall,
"Treatise" 21 (8th ed. Higgins 1921); 3 Acci-
oly, "Tratado de Direito Internacional Pub-
lico" 82 (1956-57). See also draft articles
42 and 46 of the Law of Treaties by the
International Law Conunission, contained in
the report on the work of its 15th session
(General Assembly, official records, 18th ses-
sion, supplement No. 9 (A/5809) ) .
D. South Vietnam was lustified in refusing
to implement the election provisions of
the Geneva accords
The Geneva accords contemplated the re-
unification of the two parts of Vietnam.
They contained a provision for general elec-
tions to be held in July 1956 in order to
obtain a "free expression of the national
will." The accords stated that "consulta-
tions will be held on this subject between
the competent representative authorities of
the two zones from July 20, 1955, onwards."
There may be some question whether
South Vietnam was bound by these election
provisions. As indicated earlier, South Viet-
nam did not sign the cease-fire agreement of
1954, nor did it adhere to the final declara-
tion of the Geneva Conference. The South
Vietnamese Government at that time gave
notice of its objection in particular to the
election provisions of the accords.
However, even on the premise that these
provisions were binding on South Viet-
nam, the South Vietnamese Government's
failure to engage in consultations in 1955,
with a view to holding elections in 1956, in-
volved no breach of obligation. The condi-
tions in North Vietnam during that period
were such as to make impossible any free
and meaningful expression of popular will.
Some of the facts about conditions in the
north were admitted even by the Communist
leadership in Hanoi. General Giap, cur-
rently Defense Minister of North Vietnam, in
addressing the 10th Congress of the North
Vietnamese Communist Party in October
1956, publicly acknowledged that the Com-
munist leaders were running a police state
where executions, terror, and torture were
commonplace. A nationwide election in
these circumstances would have been a
travesty. No one in the north would have
dared to vote except as directed. With a
substantial majority of the Vietnamese peo-
ple living north of the 17th parallel, such an
election would have meant turning the
country over to the Communists without
regard to the will of the people. The South
Vietnamese Government realized these facts
and quite properly took the position that
consultations for elections in 1956 as con-
templated by the accords would be a use-
less formality?'
IV. THE PRESIDENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO
COMMIT U.S. FORCES rw THE COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM
There can be no question in present cir-
cumstances of the President's authority to
commit U.S. forces to the defense of South
Vietnam. The grant of authority to the
President in article II of the Constitution
extends to the actions of the United States
currently undertaken in Vietnam. In fact,
however, it is unnecessary to determine
whether this grant standing alone is suffi-
cient to authorize the actions taken in
Vietnam. These actions rest not only on
the exercise of Presidential powers under
article II but on the SEATO Treaty?a treaty
advised and consented to by the Senate?and
on actions of the Congress, particularly the
joint resolution of August 10, 1964. When
these sources of authority are taken to-
gether?article II of the Constitution, the
SEATO Treaty, and actions by the Congress?
there can be no question of the legality
under domestic law of U.S. actions in Viet-
nam.
10 In any event, if North Vietnam consid-
ered there had been a breach of obligation
by the south, its remedies lay in discussion
with Saigon, perhaps in an appeal to the co-
chairmen of the Geneva Conference, or in a
reconvening of the conference to consider
the situation. Under international law,
North Vietnam had no right to use force out-
side its own zone in order to secure its polit-
ical objectives.
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ppr
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00446R00040005000
pstteer Ant/er ArticleJLQI
tlt?4tifi5t gite7i4? 1?/ze.?.Actioris
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ger _e peace and safety of
waa...adopteil there
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04,r_94. 41A0 AttliatLFQX.CeS to
xnaijaUtin_poaltiagas _abroad
_prior congressional_ au-
Ith
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Wit,117184) For example.
.44191-0310.9.9_9._ tz.0:OPs to
P.-?Xcitillah Z-ot-thei.early
zor.144twAr.g1apa,tcrted
PS tn....the-President
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geW-M.-til.hic?stAttagli
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944.14140==ifitigilit?
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MA:44 Pr-Thigh. filiall-be-Made.
lithory ,of the United States,
ksilarenaP_Iaw Ar-
agE,E1P.4._ the_idEA-TO Treaty
_tof =?111,w_ that a-Dom,
Alitainet_SoUtik Vietnam
ti4e,pe,ase_phd, Way of the United
14.:1-54t4ovi5_ion. the _United
ttlaclAttP404-4,..Ponanaltitiaut in the
ektY.,0 AMC& the_COMMon
er In aReo (liange.With its?conatitutional
6 0.1.44...g 13.11:GUAllaattealk.
tt,341.14p. it .18 the ?President
.1,411:44 AtMett attackluu
o-tlie-atittatitittionul re-
_0I-cl-ctarMin4ng what measures
674
vi the peace and
wma. Stitea_are endangered.
qtrs tilatisteployment of U,S. forces
41.0444. i.-5.-rAtthireeir and that min-
th0.10111.?...415t. the 4:Aire:" of-Cora-mu-
ere acces-
s -991:1.0.1Wienally empowered to
buy Dulles testified at that time that we did
ilint.l.litenal.to establish (1) a land army in
1?4414:41ri?gttig4-91011afikkic deterring Coin-
mun t aggression, or (2) an integrated head-
quarters and_miltt,ary organization like that
"of-NATO:`, instead?, the 17rAted States would
rely on 'mobile striking pqwer" against the
sources _ ,Aggr_e_s_49,r_i._ ggacever, the treaty
?613'lleatleirin article IV, paragraph 1, to meet
comm_on. d4netrlx.1 Ilia, event of armed
aressionnot llipiked_to_particular modes
o nii'lltary action. What eepstitutes an ade-
cniate deterrent o;r- atipsopriate response,
-in-terms ailitAry_stratsgy, may change;
`%trtthe essence of, pj.fr,commitment to act to
met the common danger. _as necessary at the
-time of qp. armeit ?aggressjon, remains. In
"Ibt4 The forecast of military Judgment might
have been ageinst he use asubstantial,U,S.
_gr5Und -forces in Vietnam. But tliatdoes not
preclude the President froj:_:_n reaching a dif-
ferent nillitafy judgment in different circum-
-stances, iky!_ars later.
C- The joint _resolution of Congress of Au-
gust 10, 1964, autliirizes U.S. participation
_ 111 _the collective defense of South Vietnam
As stated earlier, the legality of U.S. par-
-ticipation in the defense of South Vietnam
does not rest only on the constitu-
tional power of the President under article
II?or indeed on that power taken in con-
junction with the SEATO Treaty. In addi-
tion, the Congress has acted in unmistakable
fashion to approve and authorize U.S. actions
in Vietnam.
Following the North Vietnamese attacks in
the Gulf of Tonkin against U.S. destroyers,
-- Congress adopted, by a Senate vote of 88 to 2
and a House vote of 416 to 0, a joint resolu-
tion containing a series of important declare-
--tions and provisions of law.
-T,ggaty_istieciiies=that each party
inwatntlitt4lige, with Its _capstan-
bp_eq_Argued that_ the _use
psed vnder
t4:040.144,44eix?1lae40-.aekei armed_
wati het NiltaMPlated at the time the
ty was ,considered by the Senate pc9re-
Section 1 resolved that "the Congress ap-
proves and supports the determination of
-the President, as Commander in Chief, to
take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further .ag-
gression." Thus, the Congress gave its sane-
-11offte-#),Solfic actioris-by the Presidentto re-
pel attacks against U.S. naval vessels in the
?-mar of Tonkin and elsewhere in the western
-Paclitc. Congress farther approved the tak-
ing-of "all necessary measures * * * to pre-
vent further aggression." This authorization
extended to those measures the President
lifight consider* nece.seary to ward off further
attacks and to prevent further aggression
by North Vietnam in southeast Asia.
The joint resolution then went on to pro-
vide in section 2:
"The United States regards as vital to
its natiOn.al interest and to World peace the
maintenance of international peace and
secarily in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United 'States and
the Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
the -United States is, therefore, prepared, as
the President tieterinines, to takeall neces-
sary-Steps, including the use of armed force,
to assist any member or protocol state of
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
requesting assistance in defense of its free-
dom."
Section 2 thus constitutes an authoriza-
tion to the President, in his discretion, to
act?using armed forge _if he deternailites thSt
is required?to assist _South Vietnain at its
request in defense of,its_fr_eedom. The iden-
tification of South Vietnam through the
-
xng1ee t protocol state" in this sec-
tion is unmistakable, and the grant of au-
thorns "403 the _President _determines" is
_
It _has been suggested that the legislative
history of the joint resolution shows an in-
tention to limit U.S. assistance to South
Vietnam to aid, advice, and training. This
suggestion is hazed on, an- eiadment of
fered from the floor by Senator NELsort which
would have added the following to the text:
"The Congress also approves and supports
the efforts of the President to bring the prob-
lem of peace in southeast Asia to the Secu-
rity Council of the United Nations; and the
President's declaration that the United
States, seeking no extension of the present
military conflict, will respond to provoca-
tion in a manner that is 'limited and fitting.'
Our continuing policy is to limit our role
to the provision of aid, training assistance,
and military advice, and it is the sense of
Congress that, except when provoked to a
greater response, we should continue to at-
tempt to avoid a direct military involvement
? -in the southeast Asian conflict." 21
Senator FULDRIGHT, who had reported the
- joint resolution from the Foreign Relations
Committee, spoke on the amendment as
follows:
"Mr. FULSR/GHT. It states fairly accurately
what the President has said would be our
policy, and what I stated my understanding
was as to our policy; also what other Sen-
ators have stated. In other words, it states
that our response should be appropriate and
limited to the provocation, which the Sen-
ator states as 'respond to provocation in a
manner that is limited and fitting,' and so
forth. We do not wish any political or mili-
tary bases there. We are not seeking to gain
a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of
these people to develop along the lines of
their own desires, independent of domina-
tion by communism.
"The Senator has put into his amendment
a statement of policy that is unobjection-
able. However, I cannot accept the amend-
ment under the circumstances. I do not
believe it is contrary to the joint resolution,
but it is an enlargement. I am informed
that the House is now voting on this resolu-
tion. The House joint resolution is about to
be presented to us. I cannot accept the
amendment and go to conference with it,
and thus take responsibility for delaying
matters.
"I do not object to it as a statement of
policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection
of what I believe is the President's policy,
judging from his own statements. That does
not mean that as a practical matter I can
accept the amendment. It would delay mat-
ters to do so. It would cause confusion and
require a conference, and present us with all
the other difficulties that are involved in this
kind of legislative action. I regret that I
cannot do it, even though I do not at all
disagree with the amendment as a general
statement of policy." 12
Senator NELSON'S amendment related the
degree and kind of U.S. response in Vietnam
to "provocation" on the other side; the re-
sponse should be "limited and fitting." The
greater the provocation, the stronger are the
measures that may be characterized as "lim-
ited and fitting." Bombing of North Viet-
namese naval bases was a "limited and fitt-
ing" response to the attacks on T.J.S. destroyers
in August 1964, and the subsequent actions
taken by the United States and South Viet-
nam have been an appropriate response to
the increased war of aggression carried on by
North Vietnam since that date. Moreover,
Senator NELSON'S proposed amendment did
not purport to be a restriction on authority
available to the President but merely a state-
ment concerning what should be the con-
tinuing policy of the United States.
Congressional realization of the scope of
authority being conferred by the joint reso-
lution is shown by the legislative history of
the measure as a whole. The following ex-
change between Senators COOPER and Fut-
BRIGHT IS illuminating:
"Mr. COOPER. The Senator will remember
that the SEATO Treaty, in article IV, pro-
110 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 18459 (Aug.
'7, 1964).
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Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP671300446R000400050001-2
March 10, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
vides that in the event an armed attack is
made upon a party to the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, or upon one of
the protocol states such as South Vietnam,
the parties to the treaty, one of whom is
the United States, would then take such
action as might be appropriate, after resort-
ing to their constitutional processes. I as-
sume that would mean, in the case of the
United States, that Congress would be asked
to grant the authority to act.
"Does the Senator consider that in enact-
ing this resolution we are satisfying that
requirement of article IV of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty? In other
words, are we now giving the President ad-
vance authority to take whatever action he
may deem necessary respecting South Viet-
nam and its defense, or with respect to the
defense of any other country inguded in the
treaty?
"Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct.
"Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if the
President decided that it was necessary to
use such force as could lead into war, we
will give that authority by this resolution?
"Mr. FULDRIGHT. That is the way I would
interpret it. If a situation later developed
in which we thotight the approval should
be withdrawn it could be withdrawn by con-
current resolution," 13
The August 1964 joint resolution contin-
uses in force today, Section 2 of the resolu-
tion provides that it shall expire "when the
President shall determine that the peace
and security of the area is reasonably as-
sured by international conditions created
by action of the United Nations or other-
wise, except that it may be terminated
earlier by concurrent resolution of the Con-
gress." The President has made no such
determination, nor has Congress terminated
the joint resolution.'4
18 110 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 18409 (Aug.
6, 1964.)
Senator MORSE, who opposed the joint reso-
lution, expressed the following view on Au-
gust 6, 1964, concerning the scope of the -
proposed resolution:
"Another Senator thought, in the early
part of the debate, that this course would
n.ot broaden the power of the President to
engage in a land war if he decided that he
wanted to apply the resolution in that way.
"That Senator was taking great consola-
tion in the then held belief that, if he voted
for the resolution, it would give no author-
ity to the President to send many troops
into Asia. I am sure he was quite disap-
pointed to finally learn, because it took a lit-
tle time to get the matter cleared, that the
resolution places no restriction on the Presi-
dent in that respect. If he is still in doubt,
let him read the language on page 2, lines 3
to 6, and page 2, lines 11 to 17. The first
reads:
" 'The Congress approves and supports the
determination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.'"
"It does not say he is limited in regard
to the sending of ground forces, It does not
limit that authority. That is why I have
called it A predated declaration of war, in
clear violation of article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, which vests the power to de-
clare war in the Congress, and not in the
President.
"What is proposed is to authorize the
President of the United States, without a
declaration of war, to commit aots of war".
110 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 18426-18427 (Aug.
6, 1964).
14 On Mar. 1, 1966, the Senate voted, 92 to 5,
to table an amendment that would have re-
pealed the joint resolution.
Instead, Congress in May 1965 approved
an appropriation of $700 million to meet the
expense of mounting military requirements
in Vietnam. (Public Law 89-18, 79 Stat.
109). The President's message asking for
this appropriation stated that this was "not
a routine request. For each Member of
Congress who supports this request is also
voting to persist in our efforts to halt Com-
munist aggressions in South Vietnam." The
appropriation act constitutes a clear con-
gressional endorsement and approval of the
actions taken by the President.
On March 1, 1966 the Congress continued
to express its support of the President's pol-
icy by approving a $4.8 billion supplemental
military authorization by votes of 392 to 4
and 93 to 2. An amendment that would
have limited the President's authority to
commit forces to Vietnam was rejected in
the Senate by a vote of 94 to 2.
D. No declaration of war by the Congress is
required to authorize 11.5. participation in
the collective defense of South Vietnam
No declaration of war is needed to author-
ize American actions in Vietnam. As shown
in the preceding sections, the President has
ample authority to order the participation
of U.S. Armed Forces in the defense of South
Vietnam.
Over a very long period in our history,
practice and precedent have confirmed the
constitutional authority to engage U.S. forces
In hostilities without a declaration of war.
This history extends from the undeclared
war with France and the war against the
Barbary pirates, at the end of the 18th cen-
tury, to the Korean war of 1950-53.
James Madison, one of the leading framers
of the Constitution, and Presidents John
Adams and Jefferson all construed the Con-
stitution, in their official actions during the
early years of the Republic, as authorizing
the United States to employ its Armed Forces
abroad in hostilities in the absence of any
congressional declaration of war. Their
views and actions constitute highly persua-
sive evidence as to the meaning and effect
of the Constitution. History has accepted
the interpretation that was placed on the
Constitution by the early Presidents and
Congresses in regard to the lawfulness of
hostilities without a declaration of war. The
instances of such action in our history are
numerous.
In the Korean conflict, where large-scale
hostilities were conducted with an American
troop participation of a quarter of a million
men, no declaration of war was made by
the Congress. The President acted on the
basis of his constitutional responsibilities.
While the Security Council, under a treaty
of this country?the United Nations Char-
ter?recommended assistance to the Repub-
lic of Korea against the Communist armed
attack, the United States had no treaty com-
mitment at that time obligating us to join
in the defense of South Korea. In the case
of South Vietnam we have the obligation
of the SEATO Treaty and clear expressions
of congressional support. If the President
could act in Korea without a declaration of
war, a fortiori he is empowered to do so now
in Vietnam.
It may be suggested that a declaration of
war is the only available constitutional proc-
ess by which congressional support can be
made effective for the use of U.S. Armed
Forces in combat abroad. But the Constitu-
tion does not insist on any rigid formalism.
It gives Congress a choice of ways in which
to exercise its powers. In the case of Viet-
nam the Congress has supported the deter-
mination of the President by the Senate's
approval of the SEATO Treaty, the adop-
tion of the joint resolution of August 10,
1964, and the enactment of the necessary
authorizations and appropriations.
5279
V. CONCLUSION
South Vietnam is being subjected to armed
attack by Communist North Vietnam,
through the infiltration of armed person-
nel, military equipment and regular combat
units. International law recognizes the
right of individual and collective self-de-
fense against armed attack. South Viet-
nam, and the United States upon the request
of South Vietnam, are engaged in such
collective defense of the south. Their ac-
tions are in conformity with international
law and with the Charter of the United
Nations. The fact that South Vietnam has
been precluded by Soviet veto from becom-
ing a member of the United Nations, and
the fact that South Vietnam is a zone of
a temporarily divided state, in no way di-
minish the right of collective defense of
South Vietnam.
The United States has commitments to
assist South Vietnam in defending itself
against Communist aggression from the
north. The United States gave undertak-
ings to this effect at the conclusion of the
Geneva Conference in 1954. Later . that
year the United States undertook an inter-
national obligation in the SEATO Treaty
to defend South Vietnam against Commu-
nist armed aggression. And during the past
decade the United States has given addi-
tional assurances to the South Vietnamese
Government.
The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for
a cease-fire and regroupment of contending
forces, a division of Vietnam into two zones,
and a prohibition on the use of either zone
for the resumption of hostilities or to
"further an aggressive policy." From the
beginning, North Vietnam violated* the
Geneva accords through a systematic effort
to gain control of South Vietnam by force.
In the light of these progressive North Viet-
namese violations, the introduction into
South Vietnam beginning in late 1961
of substantial U.S. military equipment and
personnel, to assist in the defense of the
south was fully justified; substantial
breach of an international agreement by
one side permits the other side to suspend
performance of corresponding obligations
under the agreement. South Vietnam was
justified in refusing to implement the pro-
visions of the Geneva accords calling for
reunification through free elections through-
out Vietnam since the Communist regime
in North Vietnam created conditions in
the north that made free elections entirely
impossible.
The President of the United States has
full authority to commit U.S. forces in the
collective defense of South Vietnam. This
authority stems from the constitutional
powers of the President. However, it is
not necessary to rely on the Constitution
alone as the source of the President's au-
thority, since the SEATO Treaty?advised
and consented to by the Senate and form-
ing part of the law of the land?sets forth
a U.S. commitment to defend South Viet-
nam against armed attack, and since the
Congress?in the joint resolution of August
10, 1964, and in authorization and appropri-
ations acts for support of the U.S. military
effort in Vietnam?has given its approval
and support to the President's actions.
United States actions in Vietnam, taken by
the President and approved by the Con-
gress, do not require any declaration of
war, as shown by a long fine of precedents
for the use of U.S. Armed Forces abroad in
the absence of any congressional declara-
tion of war.
RETIREMENT OF SENATOR
McNAMARA
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I wish to
extend best wishes to my friend and col-
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Approifedff Or Release._ 20 SiOM
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341144-9n,114Rfouni....._ _ 3 .3 TAxii,c3,3PPPAPE 0.2,1313,Eqx,
, ,wnere I-le as peen cnairman. Appa; ently there's to be _rio income tax
rears-6nd o'n'the rgliqj #oon,for,,p tayq_pg,..who_tee1....tile aexcgt_.
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*Tflys :Iowa "13ST6rtuffatgrY, -actriiintsfrafioxi"
s' gatkikalid 9iiiEnel - haed-torpedoed Senator RIBT-COFF'S efforts to
-1 - ?-,,, .rt . eomnu--..- te-----es. As a- - get congressional approval of. a maximum
.., _.,,e2 01;2..4. ...., -s. ?r if- - tax -eredit of $325 for certain college ex-
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? any ricnce Of' ?Edx ab-alement; unrad
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on iiiiia-tafvPeriliacrYi:edigtin-a the-teed_ for -whfch the tax is levied die-
.t9,z-r nigving -my -ttale- of'appaars, granting relief only means that the
.. ,., . . ,.1 I ,.,-,, ! , .,a ... burden will fall elsewhere. Furthermore,
;
every time a particular category of taxpayers trirr? CP:148C-1: '- ytt-4 2:' tierain'drngs4mteeme- --' 492 etlial-privPted -ilegp group is established.
(in this case parents) a new
as: s? aril- plritr6:es mii?1-AUffe-s.-Milt ft- Howe ver the Cate or that Senator
as Eg credit nIBICOF:r is trifili :LO ciep
Lin the vast inid.-
443grAM'eae - 'Class; poi 1i fall most
litally.
'Pa 'to 11. - WIC fob; al-fill-lei:las-been, -Our tax laws today are honeycombed with
' e:,te'"' ei ec -' -...1 -el 13- exceptions, exemptions, and special advan-
' "r ' - albo (Hi' ? ei. ?- tags& for people of wealth and business in-
, .. i 44.? .
j-,- 11 r ?an filo Con:, ,tcre,,tp ;3,1?: tcunAtnSAin high:priced lobbyists
; road'an-struc ioriLan-Vpol- in :Fl.shinron to ylead their case. There
-th 1:7111ted is n o such lobby for the min-le-crass parent.
4P11 t:441111?41 itifiraify, even 11* all atairipts fan -thi-S:
? A_Tgl,,1* e t-? car,,ust
scor TratrOo'ff h"-
e says, ' doesn't Intend
? ;2'1, - felax efforts to get some kind of tax
7,veir:ka...k.ogri.?,?6?; Ei-s- relief for college costs. He says he will make
his_tax credit proposal "year in and year
P7 nalimi*:116:11??a chit!. beca,use_ikeik Altre
Niu?,..eyeukually realize_ som2thing must be
cf-the Alarm acii- done.
ppm Act, public We never in`cike' any substantial gains
`1.` te fax relief until a' sweeping-tax reform pro-
ayero.o.4.,u4op._, ,4,nd ??).vp., ,
-grastvisTsininnea: --This Congress has long
on control acts
g. ...--- --',. _ :-.z.: 4,:,'',4?- refused to do. The pleas of able and dis-
e1Q- of a.: '...4, '1'NvP?b V-1';'",:: *Anguished men to do something construe-
' .thtitb 4. Et.:- elauu . t..-i.:: U? se about our hodgepodge of tangled ta x
1
ha,,,,,rAarE= .
ea
1S-Eirn. e fare'
114 -61:11`"- 'IllE'llStoRGANTZED
CIA
,;.41:11.g Abg. ATI A .111 AAA ' talfk L ?
of pr ant M. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
- 4.-a? YittOs...9f AT 1?19.,. *liiirasident, the Central Intelligence ; Agen-
LOU: 111s1 ,YF4P : uudouhtedly the most misrepre-
. _ _
-.AA, a -slanted and maligned Agency of our Gov-
-:NPT9S53.1:ti-e!-PA-r-T3 eminent.
_ -.This is understandable because they
cirl?tfirig,_" f.2.. *axe in the business of gathering
vlw-q W?44.ud:`, -.game from an over the world. They are
? ?? ysv-ulnerabla .t9 attack because it
Jaag.long been the policy of the CIA?and
r-1 s tbAk rightfully attempt
waltliO"extP4Ay d 'is':(t;r41*-t(t) t9
e_ '3.*er W:a a47-?s
are
AT ,AMARA and: and' beSt'
_ ur Pr ident, I was pleased to read. a
_,,Viaves,, the_ nne. n in 'The Waling n '13-6St" Lair
e? floe I ?
-oVfOit n440' s
''4?11111 nil 4
.e.,.ess ? ' .... es:* :.,J - ..043=TV.T.aklilg P...PtQL.P.14.?ide Skills."
.., .
k r. ?ple, I enl,, al-, ' their operatftins?an it is consfirerabTe?
.,,l' ,. 3-4rf:,...PN.,, Aly.jr.. noicjge of the CIA -an
ved
- roRR'sa to,iprpv 3,3 a tai I` istilleve this article to be an accurate
co ext,Tultion war not" ad-' Mitt fair appraisal of the CIA and I wish
!Aenaa 41:est-a-da,;:the fssiie- -to itssociate my-self with the comments
to n ; -: ? ., (::41,:re."14n 1 uCfc, be- 'Of Mr. White and especially with refer-
le
, 0 r- W7,1, : 0 ? " ( -'-' 01 . I yi 1j "fl! tb-its Director, Admiral Raborn.
d'ilr'Si? .t3'r? b rigs vespers., e y needed- `'-lCfr:Pre:Si -sTenT,1' ik iiianithous c-On-:.
" 2 '3- am r4f'llft **keit ? 44141stti
; . e, itter."fteo-fgaiirze
TE March 10, 1966
sent to have this article inserted in the
/Imolai as a Valt-Of my remarks.
abjection,, the article-
was ordered obe printed-in the &coin,
as f9110.1Y.
Etzosoaropa) 0,;,474-41:46kpasm,pag', ourshos,,
SXcmLS
_
(By William S. White)
lie highly secret Central Intelligence
A_geney is broadening its communication.
with Congress, with private American scien-
Vista% aria with -Ainerfeali.
Almost, indeed, it might be said that CIA
- Is for the first time gingerly entering or-
dinary American life?or as much of that
ordinary life as its unavoidably clandestine
basic cast can possibly permit.
This, the most sensitive of the instrumen-
talities of the American Government in the
cold war has not, of course, dropped and
? cannot drop its inherent cloak-and-dagger
' co-verrnvor some operations.
- Within the limits of bedrock and unalter-
able security precautions, however, Adm.
W. F. Reborn, its Director, has reorganized
its whole inner structure and approach to
make a wide use of outside skills and
talents?and information?never before so
widely available to CIA.
The production of scientific and technical
intelligence, in consequence, has been im-
--mensely increased. This has been princi-
pally through the cooperation of world-
famous American men of science who have
been brought in as cleared consultants.
Some American industrial concerns have
made large direct contributions of their own.
That Raborn, a professional admiral yet,
has become the chief of the CIA in order to
liquidate some of its old passion for extreme
apartness is not without its irony. When
he took over the Agency there was much ex-
pressed fear that with a military mind at its
head it would more and more tend to operate
in darker and darker alleys.
The simple truth is that this has not
'happened. Nor has Raborn put in some GI
system requiring endless saluting of the boss.
In truth he has gone to the reverse. CIA
was never so little a one-man operation as
it is now. The admiral has given to the
professional operative who is his deputy,
Richard Helms, a degree of power never be-
fore held by any man other than the Director
himself.
Re/rns, in truth, actually conducts the day-
by--day operations of the Agency. He sits as
the CIA representative on the U.S. combined
.datelligence Board. He, as well as Reborn,
briefs Members of Congress. The admiral, in
short, cheerfully acknowledges Helms' supe-
rior savvy as a career intelligence operative.
Raborn's simple purpose has been to merge
his own executive managerial experience with
the intelligence expertise of Richard Helms.
The intelligence community is a small and
at heart a closed community and the intro-
duction into CIA of a seadog outsider un-
doubtedly did not sit well at first within the
ranks. But the best information available
BOW is that professional morale is high and
'not low. This, at any rate, is the estimate
-of men not involved in the agency but with
certain supervisory powers over it.
- The admiral seems to have found a way of
running a taut ship without making it also a
,Anartial one?and a ship, moreover, which
can take On Outside and puiery civilian pas-
sengers occasionally with no harm to them
'Or to the professional crew.
One Other fact is perhaps 'Worth noting:
Not once in Raborn's regime has CIA been
caught napping in any major outbreak of
trouble for us around the world.
One of his creations, a new form of special
intelligence task force for special needs, in-
? volving senior operations officers from all
arms of American intelligence, is on 24-hour
1 1
II
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Marsh 10, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
attain. His unfailing courage and his
relentless determination contributed
greatly to the position of eminence this
country enjoys throughout the world.
-
In every sense of the word, he was the
guardian of the Treasury and placed his
stamp of personal integrity on many ma-
jor fiscal decisions of this country in
modern times.
It was my good fortune, before his re-
tirement, to have had frequent discus-
sions with this outstanding man from
Virginia, and I well remember I was con-
sistently given better understanding,
clearer insight, increased strength, and
encouragement as a result of our friend-
ship and those conversations.
Harry Flood Byrd was surely the fore-
most champion in our time of the cause
of a balanced budget, fiscal responsibility
and stability of a National Government.
His was a difficult and often personally
painful role in an age when spending
has become synonymous with votes and
when there is cause to wonder whether
taxpayers appreciate the savings of bil-
lions of dollars by men such as Senator
Byrd.
I think that his type of service will
prove enduring and that appreciation
of his devotion will grow with the years.
Surely, none can doubt that our coun-
try is stronger for his devotion to it.
Mr. President, it is my wish that
Harry Flood Byrd live out his years in
peace and good health in his beloved
Virginia which he so ably represented.
I also hold every confidence that his
example will prove an inspiration to h's
family, his State, and his Nation.
POSTMASTER GENERAL O'BRIEN
SPEAKS ON VIETNAM
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, many
millions of words have been spoken and
written about the Vietnam conflict since
this Nation committed itself to help
South Vietnam more than a decade ago.
But one of the finest public expressions
of our national policy on Vietnam was
made February 25 at Des Moines, Iowa,
by Postmaster. General Lawrence F.
O'Brien.
I urge each and every one of my Senate
colleagues to read Mr. O'Brien's words
very carefully. I respectfully ask unani-
mous consent to have the full text of the
Postmaster General's remarks at the
Iowa congressional fundraising gala to
be included in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
ADDRESS BY POSTMASTER GENERAL LAWRENCE F.
O'BRIED7 AT THE IOWA CONGRESSIONAL FUND-
RAISING GALA, DES MOINES, IOWA, FEBRUARY
26, 1966
It's good to be with you tonight.
One of President Johnson's favorite say-
ings is that "An ounce of work is worth
pounds of words." Hard work is the secret
of a President's success, of a nation's success,
and certainly of a party's success. And to-
night this gala is celebrating the results of
hard work in the past as well as anticipating
and preparing for the important tasks that
lie ahead.
Of course, we don't lack for evidence that
you have performed diligently and that your
diligence has paid real dividends.
Democrats, through hard work, took poor
seeds of farm recession planted by Republican
farm policy and produced a Democratic State
legislature for the first time in 30 years as
well as a great bumper crop of Democratic
Congressinen. in Washington.
The rollcall is certainly impressive.
BANDSTRA, CULVER, GREGG, HANSEN, SCHMID-
HAUSER, and SMITH?each and every one of
them an energetic and effective Congressman
who is making his influence, and your in-
fluence, felt in Washington every legislative
day.
And, of course, while we are calling the roll
of leadership, let me salute your great Gov-
ernor, Harold Hughes, and your outstanding
State chairman, Lex Hawkins.
This evening I want to discuss a subject
of great concern to all Americans, no matter
where they live, no matter how they vote.
The subject is Vietnam.
During my 5 years in the White House,
I saw this problem grow with ever increas-
ing intensity. It became more and more
menacing. It claimed a large portion of
President Kennedy's daily attention, as it is
now claiming President Johnson's.
While the scope of the conflict in Viet-
nam may continue, while the violence and
terrorism may go on, while the demands on
our patience and our strength may remain,
I can tell you from my close association
with President Kennedy and with President
Johnson that one element is unchanged:
our commitment to "pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe, to assure the sur-
vival of the success of liberty."
On October 26, 1961, President Kennedy
said: "The United States is determined to
help Vietnam preserve its independence,
protect its people against Communist
assassins, and build a better life through
economic growth." And he added "we know
that the future of the Vietnamese people is
not Communist slavery but the freedom and
prosperity which they have defended and
pursued throughout their history."
In February 1962, in a message to the
Vietnamese people for their New Year's cele-
bration, President Kennedy reiterated that
pledge, saying: "Let me assure you of our
continued assistance in the development of
your capabilities to maintain your freedom
and to defeat those who wish to destroy
that freedom."
And in October 1963, he showed that in-
creasing Communist aggression had only
strengthened our resolve to see a free Viet-
nam. "The security of South Vietnam,"
President Kennedy declared, "is a major in-
terest of the United States as of other free
nations. We will adhere to our policy of
working with the people and Government
of South Vietnam to deny this country to
communism and to suppress the externally
stimulated and supported insurgency of the
Vietcong. Effective performance in this un-
dertaking is the central objective of our
policy in South Vietnam."
Why did President Kennedy?and Presi-
dent Eisenhower before him?choose to com-
mit this Nation to defend a country so far
from our shores? Why is President Johnson
continuing that commitment?
Why didn't these three Presidents choose
instead to say, as did Chamberlain, that we
should not be concerned over a faraway coun-
try and about a people of whom we know
little? Chamberlain told the British people
that he brought them peace, and that they
should "Go home and get a nice quiet sleep."
Chamberlain and many others did not rec-
ognize that Czechoslovakia was the front
line of England. They did not see that a
scrap of paper signed at Munich would soon
mean, not a nice quiet sleep, but bombs in
Manchester.
History is full of examples of dead socie-
ties that did not learn the harsh lessons of
existence.
5287
One of the lessons of existence in this 20th
century is that appeasement is but a down-
payment on a mortgage that comes due
quickly and is payable in blood.
Former President Harry Truman remem-
bered Chamberlain and Munich when he
stopped communism in Korea.
His three successors were guided by the
lessons of history in choosing to support
freedom in Vietnam. One of President Ken-
nedy's favorite stories dealt with Samuel
Adams, who later started a little party of
his own with some tea in Boston Harbor.
Sam Adams went to call on the British
Governor after the Boston massacre. The
Governor warned of mass arrests. Sam
Adams replied that Americans would not
knuckle under to threats and told the Gov-
ernor that we would fight. Later, he wrote
in his diary, "I saw his knees tremble."
It was not Sam Adams' knees that
trembled.
For he was on the side of freedom.
And today, our knees must not tremble;
our eyes must see clearly that failure to pro-
tect freedom in Vietnam will not end the
Communist appetite for conquest.
Ho W much better for France to have
marched into the Rhineland in 1936, than
to go down to defeat in 1940.
How much better for England to have sup-
ported its Czech ally in 1938 instead of nar-
rowly averting invasion in 1940.
How much better it was to face down Rus-
sian missiles in Cuba in 1962, without trem-
bling knees, than to permit the Communists
to blackmail our Nation.
How much better to say, "this far and no
further," in Vietnam today than to have to
draw the line again and again tomorrow, and
tomorrow, always closer to our shores.
Let us remember that in defending Viet-
nam we are defending Iowa, and Massachu-
setts, and all the free world.
In sending our fighting men to Vietnam
we are assuring that far greater numbers are
not called to fight, elsewhere, on another day
at a greater cost.
President Johnson has said: "We did not
choose to be the guardians at the gate, but
there is no one else."
Yes, my friends, there is no one else.
If we do not show the same fortitude now
that has marked us in other times and other
crises there is no one else and there may be
no other time.
In 1823 we could issue a Monroe Doctrine
secure in the knowledge that a British fleet
would uphold our brave words.
But in 1966, there is no other fleet, no
other force, with the will and with the power.
Ti we do not stand firm, who will? If we
cannot support freedom in Vietnam, who
will?
If we cannot keep our commitment to that
embattled nation, where will we keep it?
If we do not keep our trust with those
who trust us now who will trust us or rely
on us in the future?
If we look for some corner to hide our
trembling knees while we let South Vietnam
disappear will the appetite of communism
decrease or will it grow?
These are the hard questions I saw John
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson grapple
with.
They are not easy questions and those
who suggest easy answers are not serving
the Nation or solving the problems.
Thirty years ago this State was in the
heartland of American Isolationism. I think
we have all come along, long way since then.
For most Americans realize that whether
they live in Iowa or in Massachusetts, they
are united in the quest for a lasting peace
with honor. It must, however, be a peace
that will once and for all convince the ag-
gressor that we mean business, that we will
not sit on our hands while freedom is de-
stroyed.
In a forceful summary of our policy, Pres-
ident Johnson once said: "We don't want
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