TRANSCRIPT OF DD/C'S REMARKS TO NSCID 5 COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000600160016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 30, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: i
4t A,) k
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 to ' WHICH MAY BE USED.
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l"7
I have arsked you all to return this morning because it seemed
after further reflection, that consideration of this probes
by any smaller working group at this tines would not actually be
ecot ical of either time or effort. Some further explanation seests
desirable and this group #bow to be the best place for it at this tom.
the first place, the proposals contained in the O I draft working
paper advanced here last week would have the effect of creating at least
four co-equal clandestine services with responsibility for clandestine
operations and activities in the foreigee field. These proposals would
practically eliminate the
ubstitute what would be in affect mare cooperation by mutual, if not
ace and counterintellig'ACe operations and activities, and vault
rdicating responsibility of the Director
of Central Intelligence in the field of foreign clandestine intelli-
wore confusion in the field of liaison with foreign clandestine
services than has existed heretofore. In effect, these proposals
t ,lyys uaanimou1 agreement. These proposals would also result in
mmuat to retrogression to the situation that existed in the
ace caamminity prior to 1947) which in fact led to the peasage
of the National Defense Act of 1947 and the creation of the intelligence
ity as it now exists.
The concepts represented in the CIII draft working paper are
obviously contrary to the intent of Congress in passing the National
Defense Act of 19e7 and the National Security Council Directives issued
to implement that intent. The concepts are certainly contrary to the
SECRET
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ass of every Task lbrce, Dowd., and Committee vhich has
astral. Intelligence Agency a the Intelligence
the past ton years. fibre specifically, these concepts
trary to the letter and the spirit of the ndations of the
of Consultants on reign Intelligence - the Killian
Committee - i lich V e" approved by the President in person and which
an referred by him to the various elements of the Intelligence
Ccamaztty for action. This a pt of four or >aQrat prsctically
co-aeqtal clandestine services ~ with practically co-e i rasponsil ilitiea
d of foreign intelligence and nterintelligsnce vould
re sent a retrogression in the development of the 1mrican Intelligence
ty that I cannot inegina anyone proposing seriously to the
President and the Nationa3. Security Council. Knowing General lisenhower
I voutd certainly not v ant to be the bearer end
of any such proposal
perfectly obvrious, therefore, that any discussion of a
revision of SID 5 dealing with espionage and counter intelligence
start from the basic and fcndawental principle that the
t . national clandestine service that performs functions of cast
concern in the fields of espionage and counterintelligence ? Since the
departments and agencies, especially the will tary commands in foreign
areas wi3?l have need for espion of a tactical nature in var time,
It sea obvious that this services should maintain capabilities in
U40 field. the problem of UM 5 is to spell out the broad instructs
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we sherd give to the InteUigmmc5 C ity regarding the
a raesponeibilities in this field and the d rat principles
Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate
in this field.
When tee came to the consideraatiOa of the drectmcnt ehich gavertaas
instructions ebtob the Intellige t ? *mmmity sb*41A e
fiost the i in this field, there are four in points to consider:
am-P,, camtetiatelligeanee, coordintion, and liaison with foreign
cj&VA&stis services. A en a deternias the principles that should
spliced in each of these fields in the interest Of the
security a the intel3.igsnce coeessasity, the reawainder of our
*oc *nt aboitild present no particular difficulty.
br=* ping on I vmld like to elk if =W other service
#; > tiOfl such as the navy forking g + aces produced to 2%03 iit
Jet us consider first, the first paragr of the ouutstandies
5 end the first paragr of the revision proposed by CIA. This
aph rasaagesisms a vatic" cla estine service to conduct all
fo ig~a espieneagc to suet the needs of the a e-r>tments and agencies as
service of a esan concern. lbeesvsr, it also re iss that
services particularly should maintain capabilities in this fiel
this right is re .sed by the term "agreed activities" ehich aEt only
ice L s but velemes service participation provided only that these
activities are coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence.
S?EI -
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p u soml opinion t U" will be no mtrqpessics trace the
iplers. When wt wider pareirapb 1 therefore,, the Oaj
anwis for discussion are same further deiisaation, perb*ps of vbat
"sd activities" --`t what w NOW by it.
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NOW C
I have asked you all to return this morning because it seemed to me,,
after further reflection, that consideration of this problem by any
smaller working group at this time would not actually be economical of
either time or effort. Some further explanation seems desirable and
this group seems to be the best place for it at this time.
In the first place, the proposals contained in the ONI draft working;
paper advanced here last meek would have the effect of creating at least
four co-equal clandestine services with responsibility for clandestine
operations and activities in the foreign field. These proposals would
practically eliminate the coordinating responsibility of the Director
of Central Intelligence in the field of foreign clandestine intelligence
and counterintelligence activities, and would substitute what could be,,
in effect, mere cooperation by mutual if not actually unanimous agreements.
These proposals would also result in more confusion in the field of
liaison with foreign clandestine services than has existed heretofore.
in effect, these proposals would amount to retrogression to the situation
that existed in the intelligence community prior to 197, which led to
the passage of the Rational Defense Act of 1947 and to the creation of
the intelligence community as it now exists.
The concepts represented in the ONI draft working paper are contrary
to the intent of Congress in passing the National Defense Act of 1947
and the National Security Council Directives issued to implement that
intent. The concepts are certainly contrary to the recommendations of
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ILLEGIB
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3-E WC-R-E-T
every Task Force, Board, and Committee which has invesstiga'5d the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Commtuaity during
the.fit, ten years. More specifically, these concepts are contrary
to t letter and the spirit of the Recommendations of the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence - the Killian Committee -
which were approved by the President in person and which have been
referred .by him to the various elements of the intelligence cuanmoutaiay
for action. This concept of four or more practically co -equal clandes-
tine:.-services, with practically co-equal responsibilities in the field
of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, would repr sent a
retrOgsion in the development of the American Intelligence Community
that.I cannot imagine anyone proposing seriously to the president and
the . National Security Council. Knowing General. Eisenhower as I have
known him, I would certainly not want to be the bearer and advocate
of. any such proposal .
It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that any discussion of a
revision of NSCID 5 dealing with espionage and counterintelligence
abroad has to start from the basic and fundamental principle that the
CIA is the national clandestine service that performs functions of
common concern in the fields of espionage and counterintell-iga"nce
Since the departments and agencies, especially the military cods
in foreign areas, will have need for espionage of a tactical nature
in war time it seems obvious that the services should maintain
.capabilities in this field. The problem of NSCID 5 is to spell out
.the broad instructions which the 1SC should give to the Intelligence
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S-E-C-R-E..T
Connunity regarding relative responsibilities in this field and the,
general principles which will enable the Director of Central Xntell.i-
gence to coordinate activities in this field.
When we come to the consideration of the document which governs
the broad instructions which the Intelligence Community should expect
from the ISC in this field, there are four main points to consider:
espionage, counterintelligence, coordination, and liaison with foreign
clandestine services. When we determine the principles that should
and must be applied in each of these fields in the interest of the
national security and the intelligence community, the remainder of our
document should present no particular difficulty.
Let us consider first, the first paragraph of the outstanding p6CITJ 5
and the first paragraph of the revision proposed by CIA. This paragrap1
recognizes a national clandestine service to conduct all foreign
espionage to meet the needs of the departments and agencies as a
service of common concern. It also recognizes., however, that the
military services should maintain capabilities in this field. This
right is recognized by the term "agreed activities" which not only
implies but welcc-mes service participation provided only that these
activities are coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence.
In my persona). opinion there will be no retrogression from these
basic principles. When we consider paragraph 1 therefore, the only
arses for discussion is some further delineation, perhaps, of that is
included in "agreed activities".
-3-
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No Ch'ag'In Class. ^ `' /~
F] Decl2s. Itled
Class. Changed to: TS
Auth.: HR 70
-
~f l
Date: 67
;:AIT
Z4 July 19
Wi IONAL SECUT I"iY COUNCIL TNTELLICtENCE DIPS IVE NO-
and Coun1x: in l7.ig ence
's 71 araa?n r roc tei The feel-knit verbiage is from the CIA draft
2Z 9 July 1957 nd not the present NSCT. boa M
s't*reuant to the provisions of Seabiou 102(d) of the Native,
Se rity Act of 19473, as emended,. the National Security Courtil hh:> ity
L.utho :?:zos arr d directs the :
1. The Central I itelligence Agency shall conduct ttonui s i.c~ .
we M ra~t~.at outciae t ' - i e United States. and its possessions . i n c rda - v~ - :
:atS:i-,'t cX"3m s.a'?' ",..* ? "'v '73i'' T3S1.Zf~'?` '~~t~i~$9' E~+C:t$.k-'3V' iZrJ` 4:.c:i'3-^$' e '1`kT3 " 8`:"?~' -. 's o
d !~.a
3c3 1SfV int 9 # t t3 rt3 irG efltf# re3.a1.r to the National SE'Cl ' L. r
BEM'pasrU its and other a envies may condualb es-Liona o erat t .s catsac fs t.15
i.StlM~'~Y!xyiaaRS+asAYS+:MME:.~~~..ew#as..s~+!iw.o~Yirsrwm....va+.a+~.v t~~- B ..m -t .+nv w'w?z .w, z:rr
rn ~, ed S ies and its possess aaxs . order to ksfv, s ciepE 4 l ir-I-A0,
aS'y'3J"~"r'.?~.'7+'SS~~'s
~~~;~ne~:ce~~;~~eeses~,.~~~..e:A..~he~~~o'~e~~tha~-~e3ati .~~~-~~~
wee
2., The CIA shall conduct ~ counterIntellgence Q rat= e si; c~a
,bhe United Sates and its possessions' e - a~ r eea t a s =off : n
: s` ~iy~ sE ' ' 3:'$S?~." C34 ~~8~t91 Y^ 3~.~sc zai3 nOCe.S-,s= the Ilk"? r 3a+ ,
of nattion