MR. ALLEN DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000500080002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 15, 1964
• Content Type: TRANS

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
3333 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W., WASHINGTON 8, D. C
FOR
CNNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PROGRAM Contemporaneous STATION WAMU-VM
March 150 1964 .5:00 PeM* CITY Washington, D. C.
MR, ALLEN DULTAS
ANNOUNCER: "Good afternoon, and'welcome to Contemporaneous*
Todai we present a talk by Mr, Allen W* Dulles, former Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency. ?Ibis was part of the Harvard
Law School Forum devoted to this topics which inc1udedeParticipants0
Professor Thomas Sehelling0 Department of Economics, and Harvard
Professor Milton Katz, as well ELS Henry L. Stimson,'Professor of
Law* Mr, Dulles spoke at the Harvard Law School Forum held on the
27th of January, 1964. The moderator for this particular Harvard
law school forum was Professor Arthur T. Von Mehren, The Professor
will introduce Mr0.Dulles*"
DATE
VON MEHREN: "My function for the evening are essentially of
a housekeeping nature. I would like to introduce to you very briefly
both the topic an. our principal speaker. Our tonight's topic) for
discussion, the role of intelligence in policy making, is I think
susceptibld'of a good many interpretations, I wondered when I was
first called on the phone about it, juut what waa really involved*
Within its ample contours, one could take up such problems as those,
What is the optimum intelligence quotient for policy makers? Do
the more intelligent policy makers reach in .general, better decisions?
Or, whet are the relative roles of ratiocination and intuition in the
decision making process?
? "However, and this will doubtless relieve many of you -- the
name and career of our principal speaker for tonight suggests quite
another emphasis.
(LAUGHTER)
"A man who served with the office of Strategic Services during
World War 110 and who was DePutyeDirector, Central Intelligence
Agency 1951 through 1953, and the Director of that agency from /953
through 1961 -- though certainly not uninterested in these more
eheoretidal and philosophical problems, is doubtless here tonight to
discuss with us some aspects of what, in simpler and cruder days
was called espionage*
"If the year were 19239 and the closest counterpart to Allen .
Dulles that the United States had at that period were addressing us,
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" OFFICES IN: NEW YORK DETROIT ? LOS ANGELES ? WASHINGTON D. C. SAN FRANCISCO' NEW ENGLAND ? CHICAGO
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.. a
we might be In for an evening of adventure and romanoe. At least
to some one growing up In the 1930I8e World War I espionage was
symbolized by such romantic, and at least when portrayed by Greta
Garbo, beautiful spies as Mati Hari. Perhaps Mr. Dulles will
discuss among other things how much the world has changed in this
respect since World War lo How large a component a modern in-
telligence work still has this flavor of romance and adventure, or
has the world here too, as in so many other areas of life, become
more routineized and less the stage on which soldiers of fortune
play out individual dramas.
"Even if I am correct in assuming that Mr. Dulles will discuss
tonight the theory and practice of modern intelligence activities,
Pm not sure just what aspects of that topic will primarily concern
him during the relatively short time that he baa to address us tonight.
Perhaps if I had had the opportunity to 'read his new book, 'The Craft
of Intolligencees I would be in a better position to guess. I
suspect moreover that his co-panelists Professor Schelling and
Professor Katz may view the problem from still other angles than those
presented by Mr. Dulles.
"The role of intelligence in policy making could be approached
essentially in terms of the intelligence process. What kinds of
material tall under the jurisdiction of intelligence services? How
is this material gathered? And how is it evaluated for presentation
to the persons ultimately charged with formulating policy? What
dimensions do they add to understanding? Do those materials do more
than reinforce policies that would be reached on general analysis
based on unclassified materials. Again, it will be interesting to
consider the risks inherent in intelligence services. Do the services
have a tendency to develop their own conceptions of national policy
with the resulting danger of using intelligence materials in some
degree to persuade, rather than merely to inform those who are charged
with making policy.
"Is there any danger that those working within the Intelligence
Agency, shielded as they must be from public gaze and criticism,
will lose their balance in judgment and so impair the value of, or
even render dangerous their work? One further aspect of the problem
could be suggested. How effectively do those who make policy use
intelligence materials? Do they know enough about the intelligence
process? Its strength and weaknesses, to understand the end product
and to use it wisely? Can this product be presented to them in
,sufficient detail, so that they are able to rely .upon it as an
element in reaching their conclusions. Indeed, to what extent can and
do individuals make policy in the government of our modern, highly
complex societies. Is policy making sometimes or, often really a kind
of corporate consensus, articulated through the policy maker? And
If policy making has this corporate quality, how can the intelligence
services participate in achieving and then refiaing the consensus that
is policy?
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"With such problems as these in mind, we can, I think, look
forward to a most interesting evening with our three panelists?
Our first speaker, Allen Wo Dulles was born in 1893, educated at
Princeton and then at George Washington University, from which he
received his LLD. His distinguished career in government service
goes back to /9160 when he entered the U. S. diplomatic service.
From 1922 through 19260 he served in the State Department as chief
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. In 1926 and 1927, and
again in 1932 and '33, he was a delegate to the Geneva Disarmament
conferences. From 1926 until World War II Mr. Dulles practiced law
with Sullivan and Cromwell, as I've already mentioned he served
during World War II with the Office of Strategic Services.
"From 1951 to 1961 he was Deputy Director and then Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. In this crowded career he has found
time to write four booka,'all related to international affairs and
intelligence activities. 'Can We Be Neutral?' 1935. 'Can America
Stay Neutral?' 1939 -- he had become leas optimistic with the passage
of time. oGermany's Underground,' 1947 -- I suppose a reflection of
the fact that we did not stay neutral. And most recently 'The Craft
of Intelligence,' -- I don't know whether this has any implication,
either for the past ar the future. Among his many honors are honorary
degrees from several universities* including Columbia and Princeton.
He is also an officer of the Legion 0 Honneur. It is a great pleasure
to introduce to you a distinguished member of a distinguished family,
Allen W. Dulles."
(APPLAUSE)
DULLES: "Professor Von Mehren, distinguished panel, President,
ladies and gentlemen. I wish I felt that I could meet all of the ?
requirements that were placed upon me by the Introduction. I will
deal with some of these subjects. As to my topics you know in
Intelligence, we.often use what we call case cover, and this is really
a cover topic.. I don't really plan to discuss that subject very
particularly, because I hope to persuade you that it is net the job
of the intelligence services to make policy. It is the job to submit
the information on which one hopes sometimes vainly, that a policy
may be made.
"But I appear before you tonight In part, as a lawyer, because
as you will note, I just want to make stare you did note in the intro-
dUction, it was indicated that I practiced lama Since now I'm on my
own, and not supported by the government, I am out in the search of
clients -- (LAUGHTER) and I don't wish to be known solely as an
intelligence officer, but also as a lawyer -- a little out of date ?
possibly, but still. I have been asked recently to so back on a sad
and difficult task, se_ a member of the Commission the President has
appointed under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of the United
States, to look into the circumstances surrounding the assassination
of President Kannody, and to see whether we can Contribute to an -
understanding -.a popular understanding -- of the facts when and if
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we can find them. And maybe, to contribute in some way to lessoning
the chances of a recurrondo of these sad events that have struck
down presidents in this country too often, and which have only
-
narrowly .failed on several occasions
"Since this matter is more or lesa sub judice, I will net
really go into it any further thanto say that the panel is seriously
starting its work those next few days and it will have to take some
little time because we obviously cannot proceed with certain phases
of it as long as the Ruby case is pending.
"I am going hero tonight, to present the case for an American
intelligence service, one patterned somewhat along the lines of the -
one that we have under the National Security Act of 1947. The panel.
and you will be sort of judge and juries. I expect to say some
provocative things, and I hope that I shall be adequately attacked
and given a further chance to defend myself and I can always say that
if you don't agree with me, in what I have said, just please buy My
book -- you needn't road it necessarily -- and therein you will find
the answers to all of your problems.
"I want to start out, and as a lawyer and speaking to lawyers
and their-friends0.at this great law school, that I admit that certain
types of intelligence, work are not tainted by any legality at all.
And if one trios to fit them in to our ideas of international law, or
in certain respects demestic law, one will fail. If we did not have
a world which was almost ono-third communist, and which Was not .
guided by or considered itself subject to the principles of law that
? we respect and honor ourselves, waybo we Wouldn't have to have .an -
intelligence service. But in a world such as we have today, in a
world wherein the aoviet Union .e- they surround all their preparations
for war behind a veil of secrecy -- we have to choose between trying
to be informed as to what they are doing, or expose ourselves to
possibly a sudden surprise attack with weapons, the danger of which
we might not otherwise have realized.
"I admit -e and I shall give my credentials here, but cut it
doWn a bit,- because your chairman has already been very generous in
what he has said about me - I admit to being a very prejudiced
witness. I believe firmly in an intelligence service. I worked in
it not only in the last ten years, but I really Started working in it
. many years before, even in World War I. I got into it in a way,
because of the consequences of a rather tragic mistake that I made. one of the Mistakes I made -- that I may have ?profited from. Years
.ago in 1917, Narch, 1917, I was then In the diplomatic service,? I
had been in Austria, the Austro-ungarian Empire. in,Vienna and. I
wee-then transferred $:rom Vienna to Bern, just before we Went into the
'war in 1917 in April. I was then in Switzerlaad,.and one day one
of my colleagues, wiser than Ia whose name unfortunately I ?mgt.
remember, COMB up to me and said that he was goingto -Zurichi about
? ,
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tuo hours ride by train from Bern, he was 'going over there to see a
man who had a new theory. About all he knew about him was that he
was a little man in size, and had a beard. I asked his namee and
he said it was something like Ilich something like Ilich
but it was, better known as Lenin.
"I said to him that I had that day a rather important tennis
game that I was going to play, and I thought Id get my information
on the bearded man with a theory, later. I missed the chance then
of seeing Vladimir Ilich Lenin. I never had another one. And I can
assure you that since then I have seen all kinds of queer people,
with and without beards. I didnvt want to pass up another chance
such as that, and on the whole Dye profited from it. Item had my
leg -pulled from time to time, but it helped me to be able to judge'
people, and judgment of people is one of the great keys to intelli-
genes.
"After that I worked really as an intelligence officer. I was
technically a diplomat, but I. really was an intelligence officer in
World War I, working for Switzerland, I had to cover the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the reports of what was going on there, because
I had been there, Then at Versailles, and just before the Versailles
Peace Conference an opportunity to follow and do some modest bit of
work on what I think was one of the great psychological warfare
operations of al/ time, the negotiations of Woodrow Wilson leading to
the Armistice of 1918.
"How different it was in that war than In the second World War.
Here Wilson, before the days of radio, before the days of television,
before the days when mass media could quickly have such an impact on
people and peoples, Wilson by his doctrines, which he did get over to
the German people, undermined the hemefront, so that despite all that
Ludendorff can do, and many complaints did he address back to the
front, the home front, he said the military home frontvs all right --
wove had a few knocks, but still the front is intact. And in fact
the war did end then, at a time when the German armies were in
retreat but still intact. How different, as I say, World War II.
think Woodrow Wilsons policy was the wiser one, than that one we
followed with unconditional surrender in World War II, but that is a
matter that is subject to discussion,
"In any event, certainly we were influenced by an entirely false
theory that was then spread abroad, that the reason that the Germans
had, after Versailles, had turned and rearmed, and then.reattacked
Western Europe, because we hadnvt really dealt with them in World War
I. I think thatvs an entirely false theory. Maybe we didnvt deal
with theth wisely in the Treaty of Versailles, and I don't think we
did, but in any event that waa not fully the reason, and I doubt .
whether we achieved .,by our policies at the end of World War II all
that we had hoped or might have achieved with a slightly different
policy. But I don't want to spend too much time on that.
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"Before the war, the days leading up to World War II, it seems
to mo there were three .or four main failures that we had, of in-
telligence appraisal, and with 'we I include of course, the Western
European powers most immediately involved. We failed to understand
the implications of the communist menace. I was at the Paris Peace
Conference at the time of the Bill Bullitt mission. Bill Bullitt
went to Russia, brought back some proposals -- pretty bad proposals,
may say from Lenin and Trotsky -- but still they were the only
proposals that were available at that time, and when he came back to
Paris that spring of 1919, nobody had the time even to talk with him,
and he went down to the Riviera and shook the dust of the Paris Peace
Conference off his foot. I think that was a mistake -- I think if he'd
been .a little more patient, maybe somebody would' have listened to him,
but they wouldn't listen to him -- although the leaders at Versailles
had Sent him to the Soviet Union.
"Anyway, in the early days we didn't have to -- we had -too many -
problems to bother with, we couldn't bother with the communist problem,
couldn't take it seriously, and that is a sad point of history. Then
of courser except for Churchill and a few others, there was a great
error in dealing with Hitler'e intentions and his power, and that
was one of the causes of the war. And turning to the East, we had
not properly appraised the nature and effect of Japan's ambitions.
"All of these, In my opinion, were intelligence failures. I
don't say they all could have been avoided -- they might have been
mitigated, with proper intelligence appraisals reaching the high
authorities, but at that time we had no intelligence agency that had
the responsibility of doing that. We had a military intelligence, we
had a naval intelligence, but it did not deal with matters of this
character.
"In any discussion of intelligence, one has to go back to Pearl
Harbor, because that was an outstanding example of a case where
a case which was not a case of a failure to collect intelligence
the failure there was to use intelligence. At that time maybe you
will recall that we were reading the Japanese codes, not al/ of them,
but a good many of them, and we were getting invaluable information
as to Japanese policy, that we had every reason to believe was
accurate. Now I do not say that anyone could have predicted and
pinpointed that on December 7th that Pearl Harbor was going to be
attacked -- that was one Of the alternatives we should have taken into
account -- but I think all of the recent soundings on this show that
we should have realized that a very great crisis was right around the
corner, maybe only hours away, and we should have boon prepared for a
crisis in our relations with Japan, of a very serious. nature.
"The fact that we. did net do that, and the facts as they were
disolosed in all of thee investigations of Pearl Harbor that took
Place, starting right after the event, and reaching on for many
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months, and the facts that are coming out in books that are being
published today bear out, I believe, what I have said. I don't
believe at all any of these theories that there was some treachery ?
in this, or that we invited a Pearl Harbor -- that's all bunk
but we did not use the intelligence wisely and effectively. Then
as we came to the conclusion of the war, then we had in many ways
better intelligence than we had when the war started, because all
our intelligence services had been built up. The OBS, which was the
stepfather of the CIA had boon organized, and we were getting better
intelligence. .A very eminent professor of Harvard, Professor Langer,
was doing very outstanding work with many others from this University,
and others, were doing outstanding -- you were there, weren't you,
Milt, about that time? Were you responsible for that?"
KA:TZ: "1 was there
*4?01
yes."
DULLES: "So that by the time the uar was aver, we did have a
fairly effective intelligence service,- but we proceeded immediately
after the war to disband most of it, under the impression that we
could cooperate with the Soviet Union if they really wanted to make
a peace, and that we might not need en intelligence service. And for
the period between 1945 and l947, when the CIA was organized under
lawn we were as I say, in a process of disbanding our service, and
many people were pressing for the pasteurization of Germany. -We
brought the Soviet into the war, invited them in to the Far Eastern
war -- urged them in -- at a time when in my opinion, we couldn't
have kept them out with wild horses, couldn't have kept them out,
they wore going to get into that Far Eastern wax assoon as they .
possibly could anyway. We didn't need to pay them anything to get
into the war.
"And when we thought, as I say, that cooperation with the Soviets
in Eastern Europe, and in the Far East would be a possibility. All
this proved to be a mirage. It was about 1947 that there began the
awakening, and it was at that time that the Central Intelligence
Agency was organized. It came under President Truman, You may
recall that in 1947 he proclaimed what became known as the Truman
Doctrine, and under this doctrine, the United States in a very general
way, but in quite effective way, as far- as Greece and Turkey was
concerned pledged itself to OOMB to the help of any nation which
was resisting communist infiltration and communist sUbversion, .and
which was prepared to put its resources to work together with ours,
to see that that danger was avoided, The doctrine was based on the
theory that we would be invited in, that we would be asked to par-
ticipate, and not only that, but the country that invited us, in
would make it own resources available to work with us.
ItNew
Helped on
there we
communist
Act which
that worked out quite Well in the case of Greece and Turkey0
by the rift between YUgoslavia and the Soviet Union. But
were able to turn back what looked like a possibly imminent
take-over. And at that time we passed the national Security
organized the Department of Defense, combined the services,
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created the Air Force -- I say combined them, combined them in a way,
they were never entirely combined. And it .also created the Central ,
Intelligence Agency as one chapter in that legislation. This was
all done under the impulse and the reaction to the awakening, our
disappointment and deception at the fact that we had not been able
to work with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had used its fears
of influence, and its fears of military occupation as means for a -
communizing of countries -- it had taken over Poland, Hungary, later
Czechoplavakia, Bulgaria, Roumania; the Chinese take-over by
communism was under way. Czechoslovakia, even though not boon
occupied by any Soviet troops was taken over by communism without a.
shot being fired -- again a case of a minority government taking over
power by the ruthless methods of subversion, just as earlier in 1917
Lenin had taken over power in Petrograd later Leningrad -- by
doing- away with the constituent assembly and whiph at that time the
communists had only about 25 per cent of the representation.
"Czechoslovakia, as 'I say, the pattern was in the same general
pattern -- take over a country when they only had the communists in
the minority. In fact there is no daso that I know of, with the
possible exception of Kerala in India, and that was not really ,a true
exception, whore communism has been voted into power by the free
votes of the people in, any country, and it wasngt true in the Soviet
Union itself. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as a,part of our awakening to the threat of communism, and in order
to create an instrument which could help our government in the con-
test, the worldwide contest against comMunist -- growth .of counted--
because that is one of its functions. What are its other functions?
. "The CIA was to coordinate intelligence Work in the government.
It was to collect secret intelligence. Your chairman referred to that
as espionage, and thatgs a perfectly good name for it -- a more '-
exciting name than secret intelligence. That iS in addition, of
course, to all the overt intelligence thatgs collected by the State
Department, the military services, and others, and you should only
use secret intelligence when you cant get it any other way, and its
only one part. Its often advertised as being the chief function of
the CIA, but that is not the case itgs only one of its functions.
Than the CIA was to develop counter intelligence abroad. The FBI is
the counter intelligence agency in the .United States, and that has
been one of its most successful missions, and if you read about spies
being, picked up here and there, not only in ,the United States, which
is mostly J. Edgar floovergs work, but in various countries abroad,
it is because this country has developed one of the best counter
intelligence services in the world, and we have penetrated the Soviet
system in many areas, and they know it -- and we have been .able to
catch their agents, some of them who have been working in various
European countries for well over a decade.
"That is the third function.' The fourth function, and a very
important one, of the Central Intelligence Agency is the analysis
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and preparation of national estimates. There's a section of the
Central Intelligence Agency which is devoted to the collation of
all information that's received by all departments of governments
including the CIA, and then working, together with the other in-
telligence services which are represented on the United States
Intelligence Board, trying to produce for the President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, the. policy making organs of govern-
ment, trying to produce for them intelligence in a coordinated,
collated, and readable form, so that as the various -issues came ups
they can turn to the Central Intelligence Agency and the United
States Intelligence Board and get a statement of the factual position.
."So going back to my title, which. I said was somewhat of a cover
title, CIA has no business whatever to suggest what the policies
should be. It can give its estimate of what it thinks the facts are,
and then it is up to the President, the Secretary of State, and
Defense to determine what the policy should be. Sometimes we may
have to work against what appeared to be the facts, for other reasons
of national security, but in any event those facts should be avail-
able for the policy making. And thaa as I have indicated, the CIA
has certain functions in meeting the cold war's subversive threat
of international communism. I:11 discuss that a little but further.
"The work of coordinations of course, is to try to see that all
the target areas are covered, and wore getting information on the
most important things to our national security, and that the particular
agency best qualified to do the work is assigned the task. Sometimes
It may be the Army, Navy or the Air Force. Sometimes it should be
best done by the State Department -- overt means. Sometimes, as -
happened at the time of the Ue2? and you may want to talk about that
in 7the question period, at the time of the U-2, the only way we could
gat information on what was going on with regard to Soviet missiles
was to fly over and coo them. The question of the legality of that
as I say, was not tainted particularly with legality, but neither is
any espionage operation.
"When the Soviet documents of one of their subjects with false
papers, gives him a false identity, sends him into the United States,
that is Just as much a violation of our security in our territory
. as sending a plane over, and its a much messier way of doing it. .
The plane up there, far away, nobody secs it -- doesn't make any
noise doesn't get involved with other Americans at all, but if
you let it alone it:11 stay right. there. So that it's hard for me
to see why, if one looke at this from the legal angle, a U-2 is.
more of a violation of law than sending agents in. You might say
well a U-2 might have a bomb. So could anybody coming in here,
eerfet carry a small bomb, and neither the U-2 nor a traveler could
(eeery a very large bomb because there was not a space, nor could they
liear the weight of it.
"Ivo mentioned the work of collecting secret intelligence, and
then counter intelligence. I don't think I need to develop those
functions any more. The estimative function I've also discussed,
The cold war functions I have not yet discussed.- But they're very -
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lAportant, and in that the CIA has a role. Why is that? It is
because a Groat deol of the communist subversive work direeted
against free countrios, concentrating on those countries that are
least able to gover.a themselves, those countries where there is the
greatost econauic difficulties. Most of their work is done on a
covert basis, They have Great advantages in this field, because
they have a type of apparatus that we could not duplicate -- we
womldngt want to duplicate. First they have the worldwide Communist
Parties. For a time they hid those parties under the veil of the
0Comminromg the sComintorns.and now that veil has been aundered
and is no longer necossary. Most of the Communist Forties of the
free world -- not all, because some are directed by Peking -- but
most of the Communist Parties of the free world are directed from
Moscow through the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Soviet
Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and practically every
country of the world, Including this country, has Its Communist Party.
"We have nothing of that kind, and that Communist Party in the
United States and all these other countries is a subversive weapon.
In some countries itgs a very important element. It ss one of the
largest parties in France, in Italy, Indonesia, and a groat many
other countries* It is important oven in those areas where its
voting is small -- not very important in the United States -- but
in many countries whore it does not have a largo vote, theregs a
hard core, because when yougre doing subversive work, yougre far more
interested in the hard cove than in all the voters. When you want to
come and take over a country, then the voters would become very im-
portant, because the Soviet Union uses our free institutions, in
order to -- and because thoygre free, trios to turn them against us,
and use them to take over power, and of course once power is taken
over by the communists then theress no more voting, and theross no
way to make a obango.
" In addition to the parties, there are the communist labor
unions* The largest labor union in France is communist-mdominated.
The largest labor union in Indonesia is communist-dominated, Italy
also. And those are all underground:, or have an underground to them*
It takes intelligence work to penetrate these organisations, and
yougve got to know about them, yousve got to know what theygro up to.
Ws no secret at all, the extent to which the FBI has penetrated the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the Communist Party of the
United States rather -- that has boon pretty well publicized. The
extant to which the CIA has penetrated the communist parties of other
countries is still a secret. Its perfectly doable -- It's very
important to do it, and I hope that work will continue,
"And then in addition to the party and the labor unions, as a
-oar';; of this orchestra of subversion, they have all these popular
fronts -- ban the bomb movement, generally itss communist infiltrated
If not dominated. They have their youth organizations which meet in
various parts of the world. They have their peace organizations* It
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met not long ago in Mexico, and It meets from time to time, Its
a corTmunist front, and they can multiply 'these fronts according to
the nature of the situation In each country, And then as paymaster,
director, supervisor, you have the Soviet Secret Service operating
directly under Ehrue,hchev -- the KGB as its known today,
which is a lineal descendant of the Choka, the Ogpu, the NEM. In
fact every year they have, and they advertise this, they have a
ceremony celebrating the anniversary of the organization of the
Soviet Secret Service, one of the most important organs of the whole
Soviet Union, and they take as their beginning .point, the first year
that theChoka began to ?Donato in the daYs of, just after the take-
over in Petrograd, So that to meet this type of subversion. that we
have Ws absolutely essential that we have a Secret Service, that
learns everything possible about this underground, because while
that cannot be advertised, it helps to give our policy makers an
idea of the countries that are threatened, the. nature of the threat,
the persons who are being.subvorted, and that is goingoon, and
without that, we would have one hand tied behind our backs in meeting
the policy of Khrushchev?. which goes on in time of thaw, and in time
of stress, the time of coexistence and time of non -coexistence.
nThe policy that he proclaimed on January- 6th,. 1961, of wars
of liberation -- that meant, as defined by him, that anything that
could help undermine free governments, non communist governments,
would have appropriate support from the Soviet Union, That doesn't
mean that they're going to the paint of war, or the threat of war,
they're. going to use the covert, rather than the overt means of
giving help.- I have now talked as long as I should, and I want to
give the panelists chance. I will skip here, just to give you a few
more provocative things to-get the panelists to get their tooth into,
nI want to refer to several types of attack on the CIA.
Fortunately for the CIA the greatest attack that comes on it is from
the Soviet Union. I have a tremendous collection of compliments
they've addressed to me over the years, and they make very- Interesting
reading, One of them though, I- really did appreciate. You may have,
It was (Ilia Ehrenberg?) who's a little out of favor now, because
he has a sense Of humor, and he wrote about ten years ago, and he
said If that spy Allen Dulles should ever pass the pearly gates,
or approach the pearly gates, and then gat allowed in, he would be
found mining the clouds, shooting the stars, and slaughtering the
angels,' I really appreciated that particular attack,
"But wa get a good many attacks from this country that are more.
worrying, by journalists of note and repute -- some of them say that
on intelligence service is not in the American tradition. All I can
say is that George Washington was one of our great leaders who
understood Intelligence and who during the Revolutionary War spent
a great deal of time on intelligence. Well, the critics would say
intelligence is all right in time of war, but it's got, you shouldn't
have it in time of peace. Well tees an old Latin phrase, isn't it
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12 -
;:o, toztporo pacus pora bolluol? you Gantt havo -- you cantt turn
5nt-elligence orgonizations on and off. If you went to have them
11 timo of wav, you've got to prepare than in time of peace. But
6.ont havo a time of roal psaeo, There novor was a time, in, my
oDlnion whon wo had creator need for developing our IntellIsonco
oorvico as right today, bonause of Its role in the cold mar,
"Then they attack CIA bocause it interferes In policy, And we
may get to that in the question period. There never has boon a
political action, or an action of a political nature, Bay of Pigs,
U-20 Viot Nam, and the security sorvicqs, there never has been an
operation of that kind that had not boon approvod frau the very
beginning, from Its very inception at the highest level of govern-
went., and approved, Now when thero5s a failure, or something blows
u:p?. whethor a plane or a Bay of Piss, youtre Going to have criticism,
cad the CIA cantt then run out and say, look here, we were backed on
this by a ?
(SOUND OF BUZZER RINGING)
"Doos that mosn I should stop? I'm going to very soon, The
CIA caatt 'got up and cay, oh no we didntt have anything to do with
this, and so forth afft 80 on you just keep your mouth shut. In
both the Boy of Pigs situation and In the U-2 nituation, the Chief
1:zocui;ive assrod rospons;.bility, not became I aoked him to -- not
at all, but ause ho felt that not to assume responsibility of
these partinuler actions -- end I think he was right; both were
ttht-- would have meant IrresonsibilitT in government. If I was
ffoi:o3 to 43 allowed to sit nrouud there and sand airplanes over
Ruia,, uhont policy aoprovalj, I ought to be shot pretty nearly,
or cortai:oy dismiosod, Or If I were mounting a BT,y. of Pigs operation
without; approval, samo thing should have happonod, Well, it just
didnct wok that way.
Wol7on tato Viet Yam. This torrIble uproar on the port of the
p:000a -- CIA making policy thoro? by supplying a security force to
Po, 1";u. Well wloolt happened was this. About throe or four years ago,
;thotts when I Was still Director of CIA, after a groat deal of
:thought, it was decided that we ought to try to help the Vietnsmese
oolieo to develop a good anti-communk,./o organ, so that they could
Tpot the Viot Cons and so forth that were Infiltrating into their
very GOVO:.Makallio and into their cities and towns. And we proceeded
to organize such an organization, and it was very officiont. The
trouble is the more efficient, the more danger comes -- and so Ion
,;olot toll you, -- it was so efficient that Mr. Wu and President Diem
took it over and turned it against their own internal enemies to
50A3 oztent. Now there's no way we could stop them -- they had the
poolor there --we didntt have enough military force at that time to
stop this, and no arguments would change their point of view. The
ome thing happened in Cuba, before -- long before Castro took ovor,
we had organized an effoctive force there, of FBI types In order to
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. 13 .
deal with communist penetration In Cuba, They got so efficient
that tatieta took them over and used them against his own political
enemies, and you could argue with him until you were red in the
face, but you couldn't persuade Wee not to do that, Ho felt his
position was threatened, this was the best arm there was, carefully
trained in the United States by Americans and othera, and so he used
it for that purpose.
"Well, that may raise the question of whether you should do that
sort of thing,' but all of that was done with full approval. The only
thing that didn"t have the approval was diverting it from the proper
purposes.. for which it was organized to Improper purposes. Then, you
hoar the argument against the CIA that there are no adequate controls.
There are sane people -- and some very responsible people -- that have
urged for years that there be a watch-dog committee of the Congress.
What It's going to do -- this Is an Executive, not a Legislative
function. Well in any event that has been voted down, and I don't
think its likely ever to be voted, but still there are many people
and some vbry responsible journalists who are still urging that a
watch-dog committee be established, The President -- President
Eisenhower first and President Eennedy then followed on with it -.
has designated a special cenmittee -- kind of a watch-dog committee --
to report to him, because the CIA is directly under the President of
the National Security Counoil. That committee was for many years
headed by a very eminent citizen of this city, Dr. Killian of MIT.
The representation on this committee is of the highest, awl it's been
very useful.. _I-urged the President to -- President Eisenhower -- to
appoint this committee, and it's been of very great value,
"Then they say, well, COM:0063s hasn't any control, The CIA
reports to four committees of We Congress, two in the House, tuo in
the Senate, The Armed Services Committee, and the Appropriations
Committee, Our budget is studied by a subcoMmittee of the Appropri-
ations Committee, just as the State Department budget is, and the
.others, The only difference is the amount isn't published. We don't
toll you haw much is spent. Of course that irks some Congressmen, and
it irks the Press %?-, they would like to know, so they say we spend a
billion, dollars. That's a good sum. Everything is in billions in
Washington now, so they couldn't possibly suggest that we spend less
than a billion dollars, That 'figure is perfectly ridiculous-- it's
out of all line, and has no relation to the reality of what is
actually being Spent. -e?
"But these are the kinds of attack, and maybe some of the panel
will want to take them up end tarry them forward. I2m hare as an
advocate, and I don't admit they have very much validity. I feel
now that we have in the CIA a skilled group of men and women, highly
motivated. I don't know a finer lot of people that Xlve ever worked
with in my somewhat long career, and I think they deserve your
support, as the whole project deserves your support, and I'm not
going to admit any shortcominge. There are curtain -- haven't got
time now -- haven't left time enough for that, so I'll leave that to
the panelists to bring out, and then we can then possibly .have a good
argument, I've enjoyed being with you very much tonight. Thank you."
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