CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000310001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 November 1961
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2 November 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
4. Scandinavia: Moscow's 30 October note to Finland causes
deep concern throughout Scandinavia. (Page it)
6. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page tit)
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I
II
VON,
Scandinavia, The Soviet note of 30 October proposing con-
sultations with Finland on defense measures has caused deep
concern throughout Scandinavia. In Sweden, the Soviet move
has evoked a "crisis atmosphere," according to the US Embassy.
The two Scandinavian members of NATO, Denmark and Norway,
may become more reluctant to support any NATO defensive
measures which Moscow might regard as provocative.
In Finland itself the initial shock of the Soviet note appears
to be giving way to moves toward national unity. The Agrarian
party's minority government has taken under advisement a for-
mal proposal of the three right-of-center parties that a national
2 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
v K
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coalition government be formed, excluding the Communists.
The Finns will probably feel themselves compelled to agree
to preliminary discussions on the Soviet proposal, but will
balk at accepting the Soviet charge that a threat from West
Germany exists.
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
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(On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
United States Intelligence Board concludes that..,
Eo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberate'q to initiate
direct military action in the immediate future
nam, particularly in the plateau area.
South Vietnam: Communist forces continue their efforts to
undermine the Diem government by sabotage and terrorism and
to expand the Viet Cong areas of military control in South Viet-
2 Nov 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Soviet Note to Finland Proposing Consultations
On Defense Measures
The Soviet note invoking the 1948 treaty of mutual assist-
ance has depressed the Finnish public and reinforced doubts
about the government's view that Soviet-Finnish relations had
been stabilized to the point where developments elsewhere
would have no effect on them. The note may have some influ-
ence on the presidential election campaign, but will not neces-
sarily work to the disadvantage of President Kekkonen, who
has taken much of the credit for the improved relations between
the two countries. Most Finns probably will support his can-
didacy on grounds that any change now would merely aggravate
relations with the Soviet Union.
The Finns generally are doubtful that the government
should enter into formal discussions with Moscow. President
Kekkonen, who is due to return from his visit to the United
States on 3 November, may believe that Finland has no alter-
native to preliminary talks. Both he and the Finnish Govern-
ment, however, are likely to balk at accepting the Soviet
charge that Finnish and Soviet security is threatened by West
Germany. Acceptance by Finland of the Soviet view that a
threat from West Germany does exist would pave the way for
eventual Soviet moves to draw Finland into direct ties with
bloc security arrangements.
The Swedish Government's reaction to the note has been to
hold an emergency cabinet session and meetings with opposition
leaders. Sweden traditionally has maintained the closest ties
with Finland and, in addition, would feel itself directly threat-
ened militarily if it could no longer count on a friendly Finland
as a buffer against the Soviet Union. Some conservative ele-
,rents have suggested that Sweden may be required to recon-
sider its alliance-free foreign policy if Finland's independence
is jeopardized.
The note may cause Denmark to procrastinate further on
such questions as creating a unified NATO command for the
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Baltic in which West Germany would play a major role. This
question received considerable attention in the Soviet note, and
both Norway's and Denmark's roles in the plan were sharply at-
tacked. The visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange to the
Soviet Union later this month will provide Moscow with another
opportunity to impress upon Norway the danger it faces through
membership in NATO.
Khrushchev's statement in his 27 October speech at the
party congress, in which he again listed the liquidation of Soviet
bases on foreign territory as one of the peaceful initiatives of
his policy, provides evidence that the demarche to Finland is
an effort to gain support for Soviet claims of a growing "military
threat" from West Germany rather than the opening of a campaign
Kh
ru-
to gain bases on Finnish territory. In this connection,
shchev, in his August interview with columnist Drew Pearson,
took personal credit for deciding to evacuate the Soviet base at
Porkkala in 1955-56, despite objections by Molotov.
It is likely that the Soviets will make it clear in subsequent
conversations with Helsinki the they expect Finland to adhere
to any German peace treaty.[Khrushchev reportedly told Fin-
nish Communi.~t officials in ugust that all neutral countries
would be forced to define their positions on Germany when the
USSR concluded a German peace treaty. He emphasized that
"in a situation which is tightening we must be able to trust Fin-
land to react toward us correctly:' Khrushchev also coiY=plained
that the candidates who are opposing Kekkonen in the elections
are attempting to undermine Kekkonen's policy of friendship with
the Soviet Union, He stated, "This must be stopped" The Soviet
note of 30 October also referred to Finnish circles who were op-
implying that only the present Finnish
olic
'
y,
s p
posing Kekkonen
course was acceptable to the Soviet Union
2 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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