INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - INTELLIGENCE SECRECY AND SECURITY IN A FREE SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500020004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

i' Tr'CLE APPEARED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ONP.AG6 ,esJ For Reldebb 21 /03/0& -C1A-RDP 1-00901
STATINTL
Intelligence secrete
and ci
a Free Society
I nowledge is power,
mass opinion.
propriate to our new society of instant communication, universal education, and
Is secrecy incompatible with a free society? Should we forswear secret intelli-
gence in order to protect our freedoms, and look to a resulting moral strength to
save us from threats from the world around us? Or must we accept limits on our
freedoms in order to preserve our community in a dangerous world?
We are not faced.with such cataclysmic choices. Both exposure and secrecy are
essential to a truly free society. But we must achieve a new theory of secrecy ap-
ealed behind even the most justifiable of secrets.
giving strength to one who possesses it, weakening Iiiin deprived of it. On this
concept secret intelligence arose over the centuries, justified by the sovereign state
system in -which a nation's independence and welfare depended on- its strength.
But in recent years a new concept of national strength has arisen. The active
political involvement of a nation's population was seen necessary to national
survival and progress. This development led to the necessity of informing and
even "indoctrinating" the nation in its government's policies- in order to inspire
the population to sacrifice for the nation's goals. As universal suffrage, educa-
tion, and communications improved and spread, so did the need to inform the
people of the challenges their nation faced-
-In nations with-authoritarian discipline-or ones amenable to directionby an
"establishment," the reserve power of the secret was accepted, and preserved.
But free societies and their free press strove for the revelation of the secret, creating
a contest between how much should be revealed to produce an informed public
and how much should be withheld in the nation's interest. In times of great
challenge, national allegiance prevailed over curiosity, and secrets-were-respect-T_
ed: Inoth- r periods, the public and the press were less acquiescent, and exposures -
proliferated. ,r.
In the United States, Vietnam and Watergate marked a turning point in this
..relationship. The media penetrated the deepest recesses of government. These reve-
lations convinced many citizens that the leadership was manipulating access to
fact in order to mislead the public and that it was violating the trust which jus-
tified any claim to secrecy. Sensational charges of intelligence abuses then cast
doubt on the propriety of any secrets, as it seemed that wrongdoing could be con-
William E. Colby was a career Intelligence Officer. He retired as Director of the United States
Central intelligence Agency in 1976.
,, STATI NTL
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iieLegitimacy of Secrecy
Secrets are necessary to a free society. A fundamental of our democracy operates in secret-the ballot box, and its secrecy is essential to the viorkings of our demo-
system. number of other secrets are protected by our laws and legal pro-
cedures--the attorney-client and doctor-patient relationship, crop statistics com-
piled by--the Agriculture Department which might upset the free market if pre-
maturely revealed, and income-tax retu.ns which may be less forthcoming unless
protected from improper exposure to public curiosity.
These and other secrets are accepted and protected in order to make our democ-
racy work. We even see a trend toward greater concern for personal secrecy in the
growth of privacy legislation, designed to-protect the-citizen from exposure and
control by the improvements in information acquisition and processing in the
modern world. Also, many of our journalists look for more specific, legal recogni-
tion of the importance of protecting their sources who do not wish to be disclosed.
If "national security" is discredited as a catch-all justification for total se
crecy, a new theory of legitimate secrecy must replace it. The "troopship sailing
order" still anachronistically cited by the courts as the justifiable secret must be
translated into its modern counterpart. But if the dispatch of troops and their
continued employment depends on Congressional and public acquiescence under
the War Powers Act, then the rationale for their use must be exposed to our public,
and not hidden behind statements claiming to protect intelligence sources or to'
avoid national diplomatic embarrassment.
One of the best statements of the dilemma of secrecy in our free society was
made by President Ford when he said that he would be glac'i to share our secrets
with 214,000,000 Americans if no further exposure would occur. In his statement,
he refleced the -positive need to inform our citizens of their government's activi-
ties but noted also the fact that the world reads our press avidly. Other Presidents
have experienced this paradox of secrecy and the free society. President Eisen-
hower took full responsibility for the 1960 U-2 mission that was shot down over
the Soviet Union; he intended to demonstrate that he was fully carrying out his
Constitutional responsibilities to direct the executive branch. 'Yet, as former Soviet
Premier Khrushchev explained in his memoirs, Eisenhower's acknowledgment of
responsibility raised an intelligence problem to a chief-of-state challenge, and led
Khrushchev to cancel the Paris Summit in reprisal. The requirements of public
responsibility in our free society conflicted with the mores Of international life,
which called for secrecy or at least a disclaimer of intelligence problems. President
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Kennedy followed Eisenhower's path by accepting full responsibility for the "co-
vert" Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 despite the tenuous prior arrangements
made for its "plausible denial"
But if American political life operates on a new theory of secrecy, its legal and
bureaucratic directives do not reflect it. The language of such directives clings to
the outmoded concepts of sovereign secrecy. Valves through which the pressures
of the. real world canbe relieved exist in-backgrounders by "senior American - -
officials," in "whistle blowers," and in congressional exposure---all of which
contradict the concept of "national security:'. on which the structure of secrecy is
built..Two key documents in recent years have attempted to update basic concepts
of secrecy: President Nixon 's Executive Order 11652 of March 1972, and the Free-
dom of Information Act amendments of November 1974 . Each has made a step
toward a new structure of secrecy, but each contains major weaknesses which will
limit its effect.
The Executive Order starts with a call for greater openness in American govern-
ment, but continues to recognize the propriety of secrecy "in the interest of the na-
tional -defense or foreign relations of the United States." It sets out three_.:_ I
degrees of classification--Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential. The Order includes
several innovations,- however. It attempts to.impose individu.al_responsibility for-
the process became mechanical, was handled in large part by. the secretarial staff,
and. concentrated on avoiding chance exposure by error at the cost of extra classifi-
cation. It did however lead to the release of a number of World. War II documents
and speeded access to other historical source material in some small degree. . -
The Freedom of Information Act amendments of November 1974 had a more
substantial effect, although their major impact has been on the release of his-
torical documents rather than the revelation of current ones. The amendments'
Order's call for a careful and independent judgment on each piece -of paper. Thus
- one of the provisions whereby automatic declassification could be deferred.-The
quantitative requirements of bureaucratic -life made it impossible to apply the- -i
In fact, however, the Order made little change in the traditional climate and
processes of secrecy in intelligence.. Instead, it spawned a large bureaucratic exercise
of stamping each of thousands of pieces of paper with a notation that it fell within
on complaints.
establishes a review committee. to-.monitor, the system and. .to-receive and act _, -
by the passage of specific time limits or by review following.a request.,_And-pit
the decision that a matter should be secret, requiring that individuals be for-
mally authorized to classify. It sets out a procedure for declassification, either
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to encourage debate about our current programs and policies, not to support mere
not really solved the dilemma of secrecy in a free society..The revelations may
even have been harmful, since it was the sensational quality surrounding past-
events or activities that captured public attention. The public thus formed an
outdated image of a government agency which had already changed its rules and
procedures to forswear the activities revealed. The purpose of free information is
-Exciting as some of the revelations under these new rules have been, they have
----
reports or leaks.
official
- The Act and its amendments have had a substantial effect in opening to the
public view many documents which might never have seen the light of day with-
out it.- Its impact was increased by the congressional intelligence -investigations
of 1975, stimulating many requests for material which had been adverted to in
would still be "exactly the-way, the courts would conduct their proceedings.'
major feature gives any citizen the ability to secure documents that he can reason-
ably describe unless they fall within one of several exceptions; if the govern-
mentagency and the citizen disagree a Court is to decide.
This last provision was passed over President Ford's veto; he maintained
that a court is not the appropriate body to determine whether documents need
protection in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy of the United
States. He did concede that a court could properly review whether the" govern-
ment classification officer had acted reasonably. The President may have never-
theless won his pciint_ Congressman-Morehead, House manager and conferee for-
the Act, stated before the vote overriding the veto that the President's procedure
exercises in historical revisionism.
1. Congressional Record Nov. 20,1974, P.H-10865.
Instead, a new theory, of secrecy can start with a reversal of the old rule of
discipline within the intelligence agencies--the "need to know." This rule pro-
vided that secret information would be made available to those who needed it
caucratic attention then focuses on the exemptions.
good reason for its secrecy; as spelled out by the "exemptions" of allowable se-
crets in the 1972 Executive Order and under the Freedom of Information Act. Bur-
A new theory of secrecy can begin by approaching the question from its other
side, defining what needs to be exposed rather than what needs to be kept se-
cret. It is too easy to say that "everything" should be known unless there is- a
CO?)117lloQr
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for their duties-and only to them. In the American constitutional system and
with modern communications, this rule calls for commitments and procedures to
make information available to all participants in American decision making so
that they can fully play their roles. The executive branch thus must inform the
Congress and the public. Intelligence must serve as well as abide by the Constitu-
tion. In most cases, "need to know" would also provide the basis for a sharp
delineation between the politically significant information needed for public deci
sion,making and the technical detail not essential to such decisions. The latter gen-
erally constitutes the data which would be of value to our nation's adversaries.
The recent American experience in Angola provides an example of the need for
this new approach. Classified intelligence provided warnings as early as late
1974 that Soviet anus were being provided to the Popular Movement for the.
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The Soviet intent was clearly to strengthen this
Movement, not,in_its liberation efforts, but-rather against..its rivals for control _
of the country in a post-independence struggle- Liberation was no longer a goal
once the Portuguese had announced their intent to free Angola by November
11, 1975. This intelligence was viewed by the executive branch officials privy
to it as ominous, in the light of the Soviet Union's growing position in Somalia,
the Indian Ocean, and Guinea, and against the backdrop of its mid-1960s aborted
attempt to establish a position in the Belgian Congo, now Zaire. The black na-
tions bordering Angola were also concerned about the Soviet aid and suspected it
as bearing the seeds of radical challenge to their security. It also raised the likeli-
hood of violence-in black-white relations in Southern Africa, to the detriment of
hopes that these relations might be improved through negotiations. But the intelli-
gence reports and assessments remained within classified. channels and were not
shared with the public.
In early 1975, the Forty Committee of the National Security Council ap-
proved a secret program of political, non-military assistance for the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (NFLA). For many years the Front had oper-
ated against the Portuguese from neighboring Zaire. In compliance with a little
noticed amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act passed in December 1974, this
assistance was found by President Ford to be important to the national security
of the United States and was reported in closed sessions to the Foreign Relations,
Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House, in
which no particular objections were raised.
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By June of 1975, the Soviet assistance was proving effective. Several efforts by
African nations failed to arrange a coalition or other compromise among the
three groups vying for post-liberation power. The MPLA used the Soviet military
aid to push the National Front and the National Union for :he Independence of
Angola (UNITA) towards their traditional tribal sectors. It was, clear that inde-
pendence in November would find the MPLA in full control of Angola unless the-
resistance.of its two rival groups could be strengthened.
The National Security Council thus approved additional assistance, including
military hardware, for these two groups. Again, in conformance with the 1974 law,
I briefed the six committees of the Congress, plus the two select committees in-
vestigating intelligence, in secret sessions. In response to.a request to summarize
one committee's reaction to the briefing, I said that I thought the members of
the committee were not very much "fur it" nor very much "agin it." Under the
existing law, I said this left the executive branch free to proceed, which the com-
mittee accepted. Only two or three members noted objections to the activity.
American assistance proved effective. Within two months, he tide of the strug-
--- gle had reversed. The-two- opposing- groups-not _ only. cleared. their ..own areas---
but began to threaten the MPLA's base in Luanda. The Soviets responded with an
escalated large-scale airlift of modem weaponry, including tanks, artillery, and
rockets, and the rapid movement of some 12,000 Cuban military personnel to
join directly in the battle. The tide reversed again. In October calls were made
for additional military equipment and support for the National Front and
UNITA. UNITA also, in desperation, accepted assistance from South Africa,
thus causing its immediate rejection by a number of black African nations.
The National Security Council supported the increase in assistance, hoping that
frustration of the Communist drive could lead to a compromise settlement through
the good offices of the nations of black Africa. But available funds had been ex-
hausted,,and positive congressional approval was needed to obtain additional
funds. While the request was being discussed with the various committees, the
secret American assistance in Angola leaked into the press.
Three elements combined-to produce a storm of protest- The fall of Vietnam had
solidified public opinion against what appeared to be faraway involvement. The
intelligence investigations and their sensational revelations produced distru t of
secret activity. And there was no preparation of the public for the disclosure of
American assistance through a clearly defined over-all. United States policy
toward Angola, within which secret assistance might have bee~i understood. That
America's assistance went to anti-Portuguese nationalists struggling against a fac-
tion favored by the then left-leaning Portuguese colonial authorities, that our as-
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sistance came after consultation with neighboring black nations, and that it in no
way contemplated Vietnam-style American military involvement, were facts that
were lost in the attack against a "covert" policy and program.
The Congress voted against further aid to Angola, and within a few weeks the
?MPLA's victory over its opponents, with the aid of Soviet airlifted arms and
Cuban soldiers, was complete. America's assistance to black nationalist groups
resisting Soviet and Cuban supported factions stopped.
'There are arguments for and against the Angolan experience. But I describe it
here for another purpose, to show that even if American aid was assumed to have
been desirable, those Americans who "needed to know" about it, did not. Since
much of the intelligence about Soviet and.Cuban involvement was initially
classified, it was shared only with decision makers in the Executive Branch and
with the congressional committees that were briefed in compliance with the 1974
law..Since many of the diplomatic discussions with black African nations were
in confidence, their concern over Soviet and Cuban support of the extremist
MPLA was kept within Executive Branch policy councils. The assistance given
to the National Front and the National Union was not contained within a policy.
Terwe1ope that was -debated and agreed upon- publicly."Yet- the congressional vote
revealed clearly that-under the Constitution the public had a "need to know" the
facts and assessments about Southern Africa if it was to support an American
decision to limit the extension of Soviet and Cuban power there.
"Need to know" can also solve some of the subsidiary questions about how much
information should be disseminated. The identity of a secret intermediary whose
role, livelihood and even life might be endangered if his identity were exposed
need only be known to those actually dealing with him and the staffs who must
warrant his reliability by their independent investigations. "Need to know"
may require that the substance of the information he reports be made available to
those who must use it to make American policy decisions, but none of these policy
-levels need to know his actual identity. His professional intelligence contacts
could thus produce his information in a form appropriate for broad circulation.
without divulging his identity.
This new concept will place unaccustomed responsibilities on intelligence offi-
cers, who have justified the restricted and comfortable circulation of their sub-
stantive intelligence reports by the need to protect their sources- With the obli-
gation to disseminate the intelligence equal to the responsibility of acquiring it,
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new forms of reports and finished assessments must be developed in which the
sources do not appear but the information does. In some such cases the source
can be generically described when he or it cannot be pinpointed; in others the
journalist's convention of a "reliable source" must be used; in others the infor-
mation or assessment must merely be stated on the intelligence officer's or ser-
vice's own authority. Close collaboration between collector and analyst would be
required because the analyst must have a dear understanding of the reliability of
the source. And the reputation of the -final product of the service will he built
upon its cumulative value and accuracy over time, not by the fascination of an
inside look.
The line between dissemination and secrecy is somewhat more difficult to
draw in the world of diplomacy, but again the "need to-know" approach can
provide a guide better than those applied today. The suggestion in the 192Os of
"open covenants openly arrived at" proved unrealistic in a world in which na-
tional pride rejected any public compromise of initial bargaining positions in dip-
lomatic negotiations. But we have found equal loss of credibility and popular
acceptance from attempts to manipulate public opinion and support through selec-
tive-release of positive news by the government, especially when matched by_
exposure of negative material through leaks by unhappy line officers.
With recognition that the American public "needs to know" the essential
structure of negotiations or other foreign policy problems, these can be briefed in
broad terms without exposing the confidences which are essential to the process:
The successful example of the statements by "a senior American official" trav-
elling on Secretary Kissinger's aircraft during his Middle East negotiations demon-
strates this approach best. Formalized, the approach could lead to a security system
appropriate to diplomacy, marking position papers as "protected while under
negotiation," identifying-confidences provided by foreign friends as not to be
associated with them, and limiting the circulation of criticism of foreigners and
foreign situations which would cause insult or retribution if revealed. It would
certainly be an improvement over current procedures requiring such real justifica-
tions to be phrased in the terms of the 1972 Executive Order (i..e., exposure would
cause "exceptionally grave," "serious," or mere "damage" to the "national. se
curity"). Despite the flood of leaks and other exposures of such material over the
past several years, it has been difficult to specify such "damage to the. national -
security" in any but general terms.
In the military field, the approach is just as applicable, and the distinctions
reasonably easy to draw. In fact, the Defense Department and the military ser-
vices to a large degree appreciate the public's and the Congress's "need to know"
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and are carrying on an extensive program of public information and Congressional
briefings, including the content of many documents which still bear secrecy mark-
ings threatening doom to any exposer. -
This new approach to secrecy is subject to the challenge that it might result in
the selective exposure of favorable information only, on the thesis that the Con-
gress or the public needs to be "convinced" of a preferred solution rather than
to "know" the full spectrum of information and assessment about a problem. But
attempts to use this approach only to that limited degree would fall of their own
weight. The critic within the system would press the public's need to know
his side of the case with its supporting information and rationale. In very little
? time the record-would clearly reveal a bias in the matters exposed, or error in
the assessments or data distributed. Any failure of integrity in applying the sys-
tem would be more identifiable than the present process of throwing the blan-
ket of "national security" over a host of matters which reserve confidential han-
dlingbutwhose exposure certainly would not collapse the Capitol.
Another dilemma has complicated our security system, that of including in it
material which may be generally known but which should not be asserted or ad-
mitted officially. As a centuries-old vile- of international relations the spy -has___._
been disowned when caught. In more recent years, this rule has been both vio-
lated and respected. President Eisenhower, we recall, assumed responsibility for
the U-2. On the other hand, after many detailed journalistic accounts of intelli-
gence operations obtained from leaks, the Executive Branch has refused comment..
The first case caused, while the second cases avoided, international confrontations.
Ari executive branch claim that official admission of such an "event would
cause "damage to national security" is usually rejected by Congress and the press
who point to wide public knowledge of it. With a general acceptance of the public's
"need to know" r? release of such information can be made by a congressional com-
mittee or the press without attribution while the executive officially remains silent.
This in fact took place with respect to several matters reviewed by the select com-
mittees investigating intelligence-in a typical, pragmatic, American constitution-
al solution to a theoretical dilemma.
Who is to Decide
A problem inherent in any system of secrecy arises over who is to decide what
is to remain secret. The present structure based on the 1972 Executive Order re-
quires the individual appointment of classification officers and gives them the
concomitant authority to declassify. As mentioned earlier, it calls for automatic
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declassification at certain time limits unless the mate.rial is exempted, and in
such cases provides that the validity of the exemption may be reviewed. The deci-
sion in all cases, however, essentially remains with the originat:iing department
or agency. The 1974 amendrrtents to the Freedom of Information Act provided an
additional locus of decision in court review of the agency's decision that material
be withheld. The major unsettled question, though, revolves around the Con-
gress's role and y uthority in this field.
The present classification system rests on executive branch authority, in Execu-
tive Order 11652,. Congress has recognized the legitimacy of such a category of
information in many statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act with its
exemption of matters "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." At the same time, the Con-
gress again in many statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, has clearly
stated that no authority is granted to withhold information from the Congress.
With the exception of the sharply limited but still somewhat imprecise area of
so-called "executive privilege," the Congress asserts full access to executive depart-
mentor agency information as an aspect of its constitutionally-provided legislating
and appropriating functions.
Sharing secret information with Congress removes the information from execu-
tive branch administrative authority, however, and subjects it to possible ex-
posure on the floor, since members are protected by the "speech and debate" clause
of the Constitution. In recent times this regrettably has increased its vulner-
ability to being leaked? A series of confrontations has thus occurred over
whether secret information should be shared with a Congress asserting a right to
reveal it. Preliminary steps were taken recently to cite Secretary Kissinger and
myself for contempt of Congress over this issue. The resolution of those cases,
and of many more, eventually occurred through mutual compromise, leaving the
ultimate constitutional question unanswered--in the best tradition of the separa-
tion of powers.
It is probably best not to decide between the respeclve and contradictory
claims of full access and authority made by each branch, and instead resolve =
conflicts on a case by case basis. The alternative could bean unrealistic "victory"
by one branch over the other or a complex and unworkable over-all arrangement -
leading to interminable bickering about its interpretation. However, commit-
ment on both sides to the Congress's and the public's "neec[ to know" with recog-
2. The Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress in 1776 first identified
this problem when it refused to pass certain secret information to the Congress as it found "by
fatal experience, that the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets."
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nition that some categories of detail are not "needed,- would reduce the occasions
Protection of Secrecy
Any review of the status of secrecy in America must also look at the protection of
secrecy. A recent study summarizes its status starkly by saying, "The basic es-
pionage statutes are totally inadequate."3 The flood of secrets which has marked
the past tyro years has called into question the nation's ability to keep any secrets,
has worried many nations dependent on America's support, and has provided
our foreign adversaries with a cornucopia of specific material to use against us.
A principal failing of the present secrecy system is that essentially it protects
only against foreign espionage. In fact, in today's world, information published
becomes available to adversary and ally, as well as citizen, and the intelligence
profession in many countries now includes many students and researchers of our
open literature. Resultant government attempts to bar publication through in-
junction have run into the Supreme Court's position that "prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable-infringement
on_pirst_Amendment__rights."4 In one case involving a former CIA employee
threatening to reveal secrets learned during his e mployment; an` agreement that
he made when he began work to keep those secrets was enforced by injunction.
However, the government's success in that case depended more on contract law
and its fortuitous discovery of the employee's publishing plans before he im-
plemented them than .on secrecy law, and punishment after the fact might have
been considerably more difficult.
On various occasions, the executive branch has raised with Congress the need
for clear legal punishment for the unauthorized publication of the nation's de-
fense and foreign policy secrets. Congress has consistently seen broad dangers to
free speech, the free press and executive responsibility in such proposals. The
broad restrictions of the British Official Secrets Act were seen as incompatible
with the protections of the Bill of Rights. The price of protection of the executive's
secrets was seen as too high and the exposure of some of the nation's secrets was
accepted as a reasonable cost of a free society. In many cases, such exposure was
viewed as a positive contribution to the revelation and correction of governmental
wrongdoing.
3. Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Basic Espionage Statutes and Publication of De-
fense Information, 73 Columbia Late Review 929,1076 (1973).
4. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, June 30, 1976.
I/
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In the past year, however, two developments make another look at this problem
mandatory. First, the flow of legitimate secrets has increased rnanyfold, with
adverse effects on the government's ability to act and to maintain a resonable
discipline among it.; employees. Serious Americans, including some in the press,
are wondering aloud if reasonable limits have not been passed on undisci.
plined exposure.
The second development is President Ford's recommendation of legislation to
punish the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. Follow-
ing considerable study and debate within the executive branch, he submitted a
sharply limited bill.. The bill would apply only to those in authorized possession
of such secrets and would impose penalties on them for any unauthorized dis-
closure of the secrets that they had promised to keep. However, it would shield
the recipient of the information-whether a journalist or any other citizen-from
penalty. It also provides that a court in camera can review whether the revealed
information was lawfully classified. This provides judicial review of the execu-
tive decision that the matter be held secret and protects ag~iinst capricious over-
classification or cover-up of wrongdoing. The modified bill would thus give
full recognition to the essentials of our free society and would protect the intelli-
gence sources necessary to its continued existence in a wor.!d, which has not yet
" become safe for democracy.
One objection raised against the bill can be easily solved. journalists have been
concerned that they might be subpoenaed as witnesses and asked to divulge sourc-
es of leaked information, even though they themselves would be immune from
prosecution. A "'shield law" provision could be added that any user of the ex-
posed information under the Bill of Rights could not be compelled to testify
against his source. This could still permit punishment of the violation based on
other evidence.
Within the framework of a new commitment by the executive to the Con-
gress's and the public's "need to know, this better protection of what they do
not need to know should gain the Congressional votes and the public support for
passage into law. This policy of "need to know" would constitute a new and
uniquely American theory of intelligence secrecy which conforms to American
values. Indeed, the practice of such a theory could lead to a freer exchange with
other nations and peoples of what they too "need to know" about the difficult
economic, sociological, political and security problems of the world in the 1.980s
and 1990s. These then might be negotiated and resolved by cooperation based on
knowledge-obtained through intelligence.
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020004-0