CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900160001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 August 1961 25X1
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IA has no objection to declassification and release.
DIA review(s) completed.
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28 August 1961
. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
.CONTENTS
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3. Algeria: New rebel government likely to be even less
compromising than former regime in any negotiations
with France. (Page tt)
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5. Nationalist China. Further comment on preparations for
operations against mainland. (Page itt)
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8. Brazil. (Page v)
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with France and will be more willing to accept aid from the bloc.
The new government reflects Algerian rebel dissatisfaction, pri-
marily among military elements, over the failure of the two
rounds of negotiations with the French at Evian and Lugrin.
Algeria: In the reorganization of the provisional Algerian
government (PAG) announced on 27 August, moderate pro-
Western elder statesman Ferhat Abbas has been replaced as
premier by Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, who has favored a more
vigorous prosecution of the Algerian war. The other changes
also suggest that the new leadership will be even less compro-
mising than the former PAG regime in any future negotiations
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.28 Aug 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Nationalist China:
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can advisers have been given permission to accompany most,
but not all, of the airborne training flights, of the. Chinese Na-
tionalist special forces. These flights, however, including
those on which no American advisers are allowed, are so
scheduled that a plane could be diverted to the mainland from
its training mission and return within the allotted time of the
exercise. The army attache also reports that-the airborne
training program has recently been intensified.
the Nationalists were continuing preparations
to support any resistance that might arise on the Communist
mainland, whether spontaneous or generated by Nationalist
unconventional warfare teams. His government, he said, con-
sidered such support its own responsibility, but realized that
large-scale use of military forces would require high-level
discussions with the United States within the provisions of the
bilateral military pact.
According to the American army attache in Taipei, Ameri
28 Aug 61
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However, if it becomes clear that Goulart's chances are fading,
agitation could take a serious turn and serious disorders are
possible. Communist policy is reportedly to agitate in favor
of Goulart.
The Brazilian constitution provides that both the presi-
dency and the vice presidency should be..vacated during the first
half of a presidential term, elections must be held within sixty
days. The congress can choose a successor only if the vacancies
occur in the second half of the presidential term. In any elec-
tion, constitutional provisions bar from candidacy "a President
who may have exercised the office for any time in the term im-
mediately preceding," as well as governors, cabinet ministers,
and the chiefs of the general staff.
A legal solution by congress- -acceptable to military leaders
--would apparently consist of amending the constitution to bar
Goulart from office and provide for an acceptable successor. A
constitutional amendment may be proposed by one-fourth of
either chamber and becomes law if passed in two successive votes
their agitation will be designed to promote his takeover rather
than to create a situation so chaotic as to spoil his chances. E
that labor and student leaders have been meeting almost constant-
ly. He believes that, since this segment clearly prefers Goulart,
orders have been noted in Brazil. F__ I 25X1
After initial outbreaks on the night of 25 August, few dis-
010%
is apparently largely support for legality rather than support
for Goulart himself.
Brazil: The situation following Janio Quadros' resig-
nation from the presidency on 25 August remains unclear.
A majority faction of the armed forces appears to support
'War Minister Denys, who has publicly stated that leftist
Vice President Joao Goulart will not be allowed to assume
the presidency. A minority faction of the armed forces sup-
ports Goulart's right to the office, but its leader, former presi-
dential candidate Marshal Lott, has been arrested. The sup-
port of the minority faction of the armed. forces for Goulart
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by two-thirds of the total membership of each house of
congress. Such a solution would require the cooperation
of Brazil's two major parties--the National Democratic
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Union which supported Quadros' election, and the Social
Democratic Party which backed former President Kubitschek.
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Goulart's Labor Party would be unable by itself to block such
an amendment although Labor Party Deputy Magalhaes, who
is acting president of the Chamber of Deputies, had declared
his adamant opposition to an amendment at this times Goulart
is now in Paris consulting with members of his labor party.
j
He has publicly stated that he has no choice but to become
president of Brazil.
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and his family will leave Brazil for an unannounced destin-
ation aboard a British ship due to sail on Tuesda
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New Provisional Algerian Government
The.. new PAG premier, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, was
minister of social affairs until January 1960, .when he resigned
in a dispute over what he regarded as the PAG's failure to push
the war against the French. The 41-year-old Ben Khedda is
regarded as one of the most ardent Algerian revolutionaries.
He has had a number of contacts with. the Sino-Soviet bloc and
is reportedly an admirer of Communist organization and achieve-
ments. He is believed.intelligent, shrewd, "hard as nails," and
extremely able and is well regarded by the rebel military appara-
tus.
The 62-year-old Abbas, who has been premier since 1958,
had limited influence in the PAG because of his pro-French. back-
ground, but was useful primarily as a leader acceptable to the
French and because. he was widely known and popular in Algeria.
Ben Khedda also took over the ministry of finance, previously
under Ahmed Francis, brother-in-law of Abbas and a follower
of Abbas' moderate line. Another moderate, Abdelhamid Mehri,
minister of social and cultural affairs,has been dropped, as has
minister of state Said Mohammedi, who some sources report to
be a supporter of Belkacem Krim, the PAG's top negotiator.
Krim himself appears to have been downgraded, although
he retains his vice-premiership. Saad Dahlab, who was former
secretary of state for foreign affairs under Krim and also a mem-
ber of the PAG negotiating team, replaces Krim as foreign minis-
ter. Dahlab, regarded by the French as one of the more sophisti-
cated and able PAG negotiators, is a 42-year-old militant believed
to be a member of the PAG left wing; he has visited Peiping and
Moscow. Krim was given the ministry of interior. Another vice-
premier- -Mohamed Boudiaf--has been added to the previous two,
Krim and Mohammed Ben Bella. Boudiaf and Ben. Bella are im-
prisoned in France.
The apparent demotion of Krim and the removal of hard-liner
Lakhdar Ben Tobbal from minister of interior to the nonportfolio
job of minister of state suggest that minister of armaments Abdel-
hafi.d Boussouf may have enhanced his already strong position.
Boussouf has been working to undercut Krim. Krim, Tobbal and
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Boussouf were the only three members of the Interministerial
Council, the top governing body of the rebel movement.
Despite the establishment of a tougher negotiating team,
the PAG is probably still willing to reach a settlement by nego-
tiations. However, if Paris moves toward resumed negotia-
tions, the PAG will take an even less compromising stand,
particularly on its demand for control over the Sahara. Other-
wise the PAG is likely to step up its military effort and move
to obtain substantial support from the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Although Paris may attempt to feel out the new PAG gov-
ernment with a view to resumed negotiations in the light of De
Gaulle's desire to set a solution in motion before the end of the
year, the new PAG line-up may have the opposite effect on Paris
and De Gaulle may feel that he has no alternative but to proceed
with the establishment of a provisional Algerian executive with-
out the FLN.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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