CONFLICT IN THE SAHARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
(When Filled In)
24 May 1977
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MEMORAUDUM FOR: Chief Receptionist
Please provide the following representatives with USIB badges.
Their respective agencies have certified their clearances to us.
"Conflict in the Sahara"
Air Force: /Capt. Gary Koldyke
Army :/Nancy McCabe
State :-/David Newton
/Bryan Flora
Ad Schaeffer
Navy : /Alex Button
0sR
Please refer questions to:
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SECRET
(When Filled In)
DATE: 24 May 1977
The following attended the inter-agency meeting on
IIM 77-008: THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA
Phone No.
State Department:
g- N &q
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/OCJ L~IYI& F
Defense Intelligenc
Army:
Navy:
NSA:
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Political and Economic Consequences of a Protracted
Guerrilla War
30. The stability of King Hassan's regime is closely
linked to the success of his Saharan venture. The popularity
of his actions to date leaves him little room to make conces-
sions, and puts pressure on him to continue to prosecute the war
against the POLISARIO, even if it means increasing support for
Mauritania in the event that Nouakchott is unable to hold up its
end of the alliance. A continuation of the war at about the
current level poses two potential threats to Hassan. Although
we judge these threats to be relatively minor at present, they
both will become more serious over time.
31. The inevitable strains of an inconclusive conflict
have probably led to some degree of dissatisfaction within the
military. The army has suffered from low morale, poor disci-
pline, lackluster leadership at the local level, and a poor
logistics system. These shortcomings have compounded the frus-
tration of troops engaged in a no-win situation in the desolate
Sahara. Additionally, various reports have indicated some
dissatisfaction within the military with Hassan's policy of
avoiding direct attack on POLISARIO bases in Algeria. Hassan
appears to be in full control of his military, however, and that
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situation is unlikely to change during the coming year. Having
capitalized on the Sahara issue to increase his popularity,
he now appears to be in his strongest position vis-a-vis the
military since the abortive coups of 1971 and 1972. Morocco's
successful intervention in Zaire should further boost his pres-
tige with the military.
32. A more serious difficulty is the possibility that
the economic burden of the Saharan conflict could lead to in-
creased social unrest. Though we cannot measure precisely the
war's cost, military expenditures are partly responsible for
the current strains in the Moroccan economy. The inflation rate
is approaching 20 percent, the government has halved its program
of subsidies for consumer goods, and unemployment is rampant in
urban areas. Politically aware elements increasingly believe
that the Saharan operation and the related support for Mauritania
are major causes for high inflation, unemployment, and shortages
of consumer items.
33. Morocco's overall economic situation in 1977, how-
ever, appears relatively more favorable than it was last year.
Massive loan commitments and grants perhaps eventually totaling
$775 million, from oil-rich Arab states will largely cover its
Saharan expenditures.
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In addition,
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the reduction of press censorship and the election of a new
parliament, could serve as a safety valve for dissatisfaction
over economic issues. On balance, given widespread popular
support for Hassan's Saharan policy, the present level of con-
flict probably will not cause serious problems for the Moroccan
regime within the next two years, barring an unforeseen termi-
nation of the country's foreign subsidies.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 2, 1977
SECRET (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
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CIA Headquarters
Room 7E62
Langley, Virginia
SUBJECT: Proposed Study on "The Conflict in the
Western Sahara. "
My interest in the Sahara issue goes beyond its probable importance.
The terms of reference outlined in Bob Bowie's memorandum of
April 20, 1977, seem to touch on most of the significant points, with
one exception. I see no indication that any thought is being given
to what a negotiated settlement including Algeria and Morocco might
look like. Does either side have a fall-back position? When I was in
Algiers a year or so ago, I heard people talk about various acceptable
outcomes. Could the study go into some of these, at least on hypo-
thetical future positions? Also, on the Moroccan side is there any
chance of a change in policy? Who has influence over whom if some
kind of negotiation or mediation were to begin? How sure are we of
our answers to these questions, given the sources of information?
William B. Quandt
SECRET (GDS)
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MEMORANDUM
April 27, 1977
TO CIA/NIO/NESA -
FROM NEA/AFN - Winifred S. Weislogel
SUBJECT: Comments on Terms of Reference (TOR) for
Sahara Study
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A. 1. Should include tribal relationships
4. Successes and Failures
5. Prospects for future of Polisario movement
3. Press campaign (Add)
1.
d.. Ideological differences (Add)
2.
C.
(2) Phasedown of Tindouf (Add)
3. Diplomatic efforts by Algeria in OAU, UN
and non-aligned
B. Morocco/Mauritania - The TOR for this section
implies an identity of experience, objective and
interest which does not exist. There are dif-
ferences of approach, closer tribal linkages with
Mauritania than with Morocco and some lingering
fears in Nouakchott that Morocco may not have
abandoned completely its designs on Mauritanian
territory. These should be examined in the study.
It should also deal with the attitude of the
Saharan population toward Moroccan and Mauritanian
control and its effect on overall situation.
SECRET
GDS
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C. Point three should emphasize the high priority
placed by Algeria on economic development.
A. Should point out the basic issues which an
acceptable settlement would probably have to
address, including the question of self deter-
mination and the longstanding Algerian-Moroccan
border problem.
The paper makes no mention of the refugee problem, which
could easily take on greater international importance or
could affect the U.S. position in view of the new Administra-
tion's stance on human rights.
The paper might note any effect which Moroccan inter-
vention in Zaire might have on the Sahara dispute. In my
view the Zaire imbroglio guarantees no Algerian acceptance
of a negotiated Sahara settlement, even if they had been
disposed to do so, until the outcome in Zaire is clear.
If the GOM forces are in and out successfully and quickly,
I doubt there will be any effect. If the Moroccans get
bogged down,I imagine their involvement in Zaire would
exacerbate many of the same tensions resulting from the
Sahara conflict and could encourage increased Algerian/
Polisario activity.
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DistributioAplaYovecl Foidb4isg :04/TM7Cfld K.MPTOFMI60
Mr. Leslie Janka
Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense,
Room 4E840, Pentagon
Asst Secretary (Intelligence) /Director
of Defense Intelligence
Room 3E282, Pentagon
I I
NSA G-
Room 4A156
Ft. Meade
Mr. William Quandt
NSC Staff
Room 386, Old EOB
Mr. Harold Saunders
Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research
Rooin 6531, State Dept
Mr. Nicholas Veliotes
Deputy Asst Secretary, NEA
Room 6242, State Dept
-Mr. Arthur Day
Deputy Asst Secretary, NEA
Room 6242, State Dept
--~-Iir. Robert A#o ~_ e14 ACD:1
-- Room6510, State Dept
Mr. Th c+ ^"~at
PM
Room 7317, State Dept
Been Charles D. Youree
JCS-J5 ?
Room 2E968, Pentagon
Capt. Gary Koldyke
AF/INAKE
Room 4B879, Pentagon
Mr. Alex Button
Estimates Branch
Office of Naval Intelligence
Room 5B681, Pentagon
Ms Nancy McCabe
DA`II-Fl l
Room 2D485, Pentagon
Mr. Foster Collins
Office of National Security
Room 4325, Main Treasury
Mr --Richard Violette
Mr. Harry J. Shaw
Chief, Military Assistance Branch
International Affairs Div
0MB
Room 8236, New E0B
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NIO/USSR
NIO/CF
NIO/AF
NI0/E
IC Staff
Room 6E291.4
OER - 4G24
OER - 6617
OSR - 3F25
CPS - 7F30
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
20 April 1977
1. The protracted guerrilla war involving Moroccan, Algerian,
Mauritanian and Polisario interests in the ex-Spanish Sahara continues
to be a potentially escalatory and explosive situation. In view of the
US Government's interests in the area, I have asked that a study be
undertaken to examine the current situation, assess the likelihood of
expanded fighting, and explore the elements of a possible settlement.
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or his assistantL __J If any addressee feels 25X
that it would be desirable to hold a meeting to discuss the TOR, the
NIO/NESA can make such arrangements. In the absence of such a request,
however, the draft TOR -- as modified in light of your comments -- will
be adopted for the IIM. It would thus be appreciated if your comments
could be submitted by COB 29 April.
3. The tentative production schedule for this IIM envisages
completion of the first draft by 9 May and consideration of the draft
by NFIB representatives during mid-May.
Robert R. Bowie
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
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2. The proposed Terms of Reference (TOR) for this IIM have been
prepared by the designated Project Officer, 25X
(DIA/DN-2E2), in consultation with regional experts from State
(INR) and CIA t would be appreciated if you would review the
draft TOR and provide your comments concerning it to the National Intelli-
gence Officer for the Near East and South Asia (NIO/NESA), 25X
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I. The Continuing Guerrilla Campaign
A. THE POLISARIO
1. Aim, motivation and morale of the POLISARIO
2. Size and disposition of forces
3. Tactics and capabilities
4. Successes
B. OUTSIDE SUPPORT
1. Military
a. Algeria
b. Libya and others
2. Diplomatic (recognitions)
II. Algeria and Moroccan/Mauritanian Confrontation
A. ALGERIAN
1. Motivation
a. Geopolitical competition with Morocco
b. Deny Morocco Saharan resources
c. Formation of pro-Algerian Saharan state
2. Augmentation of conventional military forces
a. Soviet deliveries
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b. Libyan connection
c. Disposition of forces
1. Build-up at Tindouf
B.
MOROCCO/MAURITANIA
1.
Objectives
2.
Modernization and augmentation of armed forces
a. Arms resources
b. Arab financial b
acking
3.
Strategy
a. Diplomatic
(1) Sustain support from Arab and African states
b. Military
(1)
Moroccan/Mauritanian alliance
(2) Tactics
(a) Sweeps
(b) Use of Saharan troops
(c) Border crossings
(3) Effectiveness of operations and continuing problems
III. The Consequences of a Prolonged Guerrilla Campaign
A. POSSIBLE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS
1. Morocco
2. Algeria
3. Mauritania
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IV. Constraints against a Conventional War
A. DECISIVE VICTORY UNLIKELY
1. Terrain
2. Logistics
B. RESTRAINTS ON MOROCCO
1. Possible adverse effect on the Monarchy
2. Algerian military superiority
3. Cost to an already strained economy
C. ALGERIAN LIMITATIONS
1. Lack of internal support
2. Vulnerability of LNG plants
3. Diversion of scarce resources
D. DIPLOMATIC REPERCUSSIONS
1. Political ramifications
2. Arab response.
3. Soviet reaction
4. The French role
V. U.S. Interest in Regional Stability
A. STRATEGIC
B. POLITICAL
C. ECONOMIC
D
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VI. Outlook
A. PROGNOSIS FOR A SETTLEMENT
1. Previous negotiation attempts
2. Depth of commitment
3. Negotiated settlement unlikely
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Protracted guerrilla war expected
2. Increase in limited border raids
3. Conventional war unlikely
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