NI IIM 77-008: THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA (U) (FINAL DRAFT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500070002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 3, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approvedor Release 2004/12/01 is CIA-RDP79Rc3A002500070002-9
TOP SECRET
THE. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Representatives of the National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT NI IIM 77-008: THE CO::FLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA
(Final Draft)
0
25X1 1. The final draft of IIM 77-008 is attached for your review.
Required changes identified at the meeting of 24 May have been incorporated and
the Principal Judgments have been substantially rewritten. Please note also
that the Principal Judgmentq- when arated from the remainder of the IIM bear
25X1 the classification of SECRE This lower classification will facilitate
the broader dissemination of the study's conclusions. Representatives who desire
to discuss any of the textual changes that have been made should contact the
25X1 Project Officer, DIA/DN-2E2),
25X1 2. it is requested that representatives register their a
en
i
'
g
c
es
25X1 concurrences by telephoning by not later than 1600,
Friday 7 0 T,,--
3. (U) It is not anticipated at this time that IIM 77-008 will be
submitted for formal review by the NFIB.
25X1
National Intelligence Officer for the
Near East and South Asia
Attachment: As stated
J
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Principal Judgments ...................................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................... 4
DISCUSSION ............................................... 7
Who Owns the Sahara? ............................ 7
Algeria's Motives ............................... 8
Origins of the POLISARIO ........................ 9
The Guerrilla Campaign .......................... 11
POLISARIO Politics .............................. 12
The POLISARIO's Military Advantages and Successes 13
The Moroccan-Mauritanian Military Alliance ...... 16
Guerrilla Limitations ........................... 18
Political and Economic Consequences of a Pro-
tracted Guerrilla War ......................... 21
Morocco. :,****'****'*** .... *'**"******'**'* 21
Mauritania ................................. 23
Algeria .................................... 24
Military Developments ........................... 25
The Moroccan Response ...................... 25
Algeria Upgrades Conventional Forces ....... 27
Restraints Against a Moroccan-Algerian War ...... 28
Moroccan Deliberations ..................... 28
Algerian Limitations ....................... 31
Terrain and Logistic Restraints ............ 34
Projected International Reaction to the Advent
of Hostilities ................................ 36
Arab Reactions ............................. 36
Soviet Role ................................ 37
French Interests ........................... 40
US Strategic and Economic Interests in North-
west Africa ................................... 41
Prospects for a Settlement ...................... 46
Conclusions ..................................... 51
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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA*
Principal Judgments
Morocco and Mauritania are tenaciously maintaining their
hold on the former Spanish Sahara despite persistent harass-
ment by the guerrillas of the POLISARIO movement. Algeria
refuses to recognize the Moroccan-Mauritanian annexations,
advocates self-determination for the Sahara, and gives sub-
stantial material support to the POLISARIO insurgency. In the
short term, there appears to be little chance of a negotiated
settlement of this conflict.
The POLISARIO movement has caused a significant amount
of Moroccan and Mauritanian resources to be used for countering
guerrilla activity. As long as the flow of Algerian military
supplies is continued and their Algerian safehaven is main-
tained, the guerrillas should be able to operate almost in-
definitely. Numbering only some 3,000 to 5,000 men, however,
and hampered by logistic constraints and their heavy dependence
on outside military support, they do not pose an insuperable
military threat to either Morocco or Mauritania. Nor do we
believe that the POLISARIO can, at its own initiative, signifi-
cantly upgrade its existing military force.
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* This memorandum--at the request of the National Intelligence
Officer for the Near East and South Asia--was prepared under
the direction of DIA/DN-2E2, with 25X
major contributions being submitted by 25X
-
um was
State/INR. The memora
coordinated at the working level among DIA, CIA, State/INR,
NSA, Treasury, and the intelligence organizations of the Armed
Services.
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During the next two years, the current situation will
probably continue:
--Morocco and Mauritania will strive to con-
solidate their political control over the
territory, alleging that integration of the
Sahara fulfills the desires of the Saharan
people, but avoiding any referendum not under
their control. They will control the principal
population centers but will not be able to
eliminate the guerrilla movement so long as it
is sustained by Algeria.
--the POLISARIO will continue to move through the
countryside harassing Moroccan and Mauritanian
forces, and on occasion scoring minor military
successes,'some of considerable propaganda value.
--Algeria will continue its support of the POLISARIO
and will try to keep the issue before international
forums. Algeria will not, however, seek outside
help other than diplomatic support as it does not
wish to dilute its influence over the POLISARIO.
--Internationally, most countries, while withholding
formal recognition, will regard the Sahara annexa-
tion by Morocco and Mauritania as a fait accompli.
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There is little likelihood that the Soviets
will become involved in the conflict on a large
scale, since they do not want to jeopardize
their relations with Morocco by providing
direct support to the POLISARIO.
Prospects for a reduction in tension in the short run
are dim because of the lack of negotiating flexibility exhibited
by all parties, which in turn results partly from the moderate
military losses being inflicted on either side. Serious politi-
cal, economic, and military restraints, however, will probably
keep the conflict from escalating into a conventional war between
Algeria and Morocco.
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The coup in Portugal in April 1974 and Lisbon's sub-
sequent decision to grant its African territories independence
prompted King Hassan of Morocco to press Madrid to pull out
of the Spanish Sahara. Rabat was convinced that Spain would
not wish to remain long as the only significant colonial power
in Africa.
On 20 August 1974, Spain notified the UN Secretary
General of its intention to hold a referendum on self-deter-
mination in its colony. Morocco seized upon the announcement
to reassert its claims to the phosphate rich territory. Rabat
argued that in the pre-colonial era Moroccan rulers intermit-
tently exercised varying degrees of control over much of this
territory, as well as portions of western Algeria, Mauritania,
and parts of Mali.
Indeed, it was not until 1970--14 years after achieving
its own independence, that Morocco recognized Mauritania and
dropped its claims to that country. Rabat's feud with Algeria
over the region stretching from the area south of Bechar and
including Tindouf was the cause of a brief border war in 1963.
Both countries signed an agreement in 1972 delineating a common
boundary, but Rabat has not yet ratified the accord.
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In conjunction with Rabat's aggressive political campaign
to recover the Sahara in 1974, Mauritania took the occasion to
voice its own territorial claims. The former Spanish Sahara
has no natural frontiers and shares its southern and virtually
all of its eastern border with Mauritania. The nomadic tribes
of the Sahara have traditionally roamed across those borders,
as well as across into Morocco.
Mauritania's assertion of its own territorial ambitions
resulted in a brief period of tension with Morocco. A recon-
ciliation was effected by September 1974 when the two countries
agreed to submit their case to the International Court of Justice
for a legal opinion. By the end of the year, Rabat and Nouakchott
agreed in principle to partition the territory.
In May 1975, Madrid announced it was prepared to transfer
sovereignty of the territory. Five months later the International
Court of Justice concluded that, although certain ties of alle-
giance existed between Morocco/Mauritania and the Western Sahara
prior to Spanish colonization, these did not support a claim
of territorial sovereignty for either party. The principle
of self-determination was upheld.
Algeria, for its part, sought to secure an independent
Spanish Sahara amenable to Algerian influence. Algiers was con-
cerned that Rabat's acquisition of additional territory would
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enhance Morocco's role in north Africa at the expense of Algerian
interests.
Nevertheless, Rabat moved ahead with its plans for an-
nexation by organizing the ''Green March'' into the Sahara by
some 350,000 unarmed civilians in early November 1975 while
Spain remained in control. This compelled Madrid to partition
the country and transfer administrative responsibility, but
not sovereignty, to Morocco and Mauritania. Spain withdrew
from the Spanish Sahara in February 1976, advocating a self-
determination for the Saharan people--a stance it has continued
to maintain. On 14 April Morocco and Mauritania formalized
their annexation of the Sahara by announcing new boundaries;
Rabat gained the phosphate-rich northern two-thirds.
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1. Morocco and Mauritania exercise de facto control
over most of the former Spanish Sahara. United Nations
General Assembly resolutions have upheld the right of self-
determination of the Saharan people, but both governments
claim that the convocation of the Saharan territorial assembly
in February 1976 and the vote of some 60 of its original 102
members to integrate the Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania
constituted compliance. They further cite the participation of
the Saharans in the Moroccan and Mauritanian elections during
the past year. Neither Spain nor the UN has accepted Rabat's
gambit to dispose of the troublesome consultation process.
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