NSC ON KOREA 27 APRIL 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 28, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/07/20 CIA-RDP79R00603AO02500020017-8
TS 770131
C y
2 8 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: NSC on Korea
27 April 1977
At the NSC meeting on Korea, General Brown took up the
theme which you and I had injected into the PRC meeting on Korea
last week --- that of diving the President a good evaluation of
the risks and benefits of both pulling out and the possible
ameliorative measures in so doing. He clearly indicated was
not his opinion tat this had been done.
1. It is my view that we should develop a
much more useful paper than the two-page one that
I saw shortly before getting into that NSC meeting.
It is also my view that we should specifically
address our evaluation of the impact on t_hevarious
parties concerne; e.g., Japan, China, North and-'
ou Korea, of t e various offsetting measures
that are pro ose ose measures as I understood
t e' were:
7
a. Reaffirming our intent to
maintain Naval and Air Force forces
i n the Far East.
b. Coming up with a phased
reduction program rather than 'a
sudden withdrawal.
c. Public reaffirmation of our
commitment to the.defense'of South
Korea, indicating that the residual
South Korean forces will be the
equivalent of what has been there
between US and the South Koreans
in capability.
25X1
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produce after the PRC meeting.
d. Indicating a commitment to
refurbish the South Korean military
forces. It is necessary to build up
their capability to an equivalency
of what is there now, this to be
done largely by South Korean procure-
ment with their own funds from the
United States, but perhaps partly
with the leaving behind of equipment
from the division we withdraw. (The
question of Congressional approval
for either type of action must be
considered.)
2. Working with State, I think we should
continue to develop the paper we set out to
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO02500020017-8