(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050030-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050030-8
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b. Page 4, para 1. While basically true, the view expressed here borders
on the pessimistic. Whether or not the Arab states adopt an increasingly
neutralist position in the East-West struggle depends to a large extent upon
what measures the West takes during the nest few months to alleviate or
dissipate existing grievances. Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon give evidence of
wanting to be helped and of basically wanting to side with the West. However,
despite the fact that the U.S. claims to have the same objective policy towards
both Israel and the Arab states, it is manifest that the Israelis have been
favored by large grants-in-aid and other measures, and that only now is U.S.
attempting to redress this inbalance with economic and military aid programs.
The Arabs have just grievances against both the British and the French, as
well. Recognizing the rightful aspirations of these peoples and treating them
with respect and dignity would eliminate much hard feeling and suspicion upon
which neutralism feeds. It is true that the Arabs have, and will continue to
have, a selfish attitude and attempt to obtain as much aid as possible. But
it cannot be stated categorically that the underlying reason for this is that
such aid can be employed against Israel. It might be used against her under
certain conditions, but the Arabs are interested in the aid for itself and
for the security which it provides. The chances of the Arab states declaring
war on Israel at any time within a foreseeable future are extremely remote.
The danger of Israel using force to break down the so-called Arab blockade and
to assure the survival of her present and projected future population is much
more real.
Para 2, lines 1-3. We feel this should be toned down somewhat, as
the flat statement is too cynical. (There are elements in the Arab states
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050030-8
5. Middle East & Africa: --a. Page 2, para 4 Suggest putting period after A e word "issues."
The paper does not make it clear as to just why the lurks should side increasingly-
with Arab-Asian bloc on colonial issues. The Turks have very little sympathy for
the Arabs, and the Arabs have no love for the Turks who held them in subjection
for 400 years.
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Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050030-8
 SECRET Approved For Reley&e 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A003G0050030-8
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who believe in freedom and democracy, and are as opposed to communism as we
are. These elements may not always be dominant, but there is a residue of
good will existing there that can be cultivated.)
Line 8. The military regimes in Egypt and Syria are also
interested in building up their military forces for survival purposes, and
this is perhaps more over-riding -than prestige.
c. Page 5, para 3. (in the belief etc....") We feel that this is
probably too pat, and that there are other equally important feelings involved.
The Arabs resent the presence of foreign troops on their soil and interferences
in their internal affairs. They have an inferiority complex and are extremely
sensitive to foreign influences and pressures. They are aware of their military
weakness, but are also convinced that they could defend their countries if
given training and the necessary weapons.
Last sentence. Here too we believe the statement too strong. All
the Arab states, including Iraq, are opposed to granting bases, especially in
peacetime. There is no evidence that they would not accept the stationing of
foreign ground troops in their respective countries if a real emergency develop-
ed. West-Arab relations at the time would probably decide that.
d. Page 5, para 4. Last sentence.. We feel there is an alternative, as
the Arab nations have little to gain by remaining neutral or passive. In the
event of a developing emergency would there not be requests for more and
greater aid, rather than passive acceptance?
e. Page 8, para 1, line 4. We suggest inclusion of statement regarding
Israel's financial and economic dependence on the West, as well as vulnerability
to wartime shortages.
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Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA RDP79R01012A001300050030-8