CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600430001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 April 1961
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Lim
TELLI ENCE
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State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
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19 April 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Khrushchev implicitly links Cuba to Laos in
letter to President. (Page t)
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r.
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5. Congo: Kasavubu's agreement with UN to reorganize
Congolese Army apparently made independently of
Mobutu. (Page v t )
7. Yugoslavia: Regime shows confidence. (.Page vi)
8. Austria: Business interests again urge recognition of
Communist China. (Page vi t)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR-Cuba-Laos: The first official Soviet pronounce-I
ments on the Cuban situation foreshadow a massive prop-
aganda and diplomatic campaign to mobilize world opinion
i
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against the US and generate alarm over the consequences of
the fighting in Cuba. While the Soviet leaders will not hes-
itate to make maximum political capital from Cuban devel-
opments, neither Khrushchev's letter to the President nor
the official government statements goes beyond the general
warning that "we will extend to the Cuban people and its gov-
ernment all the necessary aid for the repulse of the armed
attack on Cuba." Khrushchev's letter, however, implicitly
links the Cuban situation to Laos by warning that "in general
it is impossible to carry on affairs in such a way that in one
area the situation is settled and the fire is put out and in an-
other area a new fire is lit." Although the Soviet leaders prob-
ably will be careful to avoid any commitments to specific
counteraction in Cuba, Khrushchev's letter suggests that
Moscow may continue to stall on cease-fire arrangements
in Laos and may sanction increased military pressure against
the Vientiane government. The Soviet Government statement,
appealing to all UN members to "render all necessary aid"
to Cuba and demanding that the UN General Assembly urgent-
ly study the "aggressive actions" of the US, was followed by
the Soviet resolution along the same lines presented in the
yesterday evening.
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MA
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INDIA
300
Z
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
LIBERIA
230
INDIA
3000
INDONESIA
870
INDONESIA
280
Leopoldv
ysville
MOBUTU
7.200
MOBUTU
800
NIGERIA
500
GHANA
1600
uluabourg"\~ --
Bakwaf'
GIZENGA
7,000
KA1:0NI I
11500
MALAYA
870
ETHIOPI
800
ETHIOPIA
1,500
Manono
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Gizenga
0 STATUTE MILES 400
1 ~
EER Kalonji
Eal Tshombe
-i -~- Selected railroad
Selected airfield
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Congo: Although President Kasavubu is still avoiding any
commitment to allow re-entry of UN troops into Matadi, he
declared his willingness on 17 April to cooperate with the UN
and to permit a reorganization of the UN army under UN aus-
pices. His agreement on reorganization of the army appears
to have been made independently of Army Chief Joseph Mobutu.
It appears likely that Mobutu will demand assurances that suc
a reorganization will not. be used as a pretext for disarming
the army. Mobutu claims to have reestablished his author-
ity over Gizenga's forces in Orientale Province.
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Yugoslavia: Belgrade is showing confidence in its ability 25X1
to develop its domestic economy and to achieve greater public
participation in achieving the regime's goals. The two most re--
cent steps, the Third Five-Year Plan (1961=65) and a far-reach-
ing economic reform, have the avowed purpose of reaching by
1965 a per capita income comparable to that of present-day
Italy, i. e. , about $575 per year. The initial adjustment to the
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DAILY BRIEF
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reform, however, has not been as smooth as the regime had
hoped, Land certain elements in the party are concerned that
inflationary trends accompanying the reform may create pub-
lic dissatisfaction In the political sphere, the regime has
further demonstrated its confidence by releasing from jail
Milovan Djilas, author of The New Class, and continuing to
ease pressures on the Catholic Church.
Austria ? Communist China: lThe Austrian Government
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is again under pressure from business interests to consider
recognizing Communist China. A delegation from the League
of Austrian Industrialists reportedly has urged recognition on
Foreign Minister Kreisky, who said that he personally favored
such a move but that it would require time- perhaps half a
that there would be "no difficulty for Austria to recognize" Pei-
ping but that Austria had not so far done so because of Wash-
year-to maneuver the government into position for it. Kreisky
said he would raise the matter at a meeting of the new Gorbach
cabinet. Kreisky has told Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki
ington's position)
NOTE: Che Department of State believes that Kreisky's
personal attitude toward Communist China is well known, and
feels it unlikely any change in Austrian policy wi take place
in the foreseeable future
j
INS
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DAILY BRIEF vii
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The Situation in the Congo
The 17 April claim by Congo Army headquarters that Gen-
eral Mobutu has reached agreement with the authorities in
Orientale Province has yet to be confirmed by any spokesman
for Gizenga. The position of the Leopoldville government rel-
ative to its rivals appears to have improved, however, as a
result of the internal dissensions besetting the Gizenga and
Tshomb6 regimes. In Stanleyville, the leader of one faction
was briefly under arrest in mid-April for subversive activi-
ties; in Elisabethville, Tshombe's freedom of action has been
limited both by factional rivalries among his subordinates and
by diminishing popular support.
President Kasavubu's declaration of his willingness to
cooperate with the UN contrasts with TshombL's recent
warnings against any reinforcement of UN troops in Katanga.
That Kasavubu desires further to isolate Tshombd is suggested
by a passage in his agreement with the UN calling for the ex-
pulsion of all foreign political and military functionaries
hired by any agency other than the Kasavubu government.
As of 17 April, approximately 900 Indian troops had been
airlifted from Tanganyika to Kamina base in Katanga. UN
officials, however, have charged that Tshombd has revived
efforts to boycott the UN in Katanga and to prevent it from
purchasing food and other supplies.
On 14 April Albert Ndele, governor of the Congo National
Bank, briefed foreign diplomats and businessmen on the
financial condition of the Congo, which he described as grave.
According to Ndele, governmental expenditures in the last
half of 1960 exceeded income by US $12 million per month.
Ndele observed that falling imports had brought serious
inflation, and charged various government agencies, particu-
larly the Congo Army, with fiscal extravagance.
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 Approved Fo
Internal Developments in Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia's parliament convened on 18 April to approve
the annual report of the Federal Executive Council (the cab-
inet) on economic development and the primary tasks to be
faced in the coming year. While the report itself contains
little of dramatic import, it comes at a time of significant
change in Yugoslavia. On 1 January Belgrade announced that
its Second Five-Year Plan (195761) had been completed one
year early and that the third would be begun immediately.
The economic reform accompanying the new plan will
bring Yugoslavia's foreign trade practices into closer accord
with those of the West by lessening central government con-
trol over trade, unifying the exchange rate of its currency at
750 dinars to the dollar, and using simplified, direct tariffs.
Belgrade hopes that these changes will increase foreign trade
by 74 percent in the next five years. The reform also calls for
further decentralization of Yugoslavia's political administra-
tion and economy. By vesting more power at the local level,
the regime hopes to solve a problem which plagues all Com-
munist regimes==how to stimulate individual initiative and in-
dustrial efficiency without endangering the regime's control.
The reform has had unsettling domestic, effects,jand as a
result, some party officials fear that popular unrest may de-
velop] Retail prices for certain consumer goods have risen
sharply, necessitating the extension of price controls. Under
the new system, some industries have engaged in monopolistic
practices, forcing up prices despite the regime's expectations
to the contrary. Belgrade has not been able, moreover, to re-
duce controls on as many commodities as originally planned,
because some of the Western aid--totaling $275,000,000..-sup-
porting the reform is relatively short term, high interest, and
restricted as to its use.
Yugoslavia is making ideological claims about the reform
in an attempt to justify a program which some party cadres
apparently consider non-Marxist. Moreover, these cadres may
feel threatened by the regime's policy of emphasizing efficiency
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rather than party loyalty. The front organization and the trade
union federation have undertaken a campaign to win popular
support and to ensure compliance with the reform by local eco-
nomic functionaries. In addition, Yugoslav courts have begun
handing out jail sentences in cases involving economic malfea-
sance by executives.
In order to reflect more accurately the extent to which the
Yugoslav system has been decentralized and "democratized"--
i. e., more persons involved in the processes of administra=
tion-a new constitution. is being written which will institution-
alize current practices. Avowedly, it will also broaden civil
rights and, perhaps, attempt to provide a mechanism which
would ease the transfer of power after Tito's death.
Djilas was released after serving only four years of his
ten-year jail sentence for "hostile propaganda"; he is not be-V
ing subjected to normal parole restrictions, Djilas hopes to
publish in Yugoslavia some of the five books he wrote while in
prison and expects to resume a significant role in Yugoslav
politics, although the latter seems unlikely during Tito's life-
time.
Similarly, Belgrade has moved since the death of Cardinal
Stepinac in February 1960 to improve its relations with the
Catholic Church; a working relationship has already been
reached with the Moslem and Orthodox Church communities.
Although progress has been made, a disagreement over ap-
pointment of an apostolic delegate, who the regime insists
must be a Yugoslav citizen, has not been resolved.
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Pressure in Aus a for ecognizF. g Communist China
n its session with the foreign minister, the delegation
from the League of Austrian Industrialists argued that Austria
should recognize Communist China before the US did, in order
to avoid giving the impression that Austria was an American
satellite. Kreisky, one of the prominent Socialist members of
the coalition cabinet, replied that he could not move alone in
the matter because his political enemies, particularly in the
coalition People's party, were jealous of his growing prestige
and would label him a Communist. He said that the Socialist
party in general favors recognition because of its interest in
developing the country's nationalized industries. Kreisky also
told the delegates that in 1958 he had changed Austria's position
in the UN from one of supporting the moratorium on Chinese
UN representation to one of abstention on the issue, and that
Austria's future attitude would depend on circumstances in the
next General Assembly]
LIn the first ten months of 1960 Austrian imports from Com-
munist China were worth $5,200,000, practically double what
they were for the same period in 1959. Exports, however, re-
mained at about the same level, around $11,000,000 in each
period. Austrian businessmen have frequently complained that
lack of political ties is hurting Austria's export trade. Austria's
trade with Communist China makes up about 13 percent of its
total trade with the bloc. Austria has no diplomatic, consular,
or commercial representation in either Nationalist or Commu-
nist China. A trade commissioner resident in Hong Kong
handles Austria's trade matters in the area
eisky, in telling US Ambassador Matthews about his
discussions with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki during his
visit to Vienna from 8 to 11 March, implied that establishing
Austrian diplomatic relations with Communist China was main-
ly a matter of time. Kreisky said he had turned down Rapacki's
offer of mediation because of the domestic political situation,
adding that the USSR had made a similar offer but that he pre-
fers the mediation of a neutral like Switzerland which already
has an embassy in Peipingg
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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