CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600390001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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Congo: Katangan tribal leaders attempt to circumscribe
Tshombe's power. (Page it)
Portugal: Salazar removes Defense Minister Moniz;
reshuffles cabinet. (Page it)
France =Algeria: US Embassy in Paris comments on De
Gaulle's press conference. (Page it)
Communist China India: Peiping unofficially broaches
possibility of arbitration of border dispute. (Page tit)
6. Japan-Korea: Pyongyang agrees to resumed repatriation
of Koreans in Japan. (Page tit)
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INDIA
300
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
INDONESIA
2$0
Scattered ForceT-
BUTU
3,400
EQUATED
Coquilhatville ?Boende
ETHIOPIA
200
7,200 Scattered,Forces
EQP?LOVILL
Leopoldo'
ysville
MOBUTU
800
Ikela,C
Matad.i uluabour \4
a / Bakw
NDONESIA
870
GHANA
1600
Gizenga
Kalonji
/610413 2
Selected road
-*-h- Selected railroad
Selected airfield
INDIA
1400
ETHIOPIA
1,500
NIGERIA
900
NIGERIA
500
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
-Aket
GIZENGA
7,000
MALAYA
870
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Congo: Tshombe's hegemony in Katanga politics appar-
ently is eing challenged by tribal traditionalists led by
Interior Minister Munongo. Under a proposed constitu-
tional amendment published on 12 April and immediately eL_4
denounced by Tshombe' as illegal, most of the president's
executive functions would be transferred to a prime minis-
ter. Munongo, who is strongly opposed to Belgians and is
unfriendly to whites in general, is the likely candidate for
.the new post. The tribalists dominate the legislature and
are influential in most areas of Katanga, and Tshomb4, who
seems to retain the support of his Belgian military and
civilian advisers, may be faced with a oreakuD of the tribal 25X1
coalition which brought him to power. I
Portugal. The 13 April cabinet changes, and particularly
the removal of Defense Minister Moniz, represent a rejection
by Salazar of demands for liberalization of Portugal's internal
and African policies. Moniz was the principal advocate withi
the cabinet of such liberalization. Salazar has taken me de
top officers for his demand that Salazar either
-ies or face a military takeover-]
a vigorous defender of the government's "stand firm" policies
in Africa. &W-azar's move may now provoke a reaction from
Moniz, who recently intimated to US officials that he had the
-orevious undersecretary, the 38-year=old Adriano Moreira,
fense portfolio himself, appointed a comparative unknown a
army minister, and promoted to the Overseas Ministry the
.France=Algeria: The American Embassy in Paris feels
De 6-a-ull els 11 April press conference posed to the Algerians
4-1-- -1--- d-%-f f,,+,,rn fripnrl.qhin with France or a
NS! complete rupture, with independence in any case, and fore=
I WON
ME ial
F////, shadowed the future development of France as a noncolon
power. The US consul general in Algiers points out that
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granting them the role of exclusive spokesmen for Algeria,
Aro attribute to them a ttenecialt? racnnnsihility_ The consul
general feels that this may be sufficient to bring the FLN to
peace talks with the French. The rebel provisional Algerian
government has not yet commented officially on De Gaulle's
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a response.
Communist China - India.
e1=
ping has never before submitted a political dispute to arbitra=
tion. In the present case, however, the Chinese may see
definite tactical advantages in the move. They probably rea-
son. that Nehru, who has consistently refused Chinese offers
to compromise the border dispute, would in all likelihood
reject an arbitration offer. The Indian leader insists that the
border problem has grown out of Chinese aggression. The
Chinese would try to present an Indian rejection as a refusal
to loin with Peiping in a move to relax tensions in the area.
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Japan-Ko f ea: Repatriation of Korean residents in Japan
to North Korea will resume on 14 April but probably will no
longer be a major irritant in relations between Japan and
South Korea. The post-Rhee government in Seoul has tende
to ignore the repatriation question in negotiations to settle
outstanding problems with Tokyo. Pyongyang suspended the
repatriation program last February, presumably because the
North Koreans were embarrassed by the drop in the number
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Korean community in Japan, and from its own front group
in Japan which has warned of a major prestige loss if repa-
triation was not resumed. About 10 percent of the 600,000
Japanese, who want to reduce the size of the
been under pressure to resume the program both from the
of Koreans seeking repatriation. Pyongyang, however, has
Korean residents in Japan have gone to North Korea since
the program was initiated in December 1959.
(Briefs continued on following page)
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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
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Few Years. USIB. NIE 60/70-61. 11 April 19610
Situation in Colonial Africa South of the Sahara Over the Next
Probable Political Developments and the Internal Security
USIB. NIE 11-61. 6 April 1961. 0036854.
Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US.
Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament and Arms
Control: Assessment of the Underlying Motivations and Objec-
tives of the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West
Germany, and Canada. USIB. NIE 4.2-61. 6 April 1961.
1 1
14 Apr 61
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Situation in the Congo
The proposed changes in the Katanga constitution would
subordinate the executive to the legislature--an obvious ef-
fort to check Tshombe's freewheeling.. An earlier resolu-
tion. requesting the nomination of a prime minister passed
the lower house by a vote of 34 to 6, and Tshombe's. oppo-
nents probably command a similar majority in the Grand
Council of chiefs. Many of these leaders reportedly object
that Tshombe's ministers have voted themselves salary in=
creases without increasing the stipends of the chiefs; most
of them, moreover, apparently oppose Tshombe's alliance
with the Belgians.
Tshombe has rebutted this attack with a plea that strong
executive rule is necessary in view of the threats to Katanga's
independence. He further asserted that the legislature cannot
unilaterally promulgate a constitutional change, since the pres-
ident's approval is necessary as well as that of two thirds of
the lower house.
Most Belgians in Katanga believe that Tshombe will weather
this challenge, although one of them told the American consul
in Elisabethville that he thought the Katanga president was "used
up" as a leader. In addition, the Belgians reportedly are uneasy
over the influence which tribalists such as Munongo can wield in
the countryside, where many tribesmen are growing dissatis-
fied with the influence Belgium in exerting in Katanga. 25X1
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Salazar Drops Portugue Minister
In Cabinet Reshuffle
General Manuel Gomes de Araujo, the chief of general
staff of the armed forces, is considered exceptionally loyal
to Salazar, and both he and the new army minister, Brigadier
Mario Silva, are generally regarded as members of the ex-
treme right-wing group of former Defense Minister Santos
Costa. Santos Costa is a bitter rival of Moniz, and Salazar
may intend to return him to the Defense Ministry shortly
CA further indication that the regime will continue to take
a firm stand against changes in the overseas provinces appears
in a recent statement made by French Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville to Ambassador Elbrick.in Lisbon on 8 April. He
said that a long talk with Salazar and Foreign Minister Mathias
revealed no sign of any "give" or new ideas for a solution of
Portugal's African problems. Couve subsequently implied to
US Ambassador Gavin in Paris that Salazar would have to go
before there could be significant changes in Portugal's African
poiicie~
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Reactions to De Gaulle's Remarks on Algeria
The US Embassy in Paris notes that De Gaulle carefully
avoided questions of detail and procedure but feels that he has
clarified his general intentions for Algeria once and for all and
has offered the rebels a unique opportunity to. come to terms.
In his follow-up provincial speaking tour, De Gaulle declared
on 12 April that he has been and still is offering Algeria peace
and cooperation and said, "Let the other side want this and it
will be done:' On 13 April, he made another overture to the
rebels saying, "We want to settle the rebellion by extending
our hand to those who, up to now, have not wished to accept
it, and in such a manner that it will be possible for them to
construct the new Algeria, and for us, if they are willing, to
help them do it."
Although De Gaulle's statements are designed to demon-
strate French willingness to seek a reasonable solution, he is
still a long way from offering to deal with the Provisional. Al-
gerian Government on anything resembling a government-to-
government basis. He continues to speak only in terms of
self =determination by all of the Algerian people after a rebel
agreement to stop the fighting. He also threatened .that an in-
dependent Algeria not closely associated with France would be
left to face economic chaos and might also have to submit to
partition.
This type of presentation may revive latent discord within
the PAG., The rebels had reached their decision to go to Evian
in.the first place by glossing over such long=range problems,
and they were hoping for clarification of a few points of imme-
diate interest to them. The rebels may view De Gaulle's reit-
eration. of these positions at this time as an attempt to limit the
scope of negotiations and force a settlement which would provide
for continued French influence. Powerful elements within the
PAG could argue that no basis exists for successful negotiations
within such a context, More moderate elements, however, in
view of what they consider improved relations with the US and
possibly the UK--a British parliamentary delegation met with
rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas on 10 April, apparently on British
initiative--may consider it unwise to refuse to meet with the
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French. The rebels are reportedly continuing attempts to
establish through secret contacts a basis for opening talks.
The early reaction in Algeria to De Gaulle's statements
has been unfavorable. The settler ultras are likely to see in
this week's speeches a full confirmation of their fears that De
Gaulle is renouncing the maintenance of French sovereignty in
Algeria and they will probably step up their bombings and other
"counterterrorist" activities. The Moslem population, which
had been looking. toward an early end to hostilities, is disap=
pointed that De Gaulle did not make more specific concessions
to the PAG and fears an adverse effect on prospects for nego-
tiations.
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Korean Repatriation From Japan to North Korea Resumed
The repatriation agreement, concluded in mid-1959, is a
private agreement between the Japanese and North Korean Red
Cross Societies, but has the official backing of both govern-
ments. Tokyo has long sought a means for solving the problem
of its Korean minority, which has a high crime rate and has
required heavy government assistance.
The Japanese failed, however, in efforts to persuade
President Syngman Rhee's government that the program was
based on humanitarian principles and would be entirely volun-
tary. Rhee reacted by severing trade with Japan and breaking
off negotiations for an over-all settlement of Japanese - South
Korean differences. With the ouster of the Rhee regime and
the actual implementation of the program, official and public
outrage in South Korea subsided. The Chang Myon government
opposes the program in principle, but in practice has tended to
ignore it. Despite the friendlier atmosphere in negotiations be-
tween Tokyo and Seoul in the post-Rhee period, however, major
differences on issues other than the repatriation problem have
prevented substantive progress.
More than 54,000 Koreans have been sent from Japan to
North Korea aboard the two repatriation ships made available
by the USSR. There is now a backlog of 17,000 applications for
repatriation, but many Koreans are likely to renege before de-
parture time, and it is doubtful that the sailings, resuming on
14 April, will reach the previous average of 1,000 repatriates
weekly.
(Pyongyang has apparently experienced difficulty in reset-
tling repatriates, who find living conditions in North Korea less
appealing than advertised by Chosen Soren, the Korean Commu-
nist front in Japan. There are reports that dissatisfied repa-
triates have refused to accept job assignments and have openly
criticized the Communist regime. Many have written to rela-
tives and friends in Japan of shortages in daily necessities and
warned them not to apply for repatriation. Pyongyang has im-
posed strict censorship on all mail, but elaborate private codes;
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Lave been devised and reports on conditions continue to
trickle out
Registration for sailings fell off sharply late last fall
and Pyongyang suspended the program in early February,
using its concern over a "flu epidemic" as an excuse. Chosen
Soren, working diligently to build up a backlog of repatriates,
has warned Pyongyang that North Korean prestige will suffer
in the Japanese Korean community unless the program is speed-
ily resumed.
Despite a labor shortage in North Korea, repatriation has
undoubtedly lost much of its political and economic appeal to
Pyongyang. The regime has probably come to view the disaf-
fected repatriates as an increasing liability, and probably would
like to find a way to discontinue the program if it could do so
without damaging North Korean prestige among Koreans in Japan.
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The Director
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
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