CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500340001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 February 1961
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Copy No, C 79
TEL IGE.J, CE
DIA and DOS
review(s)
completed.
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 101
INNOMMMOMMUS,
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10 February 1961
REN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: Moscow may be. considering release of U-2
pilot Powers. (Page i)
3. USSR=Indonesia: Earlier reports of Soviet agree-
ment to. provide Djakarta with TU-16 jet bombers
and MIG-21 jet fighters now confirmed. (Page i)
4. France-Algeria: De Gaulle to meet Bourguiba for
preparatory talks on Algeria. (Page it)
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6. Portugal: Riots of 4-5 February in Angola have a-
roused further criticism of. Salazar regime. (Page t')
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INNE' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
volved, as a further gesture toward improving relations
with the US.
USSR:LMoscow may be planning to release U-2 pilot
Gary Powers, in spite of the security consideration in-
1 11
released "within three weeR-s7r-F
Powers would be.
At the end of the Pow-
ers trial the chairman of the Moscow Lawyers Coliegium
told American attorneys that US-Soviet relations would
improve in coming months and a commutation or remis-
sion of Powers' sentence might then be possible. Powers' 25X1
Soviet defense attorney told US lawyers that he would file
application for commutation of sentence "at an appropriate
'
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110 Mffi
USSR-Indonesia-
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Soviet-Indonesian arms pact s i gned in Moscow on an-
uary the USSR agreed to deliver high-performance TU-16
jet bombers, MIG-21 jet fighters, and air-to-air and air-
don si
25X1 to-surface missiles to III,
Indonesian ability to absorb and effective-
25X1 ly use this modern equipment will depend on the USSR's car-
11
rying through a training program, which is outlined in the
agreement, in the use n nhance equipment and oisti.cd caalso
The
proved Indonesian mal g
Indonesians are now able to utilize less than 30 percent of
bloc jet aircraft delivered under. the 1958 arms deal. It is,
of course, possible that the Indonesians may find the more
advanced air force equipment too expensive and time co R
suming to maintain and use and therefore may subsequently
However
request a modification of the agreement.
the SSRast
that the U
pattern of such Soviet agreements suggests
The
will for its part carry out the. terms. of thWe agreement.
ereport-
more favorable terms of this agreement
edly extended to cover the naval equipment 25X1
pact concluded in September 1960. Since Khrushchev's visit
to Indonesia in February 1960, Moscow has sought to develop exploiting President
cordial relations with Djakarta
\N'
a leader of the Afro-
Sukarno's as iration to be
Asian bloc 25X1
110
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10 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii
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cials already has expressed resentment of what he terms
Bourguiba's "newspaper. diplomacy:' Bourguiba himself
seems uneasy over the.loss of prestige he will suffer if
.France-A1 eria: he prospective meeting between
De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba, seen by De
Gaulle as a means of preparing the way for negotiations
with the. Algerian rebels, could complicate French rela-
tions with the rebels. The rebel government has almost
certainly not authorized Bourguiba to discuss any substan-
tive aspects of the Algerian problem, and one of its offi-
the encounter with De Gaulle is without real results, but
he is anxious to gain credit for promoting a settlement.
He has therefore asked the US and UK to encourage the
French to be for hcomin .
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10 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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 Portugal: The riots in Angola. over the week end of-
4-5 February have aroused further. criticism of the Sal-
azar regime from its supporters.
has charged
that the government's present policy in r ca is designed
to protect a few important commercial interests and has
there is widespread dissatisfaction with Salazar among
army officers and has stated that some move against him
may be made in, the next few weeks. F- I
(Backup, Page 4)
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10 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv 1
M?RI
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Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia
Moscow, in keeping with its past performance in certain
other underdeveloped countries-=such as the UAR, Afghan-
istan, and even Yemen--apparently is willing for political
reasons to provide modern weapons to the Indonesian armed
forces regardless of Indonesian ability to utilize such ma-
teriel
[Since the Soviet Union's extension of a $250,000,000 eco-
nomic credit to Indonesia during Khrushchev's visit to Dja-
karta last February, Moscow has engaged in a program with
far-reaching political implications to ensure Soviet participa-
tion in Indonesia's economic and military development. It has
effectively capitalized on the Indonesian President's sensitiv-
ity to what he considers US hostility to himself. The Soviet
Union probably hopes that this approach, combined with its
economic aid and well over in military assist= 25X1
ance since February 1960, wiII strengthen Sukarno's resolve
to bring members of the Indonesian Communist party into his
cabinet
[Previously the anti-Communist posture of Army Chief of
Staff General Nasution and the Indonesian Army had fore-
stalled Sukarno's -intentions in this regard. However, on Su-
karno's orders, General Nasution led the Indonesian mission
to Moscow in January which resulted in the army's acceptance
for the first time of a substantial amount of bloc military equip-
.ment. Moscow may feel that Nasution's acceptance of this ma-
teriel will undercut his opposition to President Sukarno's plans.
In addition, Soviet 25X1
officials also impresse Nasution with their support of Indo-
nesia's intention to recover West New Guinea
(Since the conclusion of the January arms agreement, Mos-
cow radio has launched a steady propaganda barrage in support
of Indonesia's position on Guinea. Subandrio told the US ambas-
sador in Djakarta that accommodation with the bloc "had been
unavoidable" since no alternative was available. to the Soviet of-
fer of political support on the question of New Guinea. Moscow
probably hopes that Soviet assurances of continued full diplo-
matic support for Djakarta in the New Guinea campaign will
strengthen the Communist party in Indonesia in its efforts to ex-
pand its role throughout all levels of the government 25X1
10 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Is a iS action of or uguese Military
With Salazar Regime
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Ithe polit-
ical situation in Portugal was very bad and that drastic
changes were needed in its African policy.
the military, while able to handle disorders of the kind that
took at least 31 lives in Angola over the previous week end,
could not solve the African problem by repression or cope
with a general uprising. Portugal must
henceforth give satisfaction to "valid complaints" from over-
seas on the part of both Portuguese and Africans.
Dissatisfaction among the armed forces with Salazar's
policies is further reflected in an 8 February statement to
the US consul in Oporto by an who had pre-
dicted Salazar's fall six weeks before the abortive coup of
March 1959 that "a military movement" against the premier
had been expected last week.
such a move was being "freely"
discussed at a military base near Lisbon, and said it might
take place in the next few weeks, However, the US Embassy
in Lisbon reports its service attaches have received .no im-
pression of an early attempt at a coup from contacts in the
upper level of defense officials and among the middle and
junior ranks of the armed forces, where it believes such a
move would be most likely to originate.
On 6 February three leaders of a group which had signed
a letter calling on President Thomaz to grant Portugal a gov-
ernment willing to restore the fundamental liberties, told
Thomaz personally,
that if he wanted to rally Portuguese popular support in the
face of a deteriorating domestic situation and threats to the
overseas provinces, he would have to dismiss Salazar and
bring some of the opposition into the government. Similar
views reportedly have long been held b junior and even some
high-ranking military officers.
10 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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'THE?PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget .
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
.Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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