CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 January 1961
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.Copy No. C 7v /
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CENTRAL
I AN.- TELLI(3ENCF.I
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/ State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
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"IffM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
inommos 7 January 1961
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DAILY BRIEF
00\01
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
in Moscow on
USSR: Khrushchev stated at a reception
f F b
d
l
m
r
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IdMENEW11
or e -
2 January that the Soviet party congress schedule
t
-
ruary will be postponed until later in the year, and he a
tributed the postponement to the need to establish contact
with the new US administration, according to the Yugoslav
ambassador in Moscow. Khrushchev allegedly said he did
not expect to meet with the new US President until perhaps
. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the Chinese
Jul
y
Communist challenge makes it imperative that the forthcom-
ing party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as
well as foreign-policy questions, and that this will be impos-
sible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess
the character and likely moves of the new US administration.
Khrushchev may also feel compelled to achieve some tangi-
ble.. success which can be. used to demonstrate the validity
and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the
Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range pro-
grams that are enunciated at party. congresses. It is also
possible that internal Soviet developments may be at least
ress
t
.
y cong
partly responsible for postponement of the par
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nigeria: The intensity of Nigeria's reaction to the third
Frenchnuclear test--illustrated by the severance of diplo-
matic relations with Paris on 5 January-imposes a further
strain on the disposition of the Nigerian rulers to follow a
moderate and basically pro-Western course. Nigerian atti-
tudes toward the West, particularly the US, were already
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being affected by Western support for Kasavubu over Lu-
ba, who is regarded even by conservative Nigerians
's legitimate premier. Prime Minister Balewa's
as the Congo recent initial experience with the frustrations of the Alge-
Tian situation and Nigeria's exposure this fall, for the first
time, to the prevailing currents in the Asian-African bloc at
the UN may also be contributin to an erosion of Nigerian 25X1
good will toward the West.
Somali Republic: An offer by Britain and Italy to estab-
lish a 'joint military advisory mission to train the Somali 25X1
nse officials
f
li d
e
e
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Army is meeting opposition from Soma
who favor UAR assistance for the new republic's embryonic \
military establishment. These officials recently told mem-
bers of an.Anglo-Italian negotiating team that lack of confi=
dence in British and Italian support of Somali nationalist
aspirations militated against the joint mission proposal. The
Somali Army chief also said that the first. shipment of weap-
ons promised by Nasir was "being delivered.now, and that
UAR' instructors were expected. Somali interest in acquiring
military aid presumably has been heightened by recent clashes 25X1
along the ill-defined border with Ethio is
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INEEN
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ImMEMEME
Panama: Clashes between pro- and anti Castro forces
may break out soon in Panama City as a result of publica-
\ tion of the. government's plan to declare the Cuban ambas
sador non grata for meddling in internal Panamanian
persona affairs.
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both pro- ananti-Castro factions were preparing rallies in
the capital, and that goon squads supporting each. faction were
coming to Panama City. from the Atlantic port of Colon. Pan-
amanian security forces reportedly are on a semialert status.
Castro supporters in other Latin American countries may
also stage demonstrations similar to the one which occurred
in Uruguay on 5 January as a protest against Washington's 25X1
break with Havana.
7 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv
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Nigerian Attitudes Toward West Adversely Affected
. The intensity of feeling aroused in Nigeria by the third
French nuclear test in the Sahara--reflected in the sever-
ance by Prime Minister Balewa's government on 5 January
of diplomatic ties with Paris--imposes a further strain on
the disposition of the leaders of Africa's most populous state
to follow a moderate and essentially pro-Western course.
France's two earlier tests also had evoked a strong popular
and official reaction and were an important factor in the
growth during the past year of sentiment for an "independ-
ent" foreign policy which would identify Nigeria closely with
Africa-wide interests. The failure of leading. Western na-
tions--especially the US and UK--to react more vigorously
to South Africa's suppression of native rioting last spring
and to its subsequent refusal to abandon its apartheid policy
have likewise damaged the general Western image in Nigeria.
Such developments were effectively exploited by neutralist-
inclined Nigerian elements even before the country became
independent on 1 October.
More recently, the Congo situation, especially the arrest
of Lumumba by Colonel Mobutu's forces in. early December,
has provoked unprecedentedly severe press criticism of the
US, NATO, the "colonial powers," and the UN, which have
been lumped together as instigators of a plot against the Con-
go's sovereignty. When such attacks were at their height last
month the heaviest criticism was directed against the US, while
the USSR appeared to gain prestige for its prom Lumumba posi-
tione ile reaction on. the official level was much more re-
strained, top Nigerian.leaders=including generally conserva-
tive northerners--expressed to American officials strong
criticism of Lumumba's arrest and the failure of the UN to
insist on his release. Nearly all such Nigerians have little
use for the erratic Congolese leader,. but they nevertheless
regard him as still the legitimate premier and appear. to share
the general public's increasing tendency to view him as the per-
sonification of Africa in. its fight against "imperialism
Balewa's initial direct experience with the frustrations of
the Algerian situation--he recently visited Tunis and London
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in the apparent hope of playing some sort of mediatory role
between France and the rebels--and Nigeria's exposure this
fall, for the first time, to the prevailing currents in the
Asian-African bloc at the UN may also have contributed to
the apparent erosion of Nigerian good will toward the West.
[Meanwhile,, Balewa's reported invitation. to the Soviet
ambassador in Ghana to visit Lagos on 11 January to discuss
details regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Nigeria and the USSR suggests that the prime minis-
ter now feels he can no longer defer such action. At the time
of Nigerian independence celebrations Balewa had rebuffed a
bid by Soviet representatives for immediate relations and in-
dicated to US Embassy officials a desire to avoid them as long
as possible. Since then, there have been several additional
formal Soviet requests for diplomatic ties.
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Somali Army Rebuffs Anglo-Italian Aid
offer by Britain and. Italy to establish a joint military
advisory mission to train the Somali Army is meeting opposi-
tion from Somali defense officials who favor UAR assistance
for the new republic's embryonic military establishment.
These officials recently told members of a joint Anglo-Italian
negotiating team, which arrived' in Mogadiscio in late Decem-
ber to discuss terms of a military assistance agreement, that
lack of confidence in British and Italian support for Somali
nationalist as irations militated against accepting the joint mis-
sion proposal
he Somalis reiterated their desire to limit the British
.
0
and I alian role to rear-echelon training and implied they were
considering UAR assistance for training the army's combat
elements. The Somali Army chief told the mission that the
first consignment of weapons promised by Cairo- -presumably
under the accords reached by Nasir and Prime Minister Abdi-
rascid in Cairo last month--was being delivered and that UAR
instructors were expected with the weapons
S mali interest in acquiring military aid presumably has
been heightened by a recent flare-up between Somalis and
Ethiopian security forces in the disputed Haud. region of east-
ern Ethiopia. Clashes occur sporadically throughout the year
between tribes from both sides of the ill-defined border, es-
pecially during the seasonal migration of Somali herdsmen"in-
to Ethiopia in search of pasturage and water. The present dif-
ficulties may have been aggravated by Ethiopian preoccupation
with border s writ in view of
Addis Ababa
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federai Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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 Ar. r.rwerl Cr r D T fln e1r 7oTA r. AAArr.AAAL:AAA4_A /
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