WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 33-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE,CIA 15 AUGUST 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 15, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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CONFIDENTIAL
179.011Y-22===.-/22
Latin America Division,- ORE, CIA
15 August 1950
424-674
Of the items reported this week DIM finds that on the possible
communist violence in Brazil (p. 3) of partienlegte interest.
CURRENT DEVELOPIENTS
NORTIERN AREA: Costa Rica's government has seized numerous Communists
(p. 2). Haiti's Colonel Magloire is expected to be elected president
on 8 Octeler (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: Brazil has decided to offer no direct military aid to
,he UN at this time (p. 2)./
25X1
Ccatn?F-Eri-lmas new
president, in naming his cabinet, has taken a step towards establish-
ing public confidence in his government (p. 3). Ecuador's govern-
ment* even though it quickly suppressed the recent uprising, continues
to be unstable (1)- 3).
rEl
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Inter-American Situation........ ....
The Current Situation in Mexico............... ...... ..... .........8
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Weekly Contributions? D/LAa 33-50
CONFIDENTIAL 15 ALVII8t 195?
(CTA Working Paper)
2 a
COSTA RICA; gennuagajdwaszatilythar_Banote%Ult
The seizure of Vsnuel Mora and other Communist leadere on
11 August appears to be a preventive move taken by. the government ae a
result of reported Calderonista plotting plus the continued actiaity of
Communists who defied the governs:wale proscription of their party., The
Ulate administnationy by numerous arrests and elaborate police precaue-
tions, has buttressed its stability but there Is little indication? an.
the basis of re15orts presently available, that any serious threat existed,
HAITIs v_11,21.1' 1/2..Filar&AlmaidisatiLlavizga.
The juntas decision to hold popular elections on 8 October for
a president, legislature and constituent assembly will 'probably result in
the elevation of Colonel nagloire to the presidency. Magloire strong
man of the junta, has resigned from the cabinet made extensive,political-
toure of the provincse and has otherwise comportecihimself as a ,'resi-
dential candidate if, as seems clearly indicated, he publicly umouneer
his candidacy, his vaser and popularity are such that he wili dountlesa
be elected nagleire/s administration in general would differ little
from its predecessors but would probably be characterized by greator
stability and fiscal conservatism, more assured army support, more regu-
larized and less wasteful graft distributicn? and more effective co-
operation with tho US in most international matters
33 BRAZIL; gezemaingattlai="ajleintietisayliAtendeetiele
Domestic political considerations were paramount in Brazil's
decision not to offer direct military aid to the 0 forces at this time,
It is true that the National Security- Council said that Brazil did not
have the means to furnish a military contingent as desired by the Urified
Command of the UN forces The weight of the political factor a in the
decision, however, is illustrated by the action of President Dutra and
the Combined General Staff of the armed forces in concurring with the
Foreign rinisteris recommendation -- that for diplomatic and moral ree-
sons Brazil furnish military aid now -- but with the reservation that
high political opinion should be sounded out, It is further illuatrated
in the statements of both ?democratic" candidates for the presidency in
the 3 October elections, Both candidates -- 1.7achado of the governrent
party (PSD), and Comes of the "loyal opposition" party (UDN) made
statements to the effect that an offer of military aid by Brazil at this
time vould play into the hands of candidate Viraas, the ox dictator, who,
by opposing Brazil's sending of military aid to the UN forces figrting
in Roma, gained political support from roily extreme nationaliste,
Comnunists and those whe have anti-US attitudes, Both rachado and Gone,
apparently feel that any such action by the government now would be the
factor that could swine the election te Vargae, Brazilts decision is
pecularly adverse to la; inereets because that country is perhaps more
capable than any other in Latin America of furnishing useful direct mili-
tary aid, and because the Brazilian daeision, when it becomes know to -
other Is tin American governments, nay well adversely influence the deci-
sions of many of them...
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? After the elections however, Brazil may offer direct aid if
either Uachado or Gomes are elected. Both of these candidates have
said that after the election, if either is victorious, that they would
be prepared to reexamine the question. On the other hand, If Vargas
is elected, he may well decide to offer no military assistance until
such time as an all-out war exists, or until Brazil is directly or
indirectly attacked,.
Meanwhile, Brazil may cake an offer of material aid, The
Foreign Vinister has told our Embassy that Brazil would make a substan-
tial offer, and it is reported that details of this offer are being
worked out by Brazilian officials. The offer, if it is mode, erNy be a
'roe gift of money for purchase in Brazil of supplies and raw meterials
!leaded by the UN command or the US,
5, 001,0n1A1 iiiiM91-422u1D11.11210:-e?U-Cabingt
Colombia now president, Laureano amez, has taken a first
et44) toun-d establishing public confidence in his goverment by givinc
key posts in his new cabinet to nen who,, although unshAobly Conservativo
ix their political viewsl are not subservient to CaOmeg peronnlly
Furthernere, the appointment of pro-US Gonzalo Pestrepil Jaranallo to the
Unistry 3f Foroien Affairsr aell inoicate th:t Gbnez hcs been -.11thcere
In his arorrased desire for good relations with the US,
ECUADOR: ,g,CEAX:Xlaa-ati22.1112krabILAWILIftl-taintigikticSKI-a-ii_ttlsrPt
The failure of Colonel Carlos nanchenots revolutionary attempt,
of 10 Aurust will not help to incroase the stability of the covernment-
This most recent outbreak is indicative of a growing FoArlt of unr-ot !a
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(CIA Warkillg Paper)
15 August 1950
the army and it is possible that there may be further trouble,: Future
outbreaks will probably meet with the same results as did that led by
Vancheno, if opposed by the Elnister of Defense, ?Lemuel Dlaz-Gronadelit 4
whose decisive action in alerting the mechanised unit in Quito led to
quick povernment slannressi
_on of the rtictant myr4ainti
ZONFIEVENTIAk
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Th...212.svat Inter-American Situatioa
-- The most important developmont in the inter-American
scene r thin. the past three months was the unanimous ducision
of the CCAS to pass a resolution of support for the UN in the
msttor of Xoroa. Also noterrorth,y vas the first report cf tho
Special Committee for the Caribbean, stating that an "atmosphcre
of understanding and Good will" has been reostablishod IL that
area., The stabilizing effect on the disputant nations produced
by OAS action is evidently continuing, and it is not oLpocted
that any of the countrios conoornod will del unythinvi ,v11thia
next three months tp alter that situation. Tbe nmnINr of sta.es
ratifyiac basic inter-American instruments oontiaues to iacrcase.
A temporary rise in anti-US fooling in the coffee countries re-
sulted fran the Gillette report, and the reopesia6 of long stand-
inc issuos betmeon certain South Amorican republics curry a
poteLtial threat to frionaly relations, On the international
level thoro Las boon moral sip ort from the nations of Latin
America an tho 'tonna natter, though little in the raly of con-
crete zilitary aid has boon as t offered by them.
Intor-Aporican sclidarity continues to bt,7 stroncthanod
vith the Zorenla oriels =Iliac the not important currant oca-
trrbutioa to that uaitYa)
CAS and Intr cri an Troaticas Tho most aoteworthy later-Americaa
oiat o pa cc non ls , passage, "by unanimous vote or the
(douneil cf thu CA'd? of a resolution supportiag the UN on the mmttor of
Althou,,-,h this resolution armantod to no more than a doclaration
of or 3. supv)ort? it did indicate Latin American solidarity with tho UN
and the US on this, vital issue.
The Sposial Cemlittee for the Caribboan or "watchdog" opttee
Aablishod by -,he CC:1:: to act as a conciliatory body in the reooet
Carib,,ean difilcultis declared in its first report of 30 June that con-
crete moasuros initi:itd by the covz:Tammats ooncernod havOlelped "to
ostabliah an aosphem otundorstandiag and good will" ia tho Caribbean
aroa. The stabilizing of.eot produced y the invooation of the 110 truty
alid by subseq,ent _otion ta:,:en by the Council of the CAZ in .it capacity
as Provisional Cr,,an of Consultation has thoreforo coatirmod? and it is
Era
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neekly Contributions, D/LAI 13-50
(CIA c.)t-king Paper)
Situetion Livemorandum 49-50
000200050033-9
15 Aueut 1ie50
unlikely that any of the goverevents impliee)ted ia the Caribbean al-pates
will do anythine within the next three mehths to threaton each Ale]
security or stabi1ity0 Internal changesTin eoverneent and concern veer
serious denestic difficulties in certain of these notions, plue the dis
traAien from narrow reeional affairs caused be the Korean crisis, ;ill
probably reinforce:the alleviating effect of CAS action on tensicn: in
the Caribn an,
The c.)rean nrisi hastened ratifioation of the Rio treaty by .reentina
nay stimulate similar ection in some or 11 of
the fcLie 7onaining ne&Tatifying states, Unanimous reetification of the
treaty provtlao the legal basis for the mutual defense of the Hemi-
sphere woad bv4 of considerable importance in demonstrating intereer,ericaa
soli l'rik; cl.rtht this critical period,
hde,h1 vtolV,r, have now retified the Charter of the CAS (the most
reoelat troJrz Stj.lvader and Nicaraeua) and five republios have ratified
the Peet Beelta. The inoreaso in the number of netions ratifyine the
Charter 1_ e7L--re,jni, and it is expected that this trend will continue
tu the eve 'ee inter-American aolie:arity,.
The trend in Latin Americo toward aniforeity on the question of
iti,ork of goveinnts brouj-A tc power by collie d'etet continues
he reestablishieeet of diplomatic relations b4weea Uruguay and l'oru
an, CUlean roccenition of the Heitian Junta prcvidine the most recent
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(CIA l';orking Paper)
Situation Memorandum 49-50
15 August 1950
examples. Despite this, however, the first meeting of the Inter-American
Council of Jurists was unable to reach agreement
in principle on the criteria governing recognition of de facto regimes,
and the matter has been referred back to the American governments for
further study.
UN andS.!eoi0Azed2, encies: All the nations of Latin America aporoved
the dociiions of the Security Cunci1 on the matter of Korea, but thus far
only Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay have made specific offers of
military assistance Others have responded
to the UN request with offers of economic assistance or have indicated a
willingness to consult with the Unified Command concerning the possibility
of rendering military aid. It is not likely though that much in the way
of such assistance will materialize from these consultations (Brazil has
decided net to send combat forces at the present time) unless the Latin
Americaas come to realize more clearly the interests they have at stake
in the East-West struggle. Because of the Korean affair, however, they
will probably give stronger and more oonsi-tent support than heretofore to
US policies in the UN.
Relations with Nations outside the Western emis here: .fftin: If a
resolu on ann ng in 0 e or irraa-tre- reso ution concerning
Spain is introduced at the fifth session of the GA (as seems likely)
Latin America, except for Mexico and Guatemala, is expected to support it.
USSR: There has been no change in the status of diplomatic relations
beLveUE-RUssia and the five Latin American countries which maintain
representatives in Moscow. The continually increasing intensity of the
anti-Com unist campaign in some of these nations could eventually lead
to a diplomatic rupture. Even if this does not occur, however, none of
these five republics is expected to exploit its relations with the USSR
to the detriment of US security interests.
China: No Latin American nation has extended recognition to the
Chinese Communist regime, and it remains extremely doubtful that any would
do so as long as the US maintains its present attitude toward the Peiping
government. Moreover, at least for the moment, the Korean situation has
eliminated the possibility of any Latin American support for the admission
of Communist China delegates to the UN.
auzi?tofIxaortetUSFweiPolicies: The other American
republics continue to sup,ort the US vis-A-vis the US:111 though even
their solidarity with us on Korea has not been free from hints (especially
from Brazil) that they would have been in q betterniassitioli to render
concreteein rifeiteolumbErtsvikbPit?-6%70
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them in me MINFIDSNTIAL
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csefilas=t,,SitaltSimS111..1A;V:Ss
(Sumarv 'Sem ehongh political tension hen erisen over the
question of presidential succession, basic stebility of govern-
ment iS probably not seriously threatened,' The economic and
labor situations arc gonerally favorable. Ceramist potentiali-
ties have boon ellehtly reduced, and populte anti-Communist
fooling has incroaeed since the Korean crizie, The military
are perticipatine rare actively in domestie politics, Inter-.
national reletions renein good.
-- US security interests have been favorably affected
'ny a decline or cormuniot influence in labor t by populer sup-
port or the US-UU position in Koreal end by etronethened
relations between Sterico and the US?)
bUticA,
Political activity during the last threo months has centered around
the issue of reelection of the president, a step prohibited by the rexican
constitution and tradition since the Revolution of 1910. Alemenle tours
of the country were interpreted to be part of hie political campaign, and
tension has so mounted by mid-July that a, crisis seemed imminent
SUR) the possibility of political turmoil has not been eliminated, there
should be no threat to the stability of the government provided Aleniin
announces in hie 1 Septariber address to Cengress --- as it is anticipated
he will do -- that he does not want reelection, Radical opposition to the
administretion !ins become even loss significant as forcee have rallied
around the. omen:Tient, in support of MT activity in Korea.
in thc next f(..1 months there will probably be considerable activity
within the official oarty, particularly involvine the army over the presi-
dentiel reelection issue,
i-41212ZU
The economie eituation, although slightly depressed in recent months
?= continuation of unfavorable trade baloncesg cost of living, and
1eCtri0 nOWW, shortage which has worked dshin on industrial production.,
lot alt^red roneral economic stability. On the favorable side are in-
cd netals prices and prospects GE increased production, which would re-
t.4.- In hit: .:r r7ovoYmnent revenues and improved belsence of payments; increasing
Ileum prLJuel,lonszthe recently improved position of the peso in relation
she dollen.; cce'lnleted public works projects of lox range rnd
opocts of incromii ixade with Europe under vereenente obtained by the
T'Idcan commercial mission which should produce needed imports and L,onsorve
-rolarsa Because or the anticipated continuation of stick favorable factors
fth, econonic outlook for the next months
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Situation Memorandum 50-50
25 August 1950
The Mexican labor situation in recent months has been characterized by
an intensive struggle between the Communists and anti-Communists for union
control, with the former having lost some ground. /t is true that the
Communists have been active in inspiring the electricians' campaign against
foreign-owned Mexlight and in exploiting the third telephone strike in less
than a year as well as strike threats from the railroaders. However, dis-
affection of several important syndicates from the Communist bloc (1JGOCM0
CTAL, WFTU) has left these unions dissension-ridden with Communist influence
restricted to individuals in local groups. Moreover, CROM, in sponsoring a
congrass of all anti-Communist groups, and the pro-government CTM in its
energetic organizational campaign are proving themselves the most effective
proponents of anti-Communism. The previous trend of anti-Communist labor
toward independence from any international organization may also be reversed
with the possibtlity that the CTM and other groups may become affiliated
with the ICFTU.
Despite the loss by the Commuaiats of union control and the probability
that the Mexican government will make sure in the present crisis that labor
moves toward closer cooperation with US and other Western powers, Communist-
controlled labor unions can still call eertain impontant local strikes and
could temporarily disrupt come industries.
Military activity in recent months has been closely associated with the
foremost political issues of tglarleme and Egglegoien/ame (see Political).
Normally, all political campaigning by the military would he done on a per-
sonal basis and while on leave. However, with the increasing activity for
the proposed constitutional changes leading to presidential reelection, army
elements, especially nr.0.911212=1W, were aroused to voice this opposition
in order to sten such a movement and may prove a major contributing factor
should the President decide againat reelection. The army also can be expected
to take a more active participation in the campaign for military candidates
running for election.
Outside the sphere of reelection, the army remains loyal to the present
administration and can be counted upon to support any official decision re-
garding cooperation in the UN action against communist aggression in Korea.
211171131tY1
Communist potentialitiee in Mexico have been slightly reduced in the
last three months. Furthermore, the government is believed capable of con-
taining any major communist activity aimed at impairing Mexico's cooperation
in the present emergency. Whereas potential Communist strike and sabotage
capabilities still exist, intensified anti-communist activity in labor (see
Labor section) has decreased these capabilities. It is true that front organi-
zations and splinter groups are now more able to reach various sectors of
the population with propaganda which might embarrass the Mexican government.
However, these Communist gains are less significant than their labor losses.
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i'io restrictions, on GP or front organization activities have been imposed
nor is it likely that the government contemplates any extreme measure such
as out/awing the Party or breaking relations with the USSR. The recent
arreste and detention of known communists, however, illustrates the govern-
ment?s ability to round up known subversives. Although no organized resist-
ance to Mexican support of the UN action has been reported other than that
of the leftist press, police precautionary measures against possible communist
manifestations have been taken.
The Korean crisis has added considerably to the general anti-Communist
fecal; 7 and it is believed that press discussions of basic East versrs West
iSSUG; have clarified the thinking of many Mexicans, including some ao may
have in the past supported a Communist-sponsored movement,,
Idernotiougl
The Mexican government is now conducting discussions with the Unified
Command concerning the effective aid it can render to the UN in its action
against egression in Korea. From the beginning of the emergency, official
sources have expressed the government le intention to fulfill its obligations
urder the UN Charter and the conservative press has given undenieble moral
support to the US. No definite commitments, however, have been edvocated in
editorial or other press comments, and opposition from Corgressional and labor
circles to sending Mexlcan troops at this time is reported. It is estinated
that, whether or not Mexico sends ground troops in the event of further acts
of egression, Mexico's major contribution now will consist of farm laborers
for US agricultural needs and strategic materials for the war effort.
Relations with the US are excellent. Normal diplomatic negotiations
have renained friendly throughout the discussions of problems incident to
the joint denunciation of the MexeUS Trade Agreement and to the implementa-
tion of the Farm Labor Agreement. The visit to Mexico City of Assistant
Secretary Miller, during which important matters, including outstanding un-
settled issues between the two countries, were discussed infernally, has also
contributed to strengthening the cordial state of Mexican-US relations.
Mexican-Argentine cultural relations have been highlighted by the success-
ful Argentine campaign of emphasizing the Celebration in riexico of San rartln
Day as a common bond between the two countries. These unceasing propaganda
efforts by the Argentine have resulted in the recent organization of an
Association of Friends of Argentina.
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